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
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HIGH SCHOOL HISTORY

— OF —

GREECE AND ROME

BY

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AND

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HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER I.

GEOGRAPHY OF GREECE.

If you turn to a map of Europe, you will find on the south three important peninsulas. On the west, you will notice the Iberian peninsula, consisting of Spain and Portugal, in the form of an irregular square united to France by the Pyrenees mountains ; next, Italy, a long tongue of land, with the Apennines running down the centre, while, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, you will observe Greece washed on three sides by the sea and connected with the rest of the continent at its northern extremity.

*Peninsulas
of Southern
Europe.*

The country called by us *Greece*, and by the Romans *Graecia*, never had this name given to it by the inhabitants. They called their land *Hellas*, and themselves *Hellēnes*. The name *Hellas*, which in Homer's day was applied to a small part of Thessaly, in historical times was given to a much wider area. In a restricted sense, it was applied to the country south of the Cambunian mountains, or rather to that part of the country between the isthmus of Corinth and the Ambracian and Maliaic gulfs. In a wider sense, however, *Hellas* meant any district occupied by the *Hellēnes*, wherever they were settled : so that the name was applicable equally to Massalia in Southern Gaul, to Sinōpe on the Euxine, and to Athens in Attica.

*Hellas and
the Hellenes.*

GREECE proper extended in ancient times from the 36° 23' to 40° north latitude, and from 21° 20' to 24° east longitude. From Mount Olympus, the most northern part of *Hellas*, to Cape

*Extent of
Greece.*

Taenāron, the extreme southern part of Lacōña, the distance is about 250 English miles, while its greatest width from the western part of Acarnania to Marathon is 180 English miles. The area is about 21,000 square miles,¹ or nearly the area of Scotland, and considerably less than that of Portugal. The country was divided into a number of small, independent states, among which the only bonds of union were a common language, common religion and institutions, and a common origin. Though there were various dialects among the Greeks, and different deities were worshipped in different places, still, in the main, their language and religion were the same, and all traced their descent to a mythical Hellēn, son of Deucālion and Pyrrha.

*Mountain
ranges*

Greece is essentially a country of mountains, remarkable not for their height—the loftiest summit, Olympus, at the eastern end of the Cambunian range, rises to the height of 9,700 feet—but for their wild, rugged, and bold outline. They consist of sharp, abrupt, limestone peaks, destitute now of woods, though in ancient times many of the mountains, particularly in Northern Greece, were covered with extensive forests of ash, beech, pine and oak. So steep and impassable were these ranges, averaging from 3,000 to 7,000 feet high, that they afforded protection against foreign invasion as well as a defence to the different states against attacks from their neighbours. Another peculiarity of the mountain systems of Greece is their complexity. There is no general system or order in their course, especially in the Peloponnēsus, where the mountains radiate in all directions from the central district, Arcadia.

*(1) in North-
ern Greece,*

Greece is separated from Macedonia by the Cambunian range of mountains. At the extreme eastern end of this range is Mount Olympus, the highest mountain in Greece, in ancient times seldom free from snow, and, according to Homer, ‘the abode of the gods.’ The vale of Tempe, through which the Penēus flows, separates Mounts Olympus and Ossa, the latter of which is the first of the Magnesian chain which runs along the eastern side of Thessaly and which rises into the secondary

¹This excludes Epirus but includes Euboea. Modern Greece contains about 15,000 sq. miles: Epirus (the modern *Albania*) is 4,000 sq. miles more. Scotland contains about 29,800 sq. miles.

peak of the well-wooded Pēlīon. At right angles to the Cambunian range, and midway between the Aegēan and Ionian seas, and forming the boundary line between Thessaly and Epirus, runs the range of Pindus. At about 39° north latitude, in this range is Mount Tymphrestus, from which as a centre radiate four mountain chains. Two lateral branches extend to the shores of the Aegēan Sea, Mount Othrys to the east and Mount Oeta to the south-east, the latter forming the boundary line separating Thessaly from Central Greece, at the extreme end of which is the celebrated pass of Thermopylae, one of the 'Gates of Greece.' Again, to the south-west from Mount Tymphrestus are the Aracynthian and Panaetolian ranges in Aetolia, and to the south-east Mount Parnassus in Phocis, which continues in the ranges of Hēlicōn, Cithaeron, Parnes, Hymettus, till it ends in 'Sunium's marbled steep' in Southern Attica. Between Mounts Parnassus and Oeta rise the highlands of Doris, the original home of the Dorians.

The ranges of the Peloponnēsus are more intricate than those of Northern Greece. The central district, Arcadia, is a mass of mountains and valleys, inhabited by a pastoral people. In the north of this district, and separating it from Achaia, are Mounts Cyllēne and Erymanthus; on the east, a range which goes under the names of Stymphalus, Parthenius, Parnon and Zarax, terminating in Cape Malea; on the west, another range passing under the different names of Pholoë, Lycaeus, Parrhasius, Taygētus and ending in Cape Taenāron. The eastern and western ranges are again connected by Mount Trachys on the north, and by Mounts Sciritis and Borēus on the south. ^{(2) in Southern Greece.}

The river system of all countries is determined by that of its *Rivers* mountains. As a general rule, high mountains and wide plains will be accompanied by large rivers, while narrow ravines will produce unmanageable torrents. The mountains of Greece are usually at a short distance from the sea, and nearly all the rivers are, in consequence, small and so rapid that they are unnavigable. Most of them are comparatively shallow, except in winter and spring, when they are swollen with rains and melting snows, which render them dangerous, impetuous torrents that sweep everything before them.

(1) *in Northern Greece,*

The chief rivers in Northern Greece are the *Penēus*, *Sperchīus*, *Achēlōūs*, *Arachthus* or *Arethūsa*, and the *Cephissus*. The *Penēus* rises in the northern part of the Pindus range, traverses the plain of Thessaly in a great curve, and, after a course of sixty miles, during which it receives many tributaries, it flows into the Gulf of Therme, passing through the celebrated vale of Tempe between Mounts Olympus and Oeta near its mouth. In the southern part of Thessaly, between Mounts Othrys and Oeta, flows the *Sperchīus*, which falls, after a course of sixty miles, into the Maliac Gulf. The largest river of Greece is the *Achēlōūs*, which rises in the north-west part of the Pindus range and flows in a southerly direction through Epīrus. After a course of one hundred and thirty miles, it empties into the Ionian Sea, opposite the island of Dūlichium. For part of its course it separates Acarnania from Aetōliā. In Epīrus there is also the *Arachthus* or *Arethusa*, rising also in the Pindus range and emptying into the Ambracian Gulf. The *Cephissus* rises in the highlands of Doris and flows south-east into lake Copāis, in Boeōtiā.

(2) *in Southern Greece.*

The *Alphēus* rises in the south-east of Arcadia, traverses Arcadia and the northern part of Elis and empties into the Cyparissian Bay. On its banks is the celebrated plain of Olympia. Southward through Laconia flows the *Eurōtas*, on the banks of which is Sparta or Lacedaemon. In Messenia, the Pamīsus flows from the south-west of Arcadia, draining the rich plains of Messenia, and discharging its waters into the Messenian Gulf.

Lakes of Greece.

The lakes of Greece, as in most mountainous countries, are formed by the accumulation of water from the uplands, and in most cases are without any visible outlet. Though numerous, few of them attain any size. They are found chiefly in Thessaly, Boeotia, and Arcadia. Most of the lakes are drained by subterranean channels,¹ as lake Copāis in Boeotia. This lake receives the waters of the Cephissus, and is connected by means of underground channels with the Eurīpus. In Epīrus is lake

¹ Called βάραθρα and έναυλοι.

Pambōtis, on which Dodōna is situated. In Arcadia is lake Stymphālus, and in Argōlis, lake Lerna.

As Europe exceeds every other continent in the extent and *Coast line.* variety of its coast, so Greece is remarkable for this same characteristic among the countries of Europe. The coast of Greece is deeply indented by numerous bays, so that no part of the country is far distant from the sea—a circumstance which gives the inhabitants facilities for commerce, and which makes the Greeks of to-day the most enterprising of the traders of the Mediterranean. Though Greece is little more than half the size of Portugal, it possesses more miles of sea-coast than Spain and Portugal together. No other country of Europe is so finely indented by bays and creeks, and the sea was regarded by the ancient Hellenes as their natural element. We find Greece naturally divided into three parts by gulfs; the Maliac Gulf on the east, and the Ambracian on the west, mark the southern boundaries of Northern Greece. And again the Peloponnesus is separated from Central Greece by the Corinthian and Saronic gulfs. On the south and east of the Peloponnesus we find the Messenian, Laconian, and Argolic gulfs. All these gulfs penetrate more deeply into the country than those on the west side, with the exception of the gulf of Corinth, which seems to have been formed by an earthquake.

The chief capes are, on the south, Acrītas, Malēa,¹ and Taenā-*Capes.* ron; on the east, Scyllaeum, Sūnium, Geraestus and Artemisium, in Euboea; Sepias, south of Thessaly; on the west coast Acroceraunia, at the north-west extremity of the Ceraunian mountains in Epirus; Leucāte, south of Leucadia; and Chelonāte, on the coast of Elis.

In ancient times the chief productions of Greece were wheat, *Productions* barley and other cereals, grapes in great abundance, especially in the islands, olives, oil, flax and figs. Cattle and sheep were plentiful in the hilly districts of the interior.

Greece was not rich in mineral wealth. Gold, silver, copper, *Minerals.* lead, and iron were found, but the mines do not seem to have been very much worked, except the gold mines of Thasos, an

¹or Malēa.

island south of Thrace, and the silver mines of Laurion, in Southern Attica. Coal is found in the island of Euboea, and in several parts of the Peloponnesus, and salt is obtained in many places in continental Greece and in the Ionian Islands. In almost every part of the country, however, are rich veins of marble of the finest quality and of various colours, affording material for the architect and sculptor such as hardly any other land possesses. The most famous marble quarries were found in the island of Paros, at Carystus of Euboea, on Mount Pentélicus, near Athens. The limestone, too, of which most of the Greek hills are composed, afforded excellent building material, and many of the polygonal walls still to be seen crowning so many of the hills were made of it.

Climate.

The climate of Greece in ancient times may be said to have been temperate. The heat of summer was modified by the height of the mountains, the sea breezes, and the extent of the forests. Still, even in ancient days, the climate must have varied from the rigorous winter of the highlands to the almost perpetual spring of the valleys near the coast. In Homer's day, Olympus was generally white with snow, while the vale of Tempe at its base was noted for the richness of its verdure even in winter. In moisture, too, there was great variety. While Attica was celebrated for its clear bright skies, Boeotia was equally noted for its moist and foggy atmosphere. Some attribute the quick wit of the Athenians to the pure, pellucid air of that district, and ascribe the dulness of the Boeotians to the heavy, depressing influence of their climate.

*Influence of
physical fea-
tures on the
character of
a people.*

The physical features of a country always have an important influence in moulding the character of a people. No country in Europe, except Switzerland, possesses so many mountains as Greece. These mountains, as we have before remarked, served as barriers against a foreign foe, and also as dividing lines between individual states. Hence, we find from the earliest days that Greece was divided into a number of small states which grew up and developed civilization and government, more or less independent of each other and unexposed to foreign influence. The mountains were also a preventive against any single tribe obtaining a preponderating influence over the rest of

the country. The pass of the vale of Tempe guarded Greece on the north, that of Thermöpylae also protected Central Greece from the north, while the isthmus of Corinth was a protection to the Peloponnesus. The Greeks of the interior were a nation of mountaineers, and they had all the characteristics that usually belong to such a people. They were quick, impetuous, fond of freedom and home, fickle in their affections, and unrelenting in their hate.

But, while the Greeks of the interior were nearly all mountaineers, those on the sea-coast were a population of sailors. As we have mentioned before, the extent and variety of the sea-coast is one of the chief physical features of Greece. Situated, too, in the most accessible part of the Mediterranean, Greece had easy means of intercommunication with Asia Minor, Egypt and Italy by means of the numerous islands that encircled it on all sides. The Greeks on the sea-coast were thus a nation of sea-farers, and they possessed that love of adventure and that keen susceptibility to external impressions that have characterized maritime people in all ages.

CHAPTER II.

PREHISTORIC GREECE.

The Aryans. If you take a map of Ancient Asia, you will find an elevated district called Ariāna, near the sources of the rivers that now go under the names of Oxus (or *Amu*) and Jaxartes (or *Syr-darya*). Long before the beginnings of authentic history, this country was the home of the Aryans,¹ a name applied to the Hindus, Persians and Armenians of Asia, as well as to the different nationalities of Europe, with the exception of the Turks, Hungarians, Finlanders and Basques on the bay of Biscay. The study of languages tells us that the Aryan tribes, before their separation from their original home, led a pastoral-agricultural life, that they knew how to build houses, to plough, construct ships, weave, sew, and that they could count up to one hundred; that they already had flocks and herds, that they had domesticated the horse and the dog, and were acquainted with the extraction of gold, silver and copper from the ore, and that they armed themselves with the bow and arrow, and axe, either for peaceful or for warlike purposes. They had also recognized the bonds of blood and the laws of marriage; they followed their leader in war, and their distinctions between right and wrong were fixed by custom and law. They were also impressed with the idea of a Divine Being, whom they invoked by different names, and though they held different religious beliefs, they still had so much in common that we can refer the seemingly conflicting creeds to a common source. This we learn from Philology or the Science of Language.

Main divisions of the Aryans.

We also learn from the same source that the Aryans separated into *three* main branches. The Asiatic branch, which passed to the south and south-east, occupied the rich plains


¹ The term *Arya* seems to have meant originally 'a holder of land' or 'tiller of the soil': cp. Greek *ἔρα*, 'earth'; *ἀρούρα*, 'ploughed land': Lat. *ar-are*: Gothic *airtha*: English *ear* 'to plough': cp. Deuteronomy 21, 4; I. Sam. 8, 12; Isaiah 30, 24.

of Hindustan and the table lands of Persia and Armenia. The languages of the people inhabiting these places differ least (1) *Asiatic* from the primitive Aryan, and are still approximately preserved in the Sanskrit, the ancient literary language of the *Vedas*, or sacred books of the Hindus, and in the modern Indic dialects; in the Zend, the old language of the *Zend-Avesta* or sacred books of Zoroaster, the Persian philosopher; and in the Armenian and Kurdic dialects.

The European branches were two in number: (a) the South-western European division, which seems to have crossed from Asia into Europe by the straits of the Hellespont and Bospörus, included the Hellenic or Greek, the Italic or Latin, and the Keltic peoples who subsequently occupied France, Spain, Great Britain and Ireland, and (b) the North-western European division, which embraces the Slavonic races of Russia, Eastern Prussia, Bohemia, Servia and Bulgaria, and the Teutonic races of Germany and Scandinavia. It is probable that the last mentioned division was the first to break off from the parent stock, then the South-western European division, while the first mentioned—the Asiatic branch—was the last to sever its connection from the original stem.¹

The Greeks, like many other nations of antiquity, had a tendency to group around the name of a mythical personage events that belong to a lengthened period of time. Thus the laws of Sparta were ascribed to Lycurgus, those of Athens, to Solon, and those of Crete, to Minos. In the same way the Greeks attributed the origin of their race to Hellen, son of Deucalion and Pyrrha, who escaped the deluge, for the Greeks,

¹ Table of divergence of the different members of the Aryan family (adapted from Schleicher's Compendium):



as well as the Chinese, and even the North American Indians, have traditions of this great catastrophe. It is said that Hellen ruled over Hellas, a name originally applied to a district in the southern part of Thessaly, near the foot of Mt. Othrys, but afterwards to the whole nation. Hence the people were called from him Hellēnes. Hellen had three sons, Dōrus, Aeōlus and Xuthus, and the last mentioned had two sons, Ion and Achæus. From Dorus, Aeōlus, Ion, and Achæus were said to be descended the four tribes that formed the Greek nation, namely, the Dorians, Aeolians, Ionians and Achæans.

Four divisions of the Greeks.

The Dorians originally occupied the highlands of Doris, but in early times, as we shall afterwards see, they spread themselves over the Peloponnesus, and became, under the leadership of Sparta, one of the leading races among the Greeks. The Ionians were chiefly confined to Attica and the northern shores of the Peloponnesus, while the Achæans occupied the original abode of the Hellenes and the greater part of the Peloponnesus. In the Homeric poems the Achæan race was so prominent that the term Achæan was almost synonymous with Grecian, but in subsequent times the race was absorbed by the Ionians. The Aeolians were the most widely diffused of the Greek races. They occupied chiefly the western Peloponnesus, and the cities of Corinth and Iolcos.

Pelasgians. Besides the Hellenes, we also find mention of another class of inhabitants called Pelasgians. They probably belonged to the same stock as the Hellenes, though Herodōtus mentions them as "speaking in a barbarous tongue."¹ They dwelt in Arcadia, in parts of Thessaly and Epirus, and in Crete. It is supposed by some that they were the original inhabitants of the country, and that they preserved the primitive language and customs of their ancestors. They inhabited walled towns, tilled the soil and worshipped Zeus, the national deity of the Hellenes, the chief seat of whose worship was at Dodōna, in Epīrus. Hence, Homer gives to Dodonaean Jove the title Pelasgic, and the oracle of Dodona was regarded by the Greeks of the greatest antiquity.

¹Clio, 57.

The traditions of the Greeks all point to the fact that the civilization of the country was largely influenced by foreigners, especially by Phoenicians and Egyptians. Thus we are told that Ināchus, a Phoenician adventurer, arrived in Greece and settled at Argos. To another Phoenician, Cecrops, is ascribed the foundation of Athens. He is said to have fortified in the centre of the city the high rock which in early days was called Cecropia, and in later times the Acropōlis. Cadmus, again, another Phoenician, founded the city of Thebes, in Boeotia, the citadel of which, even in historic ages, was called Cadmeia. It is said that he introduced letters into Greece. Lelex, an Egyptian, founded Lacedaemon, or Sparta, in the Peloponnesus, while Danāūs, another Egyptian, with a number of followers, settled in Argos and became king of that district. Pelops, again, a son of the king of Phrygia, gained sway over the Peloponnesus.

The origin of these myths it is difficult to trace. It is quite possible that the sea-faring Phoenicians planted colonies at an early period in different parts of Greece, as they did in other places along the Mediterranean Sea, but these colonies were never at any time anything more than mere trading posts, and could have had little influence on the political development of the people. Of this we may be assured, that the civilization of Greece was of native growth, and was little affected by influences from either Egypt or Phoenicia.

Like all primitive peoples, the Greeks believed that all natural phenomena were manifestations of sentient being. Hence the personifications of everything in nature. To them the Dawn, the Day, the Night, the Sea, the Sky, the Earth, the Sun, the Moon and the Stars were not the mere names of objects, or of phenomena of external nature, the consistency or causes of which were known, but were real personages invested with powers of good or evil to mankind. The flashes of lightning were regarded as the fiery serpents of Zeus, the god of the air; the rays of the morning sun were the breath of the fiery steeds of Hēlios, the sun-god; the beams of the moon were the silver arrows of the goddess Diāna, while Earth itself was the teeming "Mother of All." From this nature worship arose many mytho-

logical tales, often at variance with each other and often inconsistent with morality. In after days when ethics were developed, these myths invented in the childhood of the world were regarded as primitive attempts to fathom the depths of the phenomena of external nature, and to explain by the personality of a god or goddess causes that were not then understood. Yet even in this primitive age we can trace a connection between religion and morality. Perjury, parricide, the violation of the rights of hospitality, were punished by the wrath of heaven, and though the poets may represent Zeus as a usurper dethroning his father, Cronos, still in no case is the want of filial affection marked by the approbation of heaven.

The same deities often have different attributes.

It must not be supposed, however, that the worship of the same deity was uniformly observed in the same way, or that each deity always had the same distinctive attributes. We find, for instance, that the Zeus worshipped by the Arcadians was a very different deity from the Zeus worshipped by the Cretans; that Dionysus, the god of wine, was totally different from Dionysus, the god of the lower world; that Poseidon, the national deity of the Ionians, 'the lord of the main,' had little in common with Poseidon of Mantinea, 'the earth shaker.' In fact it may be laid down as a general principle that the same deity had usually different attributes and powers in different places. Again, the same attributes were often associated with different deities. Both Iris and Hermes were messengers of the gods; Apollo, Mars and Athene presided over war; Apollo and Diana were both worshipped by the hunter, and both Vulcan and Athene instructed mortals in handicraft.

Olympic deities.

The court of Olympus, as represented by Homer, is framed after the model of an earthly kingdom. Zeus is the supreme king, and rules his court in the same way as an earthly king rules his nobles. He summons the gods to the council, presides over their debates, which are often characterized by the stormy wranglings of the Homeric assemblies. To the gods he promulgates his decrees, after these were passed in the council. The gods are only 'men writ large,' and are invested with all the passions and appetites of humanity. They are liable to anger,

jealousy, and lust, and to carry out their plans they descend even to deceit and fraud.

Two of the deities are, however, essentially Hellenic in their character, viz., Apollo and Athena. Apollo represents the moral and emotional side of human nature. He is the patron of the humanizing arts of poetry and music; the god of prophecy who fills his votaries with that insight that pierces the future; the god of purification and of healing. He averts and inflicts disease, but he also removes the curse of guilt from the conscience of the guilty sinner. *Characteristic Hellenic deities.* (1) *Apollo.*

Athena, on the other hand, represents pure, unclouded reason, and is the embodiment of the triumph of intellect. She taught to men the arts which raised mankind from barbarism to civilization. The art of the sculptor that carves the marble into forms of life, or skill of the husbandman that rears the olive, the craft of the shipwright that constructs his bark, the wisdom of the politician that gives good counsel to the assembly in days of peril, were all ascribed to the beneficence of the guardian goddess of Athens. (2) *Athena.*

The Greeks believed that there existed before the age of history a number of demigods and heroes far exceeding ordinary mortals in strength and size of body and greatness of soul. The heroic age of Greece comprises the period from the time when the first Hellenes made their appearance in Greece to the return of the heroes from the Trojan war; or, in other words, from the settlement of the country to about 1184 B.C., according to the received chronology. Still no exact line can be drawn, as we find, in many cases, the mythological period extending long after the last mentioned date. *The Heroic Age.*

Among the many heroes no one was more celebrated than Heracles, the son of Jupiter and Alcēmēne. The stories connected with his name may be divided into two distinct classes. Those of the first class allude to the labours and dangers that beset mankind in a primitive state of society, when man is fighting against the savage animals around him and reclaiming the land. The second class of myths belongs to a later age of society, when men have settled down in fixed abodes *Heracles.*

and are struggling with each other for supremacy. The twelve labours of Heracles may be reduced to one or other of these classes, such as his fight with the Nemean Lion, the fight with the Lernean Hydra, the Capture of the Erymanthian Stag, the destruction of the Erymanthian Boar, the Capture of the Mares of Diomēdes, the Capture of the Oxen of Erythia, the Fetching of the Golden Apple of the Hesperides.

*Minos of
Crete.*

Crete, too, had its hero, Minos, to whom the inhabitants of the isle ascribed their legal and political institutions. He is said to have been instructed in the art of legislation by Zeus himself, and so highly were his laws regarded that Lycurgus, the Spartan law-giver, took the constitution of Minos as a basis for that of Sparta. In his time Crete became a powerful maritime state, and exercised its dominion over the adjacent islands. All the legends represent Minos as a just and wise prince, so that along with Aeacus and Rhādāmanthus, he was judge of the dead in the lower world.

*Theseus, the
national
hero of
Attica,*

Attica also had its national hero, Thēseus. By his wise regulations he is said to have consolidated the strength and to have increased the power of his kingdom. In the days of Cecrops, the founder of Athens, Attica was divided into twelve districts, independent politically of each other. These were at constant variance with each other till Theseus by his influence abolished the separate jurisdictions and fixed the civil and military supremacy at Athens. The festival of the Panathenaea was established to commemorate the political union of the different states of Attica. Under the wise policy of Theseus, Attica advanced considerably beyond the other states of Greece in prosperity and civilization.

*establishes
the Panath-
enaea.*

*Legends not
confined to
the exploits
of individu-
als.*

Even in the heroic age, we find the legends not confined to the exploits of individual heroes, for there are evidences of men combining against common enemies. This leads us to the belief that the combination of different tribes was beginning to be formed, and that in consequence men were forming themselves into a state that afterwards developed into a political community. The three most important of these expeditions were the Argonautic Expedition, the Seven against Thebes, and the Siege of Troy.

At Iolcos, in Thessaly, dwelt a descendant of Aeölus, named Pēliās, who had deprived his half-brother, Aeson, of the sovereignty. When Jason, son of Aeson, had grown to manhood, he appeared before Pelias and demanded back the royal power that rightfully belonged to him. To this request Pelias acceded on condition that Jason should first go to Colchis, a country on the eastern side of the Euxine Sea, and bring back the golden fleece there guarded by a sleepless dragon. The ship *Argo*, built under the direction of the goddess Athēna, with fifty of the most celebrated heroes of the day, sailed from Iolcos, and after many adventures arrived at Colchis. Medēa, daughter of Aëtes, king of Colchis, fell in love with Jason, and by her power in magic put the dragon to sleep, seized the golden fleece and sailed away with Jason back to Iolcos. The story of the Argonautic Expedition probably arose out of the accounts of commercial enterprises, which the Greeks, living in the neighbourhood of Iolcos, made to the coasts of the Euxine for the purpose of either gain or plunder. *Argonautic Expedition.*

In the Heroic age, Thebes, in Bœotia, was one of the chief cities of Greece. Lāius, king of Thebes, had been warned by an oracle not to beget a son, for it was prophesied that he would be murdered by his own child. This warning, however, he disregarded. A son, Oedipus, was born to him and his wife Iocasta; but to prevent the fulfilment of the oracle, the child was exposed on the mountains to perish either from hunger or from the wild beasts. A shepherd, however, found the infant and took it to Corinth, where it was adopted by Polybus, the king, and reared as his own son. When Oedipus had grown up to manhood, he was taunted at a banquet with his birth. He left his supposed parents' house and went to Delphi to consult the oracle respecting his birth. The oracle ordered him to avoid his native land, for there, the oracle declared, he was destined to slay his father and marry his own mother. He, accordingly, avoided going to Corinth, which, he supposed, was his native land, and took the road leading to Thebes. At a narrow part of the road he met his real father, Lāius, who was also going to Delphi to enquire the fate of the son who had been left exposed on the lonely mountains. A quarrel arose, where- *The Seven against Thebes.*

upon Oedipus killed Lāius. He then went to Thebes and received the hand of Iocasta as a reward for having solved the riddle propounded by the awful Sphinx, who invested the land, but slew herself when the riddle was solved. Two sons, Etëocles and Polynices, and two daughters, Antīgōne and Ismēne, were born to Oedipus and Iocasta. The incestuous marriage of the son and mother drew down upon the land the vengeance of heaven. The crops were blighted, the herds pined away, the children died before their birth. Again the oracle was consulted as to the cause of the fearful scourge that befell Thebes, and the answer was given to banish the murderers of Laius. After a time the truth was revealed that the son had murdered the father and had married his own mother. The queen Iocasta hung herself in grief, Oedipus put out his own eyes and was banished from his native Thebes by his two sons, Etëocles and Polynices. On leaving the city, he pronounced a curse which was not long in being fulfilled. Between the rival brothers dissension arose. Etëocles gained the ascendancy and drove out Polynices, who took refuge with Adrastus, of Argos, who championed the cause of the exiled prince. Besides Adrastus and Polynices, five other chiefs join them, and the seven chiefs undertook the expedition against Thebes. All were killed except Adrastus; Etëocles and Polynices fell by each other's hand. Ten years later the descendants (Epīgōni) of the chiefs who fell in battle undertook another expedition against Thebes, when the city was taken, razed to the ground, and the greater part of the inhabitants left their native land and settled in other parts of Greece.

Such is briefly the story of the Theban war, which has furnished so many themes for the tragedies of the Greek poets.

*The story of
the Trojan
war.*

To the marriage of Pēleus and Thētis, all the gods and goddesses were invited, except the mischief-making Eris or Strife. Angry at the slight, the goddess threw a golden apple among the guests with the inscription, 'To the fair one.' Three goddesses appeared as competitors for the prize, Hēra, Aphrodite and Athēna. When the goddesses were unable to decide among themselves, Zeus ordered Hermes to conduct them to Mount

Ida to the beautiful shepherd Paris to decide the dispute. Accordingly, the three goddesses appeared before him. Hēra promised him the sovereignty of Asia, Athēna, renown in war, and Aphrodīte for his wife, the fairest woman. Paris decided in favour of Aphrodīte. Under the protection of his favouring goddess, Paris sailed for Greece and was hospitably entertained at the court of Mēnēlāūs, king of Sparta. Here he succeeded in carrying off Helen, the wife of Mēnēlāūs, who was famed far and wide for her beauty. This abduction gave rise to the Trojan war, for all the Greek chiefs looked upon this act as an outrage against themselves. At once they responded to the call of Mēnēlāūs to avenge the insult. Agamemnon, king of Mycēnae and brother of Mēnēlāūs was put in command, and with twelve hundred ships and about a hundred thousand men he sailed across the Aegean Sea to recover the faithless Helen. Though Agamemnon was commander-in-chief of the whole army, his renown was eclipsed by both Achilles, the chief of the Thessalian Myrmidons, the typical Greek hero, who united in his person strength, beauty and courage, and by Ulysses, the chief of Ithaca, who surpassed all the Greeks in worldly wisdom and eloquence. Around these two warriors—Achilles and Ulysses—centre the events of the Iliad and the Odyssey, the two poems that have survived to our own day recounting the chief incidents of the siege of Troy. Besides these two chief heroes, there are others of lesser note—Nestor, the aged sage of Pylos, famed for his eloquence and wisdom; Diomedē, the valiant son of Tydeus, and the Telamonian Ajax, from Salamis.

The siege of Troy lasted for ten years, 1194-1184 B.C., according to the received chronology. It is the concluding part of the events of this year that forms the subject of the Iliad, the story of which is as follows: Two captives, Chrysēis, daughter of Chrysēs, priest of Apollo, and Brīsēis, were captured at Lyrnessus, a town of the Troad. The former was given as a prize of war to Agamemnon; the latter, to Achilles. Chryses came to the camp of the Greeks to ransom his daughter from Agamemnon, who at first refused to release her. A pestilence, however, arose which raged for nine days throughout the host of the Greeks.

*The story of
the Iliad.*

The people were dying. In consternation an assembly was summoned to find the cause of the plague, when Calchas, the priest, told the Greeks that the cause of the pestilence was the refusal of Agamemnon to restore the maiden Chryseïs to her father. Agamemnon reluctantly gave up Chryseïs, but Briseïs was taken from Achilles by Agamemnon. Then began 'the wrath of Achilles,' the central theme of the Iliad. Enraged at Agamemnon, Achilles withdrew from the field of battle, and in his absence the Greeks were no match for Hector, the hero of the Trojans. Of the twenty-four books of the Iliad, the first fifteen are taken up with scenes of alternate victory and defeat. The Greeks at length were driven back to their camp near the sea, and their ships were set on fire. Then Patroclus, the bosom friend of Achilles, begged the latter to lend him his aid to support the falling fortunes of the Greeks. Achilles still remained deaf to all entreaties and sullenly sulked in his tent. He, however, lent his armour to his friend Patroclus and gave him command of his Myrmidons. Patroclus fell by the spear of Hector. Then Achilles was roused to action, for his desire to avenge the death of his friend was a stronger passion with him than his anger against Agamemnon. Clad in divine armour forged by Hephaestus at the command of his mother, the sea-goddess Thetis, he appeared on the scene. The Trojans were driven within the walls and Hector was slain. The Iliad closes with the funeral games at the burial of Patroclus and with the last, sad rites paid by the people of Troy to the body of Hector. According to later poets, Achilles himself fell by the shaft of Paris directed by Apollo.

*The story of
the Odyssey.*

Around none of the Greek chieftains who figured at Troy has so much interest centred as around Ulysses, the hero of the Odyssey. The account of the wanderings of 'the wily' chief of Ithāca, the cleverest of all the Greek chiefs who fought against Troy, forms a fitting sequel to the story of the Iliad.

According to post-Homeric poets, after the death of Achilles, Ulysses advised the Greeks to build a wooden horse inside of which the chiefs of the Greeks were concealed. In the dead of night the Greeks emerged from the horse, opened the gates to their comrades and delivered up Troy to the Greeks. According

to the *Odyssey*, however, we find Ulysses and his comrades sailed for Ithaca, and, at length, after many wanderings, they arrived at the isle of the *Cyclôpes*, a savage, one-eyed race, and here the hero put out the eye of *Polyphēmus*, who had already eaten up six of his comrades. But *Poseidon*, god of the sea, the father of *Polyphemus*, in revenge compelled Ulysses to wander over many lands, and at the beginning of the *Odyssey* we find him on the island of *Ogygia*, where *Calypso*, the nymph, detained him for seven years against his will. Meanwhile his wife *Pēnēlōpe*, in Ithaca, had been courted by many suitors who riotously consumed the substance of Ulysses. She contrived to defer making a decision of marriage by pretending that she wished to finish a winding sheet for the aged *Laertes*, the father of Ulysses. What she wove in the day she unravelled at night, and for three years she continued to elude the decision of choice. But the suitors finding out her plan became more importunate than ever. Then she sent *Tēlēmāchus*, her son, to the aged *Nestor* of *Pylos* to find tidings of his father. Meanwhile Ulysses was released from the thralldom of *Calypso*, and sailed from her island on a raft made by himself, but his old enemy *Poseidon* wrecked his raft. Ulysses was, however, saved by the magic scarf given by *Ino* and arrived at the isle of the *Phaeacians*, whose king *Alcinous* entertained him. A *Phaeacian* crew brought him to Ithaca. *Athena* had disguised him as a beggar and even his old swine herd *Eumaeus* failed to recognize him, though his faithful dog *Argus* knew his master. *Tēlēmāchus* now returned after an unavailing search for his father till *Athena* revealed his father to him. Ulysses, still in disguise, held an audience with his wife *Pēnēlōpe* and pretended to tell her news of her husband. Unable to withstand any longer the demands of her suitors she agreed to wed that suitor that could send an arrow from the mighty bow of the hero *Eurytus* through the eye of the twelve pole-axes set up in a row in the hall. No one of the suitors could bend the bow, but the disguised Ulysses easily strung it and sent an arrow through the axe-eyes. Then he turned his arrows against the suitors and revealed himself to his wife, overcame the kinsfolk of the suitors and safely re-established himself in his ancestral realm.

*The two
heroes.*

To the Greeks the hero of the Iliad and the hero of the Odyssey possessed in themselves conjointly the perfection of human excellence—personal beauty and good counsel. Achilles is the embodiment of the former and Ulysses of the latter. Achilles is the typical Greek warrior, the bravest and most handsome of all the Greeks, affectionate to friends, relentless to foes, rejoicing in the turmoil of battle, open-hearted and fearless, but at the same time susceptible of the deepest grief. His towering passion was personal ambition, and to gratify this desire he was willing to sacrifice the fortunes of even the whole army. It was not till the loss of his friend prompted his desire for revenge that he took the field against Hector. While Ulysses was noted for personal bravery, he was essentially the man of subtle intellect and ready resource; prudent, cunning, inventive and eloquent, whose courage was undaunted in the face of danger and unsubdued by any calamity. Unfortunately for the Greeks in all ages, they have cared too much for quickness of wit and too little for honesty of purpose, and we hence find in later poems that writers represent 'the wily Ulysses' as an unscrupulous knave regardless of everything but personal gain.

*Theories
with regard
to the Iliad
and the
Odyssey.*

The poems called the Iliad and Odyssey were generally supposed by the Greeks themselves to be the work of one poet named Homer, to whom were ascribed many other works besides the Iliad and Odyssey. It was not till the time of the Alexandrine period (about 170 B. C.) that Hellanicus and Xenon advanced the theory that the Iliad and the Odyssey were the works of two separate authors.¹ This theory had little following, and it was not till the end of the last century that any serious deviation was made from the general opinion of antiquity. Ever since F. A. Wolf (1795 A.D.) published his *Prologomena*, critics have been disputing whether Homer was a real person or a mere name applied to a number of persons who composed lays about a common subject, the siege of Troy; whether the poems were written in Asia, in North-Eastern or in Western Greece; whether Homer lived as early as 1100 B.C. or as late as 400 B.C.; whether the poems as we now have them have been tampered

¹ The followers of these grammarians were called χωρίζοντες 'separators'

with by editors or critics ; whether the poems were originally reduced to writing or handed down by rhapsodists,¹ or whether or not the poems possess the unity of plan and composition that would argue the work of a single author.

It is not our intention to argue these questions. The bulk of internal evidence goes to prove that the poems show the master hand of a single author, and are not a patch-work composition of various bards. No doubt, inconsistencies may be shown to exist between books of the *Iliad*, or between the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and additions may have been added by later hands. Still it is easier to believe that the poems were composed by one man than by a dozen of men. It is also probable that the poems were not at first committed to writing, but were transmitted by rhapsodists till the times of Pisissträtus (about 530 B.C.), when the poems were arranged in the order in which we now possess them. The interest, however, does not so much centre in the personality of Homer, as in the picture that the poems exhibit of the state of society during the Heroic age.

In the Heroic age we find Greece divided into a number of small states, each of which was absolutely independent of the other, though in times of emergency one of the states often acquired a pre-eminence through the prowess of a single chief. In each state there were three political elements—the king,² the council,³ and the freemen who composed the assembly of the people.⁴

The king was believed to rule by a hereditary and divine right. From Zeus he received his father's sceptre, and the same deity was supposed to transmit it to his son. The only limitation to the hereditary right of succession was that the king should prove himself able to discharge his duties. If the king at his death left only infant children, or if his heir to power was altogether incapable, or if a king from old age or other cause was unable to perform his duties, then some other near relative would naturally succeed. The king led his people in

¹ ῥαψωδοί, either from ῥάβδος 'a wand' and αοιδός 'a singer,' hence 'one that sings with a wand in the hand,' or from ῥάπτειν 'to string together' and ᾠδή 'a song,' therefore 'one who strings together songs.'

² βασιλεύς. ³ βουλὴ or γερουσία. ⁴ ἀγορά.

war, acted as supreme judge, was president of the council and of the popular assembly, and, in public sacrifices, as head of the nation he interceded in behalf of the welfare of his people.

(1) *a leader
in war,*

As leader of the army, he rode before the host in a war chariot driven by his chosen squire, attended by his nobles in similar guise, while the freemen followed on foot. In the Homeric age the king kept no state, had few attendants, and there was little to distinguish him from the other nobles. He did not consider it beneath his dignity to build his own raft or house, to supervise the labours of the harvest field, to exhibit his skill either as a smith or as a carpenter. His wife was the house-keeper of the palace, looked after the larder, the linen, spun and wove with her attendant domestic slaves the garments of the household.

(2) *judge,*

As judge, the king sat in the open air in the market-place with his elders around him, and decided the questions brought before him by his subjects. His decisions were given, not by any fixed laws—for formal laws¹ did not exist in Homer's time—but according to the admitted principles of right and equity.² After the plaintiff and defendant had produced their witnesses and stated their cases, the elders delivered their opinions, and then the king with sceptre in hand pronounced sentence.

(3) *priest.*

As priest, he was the mediator between his tribe and heaven. He was not attached to the service of any single deity, but offered up sacrifices on behalf of the nation in general, as the father did on behalf of his family.

*Power of the
king limited.*

Though the power of the king was virtually absolute, it was still limited in three different ways: he had to obey certain fixed customs and traditions of his people; he had to consult his council of nobles or elders, though he was not bound to follow their verdict, and the decisions arrived at by the king and elders were promulgated in an assembly of the freemen, who expressed their approval by shouts and their disapproval by silence. It will be thus seen that all measures originated with the king, that the council of nobles was merely advisory, and that the

¹νόμος, 'a law,' does not occur in Homer. ²θεμίμωτες, 'fixed customs.'

common people had the privilege of expressing approval or disapproval of the measure proposed, though their will was not necessarily followed.

The council¹ consisted of nobles,² who were generally the (2) *The council.* younger branches of the royal family and who from their prowess in war or council had acquired pre-eminence in their tribe. As has been mentioned before, though the king consulted them in all cases of importance, he was not bound by their advice. Rarely, however, do we find their advice disregarded.

The main body of the people³ were small landowners who (3) *The freemen.* tilled the soil subject to the chiefs. Besides these there was a class of farm-servants called *thētes*,⁴ whose condition was of the most abject kind, for they had no standing politically or socially. They tilled the estates of others and engaged in the most menial occupations.

The picture of society presented by the Homeric poems has both its bright and its dark sides. There was a strong bond of (Characteristics of the Homeric age.) union between members of the same tribe and especially between members of the same family. Hospitality was especially enjoined as having the favour of heaven. To maltreat the wayfarer and the stranger was the foulest of crimes. Monogamy was universal and the respect in which women were held was far higher than in after days. Slavery, though the doom of the prisoners of war, had not the repulsive character it had in republican Greece. No example is given in Homer of a cruel master, though the *Odyssey* furnishes many instances of the devotedness of slaves to their lords.

There is also, however, another side to the picture. It was the period when 'might was right.' The chief who could not protect himself was dispossessed by his more powerful neighbour. The grossest brutality was inflicted on the conquered foe in battle, and even on helpless women and children; the power of the king was often exerted for the purpose of selfish plunder; homicide was unpunished except by the nearest friends of the

¹βουλή or γερονσία. ²βασίλῃες 'princes' was often applied to them. They were often called γέροντες 'elders' or βούλευται 'councillors.' ³δῆμος or λαός. ⁴θῆτες.

deceased ; piracy was a lawful occupation ; quarter in battle was rarely given and the refinements of savagery were practised on all enemies in war.

Cyclic poets. After Homer's time heroic poetry continued to be cultivated,
776-550 B.C. but it was only a faint echo of the two great epics of Homer—the Iliad and the Odyssey. Then arose a school of poets who composed lays on subjects connected with the siege of Troy. As these legendary poems were based on a series of events forming one connected story they were called Cyclic poems.

CHAPTER III.

THE GREAT MIGRATIONS.

The age of the great migrations forms the boundary line *Dividing line between myth and history.* between the mythical and historical periods of Greek history. The time preceding this period is full of shadowy myth ; after it we arrive at the age of actual history. Then the Greeks began to build up the states with which we afterwards become acquainted in history, and to develop the political institutions which characterized the various peoples. In the accounts given of the various migrations, it is often difficult to separate fact from fiction, or to believe that some of the events could take place within the period assigned ; still it is safe to assume that the legends have some basis of historical truth.

The Thessalians were originally an obscure, but warlike tribe, *Thessalian migration.* inhabiting the northern part of Epīrus, in the region of Dodōna. Under the leadership of the Heraclidae, or descendants of Heracles, the mythical hero, they crossed the range of Pindus and exterminated, expelled or reduced to slavery the original Aeolians who inhabited the great plain of Thessaly. The inhabitants of Thessaly thus consisted of three distinct classes, viz. : the serfs of the soil, the conquered people, who, though personally free, had no share in the government, and the Thessalian conquerors who alone held power.

The Aeolians that had been expelled from Thessaly now moved *The Aeolic migration.* to the south-east and settled in Boeotia in the valleys of the Cephissus and Asōpus, from which they either drove out the original inhabitants, or became incorporated with them. Even in the earliest times, they formed a league of fourteen states, each of which was originally on terms of equality with the rest. The power of Thebes, however, increased so greatly that in historical times it rose to the leadership of the Boeotian league. According to the received chronology the Aeolic migration took place, 1124 B.C.

The Dorian migration.

These two migrations were, however, insignificant compared with that of the Dorians. In Homer's day, the Peloponnesus was inhabited by Achaeans, who were wealthy and highly advanced in civilization. The cities of Mycēnae, Argos and Tiryns had attained to a high degree of power and prosperity, and the Doric conquest seems to have been a check to the development of the civilization of Greece. The Dorians are not mentioned at all in the *Iliad*. In the *Odyssey*, they are noticed only once.¹ In early times they occupied Doris, a rugged mountainous district south of Thessaly. Pouring forth from their mountain fastnesses, they entered the Peloponnesus by the isthmus of Corinth. Here they were repulsed by the allied armies of the Achaean states of the Peloponnesus and their leader, Hyllus, was slain. The conquest was then apparently given up for a time, till the grandsons of Hyllus, Tēmēnus, Aristodēmus and Cresphontes, in conjunction with the Aeolians made a descent on the Peloponnesus by the port of Naupactus at the eastern extremity of the Corinthian gulf. The allied forces first conquered Elis, which was given to Oxylus, chief of the Aeolians as his share, while the Dorians gradually subdued in turn the districts of Messēnia, Lacōnia and Argos, which were assigned in the following order. To Tēmēnus fell Argos, to Eurysthēnes and Proclus, twin sons of Aristodēmus who was killed by lightning at Naupactus was allotted Laconia, while Cresphontes obtained Messēnia. The native Achaean population moved northward and took refuge in the cities on the southern side of the Corinthian gulf in Achaia, a district named after them. The high mountains enclosing Arcadia protected it from the invasion of the Dorians. Here the inhabitants seem to have retained the original character they possessed in ancient times. A generation after the capture of Argos, the conquering Dorians pushed their conquests still further and took possession of Sicyon, Epidaurus and Troēzen and even Corinth itself. They attempted to carry their conquest into Attica, but were repulsed, though they succeeded in taking

¹ *Odyssey* 19, 177: Δωριεὺς τριχάικες either 'plume tossing' (θριξ, αἶσσω) or 'going to war in three divisions' (τριχα, αἶσσω).

Megära, and forming it into a Dorian state. The date usually assigned to the Dorian migration is 1104 B.C.

The upheavals that were taking place among the tribes of Greece were no doubt the chief cause of the emigrations from that country to Asia Minor, although there is no doubt that intercourse existed between these lands in early days. The stories of the Trojan war and of the Argonautic expedition show that marauding expeditions took place. The Aegean, dotted, as it is, with islands within easy reach of both nations, would be the natural highway for emigrations either of a peaceful or war-like character. No doubt these emigrations took place at different times, and the colonization of Asia Minor cannot be referred to any single period.

From the Propontis on the north, to Căria on the south, the coast line of Asia differs in many respects from the country in the interior. On the coast the land is full of valleys, far surpassing in fertility those of Greece. It also abounds in excellent harbours, and is watered by fine streams, some of which attain a considerable size. The interior is a high table-land, held by various tribes of Semitic origin, the chief of which were the Hittites. The customs and religion of the inhabitants differed materially from those of Greece. The effeminacy, the fondness for display, the polygamy in some cases, the polyandry in others, the worship of hideous deities were all abhorrent to the ideas of the Greeks. The listless spirit of the Asiatic was no match for the well-directed energy of the Greek, and this reason may account for the fact that, while the migrations in Greece were invariably accompanied by struggles for supremacy between the invaders and the invaded, we have no mention of any resistance being made by the Asiatics against the Greek colonists.

The Aeolian colonies are said to have been the earliest and were probably settled by Achaeans who had been driven out of the Peloponnesus by the Dorians, and who, under their native chiefs, settled in Asia. In Boeotia these Achaeans united with the Aeolians, and hence the migration is called Boeotic, as well as Aeolic, and the land they settled in Aeolis. They occupied

Asiatic Colonies.

Character of the Asiatic coast.

Greeks and Asiatics compared.

Aeolic colonies

the district on the coast from the Straits of Hellespont to the Hermus, and formed themselves into a loose confederacy of eleven¹ cities.

*Ionic
colonies.*

The Ionians that had been driven out of their settlements on the sea-coast of the Peloponnesus took up their abode in Attica, but the barren soil was a poor inducement to the new settlers to remain there. They migrated and settled in Asia Minor, chiefly between the Hermus and the Maeander, though the chief city of the Ionic league, Milētus, was south of that river. This was one of the most fertile districts of Asia Minor, and in it sprung up cities noted in after ages for their wealth and refinement. The invaders soon intermixed with the native population, and their descendants had, in consequence, a large element of foreign blood in their veins and lost many of the characteristics of the original Ionians. They were effeminate and had little tenacity of purpose, but at the same time were fond of poetry and architecture. On the way to Asia many of the Cyclādes, and also Chīos and Samos were colonized by them. The powerful confederacy of the Ionic league consisted of twelve² cities, deputies from which met every year at the temple of Poseidon at Panīōnium, a promontory near Mount Mycāle.

*Doric
colonies.*

The spirit of migration was contagious, for it cannot be supposed that the same causes would operate in the case of the Dorians as in that of the Ionians and Aeolians. We are told that a descendant of Temenus, Althaemenes, landed at Crete, where he left some of his followers, and that he proceeded to Rhodes, where he founded the cities of Ialyssus, Lyndus and Camirus. These with Cos, Halicarnassus and Cnidus formed the Dorian Hexāpōlis.

*General
characteris-
tics.*

In each of these three classes of colonies, the city was politically independent, though there seems to have been some central authority which was exercised on emergencies. Thus the

¹ The *Hendecapolis* (confederacy of *eleven* cities) of Aeolis consisted of Cyme, Temnos, Larissa, Neon-Tichos, Aegaeae, Myrina, Grynēa, Cilla, Notium, Aegiroëssa, Pitane.

² The Ionic *Dodecapolis* (confederacy of *twelve* cities) consisted of Miletus, Myus, Priene, Samos, Ephesus, Colophon, Lebēdus, Teos, Erythrae, Chios, Clazomenae, Phocaea. Smyrna was afterwards added.

Ionians seem to have had a yearly meeting at Panionium to which each of the Ionian states sent a deputy. This assembly appears in early days to have been purely for religious purposes—a festival in honour of Poseidon, to whom splendid sacrifices were offered. The political union of the Ionian states in early days was doubtless of a loose character and they apparently never had any definite political organization till the time of the Persian wars, and even then the members of the confederacy were apparently independent of each other.

As we have seen before, the only mention of the Dorians is in the *Odyssey*, and in that poem they are represented as inhabiting Crete. The island, however, was never thoroughly Hellenized, and the inhabitants, as in the case of Cyprus, especially in the inland parts, retained the traits of the barbarian aborigines. The period of the migration in Greece and Asia probably extended from 1100-950 B.C. *Crete and Cyprus.*

CHAPTER IV.

ANCIENT INSTITUTIONS—ORACLES—GAMES.

We know little of Greek history before the period of the Persian wars, for it was only then that historical records began to be written. Previous to that time our knowledge is scant and fragmentary. We do know, however, that Greece was divided into a number of small states, independent politically of each other, and having no other bonds of union than community of origin, of language, of religious festivals, of games, of customs and manners. Political union, such as we understand it in modern days, never existed among the different states of Hellas.

*Greek idea
of patriot-
ism.*

The patriotism of the Greek was chiefly confined to his native city. *To him the city was the state.* The safety of Hellas, as a whole, was in his eyes of far less importance than that of his native town. Though he was ready to sacrifice life and property for his own city, the common interests of Greece seldom entered into his thoughts. So complete and universal was this political isolation that the citizen of one city was an alien in another city. He was excluded from all share in the government, and, except by special enactment, he could not acquire property or even legally marry there, or sue in a court of justice for the recovery of a debt except through the agency of a native citizen. This will account for the repugnance that the Greeks had to the supremacy of one city over another, and why they chafed under the successive domination of Sparta, Athens, Thebes, Macedonia and Rome.

*Amphic-
tyonic
councils.*

Still we find that even in early times there were bonds of union other than those purely political that tended to unite the Greeks. Of these the two most important were the Amphictyonic councils and the national games.

From time immemorial Amphictyonic councils¹ existed in Greece. Tribes that were neighbours naturally formed leagues for offensive and defensive purposes, and, especially, for the

¹ἀμφικτιόνες, 'those dwelling around' or 'near.'

protection of some temple where they solemnized in common their religious rites. The Greeks ascribed the origin of these councils to the hero Amphictyon. Such councils met at the temple of Poseidon at Calauria, an ancient seat of the Ionians, on the Saronic gulf. Dēlos was also the centre of another Amphictyony, which embraced the neighbouring islands of the Cyclādes, where deputies met to celebrate the rites and games of the Dēlian Apollo. The Ionians of Asia Minor, also, assembled for a similar purpose at the temple of Poseidon, near the foot of Mt. Mycāle. All the other councils were, however, overshadowed by the one which went pre-eminently under the name of the Amphictyonic league. This differed from the others in having two places of meeting and also two sanctuaries to guard—the temple of Dēmēter at Anthēla, near Thernōpylae, and the temple of Apollo at Delphi. The deputies from the different states met at the former in autumn, —at the latter, in the spring. Twelve tribes formed this confederacy, of which eleven were the Thessalians, Boeotians, Dorians, Ionians, Perrhaebians, Magnētes, Locrians, Oetaeans, or Aenēānians, Pthiōtes or Achaeans of Phthia, Mālians, and Phōcīans. The twelfth is supposed to have been either the Dōlōpes or Delphians. The fact that some of these tribes are hardly ever mentioned in historical times gives us some proof of the antiquity of this council. Each of these tribes sent deputies. The duties of the general assembly may be learned from the oath taken by the deputies: “We shall not destroy any city of the Amphictyons, nor cut off their streams in war or peace; if any shall do so, we shall march against him and destroy his city. If any shall plunder the property of the god or shall take treacherous council against the property of the temple in Delphi, we shall take vengeance on him with foot and hand and voice, and by every means in our power.” By this it will be seen that the object of this council was to prevent aggressive measures on the part of the members of the confederacy, and to protect the temple of Delphi.

The Amphictyonic league.

Oath of the deputies.

The Amphictyonic council came prominently into notice during two periods of Greek history, namely, during the period of the First Sacred War and of the Macedonian invasion.

The Amphictyonic council in history.

First Sacred War.

Crissa, a town of Phōcis, was situated on the heights of Mount Parnassus, near the temple of Delphi, which in ancient times belonged to Crissa. This town had a seaport Cirrha, situated on the Corinthian Gulf, and a rich plain which extended from the town to the port. The port Cirrha grew to a considerable size, while the town of Crissa fell into the hands of the Dorians and expanded into the town of Delphi. The oracle at Delphi had numerous pilgrims from the different parts of Hellas, and these generally passed through the territory of Cirrha, the magistrates of which laid exorbitant exactions on the pilgrims. After trying in vain to get the people of Cirrha to be more lenient in their demands, the Amphictyonic council declared war against Cirrha. The town was taken after a siege of ten years, 595-585 B.C., razed to the ground, and the rich plain was consecrated to the god, while curses were pronounced on all who tilled or inhabited it.


Oracles.

Seldom did the Greeks undertake anything of importance, either public or private, without consulting the gods through the agency of oracles, or without trying to get their aid through sacrifice or prayer. The origin of oracles did not arise merely from a curiosity innate in man to know the future, but also from a wish to have the aid of heaven in all enterprises. In all oracles the Greeks believed that the god would reveal his will to man, not in visible form, but through the medium of a priest or priestess.

Delphi.

Of all the Greek oracles the most celebrated was that of Delphi, in Phocis. The town was built on the barren, rocky heights of Mount Parnassus, amid an amphi theatre of hills. The temple itself, enriched with the presents of eager suppliants, was enormously wealthy. In the centre of the temple was a cleft in the rock, from which an intoxicating vapour arose. Over this cleft the priestess of Apollo seated herself on a tripod when the oracle was to be consulted. Soon she fell into a frenzy when the vapours had affected her brain, and the wild words uttered by her were supposed to be full of prophetic inspiration.¹ Her sayings, delivered in hexameter verse, were

¹Cf. *μάντις* 'a prophet,' from *μαίνομαι* 'I rave.'

taken down by her attendants and given to the enquiring suppliant. Though frequently ambiguous, those sayings were looked upon as divinely inspired. No oracle of Greece had the same influence as that of Delphi. Suppliants from every part of the Hellenic world, and even foreign kings thronged there to consult it on all matters of importance. No colony was founded, no war undertaken, without its sanction, and its influence was maintained till the Christian era. 

The national games of the Greeks were a distinctive characteristic of the people, for no other nation of antiquity had an institution similar to them. They, therefore, formed a thoroughly unique phase of Greek life. To a Greek, physical beauty and moral greatness were always closely associated, and everything that tended to develop the symmetry of the human figure was supposed to have the special approbation of heaven. Nothing, too, was more influential than these games in arousing and maintaining a national spirit among the Greeks. All barbarians were rigidly excluded, while all citizens of pure Hellenic blood, *exclusively national.* without distinction of rank, dialect or tribe were gladly welcomed. These festivals were participated in by men from all parts of the Hellenic world, and thus the Greeks were regularly reminded of the common tie of blood that united them, and, at the same time, of the line of demarcation that separated them from barbarians. With these games, nothing was allowed to interfere. If any states were at war, a temporary cessation of hostilities was made by the proclamation of 'the Sacred Truce.'¹ According to Cicero, a victory at the Olympic games was considered by the Greeks of more importance than a triumph was in the eyes of a Roman general. The Spartans allowed the Olympic victor to stand next their king in battle. The state was honoured by the glory of the citizen that gained a victory and, *Honors to the victors.* in turn, it honoured him with rewards of money and special privileges. Hymns were composed, and statues erected in his honour, and lustre was shed over his family and the whole community to which he belonged.

There were four national festivals among the Greeks—the Olympic, the Pythian, the Nemean and the Isthmian. *Four national festivals.*

¹ ἐκεχειρία.

The Olympic games were by far the greatest of the four national festivals. They were celebrated in honour of Olympian Zeus, in Elis, on a plain three miles long and one mile wide, at the foot of a hill, Cronos, on the north bank of the river Alphæus, about eight miles from the sea, and twenty-five from the city of Elis. Olympia, where the games were celebrated, was not a town but a collection of temples, and the beauty of its site was supposed to be especially suitable for the object to which it was dedicated. In the sacred enclosure—the Altis¹—stood the great temple of Jupiter, a temple to Hera, another to the mother of the gods, six double altars to the twelve Olympian deities, and a host of other altars and sanctuaries, besides the council hall.² Outside of the sacred enclosure were lodgings for strangers, and the race course where the games were held. The origin of these games is lost in myth. They were held every four years. The year 776 B.C. marked a chronological era and from that time down to the time of Theodosius (394 A.D.) they were celebrated without interruption. The most important fact in connection with these games was the establishment of ‘the Sacred Truce’ between all states that were at war. An armistice was proclaimed by heralds throughout Greece during ‘the sacred month’ when the games were held. During that period, no armed force could enter the territory of Elis without incurring the guilt of sacrilege. At first the foot race was the only contest. This was a mere dash of two hundred yards.³ Afterwards were introduced at different times the double course⁴ and the long race⁵; then the penthalon⁶; the four horse chariot race,⁷ the most illustrious of all the contests; the pancration, a combination of wrestling and boxing; races of saddle horses; races of boys and contests of trumpeters and heralds.

*Events at
the Olympic
games.*

*Celebrated
for five
days.*

The first day was occupied with sacrifices, the next three days with games and the fifth day with sacrifices of the victors and ambassadors, and a feast of the victors in the council house. The games were held at the time of the second full moon after

¹ ἄλσος ‘a grove’ is said to be in the language of the Eleans ἄλτις.

² πρυτανεῖον.

³ called στάδιον. ⁴ δίαυλος. ⁵ δόλιχος = 12 στάδια. ⁶ πένθαλον included five contests: leaping, footrace, throwing the quoit, hurling the javelin and wrestling.

the summer solstice, either in the last days of July or not later than the 24th of August. The reward was a crown of wild olive from the sacred tree in the Altis. This great festival attracted all who desired to meet a crowd of people collected from all parts of the Hellenic world and gave an opportunity for the Greeks to combine on any question affecting the nation as a whole. It was at Olympia that Gorgias of Leontini and Lysias, the orator, urged the Greeks to form a common union against the barbarians. The Panegyric oration of Isocrates was intended for a similar occasion. According to Lucian, Herodotus read to the assembled Greeks chapters of his history, which excited the envy of Thucydides. Painters and sculptors here exhibited their works of art, and poets celebrated the renown of the heroes in the games. The importance of these games is further shown by the fact that the time of their institution was accepted by the Greeks as a national era.¹

Next in honour and importance to the Olympic games were the *Pythian games*.⁽²⁾ Pythian, celebrated on the Crissæan plain of Delphi, originally called Pytho. These were said to have been instituted by Apollo. At a very early period these games became of national interest from their connection with the oracle of Apollo and the Amphictyonic league. At first the games consisted of a musical contest of song in praise of Apollo, for his victory over the serpent Python, and were held originally every eight years and under the care of the people of Delphi. After the first sacred war, however, the Amphictyons had charge of them and introduced gymnastic contests, and the games were then held every four years, some say, on the second, others, on the third year of every Olympiad. The various contests held at Olympia were taken as a pattern for those at Delphi, but the musical contest was always the chief attraction. At these games tragedies were performed, orators displayed their eloquence and philosophers propounded their theories, painters exhibited their pictures, and sculptors, their statuary. The prize was a crown of olive.

¹To change the Olympiads into years B.C. the following rule may be given: Multiply the completed Olympiad by *four*, add the *completed* odd year and deduct from 776 for events that happened in the autumn and winter, or from 775 for events in spring and summer, as the Attic year began at the summer solstice. Thus the battle of Salamis was in the first year of the 75 ol., i.e., 74 Olympiads had been completed $\therefore 776 - 4 \times 74 = 776 - 296 = 480$ B.C.

*Nemean
games.*

Originally the Nemean were funeral games instituted by the seven Argive leaders in the war against Thebes, in honour of Opheltēs (later called Archemōrus) who was killed at the spring Adrasteia, near Nemēa. Heracles is said to have restored these games in honour of Zeus, after his contest with the Nemean lion. The festival was held in the first and third years of each Olympiad. These games were also after the pattern of those at Olympia, but there was also a musical contest, as in the case of the Pythian games. Before the Persian wars, the crown was of olive, after that date, of wild parsley.

*Isthmian
games.*

The Isthmian games were held in the pine grove on the narrowest part of the Isthmus of Corinth, in honour of Poseidon. They were celebrated in the first month of spring in the first and third year of every Olympiad. The general character was the same as of the Olympic games. The prize was originally of pine, but afterwards of parsley.

CHAPTER V.

EARLY HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESUS.

Of the states of the Peloponnesus, Argos attained the highest importance in the early period of Greek history. In Homer's *Argos*, time, Agamemnon, 'the king of men,' the elder of the Atridae, had Mycēnae as his capital, while Menelāüs, a younger brother, was king of Sparta. Again, in the division of the Peloponnesus, the Heraclid Tēmēnus, the eldest son of Aristomāchus, and grandson of Hyllus, obtained Argos as his share; to the sons of Aristodemus fell Laconia, while the youngest brother, Cresphontes, received Messenia. These facts seem to indicate that Argos occupied at that time the highest position among the three kingdoms. Argos held sway over the eastern part of the Peloponnesus and included even the city of Corinth. It would seem that the Doric conquerors of Argos united with the original Achæan population, for we find mention of a tribe called Hyrnēthians in addition to the three tribes—Hylleis, Pamphyli and Dymānes—into which every Doric state was divided. It is supposed that these Hyrnethians were original Achæans. Doric colonies from Argos settled in Phlius, Epidaurus, Troezen and Sicyon, and the island of Aegina, which was, even then, the leading maritime state of Greece—a position which it long held until it was eclipsed by Athens. Argos was, thus, the head of a *Argive league* confederacy of states, the tutelary deity of which was Apollo Pythāeus, whose oracle and shrine was the temple built on the Acrōpōlis of Argos. The members of this confederacy, however, were never bound to each other for any length of time by any strong bond of union, and except at rare intervals—during the age of Pheidon and, again, in the time of Alcibiades—they formed a disjointed league which soon was overshadowed in the Peloponnesus by the power of Sparta.

The first kings of Argos were mere names, and the histories of *Kings of Argos* them are taken up with accounts of shadowy wars with Sparta.

Pheidon
680-650 B.C.

It was not till the age of Pheidon that we reach the period of actual history. It is said that he succeeded to power at a time when the influence of royalty had been reduced by the rising power of the Dorian oligarchy. By crushing the power of the Dorian oligarchs, he constituted himself supreme ruler of Argos, and changed the government from an oligarchy to a despotism. He bound the members of the Argive confederacy into closer union with the central authority; he reduced the cities of Sicyon and Corinth; extended his sway over the island of Aegina, and restored to the inhabitants of the city of Pisa, in Elis, the superintendency of the Olympic games which had been taken from them by the Eleans. Soon afterwards, however, by the aid of Sparta, the Eleans regained this privilege, for Pheidon was defeated and slain in battle by the confederates. It was not, however, as a conqueror, but as a legislator that Pheidon was justly famous. He was the first that introduced into Greece a copper and silver coinage, and a scale of weights and measures, which, under the name of Aeginētan, was universally adopted among the states of the Peloponnesus and in many parts of Northern Greece.¹ This name seems to have been given, not because the coins were struck on the island of Aegina, but because the people of Aegina, through their commercial activity, made them more generally known. Pheidon is said to have preserved in the temple of Hēra, at Argos, samples of the long silver nails which were replaced by his round *obols* and *drachmas*. Under his son, the power which he acquired gradually waned; still the legislation he enacted remained till the latest times of Greek history.

Messenia.

As in Argos, the Dorians who conquered Messenia did not expel the original inhabitants, but amalgamated with them. An example was set by Cresphontes, the youngest brother of Temenus, who not merely gave the native Achaeans full franchise, but who married a native Achaean wife. The Dorian conquerors, under Polyphontes, arose and slew Cresphontes, who had shown a spirit so anti-national. Aepytus, son of

¹ There were three scales of money in Greece, the Aeginetan, Euboeic and Attic, adopted by Solon. The values were relatively as 30 : 25 : 18 respectively.

Cresphontes, revenged his father's murder, but under his sway and that of his successors so completely were the original Achaeans fused with the Dorians that soon all traces of Dorian customs and institutions were obliterated.

With the Spartans the opposite process was going on. Though *Laconia*. occupying the narrow valley of the Eurōtas, hemmed in by mountains on three sides, and numerically weak, they gradually acquired sway over the neighbouring states, and so exercised their power that they stamped their impress on the institutions and political life, first of Laconia, and afterwards, of the greater part of the Peloponnesus. Sparta advanced to the first place *Lycurgus*. among the Dorian states of the Peloponnesus, chiefly through the military organization instituted by Lycurgus. Of the actual history of this legislator we know very little, and some have supposed that he did not organize or even develop the institutions usually ascribed to him by the ancients, but that Sparta had from the earliest times these institutions in common with the other Dorian states. If the latter theory is true, we must then suppose that these peculiar institutions were kept intact by Sparta while they fell into disuse in Argos and Messenia in consequence of the Doric population being merged into the native Achaean element.

Lycurgus is said to have flourished 800 B.C. He was the younger son of Eunōmus, one of the two kings that reigned at Sparta. His elder brother, Polydectes, had died and left a wife and child. The ambitious widow wished Lycurgus to share the crown with her. For a time Lycurgus apparently consented. Subsequently attended by the leading men of the state, he brought the child of his brother to the market place, where the infant was hailed by the elders as the future king of Sparta. The son was called Charilāos.¹ To avoid the suspicion of any ambitious designs, Lycurgus withdrew from Sparta and travelled in foreign lands. He is said to have visited Crete (where he studied the laws of Minos), Asia Minor, Libya, Egypt and even India. On his return Charilāos had grown to manhood, and the state was torn by dissensions and humbled by a crushing

¹i.e., 'joy of the people' (χαίρειν, λαός).

defeat inflicted by the Arcadians of Tegea. All were looking for some deliverer when Lycurgus with twenty-eight of the leading men of the state appeared in the market place and laid before the people his schemes, which were heartily approved. Before attempting to carry out his plans for the amelioration of Sparta, he consulted the Delphic oracle, from which he received the strongest assurance of support. In carrying out his design, however, he is said to have met with violent opposition, and to have lost an eye at the hands of a violent youth named Alcander. At last he triumphed and received the full assent of all classes to his new constitution. When he had fully settled the constitution of the state, he obtained from the people a solemn oath not to alter any of the laws till his return. He set out on a pilgrimage to the oracle of Delphi, from which he received a promise of everlasting prosperity to the Spartans so long as they observed his laws. To Sparta, however, Lycurgus never returned, but the institutions he established endured to the latest days of Spartan supremacy.

Object of his legislation.

The great object of the legislation of Lycurgus was to unite the small Spartan population in the closest ties of political union, and to perfect among them a military organization that would give them complete ascendancy over the rest of the Peloponnesus. About this time the Spartans probably did not number more than 9,000, about one-third of the conquered Achaean population, and still fewer than the serfs of the soil. They were thus really an army of occupation. He saw clearly that military organization was the essential requisite to final conquest, and his organization of the state was based on this idea.

Before describing the constitution of Lycurgus, it will be necessary to give an account of the different classes of population found in Laconia in his day.

Divisions of the people of Laconia.

The Spartans were the descendants of the Dorian conquerors of the Peloponnesus. They alone held the political power in the state, and alone were eligible to any public office. They lived in Sparta, though they usually had estates in different parts of Laconia which were cultivated by the Helots, who paid a fixed amount of produce, for it was derogatory to a Spartan to till the land or engage in commerce. All Spartans originally were on

(1) *Spartans*

terms of equality, and were divided into three tribes—Hylleis, Pamphyli and Dymānes,—which tribes were not, however, peculiar to Sparta itself, but were found in all Dorian states. The rights of citizenship the Spartans transmitted to their children, who held them on condition of submitting to the laws of Lycurgus, and of contributing a certain amount to the public mess.¹ When either of these conditions was unfulfilled, the citizen lost his franchise and hence there arose a distinction in after times between the *peers*² and the *disfranchised*.³ The latter might regain their position whenever they satisfied the two necessary conditions of citizenship.

The second class of the population of Laconia was the *Perioeci*. (2) *Perioeci*. These were personally free, but politically subject to the Spartans. They had no share in the government and were bound to obey the mandates of their Spartan lords. It is probable that they were the descendants of the original Achæan population and also of the Dorians who had not attained to the full franchise. They were distributed among the hundred petty towns of Laconia. In war they formed the heavy armed infantry⁵; in peace they engaged in commerce and menial occupations from which the Spartans were excluded. They often acquired great wealth, and though they were not allowed to participate in the government of the state, they were far from being in an oppressed or degraded condition.

The *Helots* were probably serfs of the old Achæan population. (3) *Helots*. They were the property of the state and not of the individual, and could be liberated only by the state. They lived in rural villages, as the *perioeci* lived in towns, cultivating the lands of their Spartan masters. They do not appear to have been subject to sale, but enjoyed their home and family apart from their master's supervision. They were distinguished by a peculiar dress, which they were compelled to wear—a leather cap and a sheepskin coat. In ancient times they were treated with mildness, but in later times they were objects of distrust to the Spartans, who often removed by secret police⁶ any of the Helots who might be

¹συσσίτια; of this we shall make mention afterwards.

²ὁμοῖοι. ³ὑπομείονες. ⁴περίοικοι ⁵ὀπλίται. ⁶κρυπτεία.

suspected of any revolutionary designs. In war, they attended their masters as armour bearers, and, for their bravery, they received their freedom though they were not classed among the Spartans. Their name is variously explained. It is supposed by some that they were captives in war,¹ or that they were inhabitants of marsh lands,² or that they were the inhabitants of a town, Helos, which held out stubbornly against the Spartans.

*Government
of Sparta.*

The functions of the government of Sparta were divided among (1) *two kings*, (2) a *Gerusia* or council of elders, (3) the *Apella* or popular assembly, and (4) an executive board of five *Ephori* or overseers, instituted shortly after the days of Lycurgus.

(1) *Kings.* The royal power of Sparta was always shared by two kings, who were the descendants of Eurysthēnes and Procles, twin sons of Aristodēmus, one of the three leaders in the Dorian conquest of the Peloponnesus. The two kings united in themselves the offices of king and high priest. They led the people in war and offered up sacrifices on behalf of the state. To them also were allotted the highest seats in the assembly, a double portion at all feasts. They chose deputies to consult the oracles when undertaking an expedition, and appointed ambassadors to foreign states. A hundred chosen men attended the person of the king; they could direct war against any foe whatever, and in the field their power was unlimited. Much of this power, however, was in later times infringed upon by the ephors.

The three tribes of Sparta—Hylleis, Pamphyli and Dymanes—were divided into ten *obae*³ each, and from each *obe* an elder⁴ was sent. The two kings always represented *ex officio* two *obae* of the Hyllean tribe, and were in the council on an equality with the other members. An elder at the time of his election had to be sixty years of age and of good birth and breeding.⁵ They were elected by acclamation, the one who received the greatest applause being declared the successful candidate. This mode of election naturally threw the decision into the hands of the presiding magistrates, the ephors, who practically thus elected

(2) *Gerusia
or council of
elders.*

¹ἐλαῖν, 'to take.' ²ἐλος, 'a marsh.' ³ὀβαι. ⁴γέρων. ⁵καλὸς καγαθός.

only those who were friendly to their policy. The office of elder was irresponsible and for life. Their duties were partly judicial and partly deliberative. They proposed measures and decrees that were to be laid before the popular assembly, so that with them originated all changes in the government and laws, and, as a criminal court, they could punish any citizen with civil degradation.¹ They appear to have also exercised a general superintendence and inspection of the lives and manners of the citizens, although it is difficult to tell how far these duties were shared between them and the ephors.

The assembly of the Spartan freemen, called Apella, was the (3) *Apella or popular assembly.* supreme authority in all matters affecting the state. Its function is tersely expressed in a *rhetra* or ordinance of Lycurgus given in the form of an oracle. "Build a temple," says the Pythian god, "to Hellānian Zeus and Hellānian Athēna: divide the people into tribes and institute thirty *obae*: appoint a council with its princes, call an assembly between Babyca² and the Knakion,³ then make a motion and depart: and let there be a right of decision and power to the people." According to this the people were supreme, and had the right to adopt or reject whatever was proposed by the king and magistrates. It was soon found necessary to remedy this ordinance by the following *proviso*: "But if the people shall follow a crooked opinion the elders and the princes shall withdraw." Plutarch interprets these words to mean: that in case the people do not either reject or approve *in toto* a measure proposed to them, the kings or elders shall dissolve the assembly and declare the proposed decree to be invalid. This appears to be confirmed by the words of Demosthenes, who says that the council of elders was supreme in all things—that is, the council of elders instituted all legislation, and that the Apella had merely the right of adopting or of rejecting any measure brought before it.

All citizens of the age of thirty who were not under any civil disability had the right to attend the Apella, but no one except the kings and magistrates had the right to speak without special invitation. The assembly met regularly every full moon, but

¹*ἀτιμία*. ²A ridge of hills at Sparta. ³A brook.

*Powers of
the Apella*

emergent meetings might be convened oftener by the magistrates. As in the Homeric *agora*, the people could express their approval or disapproval by shouts, and in consequence the decision of any motion was virtually in the hands of the presiding magistrate, who often thwarted the will of the assembly, especially when the *ephori* had the right to preside. The people in the Apella alone could proclaim war and conclude a peace, enter into negotiations for an armistice for any length of time, make treaties with foreign states—for these, though arranged by kings and ephors, had to be ratified by the popular assembly. The same assembly elected the magistrates and state priests, settled a disputed succession and all changes in laws or in the constitution after a previous decree had been passed by the council of elders.

(4) *Ephori*

The *ephori* or overseers were probably appointed after the time of Lycurgus. They were *five* in number, *four* of whom were elected from the four villages adjoining the city of Sparta and *one* from the city itself. They were chosen by the whole people without any qualification of age or property, and they acted as a counterpoise to the power of the kings and elders. They entered office at the autumnal equinox, held power for one year, and the chief ephor gave his name to the year. They possessed judicial authority and decided civil suits, while the council of elders took cognizance of capital crimes. They also acted during their tenure of office as the executive of the community, convened and presided at meetings of the Apella, received foreign ambassadors, could institute proceedings against any person whatever and even depose the kings and magistrates from office. They could deprive of civil rights any citizen who had been guilty of violating the laws of Sparta, could raise levies, collect taxes, and in war two always accompanied the king to supervise his conduct, while the three who remained at home were kept regularly informed of the progress of the war. It can be easily seen that the ephors, owing to the ridiculous method of voting in the Apella, could easily elect whom they chose as elders and that they were the supreme rulers of Sparta. It has been well said that "Sparta was governed by two kings and five irresponsible despots."

However important the political legislation of Lycurgus, still *Spartan training* more important was the peculiar training to which all Spartans were subjected; and of this Lycurgus was, if not the originator, at least the one who brought it to perfection. In modern days it is usually supposed that the state exists for the citizen; in Sparta, the citizen existed for the state. Every Spartan was bound to devote his energies and affections to the honour and glory of Sparta; all private interests had to be sacrificed for those of his native city, for as we have said before, the horizon of Greek patriotism was very narrow indeed. The sole object *Its objects.* of the legislation of Lycurgus was to perfect a military machine by means of which the Lacedaemonians would be invincible in war; and to this end the supervision of all Spartans from childhood to old age was under the direct care of the state.

As soon as a child was born, it was exposed to public view *Training of boys.* and the elders decided whether it should live or not. If deformed or weakly, it was taken to Mt. Taygetus, where it was left to die of exposure; if healthy, it was given back to its parents, under whose care it remained till its seventh year. At that age it was taken from its parents and placed in a training school under the charge of an officer who was appointed by the state and under the supervision of the elders. Here the boy was instructed not merely in gymnastic exercises and in all the military movements required in the field of battle, but he was also subjected to the severest discipline and forced to endure the greatest hardships and fatigue without a murmur. He was compelled to go barefoot, was obliged to wear the same garment summer and winter; to endure hunger and thirst, cold and heat; to sleep at night on rushes gathered with his own hands from the bed of the Eurotas. He had to cook his own food, small in quantity and unappetizing in kind, which, however, he was allowed to supplement by hunting and stealing, for it was no disgrace for a Spartan to steal, though it was looked upon as a crying sin to be caught in the act.

The Spartan youth had little training beyond gymnastics and military exercises. He was taught to despise literature as *Spartan contempt for culture.* unworthy of a warrior. The arts of painting, sculpture, archi-

ture, the studies of philosophy and eloquence which were so assiduously cultivated at Athens had no part in a Spartan education. He was, however, taught singing and playing on the lyre, martial hymns and choral music. The only relief to the drudgery of the training school was the *gymnopaedia*, in which he contended with his peers in music, dancing, running and wrestling.

Training of men. At the age of eighteen a lad was called *Melleiren* and for two years served on outpost duty, when he was styled *Eiren* and began to exercise a direct influence on his juniors. He now became a member of the public mess,¹ an institution not peculiar to Sparta, but common apparently to all Dorian communities. Each table accommodated fifteen, and no new members were admitted without the unanimous vote of the whole body. Each member sent every month a contribution of barley meal, wine, olives and figs, and a little money to buy fish—for flesh was served only on days of sacrifice. The special dish was the unpalatable ‘black broth’ which was found so distasteful to foreigners. No luxury was allowed and all members of the mess were on terms of absolute equality.

Training of girls. The Spartan girls in their earlier years were subjected to a training similar to that of the boys, though less severe. They, as the boys, were formed into classes, and competed with each other in running, wrestling and other gymnastic contests. At twenty a woman usually married; a man married at thirty. Though at twenty a woman was relieved of state discipline, her husband remained under its supervision till the age of sixty. He rarely visited his wife and only when he was not required at the mess, the drill ground and the gymnasium. The women of Sparta, though enjoying little of their husbands’ company, were treated with great respect and enjoyed a liberty quite unknown to the Athenian matron. They had a high idea of patriotism. A Spartan mother prided herself on the heroic deeds of her husband and sons, and the exhortation to her son when handing him the shield as he went to battle, “Return either with this or on this,”² shows clearly the self-sacrificing patriotism she had for her native city.

¹συσσίτια. ²τὸν ἢ ἐπὶ τάν.

The success of the Spartans in the field was due partly to *Spartan army.* their stubborn courage and partly to their military organization. The military system instituted by Lycurgus proceeded upon the principle of a graduated degree of subordination whereby every officer would have a certain degree of authority, and thus the whole military force would possess a graded body of commanders ; so that the signal given by the king would be passed in an instant throughout the whole army. The army in the field was thus a machine acting with precision and effect, and manœuvres were executed with a speed and accuracy that no other Greek army could approach. The army was divided into divisions called *moræ*, four hundred strong. These again were divided into four *lochoi*, each one hundred strong, each again into *pentekostues* of fifty each, and each of the latter into two *enomotia*. *Divisions and officers.* Each *enomotia* was led by an *enomotarchus*, each *pentekostus* by a *pentekonter*, each *lochos* by a *lochāgus*, while a *mora* was led by a *polemarchus*.

It was not long after the age of Lycurgus before the Spartans tested their system of organization, for war soon broke out with Messenia, Arcadia and Argos. These wars resulted in the supremacy of Sparta over the greater part of the Peloponnesus.

No doubt the first Messenian war arose from the desire of *First Messenian war 743-724 B.C.* the Spartans to obtain the rich lands of their neighbours. The war lasted for nineteen years, but the details are scanty and shadowy. It seems that during the first four years of the war, though it was carried on with vigour, the Spartans made little progress in the conquest of Messenia, but in the fifth year they succeeded in driving the Messenians within the mountain fastness of Ithōme, when famine so thinned the ranks of the Messenians that they were compelled to surrender. By the capture of Ithome, the power of Messenia was broken. Some of the population went into exile and formed the colony of Rhégium, while others remained at home and were reduced to the condition of Perioeci, though they seemed to have more exactions demanded of them than were required of the Perioeci, for they had to pay half of the produce of their land to their masters.

*Second
Messenian
war 685-668
B.C.*

For thirty years the Messenians endured the yoke of the Spartan conquerors, and then, aided by the Argives, Arcadians, Sicyonians and Pisatans, they declared war against their oppressors. At first the Spartans were unsuccessful and in their extremity sent to the oracle of Delphi for aid. The god bade them apply to Athens, whereupon the Athenians sent them Tyrtaeus, a lame schoolmaster of Aphidnae, whose martial songs, still extant, aroused the drooping hearts of the Spartans to renewed efforts. At length the Messenians were compelled to retire to the mountain fastness of Eira, where they were finally reduced to surrender. With the fall of Eira, the fate of Messenia was sealed till the days of Epaminondas, 369 B.C.

*War with
Arcadia.*

B.C. 560.

It is probable that the conquest of Arcadia followed shortly after that of Messenia. The Spartans met, however, a stubborn enemy in the town of Tegea, which long held out against them. Finally, however, it was forced to surrender, and compelled to acknowledge the supremacy of Sparta. The inhabitants were treated with great regard by the Spartans, and beyond acknowledging themselves as subject allies, they do not appear to have suffered any degradation in their political standing.

*War with
Argos.*

After the death of Pheidon, the Argive league broke up, and Sparta gradually pushed her conquests against the individual members of the original confederacy, so that she soon extended power over all the eastern side of the Peloponnesus.

Sparta thus humbled the power of Messenia and Argos. She had the Arcadians of Tegea as her allies and ruled over two-thirds of the Peloponnesus. At the time when Athens was engaged in civil strife with local feuds, the system of Lycurgus had placed Sparta in the foremost place among the states, not only of the Peloponnesus, but of all Greece.

CHAPTER VI.

COLONIAL GREECE.

The period 700-500 B.C. was noted in Greek history as *Age of colonization*. the era of colonization. It was then that Greece founded a number of colonies, many of which so developed in wealth, population and intelligence that they surpassed in these characteristics their mother cities. The chief causes of the origin of Greek colonization were civil dissensions in the parent state, an over-abundant population, commercial enterprise, or pressure from foreign foes. From the very nature of the various migrations,¹ civil dissensions would naturally arise. Around the conquerors in the various states there would spring up the conquered population who chafed under the yoke of serfdom. Greece, again, was unable to sustain in itself any large number of people, for the land was poor and, in many parts, unfit for tillage. Again, the Phoenicians, once the traders of the Mediterranean, and in early times successful competitors with the Greeks in commercial enterprise, lost their power in the eighth century before Christ, for their two chief cities, Tyre and Sidon, were reduced under the power of Assyria in the reigns of Sargon and Sennacherib (726-681 B.C.). It was not till the rise of Carthage and Rome that the Greeks had any commercial rivals, and thus Greece had, during two centuries at least, undisputed sway in the carrying trade of the Mediterranean.

A Greek colony² was not settled, as is generally the case with one in modern days, by a few straggling bands of adventurers scattering over a country, and, afterwards forming themselves into a political community. The Greek colonists formed from the beginning a regular political body. The colonists were collected in various ways. Often a whole faction emigrated ;

¹ See Chapter III.

² A Greek colony was called ἀποικία ; a colonist or emigrant, ἀποικὸς ; an immigrant, ἐποικὸς.

sometimes a state issued a proclamation asking for emigrants; sometimes one son from each family was chosen, and sometimes different states combined. The sanction of the Delphic oracle was generally obtained and wisdom was exhibited in this, for no persons in the ancient world could have had better opportunities to find out the suitability of a site for a colony than the Delphic priesthood, since the oracle was visited by pilgrims from all parts of the Mediterranean. After receiving the sanction of the oracle, the next step was to choose for the colony a founder,¹ who had full power to settle its size and constitution. On his arrival at the appointed place, he chose land-surveyors who allotted the land to the colonists, after he had reserved a part for the gods. The founder, after his death, usually received the honours due to a hero.

Colonies usually situated on the sea.

In most cases, with the exception of Magnesia in Asia Minor, the colony was established near the sea, and generally on a hill which formed the Acropolis. The city was built, as far as possible, after the model of the mother city,² and the buildings first erected were usually the temples of the gods, a gymnasium for the exercise of the youths, a council house, and a market place where goods were sold and public meetings held. In later times a theatre for dramatic representations was also looked upon as essential.

Relation of the colony to the mother state.

The colony was considered politically independent of the mother state and the only bonds of union were those of filial affection, such as a daughter would have for a mother, common religious rites and a common constitution. The colonists took with them fire from the central hearth³ of their native city and maintained the worship of its chief deities, while the founder generally modelled the constitution after that of the parent state. The colonists regularly sent representatives and offerings to the festivals of the mother city. If they, in turn, founded a colony, the founder was usually taken from the original mother city. In danger they aided her and expected aid in return. A war between a colony and its mother city was looked upon as an unholy thing,

¹ οἰκίστης. ² μητρόπολις. ³ πρυτανεῖον.

and the fierce struggle between Coreyra and Corinth was regarded by the Greeks as unnatural and repulsive.

In the colonies democracy developed sooner than in the mother land. As is naturally the case, men in the early days of a colony are more on an equality, and class distinctions that may exist in their former home are obliterated. Hence, it happened, that ancient usages and customs were often swept away, and that the Greek colonies increased much more quickly than the mother land in commercial activity and wealth, till in many cases they far surpassed the parent cities.

Of the Greek cities foremost in colonial enterprise, the chief were Chalcis and Eretria in Euboea, Milētus and Phocaea in Asia Minor, Corinth, Megāra, Sparta, Locri, and the Achaean towns of the northern part of the Peloponnesus. It will hereafter be seen that the Ionians were the chief colonizers among the Greeks.

On the western side of the island of Euboea are the sea ports, Chalcis and Eretria, distant from each other about twelve miles, and both situated on excellent harbours on the Euboean Straits. These towns had been for some time in the hands of a *plutocracy*, so that social distinctions among them were founded on wealth. Colonies established by them were, therefore, founded for the sake of commercial gain. These two towns were the pioneers in colonial enterprise in European Greece, and they founded most of the colonies in the district of Chalcidīce in the northern part of the Aegean—a district so called because more than half of the thirty towns in that locality were founded by Chalcis. They were probably attracted to this place by the rich silver mines in which the country abounded, for the Euboeans had already been famous for working the copper mines of their own island. In Sicily, again, they founded Naxos and Zancle (afterwards Messāna); while Naxos, in turn, founded Leontini and Catāna; and Zancle became the mother city of Himēra. Rhegium, in Italy, was founded mainly by Messenians.

The activity of Chalcis and Eretria in Euboea was equalled, if not surpassed, by that of Milētus in Asia. Situated near the mouth of the Maeander, its inhabitants were in ancient times noted for their commercial enterprise, and, as was the case in many other

Ionian states, the government fell into the hands of a powerful plutocracy. All the colonies of Miletus with the exception of Naucrātis, near the delta of the Nile, were on the Propontis or the Euxine. They first settled Cyzicus, a town situated on a narrow neck of land that runs into the Propontis, but soon afterwards established colonies on the shores of the Euxine sea, which were famous for excellent timber and rich mines of gold, iron, copper, and red lead. Here was founded Sinōpe, which in turn founded Trapezus; while on the western side of the Euxine rose the colonies of Odessus, Calatis, Tomi, Apollonia, and Messembria, the first four of which were colonies of Miletus. The enterprising Milesians penetrated even the lonely steppes of Scythia and founded Olbia, near the mouth of the Borysthēnes (*Dnieper*) and Panticapaeum, on the strait between the Euxine sea and the Maeōtic lake.

Other cities of Asia were seized with the colonizing spirit. Phocaea founded Anisus, on the Euxine, and Massalia in Southern Gaul; Perinthus was settled by colonists from Samos; Abdēra, near the mouth of the Nestus, by settlers from Clazomenae, while the island of Paros sent out a colony to the island of Thasos, rich in silver mines.

*Colonies of
Megara.*

While the colonies of Chalcis and Eretria and those of Miletus arose from a spirit of commercial enterprise, those of Megāra and of Sparta were evidently due to the misrule of the oligarchy of birth. Megarians founded Chalcēdon, on the straits of Bospōrus, in Bithynia, and a few years later, Byzantium (afterwards *Constantinople*). Colonists from Byzantium, in turn, founded Messembria, in Thrace, and Heraclea-Chersonesus, the modern *Sebastopol*. Another Heraclea, called Heraclea Pontica, was founded by the Megarians.

*Colonies of
Corinth.*

The colonies established by Corinth were probably due to the same causes as led to the foundation of those of Megara. Syracuse, perhaps, the wealthiest and most important of the Greek colonies was founded by Corinthians and, in turn, became the mother city of Camarīna. Corinthians also colonized Corcyra, which, in turn, founded colonies at Apollonia and Epidamnus.

In Southern Italy two important colonies, Sybāris and Croton, *Achaean colonies.* were founded by the Achaeans of the northern Peloponnesus, which, in after ages, became both wealthy and famous. Of the other colonies of Italy, Tarentum was founded by the Partheniae of Sparta. It is said that during the second Messenian war the *Spartan colonies.* ranks of the Spartan youth became so thinned that many of the Spartan women married *Perioeci*, the offspring of whom were called Partheniae or “bastards.” They were not recognized by the Spartans as being on social equality with the others. A conspiracy headed by Phalanthus, one of their number, was formed, but it was checked, and the conspirators were compelled to leave Laconia. They went to Italy and settled Tarentum.

Another Spartan colony was the island of Thera, which in turn founded Cyrēne in Africa, while Cyrene, again, founded Barca. Besides the colonies we have mentioned in Southern Italy there were many others. In fact, so studded was this part of the Italian peninsula with Greek colonies that it obtained the name of *Magna Graecia*.

CHAPTER VII.

THE AGE OF TYRANTS.

Abolition of hereditary royalty except at Sparta.

In the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. nearly all the states of Greece underwent a political change. That period was marked by an almost universal abolition of hereditary monarchy and the establishment of various forms of oligarchical government. With the exception of Sparta, no state during the flourishing period of Greek history retained the kingly form of government.

Age of political upheaval.

In the age of Homer, monarchical government was the rule in Greece. At the head of each state was the king or chief surrounded by his nobles, while the people had little or no influence. But, by the time of the first Olympiad, the old constitutional forms of hereditary government were passing away, and, in the place of these, oligarchies, founded generally on landed property, were established. There were various causes for this. Sometimes the direct line of the royal family died out,

Cause of this

and the council or chiefs of the late king divided the power among themselves, and they in turn transmitted this power to their heirs. In other cases, when the royal line did not die out, the king was gradually stripped by the great families of his power and prerogatives. Most of the Greek states were small, being confined to a city and the adjacent land. In such a community the king could not surround himself with the pomp of power as in olden days, when the distinctions between the nobility and the common people were more marked. As the king moved about in his little community, all his faults and failings were known to the citizens, and the reverence formerly paid to 'the divinity that doth hedge a king' gradually waned under the development of civilization.

(1) advancing civilization,

(2) the rise of the lower classes,

Another cause was the gradual rise of the lower classes of the people. Between the serfs of the soil and the nobles there existed in every state in Greece an intermediate population consisting

of (1) a class with small holdings who tilled the farms of the nobles and (2) the artisans, and (3) those engaged in commerce. While the ruling class remained stationary, or even diminished in numbers, as was the case in Sparta, these intermediate classes grew in wealth, numbers and intelligence, and began to demand a right to a share in the government of the state. Often, too, when the king became tyrannical, he was deposed and the office abolished. (3) tyrannical government.

Whatever may have been the causes that led to the subversion of the kingly authority, the establishment of an oligarchy, consisting of a few noble families which had been attached to the person of the king, followed. Rarely, however, did this kind of government succeed in maintaining itself in power for any length of time. Often its administration was bad, its rule oppressive, and the members of the oligarchy were frequently at hereditary enmity with one another. They had not the traditions of the old patriarchal kings who could point to a long descent, and they seldom gained the reverence of their subjects. These oligarchies, having thus no ancestral record on which to found their claims for support, had to stand or fall on that of their own administration, and we therefore see the reason that they seldom succeeded in holding their power for any length of time. Oligarchies unstable.

The word 'tyrant' was applied to a person who gained and exercised power in an unconstitutional way, although the character of his rule might be mild and beneficent. When the old hereditary monarchies were replaced by oligarchies, any ruler who acquired supreme power, and was not bound by any of the constitutional checks of the ancestral monarchy, was called a *tyrant*—a term applied alike to the mild rule of Peisistratus of Athens, and the cruel despotism of Periander of Corinth. Often these tyrants were ambitious oligarchs, and still oftener military or political adventurers who championed the cause of the lower classes against the oppressive exactions of the nobles. The rule of the tyrants was frequently cruel and oppressive. It was only natural that men who had acquired their power by the sword would have to maintain that power by the same means. Often the tyrant would shut himself up in the Acropolis surrounded Tyrant: meaning of the word.

by mercenary troops, exile or put to death the leading men of the state, or make the government so oppressive that the citizens would take refuge in colonial enterprise. Some of the tyrants, on the other hand, endeavoured to quiet the discontent among the lower classes by employing them in constructing public works, the money required for which was wrung from the purses of the wealthy. It is, however, worthy of notice that the age of tyrants was one of great mental development and material prosperity in Greece. Many of the stories related of them must be taken with some reservation, for the chief evidence against them is from their avowed enemies. We shall give a short account of a few tyrannies, selecting only the most typical. Of the history of the usurpation of Peisistrātus we shall speak hereafter.

*Tyrants of
Sicyon.*

No city of Greece was so long under the sway of tyrants as Sicyon, which was situated a little to the west of Corinth. The reign of tyrants lasted from the time of Orthagoras (about 676 B.C.) to that of Cleisthenes (560 B.C.) or fully a century. The revolution was brought about by Orthagoras, who was not of the ruling oligarchy of Sparta, but was descended from one of the old Achæan families that had been opposed to the Dorian conquest. No doubt he was strongly supported by the native population, and both he and his successors were men of tact and talent, whose rule was acceptable to the mass of the people—two causes which may account for the long continued power of the tyrants of Sicyon. Orthagoras was succeeded by Myron, by Aristonymus, and, lastly, by Cleisthenes, famous for his wealth and grandeur, and for his victories obtained at the Pythian and Olympic games. In the First Sacred War he fought against Cirrha; and he was also engaged in war with Argos, while he showed great disrespect for the Dorians. He died, leaving a daughter Agariste, the wife of Megacles, an Athenian, who belonged to the powerful family of the Alcmaeonidae. Agariste was the mother of Cleisthenes, the restorer of the Athenian democracy after the expulsion of the Peisistratidae.

Like many other states of the Peloponnesus, Corinth had

been conquered by the Dorians. The conquerors did not expel the original Aeolian inhabitants, but reduced them to a state of social inferiority. The ancestral monarchy of the Heraclid *Tyrants of Corinth.* princes was, however, replaced by an oligarchy who traced their descent to one Bacchis, an early Heraclid king. The rule of the Bacchiadae was one of constant unrest and marked by the foundation of many colonies established in different parts of the Hellenic world. In the hands of the Bacchiadae, the government of Corinth lasted for nearly ninety years, till it was over- *Cypselus, 655-625 B.C.* thrown by one Cypselus. According to tradition, the mother of Cypselus was of the Bacchiadae, but she was so lame and ugly that no one of that family would marry her. She, therefore, married Eëtion, one of the unprivileged multitude. As the Delphic oracle had given out that a son born from such a marriage would prove a ruin to the oligarchy, the Bacchiadae attempted to murder the child. To prevent this, the mother placed him in a chest;¹ whence his name. When he grew up to man's estate, his mixed descent excluded him from political life, but he felt that the blood of the Bacchiadae flowed in his veins. Taking advantage of the discontent in his native city, he overthrew the reigning family and for thirty years he ruled as tyrant in his native state. His popularity was so great that he did not maintain an armed force to defend his person or enforce his authority. Against the oligarchs his power was especially directed. He banished some, slew others, and taxed all heavily. Still with the majority of the people he was popular, for they had evidently come to the conclusion that his government, though despotic, was better than no government at all.

While the rule of Cypselus was on the whole mild and popular, *Periander, 625-585 B.C.* that of his son Periander, though at first gentle and beneficent, was afterwards cruel and detested. This change in the character of Periander is said to have been caused by Thrasybūlus, tyrant of Miletus. It is said that soon after his accession to royal power, Periander sent an envoy to Miletus to ask Thrasybūlus the best method of conducting his government. Thrasybūlus made no verbal answer, but led the Corinthian messenger into a

¹ κυψέλη 'a chest.'

field of corn and began to knock off with his staff the ears of the grain that stood out above the rest of the crop. On the return of the envoy, Periander proceeded to carry out the hint given by his brother tyrant. He built for himself a fortress in the Acropolis, and surrounded himself with a body of foreign mercenaries for whose support he exacted large sums from the wealthy. His spies were everywhere, and he was constantly informed of every plot against him. Without a shadow of trial he would banish or put to death any who opposed his imperious exactions or commands. He closed the gymnasium so that the young men were prevented from meeting together, and he did away with the public feast¹ where the men met at meals. His private life was embittered by misfortune. He killed his wife Melissa in a fit of jealousy, whereupon his younger son Lycophron withdrew to Corcyra. When, advanced in years and, probably, relenting through remorse, he wished his son Lycophron to return to his native land, the latter refused. Periander then agreed to go to Corcyra, if Lycophron would return to Corinth to administer the government. To this, after a time, Lycophron assented, but the Corcyraeans unwilling that Periander should rule over them put Lycophron to death. Periander died of despondency at the age of eighty, and was succeeded by his nephew, Psammeticus, who reigned for three or four years, when he fell by the daggers of conspirators at the moment when the Spartans attacked Corinth and swept away the last traces of the Cypselidae.

However oppressive the government of Periander may have been, he made the power of Corinth respected at home and abroad. He extended its sway over Epidamnus, Aegina, Ambra-cia, Leucas and Anactorium, and recovered Corcyra. He was also a patron of literature and art. The poet Arion and the sage Anacharsis were among his friends; and he himself was so famous that he is reckoned one of the 'seven sages' of Greece.

*Tyrants of
Megara.*

At Megara, Theagēnes established himself a despot during the reign of Periander of Corinth. Like Orthagoras of Sicyon, he gained his power by espousing the cause of the people, but

¹*συσσίτια* (see p. 41).

did not hold his power till his death, for he was banished, B.C. 600. Then followed a bitter feud between the oligarchy and the democracy, in which the latter finally triumphed. The lower classes do not seem to have used their power with discretion, for they plundered and confiscated the property of the wealthy, many of whom were driven into exile. The nobles were compelled to cancel all debts of the lower orders of the people and even to refund the interest. The haughty way in which the democracy exercised their power led to a revulsion of feeling in favour of the oligarchs, who returned from exile, and restored the oligarchy, but were again expelled by the democracy. It was not till after a period of defeat and victory that the oligarchy was restored to Megara.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE EARLY HISTORY OF ATTICA.

*Athens un-
important
in early
times.*

We know little of the history of Attica before the age of Solon, and the little we do know, is obscured by traditions vague and uninteresting. In the Homeric poems Athens is mentioned as a town of secondary importance, and there is nothing to indicate its future pre-eminence in Greek history. It is true we have a traditional list of kings, from the founder Cecrops to the patriotic Codrus, after whose reign the office of king was abolished. According to tradition, the Dorians invaded Attica, and the oracle declared that they would be victorious if they spared the life of the Athenian king. Codrus, upon learning this, resolved to save his country by self-sacrifice. In disguise he went to the enemy's camp, provoked a quarrel, and was killed; whereupon the Athenians, out of gratitude to his memory, abolished forever the title of *king* and substituted that of *archon* or ruler.

*Kingship
abolished
1068 B.C.*

*Life
archons
1068-752 B.C.*

At first, the *archons* were appointed for life. The first life archon was Mēdon, son of Codrus, and the office was confined to the family of Codrus during the lives of eleven successive archons. But soon after the accession of Alcmaeon, the thirteenth in descent from Codrus, another change followed, and decennial archons were appointed, these being still generally restricted to the family of Codrus.

*Decennial
archons
752-683 B.C.*

*Nine
annual
archons.*

In the year 683 B.C. another change occurred, when *nine* archons were elected annually, and this number continued down to the end of Greek history. They were elected, at first from the Eupatridae, by the votes of the people. The first, or president of the body, was called *the archon*,¹ by way of pre-eminence, or *archon eponymus*,² from the year being distinguished and registered by his name. The second was called *king archon*,³ the third *polemarch* or commander-in-chief, and the other six were styled *thesmothetae*,⁴ or law-givers.

¹ ὁ ἀρχων. ² ἀρχων ἐπώνυμος. ³ ἀρχων βασιλεύς. ⁴ θεσμόθεται.

The chief archon was a sort of state protector of all who were *The Archon.* unable to protect themselves. He was the official guardian of orphans, heiresses, or of families that had lost their natural guardian, and he also superintended all law suits arising out of family disputes. He had also charge of religious embassies, and of the greater Dionysia, or festivals of Bacchus.

The duties of the king archon were nearly all connected with *King archon.* religion. Thus he presided at the Lenaea or older Dionysia, superintended the mysteries and the Lampêdêphoria, the courts of the Areopāgus, and of the Ephētae. His wife—for marriage was compulsory in his case—had also some religious duties.

The *polemarch* was originally, as his name implies, commander-in-chief in war, and we find him discharging this duty in conjunction with the ten generals as late as the battle of Marathon, 490 B.C. After this time his duties seem to have been to take cognizance of cases arising between resident aliens, or when one of the party was a resident alien, and also, to take charge of the funeral celebrations held in honour of those who were slain in battle. *The Polemarch.*

The *thesmothetae* were so called because they were specially *The Thesmothetae.* connected with the administration of justice, and were the guardians of the code of laws. This code they annually revised so as to rescind any laws that were inconsistent with those that were passed. Their chief duty, however, seems to have been to receive informations and to bring cases to trial in the courts.

Besides the nine archons, the only other political power in these early times was the court of the Areopāgus, so called *Areopagus.* because it met on Mars' Hill.¹ It seems to have been the representative of the council of chiefs of the Homeric age. All Athenians who had occupied the office of archon and who at the expiration of their office had had their conduct subjected to a scrutiny,² and had been approved, were entitled to a seat in this court. It had charge of religious observances generally, and possessed also some censorial powers over public morals. It especially had judicial power in case of intentional homicide, arson, impiety, or treason, and it retained influence and power down to the age of Christianity.

¹ Ἀρεῖος πάγος, ² εὐθύναι.

Tribes.

We also find, at a very early period, the people of Attica divided into *four* tribes, which had different names at different times. In the period of the Ionic settlement of Attica there were *Teleontes*,¹ *Hoplētes*,² *Argādes*,³ and *Aigikōreis*.⁴ The derivation of these words, no doubt, show that they meant respectively 'consecrators' or 'priests' or 'payers'; 'heavy armed men'; 'artisans'; and 'goat-herds.' After the age of Theseus, these were divided into *Eupatridae* or 'nobles,' from whom the archons were elected; *Geomōroi* or 'yeomen'; and *Demiourgoi*, 'artisans,' 'mechanics,' or 'labourers.' Each tribe was said to have been divided into a number of *phratRIA* or 'brotherhoods,' and each *phratRIA* into thirty *gené* or 'clans.'

These tribes were, however, superseded in time by others that were purely local—those of the Plain,⁵ the Uplands,⁶ and the Shore.⁷ It is possible that the people of the Plain represented the Eupatrid nobles; of the Uplands, the shepherds or herdsmen; of the Shore, the fishermen.

*Draco,
624 B.C.*

These tribes were constantly at variance with each other and general discontent prevailed when Draco was called upon to draw up a written code of laws. These laws were so severe that they were said to have been written, not in ink, but in blood. All crimes from petty theft to wilful murder were punished alike with the death penalty. When Draco was asked why he promulgated laws so severe, he is reported to have said that small offences deserved death, and that he knew no severer punishment for the greater ones. It is probable that the laws he promulgated were severe only by comparison with the milder system of jurisprudence in vogue in later days, for we know that in one case, at least, his laws relating to homicide were not so severe as those of his predecessors. Before his time, all homicides were tried by the court of the Areopāgus, and if any person was found guilty as to the question of fact, without taking into account any justification of the act, he suffered either death or perpetual banishment with confiscation of property. Draco divided the duties of the *Arēōpāgus* between the *Arēōpāgus* and the courts called *Ephētæ*,

¹ τελεῖν. ² afterwards ὁπλίται. ³ ἔργον 'work.' ⁴ αἶξ 'a goat,' κορεῖν, 'to look after.' ⁵ πεδιάς or πεδίαίσι. ⁶ διακρίās or διάκρισι. ⁷ παραλία or παράλι.

reserving to the *Arēōpāgus* all cases of wilful murder, and to the *Ephētae* various degrees of homicide.

The written code of Draco did not allay the discontent of all classes, for the body politic was moved with the dissensions that arise from an unsettled constitution. Accordingly, twelve years after the promulgation of the laws of Draco, we find one of the Eupatridae aiming at supreme power. Cylon, an Athenian nobleman, had married the daughter of Theagēnes, tyrant of Megara, and had gained a victory in the Olympic games, 640 B.C. Encouraged, no doubt, by the success of his father-in-law, and aided by a band of mercenary troops from Megāra, he and his friends seized the Acropōlis; but the great mass of the people looked askance at his attempt, and he soon found himself and his friends besieged by the forces of the state. Though Cylon and his brother made their escape, the rest were blockaded in the citadel, where they were hard pressed by hunger. The archon, Megacles, of the great family of the Alcmaeonidae, fearing that their death should pollute the sanctuary of Athena, promised that their lives should be spared on condition that they left the place. Though a solemn promise was given, they were put to death, some, at the very altar itself of the Eumenides.

Accordingly, a deep stain of perjury and sacrilege attended the family of the Alcmaeonidae, and they were expelled from Athens. In consequence of the guilt of this family, the Athenians supposed that they were especially visited by the displeasure of the gods, and the pestilential blight which afflicted their crops was regarded as a sure sign of the wrath of heaven. The Delphic oracle advised them, in their extremity, to apply to the Cretan prophet, Epimenides. After many sacrifices and religious rites, he purified the city, and thus stayed the plague. In this he was aided by Solon, who was regarded by the Athenians as the founder of their political constitution, and, by after ages, as the man who made Athens the glory of Greece and of the civilized world.

Cylon's conspiracy.

Banishment of the Alcmaeonidae, 597 B.C.

CHAPTER IX.

THE AGE OF SOLON.

*Solon the
father of the
Athenian
constitution*

The real founder of the Athenian constitution was Solon, son of Execestides, a Eupatrid noble, who on his father's side traced his descent from Codrus, the last king of Athens, while his mother was first cousin to the mother of Peisistratus, afterwards tyrant. He was born 638 B.C. The father, Execestides, was a man of extravagant habits who squandered the little patrimony he had. Unlike the majority of the Eupatridae, he betook himself to trade to repair his shattered fortunes. His calling naturally sharpened his wits and enlarged his knowledge of the world. At an early period his gifted son, Solon, devoted his attention to literature, especially to poetry, and so celebrated did he become for his wisdom that he was enrolled among the "Seven Sages of Greece."

*War with
Megara,
610-600 B.C.*

Soon after the legislation of Draco, we find Athens involved in a long and doubtful war with Megara for the possession of Salamis, an island separated from the Attic shore by a channel less than a mile wide. So low had the fortunes of Attica fallen that this island had been seized by the Megarians. After many vain attempts to recover possession of it, the Athenians, in despondency, had actually passed a decree forbidding any one to write or say anything to incite the Megarians to renew the contest. Solon, indignant at the pusillanimous spirit of his countrymen, recited in the market place, before the assembled Athenians, a poem he had composed on the loss of Salamis, and at once he aroused the drooping spirits of his fellow-countrymen to try to regain possession of the island. Appointed to lead the expedition, he landed on the island, drove the Megarians from it, and so successfully conducted the campaign that he carried the war to the gates of the hostile city and seized its port, Nisaea. A doubtful struggle afterwards arose. This was finally settled by the interference of Sparta, which decided that in future Salamis should

remain in possession of Athens. Solon after this took part in the First Sacred War, and espoused the part of Delphi against Cirrha. He is said to have proposed the decree of the Amphictyons, by which the guilty city was destroyed. *First Sacred War, 595-585 B.C.*

We have already seen that Athens was torn by three factions, those of the Plain, the Uplands and the Coast. From the days of Cylon's conspiracy, matters had been going from bad to worse. A series of bad harvests had brought to abject poverty the poorer classes who cultivated the lands of the Eupatrids, and who had been compelled to pay one-sixth¹ of the produce as rental for this land. When they were unable to meet the stipulated rental, they were compelled to borrow money from the Eupatrid nobles at exorbitant rates, and thus they mortgaged not only their farms but also their persons to meet their pressing needs. According to Draco's laws any who were unable to pay their debts might be sold with their wives and children into slavery, and thus Attica was being gradually depleted of its rural population to swell the slave markets of Lydia and Egypt. In consequence of this condition of affairs, the state was threatened with a loss of its agricultural population through the rapacity of the rich. In alarm, the Eupatridae elected Solon archon and entrusted him with the duty of drafting a new constitution for the city. *Low ebb of the Athenian power. Solon archon, 594 B.C.*

The first measure that he introduced was his famous Disburdening Ordinance.² By this decree all debts, whether due to the state or the individual, were cancelled, and the small proprietors who had been disfranchised on account of their debts were admitted at once to the rank of citizens. In consequence of this ordinance the number of citizens was largely increased. *(1) Disburdening Ordinance.*

The second innovation of Solon was to change the coinage of Athens. The Athenians had been using the Aeginetan coinage, devised by Pheidon of Argos. Solon now adopted that of Euboea, hence called the Euboeic.³ According to Plutarch 'Solon made the *mina* of 100 drachmas which had formerly contained *(2) Changes the coinage*

¹ Hence called ἐκπημόροι.

² σείσαχθεία.

³ The relative value of Aeginetan and Euboeic was nearly as 25 : 18.

73,' which probably means that Solon made a mina or 100 drachmas out of the same quantity of silver which was formerly used for 73 drachmas.

(3) *Repeals the laws of Draco.*

After thus relieving the poor from their burdens, Solon repealed the laws of Draco, except those relating to murder, and he substituted a new code more humane in character, by which it was not allowed, for example, to lend money in mortgage on the debtor's body.

Political changes.

The most important, however, of the reforms of Solon were those that he made in the political constitution of Athens. So important were these that he was looked upon by the Athenians as the father of their constitution, though it is well known that many reforms ascribed to him were not instituted, but may have been modified, by him. By one sweeping change, he abolished all the privileges of birth which the ancient Eupatridae enjoyed and substituted a classification of citizens by which offices and municipal honors were determined, not by birth, but by property. In other words, he changed the government from an oligarchy to a timocracy.¹ All citizens were divided into four classes: (1) *Pentacosiomedimnoi*; (2) *Hippeis* or *Knights*; (3) *Zeugitae*; (4) *Thêtes*.

Four classes.

(1) *Pentacosiomedimnoi.*

The *Pentacosiomedimnoi*,² as the name implies, embraced all those whose annual income equalled *five hundred medimni* of corn or upwards. The *Hippeis*³ or *Knights*, consisted of those whose income ranged from *five hundred to three hundred medimni*, and were so called from their ability to keep a war horse. The third class *Zeugitae*,⁴ included those whose income ranged from *three hundred to one hundred and fifty medimni*, and were so named from their ability to keep a yoke of oxen. All whose income fell *below one hundred and fifty medimni* formed the fourth class or *Thetes*. In this classification, landed property alone was assessed so as to induce the wealthy to invest in land, and thus to be eligible for the highest offices of the state.

(2) *Hippeis.*

(3) *Zeugitae.*

(4) *Thêtes.*

¹ τιμοκρατία, 'the rule of the wealthy.'

² πεντακοσιομέδιμνοι. The μέδιμνος (*medimnus*) contained 12 imperial galls, or 1½ bushels and was reckoned equal to a drachma or 17½ cts.

³ ἵππεις.

⁴ ζευγίται from ζεύγος 'a yoke of oxen.'

By this arrangement, the *Eupatridae* would be included in the first two classes; the third class represented the *Geomoroi* or 'yeomanry'; while the *Thetes* formed the *Demiourgoi* or 'artisan class.' The *Eupatrids* who had not the property qualification were degraded to the rank of *Zeugitae* or *Thetes*.

The office of archon was open to the *Pentacosiomedimnoi* alone; the *Hippeis* and *Zeugitae* could, however, hold minor offices, while the *Thetes* were debarred from all offices, but were, as a sort of compensation, exempt from taxes. It was the *Thetes* that formed the light-armed troops; the *Zeugitae*, the heavy-armed infantry; the *Hippeis*, the cavalry, while the higher offices were reserved for the *Pentacosiomedimnoi*.

As we have mentioned before, the archons were chosen from the *Pentacosiomedimnoi*, but were no longer, as before, elected by suffrage. To obviate the possibility of any friction between the different classes, Solon introduced an ingenious combination of selection and chance. Each of the four original tribes could nominate ten persons each, and out of the forty persons so nominated nine were selected by lot as archons. At the expiration of their year of office each of the archons, as was the case with most of the other public officers, at Athens, had to undergo a scrutiny¹ by giving an account of his stewardship.

*Archons
chosen from
the Penta-
cosiomedim-
noi.*

To Solon is ascribed the credit of instituting the *Bule*² or senate. From each of the four original tribes one hundred members were selected, probably by suffrage. As all legislation in the days of Homer was instituted by the kings, so in historical times all laws initiated with the senate. Its duty was to prepare all matters that were to come up for discussion before the popular assembly, to provide presidents for the meetings of the popular assembly, and to carry into effect all resolutions passed. Senators held office for one year, and were subjected to scrutiny at its expiration.

Bûle.

Before Solon's time the Areopagus had charge of all cases of wilful murder, while other cases of homicide were left to the Ephētae. Solon enlarged the duties of the Areopagus by making its duties also censorial. While it still retained the right to in-

*The Areopa-
gus.*

¹ ἐϋθύναι. ² βουλή.

investigate all cases of wilful murder, it had also the general supervision of the laws and institutions of the state, and also the right to inspect the lives and occupations of its citizens. It could exact fines and forfeitures, if it considered the life and occupation of any citizen obnoxious. Profligacy, insolence, idleness, neglect of religious duties could be punished by it. This court was composed of *ex-archons*, and down to the days of Pericles it was the centre of Eupatrid influence, and a counterpoise to the democratic influence of the *Ecclesia*.

Ecclesia.

The assembly of the freemen was called in Solon's time *Heliæa*, but subsequently, *Ecclesia*. It corresponded to the Homeric *agora*. It resembled the *agora* in this, that it could not initiate a measure, but it differed from the *agora*, because it had the right of rejecting or of passing any motion brought before it. By the popular assembly the members of the senate were elected, and to the popular assembly all the principal officers, at the end of their year of office, were accountable for their administration. It was thus that the democracy secured its real power. All officers from the highest to the lowest were directly responsible to the people. This assembly could declare war or ratify treaties, and thus it had, in its own hands, the direction of the domestic and foreign policy of Athens.

*Other laws
of Solon.*

Many other constitutional enactments were ascribed to Solon which really belong to a later age. Some laws, however, he did pass which deserve notice. He gave the right to persons destitute of children to dispose of their property by will; formerly the property went to the nearest kinsmen. He also relaxed the severe restrictions the father had over the son, and forbade arbitrary disinheritance. He even enacted that a father who had not taught his son some useful trade should have no claim to maintenance in his old age. To force all persons to take a side in politics, he passed a law that any citizen who remained neutral in a political contest should be disfranchised. He encouraged trade and commerce by granting special privileges to foreigners to settle in Attica; he punished theft by compelling the guilty person to restore double the value of the property stolen; forbade speaking ill of the dead or the living; established public dinners in the town hall for the archons and others who

were regarded as worthy of state maintenance, and bestowed large rewards¹ on the victors at the Olympic and the Isthmian games.

After settling the constitution of Athens, he bound the people and the government to observe his laws for ten years. He is said to have remarked that his laws were not the best he could devise, but the best the Athenians could receive. No sooner had he promulgated his code than he was importuned to supplement his legislation with alterations or improvements. To avoid the annoyances which these requests caused him, he determined to travel, and visited Egypt, Cyprus, and Asia Minor. In Lydia he is said to have visited King Croesus, then in the height of his power. After Solon had viewed unmoved all the treasures of the Lydian monarch, Croesus asked him whom he considered the happiest man in the world, no doubt expecting that his immense wealth would entitle himself to be regarded in the first degree of happiness. But Solon mentioned in the first degree of happiness Tellus, an obscure citizen of Athens who died fighting for his native land. Again Croesus asked him whom he regarded in the second degree, and Solon mentioned Cleobis and Biton, two young Argives who died while escorting their mother to the temple of Hera. Astonished and mortified that Solon did not regard him in the number of the happy, the Athenian replied that no man could be called happy till he was dead, as the fickle goddess Fortune often changed the brightest prosperity to the darkest adversity. The rest of the story is well known to all.

On his return, Solon found that the old strife between the factions of the Plain, the Uplands, and the Shore had broken out anew. The first was headed by Lycurgus, the second by Peisistratus, a relative of Solon for their mothers were first cousins, and the third by Megacles, an Alcmaeonid and a grandson of that Megacles who had suppressed the conspiracy of Cylon. Of the three, the ablest and most energetic was Peisistratus. Though he belonged to the oligarchy, he championed the cause of the poor, and by the arts of the dema-

¹ A victor at the Olympic games received 500 drachmas; at the Isthmian, 100.

gogue—glibness of tongue and unscrupulous assertion—he persuaded the people that his life was in danger at the hands of the party of the Plain. The popular assembly at once voted him a body guard, with which he seized the Acropolis and became tyrant of Athens.

Peisistratus tyrant 560 B.C. At first Peisistratus ruled with moderation and ability, but, after a year's rule, Megacles and Lycurgus combined and drove him into exile. The two factions of the Shore and the Plain, however, could not work together and soon Peisistratus was invited to return to Athens by Megacles, who offered him the hand of his daughter in marriage. The mode of his return is noteworthy. There lived at that time at Athens a woman, *Phya*, noted for her tall, commanding figure. Clothed in the panoply of Athena, she approached the city in a war chariot with Peisistratus at her side. Heralds preceded them and announced that Athena was bringing back her Peisistratus to her own Acropolis. This story the credulous Athenians believed. For six years Megacles and Peisistratus remained apparently friendly, for the alliance was cemented by the marriage of the daughter of Megacles to Peisistratus. But it was not long

Return of Peisistratus 553 B.C.

Second exile of Peisistratus 545-535 B.C.

before Peisistratus quarrelled with his father-in-law. Once more the forces of Megacles and Lycurgus joined themselves against him. He went into exile a second time to Eretria where he remained for ten years. But these ten years were not spent in idle inactivity. Aided by mercenaries from Argos, and by exiles from Naxos, Peisistratus sailed from Eretria, and landed at Marathon, where the forces of Megacles and Lycurgus were defeated. A general amnesty was given to all his enemies and Peisistratus without opposition was allowed to enter the city.

Second return of Peisistratus 535 B.C.

On his return to Athens, he took precautions to make his power secure. He at once hired a band of Thracian mercenaries, and sent into exile to Naxos the sons of his enemies. As soon as he was thoroughly established in power, however, he showed himself a wise and merciful ruler. While he observed the Solonian constitution, he always took care that one of his family should be at the head of the board of archons. He also levied an extraordinary tax of *five* per cent. on incomes, and the money thus levied he devoted to the erection of public buildings,

and to the maintenance of public festivals. He laid the foundation of the great temple of Olympian Zeus which remained unfinished for six hundred and seventy years. The fountain of Kallirrhoe, called also Enneakrounos, was covered with a building, and by means of nine pipes supplied Athens with water. Peisistratus was also a patron of literature and art. The first public library at Athens was established by him, and by him the collection of the Homeric poems, probably in the order we now possess them, was made.

On the death of Peisistratus, his power was transmitted to his sons Hippias and Hipparchus, who conducted the government with great harmony. Hipparchus inherited the literary tastes of his father. Under the patronage of the Peisistratidae, the poets Simonides of Ceos, and Anacreon of Samos, flourished at their court. *Death of Peisistratus*

Hipparchus was, however, thoroughly immoral in his private life and offered a gross personal insult to Harmodius, a young Athenian noble. Not content with this, he insulted also the sister of Harmodius at a public festival. Stung with resentment, this young Athenian and his friend Aristogeiton determined on revenge. With a few followers they resolved to carry out their plans for slaying the Peisistratidae at the festival of the great Panathenaea, which all the citizens were required to attend in arms. They had formed their plans to first kill Hippias as he was arranging the procession, but seeing him conversing with one of the conspirators, they naturally thought their plans were being betrayed, and gave up this part of their design. They then sought out Hipparchus and despatched him with their daggers. The guards slew Harmodius on the spot. Aristogeiton at first escaped, but was afterwards taken and exposed to all the refinements of torture to extort from him the names of his fellow conspirators. *Conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogeiton*

The death of Hipparchus converted Hippias into a suspicious and cruel tyrant. He put to death a large number of citizens, surrounded himself with mercenary troops, raised arbitrary taxes, and, in consequence, became extremely unpopular, while the fame of Harmodius and Aristogeiton constantly increased. *Hipparchus killed. 514 B.C.*

In consequence of the unpopularity of Hippias, the Alcmaeoni-

*Popularity
of the
Alcmaeonidae.*

dae thought the present a favourable opportunity to return to Athens. Accordingly Cleisthenes, the Alcmaeonid, son of Megacles, who in the days of Peisistratus led the faction of the Shore, headed an armed band and attempted to return to his native land. This attempt was crushed by the mercenaries of Hippias. What Cleisthenes could not gain by force, he gained by diplomacy. The temple of Delphi had been destroyed by fire some years before this, and the family of the Alcmaeonidae had received the contract for rebuilding it. They not merely did their work satisfactorily, but even exceeded their specifications in employing Parian marble for the front of the temple, instead of the coarse stone which the specifications called for. By this means they gained the good will of the Delphic priesthood. From this time whenever the Spartans came to consult the oracle, the only answer made was that 'Athens should be liberated.' So often was this answer returned that King Cleomenes of Sparta was at length induced to undertake the war against Hippias. At first he was unsuccessful, but his second attempt succeeded. He defeated the Thessalian allies of Hippias, who afterwards sought refuge at Sigēum, a small town in the Troad.

*Return of
the Alcmaeonidae and
expulsion
of Hippias.
510 B.C.*

From that time a new era began to dawn on Athens. Harmodius and Aristogeiton were looked upon as martyrs who had shed their blood for the liberation of their native land, statues were erected to them in the market place, and their names celebrated in the national songs.

CHAPTER X.

THE AGE OF CLEISTHENES.

On the expulsion of the tyrant Hippias, the Spartans allowed the Athenians to settle their own affairs by themselves. It was not long, however, before civil strife broke out anew, not as before among the local factions of the Plain, the Coast and the Uplands, but between two men who represented different sides of politics—Isagoras, son of Tisander, a leader of the oligarchic faction, and Cleisthenes, son of Megacles, the leader of the democracy. The rule of Peisistrātus, and especially that of his two sons, had been favourable to the growth of the democratic spirit of Athens. The names of Hipparchus and Hippias were falling into popular disfavour, while those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton were rising into general popularity. As a result of this feeling, Isagoras met with little success with the people in advancing his claims to be the leader of the Athenians, who looked askance at any attempt to re-establish amongst them the old rule of the Peisistratidae. Isagoras was, therefore, forced to flee, while his rival Cleisthenes was left as undisputed master of Athens.

*Isagoras fled
509 B.C.*

Isagoras now had recourse to King Cleomēnes of Sparta, who, in endeavouring to establish a tyrant at Athens, undertook to carry out a policy utterly inconsistent with the political traditions of the Spartans. He evidently felt the inconsistency of his policy for he did not attack Athens with a state force, but at the head of a small band of followers whom he had summoned to his aid. On his arrival near Athens he sent before him heralds to order the Athenians to expel from Athens ‘the accursed family,’ thus attempting to work on the religious scruples of the Athenians, as had been done in the Cylonian conspiracy.

Without striking a blow, Cleisthēnes withdrew into exile and Isagoras was established as ruler. But his rule was short lived, for the tyrannical enactments of Isagoras soon

*Isagoras
ruler and
Cleisthenes
in exile 508
B.C.*

drew down upon him the vengeance of the Athenians. He dissolved the senate of four hundred established by Solon, and replaced it by three hundred oligarchs chosen by himself, while at the same time he expelled seven hundred democratic families who joined Cleisthēnes in exile. The people soon rose in insurrection, drove King Cleōmēnes and his Spartan hoplites with Isagōras and his adherents into the Acropolis, where, after a few days, the garrison was compelled through starvation to capitulate. The lives of Cleomenes and his Spartans were saved, probably because the Athenians had no desire to provoke a war with Sparta. It is said that Isagoras, disguised as a common soldier, eluded the vigilance of the Athenians. But the fate of the Athenian oligarchs was very different. Such was the indignation of the Athenians at the attempt of the oligarchs to subvert the constitution of Athens by means of foreign aid, that all the prominent men were at once put to death, while the rest of the usurpers were sent into exile. Instead of being grateful for the preservation of his life, Cleomenes was stung with resentment at the loss his pride had sustained from his unsuccessful attempt to establish Isagoras as tyrant of Athens. He, accordingly, used all his means to organize a second and more formidable expedition, and at once despatched orders throughout the Peloponnesus to send contingents from every state to join in the expedition against Athens. He even associated with him in the command the other king, Demarātus, a precedent unusual in the history of Sparta, for usually one of the kings remained at home while the other took the command of the armies in the field. The Athenians in dread of the threatening invasion, sent ambassadors to Artaphernes, satrap of Western Asia, to solicit aid from 'the Great King.' The Persian satrap would not, however, pledge any aid unless the Athenians were willing to acknowledge the supremacy of Persia by giving the typical offerings of earth and water. Though these terms were accepted by the Athenian envoys, they were indignantly rejected by the people when laid before the assembly. Athens was at this time destitute of allies with the exception of the small town of Plataea in Boeotia. This town, from the days of Peisistrātus to the time of the Pelopon-

*Isagoras
banished.*

nesian war, was always loyal to the Athenians. In consequence of her friendship for Plataea, Athens had incurred the enmity of the Thebans, who had united with them the maritime state of Chalcis, in Euboea, the commerce of which came into competition with that of Athens. The Spartans determined to attack Athens from the Isthmus, while Thebes and Chalcis were to make a descent from the north. Cleomenes passed the Isthmus, and had led his army as far as Eleusis when the allies first learned the objects of the expedition. Then he openly declared that his purpose was not so much to overthrow the democratical government of Athens, as to establish Isagoras as its tyrant. Up to this time the policy of establishing tyrants was altogether foreign to that of Sparta, and Cleomenes was opposed in his plans by Demaratus and by the majority of his allies. The Corinthians, and many of the others who had experienced the iniquitous rule of the Cypselidae, had no desire to assist any one in establishing a tyranny. Unsupported in his plans, Cleomenes and his confederates withdrew from Attica without wreaking his revenge.

The Athenians, however, were not content when they saw the foe withdraw from their territory. They determined to carry on war against Thebes and Chalcis. Luckily they managed to get between the armies and fell first upon the Thebans, whom they routed. They then crossed the Euripus, and not only defeated the Chalcians, but took the city itself and expelled the oligarchy. They confiscated the lands of the conquered and divided it up into four thousand farms or *cleruchies*, which they bestowed upon the poorer people of Athens. The lower classes of Chalcis were left undisturbed to dwell among the new settlers, but the state was really made a dependency of Athens, for all the power was in the hands of the Athenian *cleruch*, who was a permanent governor in Chalcis. Thus Isagoras was banished and Cleisthenes restored.

*Cleisthenes
restored.*

Cleisth enes now set about his work of reforming the constitution of Athens. He was a born legislator and belonged to a family of legislators. His grandfather, after whom he was named, was the celebrated Cleisth enes of Sicyon, and his brother Hippocr ates was the grandfather of the still more

Cleisthenes.

celebrated Pericles. The reforms that Cleisthēnes instituted were enduring, and any slight changes that subsequently were made did not destroy his original scheme of government, the central idea of which was that the citizens in the assembly were of supreme authority, without whose sanction no important measures could be enacted. The first important reform of Cleisthēnes was a redistribution of the original tribes. The four Ionic tribes were done away with altogether and ten new ones, named after ten Attic heroes, were instituted. Each of these ten tribes was divided into ten *demi*¹ or townships. The tribes were not local though the *demi* were. In this way the *demi* belonging to a particular tribe were not contiguous, and thus it was impossible for the different members of the tribes to group themselves together into a political party. Cleisthenes thus made it impossible for any local combination to arise such as had been formed by the Shore, Uplands, and Plain under the Peisistratidae. Every freeman of Attica of eighteen years of age was registered in the *demos* to which he belonged in a public register.² Besides this, Cleisthenes enrolled the resident aliens, and even the slaves of the resident aliens, who dwelt apart from their masters, but who had a sufficient property qualification. In this way he swelled the number of the citizens, and, in consequence, the military power of Athens was proportionately increased. Each *demos*, like each township in Canada, managed its own affairs. It had its own public meetings, levied taxes for local purposes, and was under the superintendence of an officer called a *demarchus*.³

*Changes in
the constitution
of the
Senate or
Bule.*

In consequence of the establishment of the ten new tribes a change was made in the constitution of the senate. Fifty persons were chosen by lot each year from each tribe. Each member of the senate had to be thirty years of age, a genuine citizen on the side of both parents, one who had never suffered any civil disability. For each day he sat in the senate he received a *drachma*, and like most of the public servants of Athens was liable

*Duties of the
Bule.*

(1) *Deliberative.* to undergo a scrutiny at the end of the year. The duties of the

¹ δῆμος, from δέω *I bind*, cp. Lat. *pagus*, root *pag* to *fix*: Eng. *tūn*, *tyn-an* to *bind*.

² ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον.

³ δῆμαρχος.

senate were partly deliberative, and partly to supply presiding officers for the assembly. It prepared bills¹ to lay before the *Ecclesia*, but these bills, unless ratified by the people, were invalid. If ratified by the people such a bill became a *psephisma*,² or decree, which was in force for one year only, and unless ratified by the *nomothetae* (originally *thesmothetae*) at the end of the year, did not pass into the list of the laws.³

The second duty of the *Bule* was to supply presidents for the popular assembly.⁴ The senate consisted as we have said of 500 members, and the Attic year of 354 days.⁵ Both the year and the senate were divided into ten sections, so that 50 members of the *Bule* held office for 35 days. This period was called a *prytaneia*⁶ and the senators who held office during that time, *prytaneis*.⁷ These were again subdivided into five sections so that 10 members of the *Bule* held office for seven days. These were called *proedri*,⁸ and the chairman⁹ of these presided over the senate and the *Ecclesia*. The chairman held office for one day. In his custody were the public seal, and the keys of the Acropolis and of the treasury.

The *Ecclesia* was the formal assembly of the Athenian citizens that met to discuss and vote upon all matters of public interest. The meetings were held at first *once* during each *prytany*, but afterwards were called on emergencies, sometimes four times during each *prytany*, at such times and places as were appointed by the *prytaneis*, by a notice¹⁰ posted up in the market place five days before such meeting. In this notice were also stated the questions to be discussed.

At first the *Ecclesia* met in the market place; then in the *Pnyx*, a portion of the city west of the Areopagus; and afterwards, in the theatre of Dionysus.

Under Solon the government of the state was chiefly in the hands of the *Archons*; under that of Cleisthenes, the power was transferred to the *Bule* and the *Ecclesia*. The popular assembly

¹ προβούλευμα. ² ψήφισμα. ³ νόμοι. ⁴ ἐκκλησία.

⁵ As this is 11½ days short of the regular year, in eight years the calendar would be 90 days short, so in the 3d, 5th and 8th year of every period of eight years an intercalary month of 30 days was inserted.

⁶ πρυτανεία. ⁷ πρυτανεῖς. ⁸ πρόεδροι. ⁹ ἐπιστάτης. ¹⁰ πρόγραμμα.

was the great political school of the Athenians. In it were discussed all questions affecting the political life of the Athenians. Here were heard all foreign embassies, all questions of peace or war, of revenue and taxation, all new laws of which previous notice had been given, all motions conferring rewards or inflicting civil punishment on citizens or strangers, and all reports of public officials at the end of their term of office. The platform¹ from which the speakers addressed the assembly was of stone, surmounted by steps which were usually occupied by the *proedroi*. The chairman² of the *proedroi* presided and read the previous bill³ which had been recommended by the senate. The crier⁴ then put the usual question, 'Who wishes to speak?' According to the institution of Solon those above fifty years of age were called upon first to speak, but this custom afterwards fell into disuse. The speakers by an old law were required to confine themselves to the subject before the meeting, and were forbidden to indulge in scurrilous or abusive language, though the latter order was often disregarded. This right of free speech,⁵ that all citizens possessed, was one of the proudest boasts of the Athenians. It was an incentive to every free-born citizen, however humble, to become an orator, for oratory was the chief avenue of success to an aspirant for political power. Any citizen who was twenty years of age, not labouring under any civil disability, and whose parents on both sides were free-born Athenians, and who had been enrolled in the register of his *demos*, could discuss before the people the political questions of the day. The discussion was not confined to a particular class of professional speakers. No doubt the assembly had favourites who wielded great influence, still the most obscure, as well as the most noted citizen had equally the right to address his fellow citizens on all questions affecting the public weal. The meetings were more marked by liveliness than by order. Bores or windbags were looked upon as intolerable nuisances, and their words were met with hoots or hisses and drowned in the din. All citizens were expected to be present and had in later times a double induce-

¹ βῆμα. ² ἐπιστάτης τῶν προέδρων. ³ προβούλευμα. ⁴ κήρυξ. ⁵ παρρησία.

ment to attend. A crowd of bowmen¹ swept the market place and other places of resort with a rope marked with vermillion. All who refused to go, or were loitering on the way, were touched by the bowmen and fined. Besides this incentive, in later times a fee of from one to three *oboli* was given to each citizen of the poorer classes to induce them to attend. The Ecclesia, as we have said, was one of the chief educational influences in the life of the Athenian citizen. The humblest citizen listened there to the finest oratory and, in consequence, became well versed in all the political affairs of his native city, and of even foreign states. The sharpness of wit and skill in repartee, so characteristic of the Athenians, were no doubt greatly due to the constant attendance on the Ecclesia, the real parliament of ancient Athens.

Before the days of Cleisthenes, the courts of Athens were the *The Ephetae* Areopagus, which we have noticed already,² and the four courts that went under the general name of *Ephetæ*. These latter took their names from the places where they met—at Palladium, Delphinium, Phreatto, and in the Prytanæum. The first court heard all cases of unintentional homicide and incitement to murder; the second, cases of justifiable homicide; the third tried all persons who had committed an act of justifiable homicide while under sentence of exile; and the fourth court had charge of cases in which the culprit was unknown, or was an inanimate object such as a stick or a stone.

After the time of Cleisthenes most cases at Athens, both *The Heliæa* criminal and civil, were tried by the Heliæa, a body of jurors selected every year. Every Athenian citizen of the age of thirty, and not under some civil disability, was eligible to serve in this court. At the beginning of each year six thousand men were drawn by the nine archons. These were sworn, in a body, to abide by the laws and to give their verdict according to the evidence brought before them. They were then distributed into the ten sections, five hundred being assigned to each court, leaving a supernumerary thousand to supply the place of any who had been removed by death or had left the country. The members of each group received a small

¹Σκῦθαι or τοξόται. ²p. 67.

tablet with one of the letters from A to K marked on it. The ten courts composing the Heliaea were also marked from A to K, so that the five hundred who received tablets marked A would be assigned to the court marked A, and so on with the others. What the jurisdiction of the different courts was, we have no means of knowing. Often two, three and even five courts were united in trials. The Heliasts received subsequently each one, two or three obols a day during their session. The size of the court was an incentive to an orator and a preventive against bribery.

Strategi.

According to the constitution of Cleisthenes the citizens were marshalled by tribes, each tribe being under a *stratēgos* or general, appointed annually by the citizens. They had supervision of all matters connected with the war department of the state. They levied and enlisted soldiers, collected war taxes, and in conjunction with the *polemarch* formed the supreme council of war.

Ostracism.

The last important institution of Cleisthenes was *ostracism*. Athens had suffered at different times from the bitter rivalry of parties and the usurpation of tyrants. To prevent the recurrence of such a state of matters, Cleisthenes devised the institution of honourable banishment called *ostracism*, by which it was provided that 'at any political crisis a special meeting could be called at which the people could declare by their vote that the presence of any individual was prejudicial to the interest of the state.' If six thousand citizens voted, by writing the name of any individual on a piece of tile,¹ that such a person should be banished, he was required within ten days to withdraw from the boundaries of Attica and remain in exile for ten years. This sentence did not cast any stigma on the person so banished for he still retained his civil rights and his property, and it was not looked on as a punishment, but, simply as the means of relieving the state of an individual whose presence would be inimical to its interests.

Such were the leading features of the constitution of Cleisthenes. By it the people had supreme control of the state. They elected its magistrates and called them to give an account

¹ ὄστρακον.

of their stewardship at the expiration of their term of office ; they shaped the foreign and home policy of the state, and also had the supreme control of its judiciary. This constitution had its weak and its strong features. While it raised the citizens intellectually, it also gave an opportunity to unscrupulous demagogues to lead them at their will, and finally succumbed at the end of the Peloponnesian and Macedonian wars.

CHAPTER XI.

LITERATURE AND PHILOSOPHY FROM THE DAYS OF HOMER TO 500 B.C.

After the period of Homer and the Cyclic poets, we enter upon a totally different phase of Greek literature. While the poetry of Homer is purely *objective*, that of the period with which we are now dealing is almost entirely *subjective*. Homer sings of the warlike deeds or adventures of heroes in which he himself took no part. To the events of which he treats, he stands in the position of a spectator. It is, however, different with the poets of the subsequent age. They deal with incidents which give colour to their life, and this colour is reflected in their song. Hesiod, for example, describes from actual experience the hard privations of a farmer's life; Archilochus blends martial strains with the plaintive notes of sorrow for the subjugation of Asia Minor under a Persian despot, while the poems of 'burning Sappho' breathe forth the passionate emotions of love. We shall see hereafter that the poetry of this period deals with the various passions that affect humanity.

Hesiod.

In point of time and in external form, the poetry of Hesiod is not far removed from that of Homer, for Hesiod lived probably a century later than Homer, and both wrote in the hexameter metre and in the Ionic dialect. It is, however, only in these particulars that 'the bard of Ascra' resembles 'the great father of Maeonian song.' The little that we know of Hesiod is gathered from his own works. He was born in the village of Ascra, in Boeotia, to which his father Dius had immigrated from the Aeolian Cyme, in Asia Minor. After his father's death, he was involved in a law suit with a younger brother, Perses, about the little patrimony. The suit was decided against Hesiod. We are also told that the poet then emigrated to Orchomenos, in Boeotia, where he spent the rest of his days.

The masterpiece of Hesiod was 'The Works and Days,' a didactic poem giving instruction to the farmer in the work he has

to do and telling him the days that were lucky and unlucky for doing it. The region of Ascra, according to the poet, was 'dreary in winter, sultry in summer, and good at no season.' The dull, heavy atmosphere of his native district and the stern poverty that was his constant companion, no doubt, produced a depressing influence on his spirits and fostered the pessimism everywhere observable in his personal references. While the bright skies of sunny Ionia are mirrored in 'the pomp and circumstance of glorious war' of the Iliad, and in the enchanting adventures of Ulysses in the Odyssey, the gloomy atmosphere and damp mists of Boeotia have their counterpart in the dreary toil and sluggish inertness depicted in 'The Works and Days.' The realism of Hesiod succeeded the romanticism of Homer. Besides 'The Works and Days,' Hesiod wrote the 'Theogony,' giving an account of the origin of the world, and the descent of the gods. Other minor works are ascribed to him.

The political changes that passed over Greece between 750 and 500 B.C. produced a corresponding change in literature. As we have mentioned already, hereditary monarchy gave way to oligarchy, and this in many cases lapsed into tyranny, which, again, was superseded by democracy. These changes in government marked the rise of individual intelligence, the enlargement of human experience, and the growth of freedom among the members of the political communities. Men individually began to think, speak and act more independently. Knowledge was dawning upon the people; science and art were gradually rising into prominence in Greece and the colonies, and were finding expression in poetry as the best medium of communicating thought. The poetry that sprang up may be divided into Elegiac, Iambic and Lyrical.

The word *elegos*¹ is probably of Asiatic origin, and was often applied, as it is in modern days, to a mournful poem. Soon, however, it lost this meaning, and the term was applied, not to the *subject* of the composition, but to the *particular form of metre* in which the poems were written. 'Elegy is the form of poetry,' according to Coleridge, 'natural to the reflective

Works of Hesiod.

Literature an outgrowth of circumstances.

Three classes of poetry—
(1) *Elegiac.*
(2) *Iambic.*
(3) *Lyrical.*

¹ ἔλεγος is said to be derived from ἔ, ἔ λέγειν, to say 'woe,' 'woe.'

mind, and it may treat of any subject, if it does so, with reference to the poet himself.' This is exactly true of Greek elegy.¹ Almost every conceivable subject is represented in the elegiac poetry of the Greeks. The inspiring martial song, the dirge for the dead, political or party songs, the lays of family feuds, laws for the guidance of the state, proverbs on morals and manners, have all a part in these poems. This kind of poetry had always a flute accompaniment, and this fact is supposed to point to its foreign origin, for stringed instruments were peculiar to the Greeks as wind instruments were to the natives of Asia Minor. Iambic² poetry was devoted to raillery, repartee and satirical composition, while lyrical was a name given to poetry that had the same range of subjects as elegiac poetry, but not restricted to any particular metre, and, as its name implies, had a lyre, instead of a flute accompaniment.

Callinus
about 690
B.C.

The first of the elegiac poets and the inventor of the metre was Callinus of Ephesus. He lived at a time when the Cimmerians, a savage horde of northern Europe, broke into Asia and invaded Ionia. The lays of Callinus are spirited appeals to his countrymen to withstand the invader.

Tyrtæus
about 675
B.C.

Tyrtæus lived at the time of the second Messenian war 685-668 B.C. Tradition states that he was a lame schoolmaster of Athens, that the Spartans were commanded by an oracle to seek a leader from the Athenians, who in mockery sent Tyrtæus. Be this as it may, his soul-stirring battle songs did more than the profoundest tactics of the ablest general could have done, to secure victory to the Spartans.

Archilochus
about 670
B.C.

Archilochus, an Ionian of the isle of Paros, was not only a great satirist, but also one of the first of the lyric poets and was ranked by the Greeks in his own sphere on an equality with Homer. He was the first Greek writer who composed Iambic verses according to fixed rules, and

¹ The elegiac metre consists alternately of a hexameter and a pentameter, having the following scheme :

— — — — —
— — — — —
— — — — —

² *ῥιάπτω*, to rail.

he shared with Callinus the honour of inventing the elegy. His fame rests, however, on his biting satires composed in the Iambic metre. The story goes that he was poor, the son of a slave mother, and, therefore, despised in his native land. He was a suitor for the hand of Neobûle, daughter of Lycambes, who at first promised his daughter, but afterwards refused. So bitter was the satire he composed on the daughters of Lycambes that they hung themselves through shame. He left his native Paros in disgust, and went to Thasos, the inhabitants of which were at war with the neighbouring Thracians. He, finally, fell in a battle between the Parians and Naxians. Many of his poems have a martial ring.

Simonides of Amorgos shares with Archilochus the honour of inventing the Iambic metre. He was born in the isle of Paros, but led a colony to the neighbouring isle of Amorgos, where he spent most of his life. He was the earliest of the gnomic poets, or moralists in verse. His satires resemble those of Archilochus. His longest extant poem is a satire 'On Women,' in which he says the gods made women from various animals: the cunning woman, from the fox; the talkative, from the dog; the untidy woman, from the swine, and so on.

Mimnermus of Smyrna introduced a new era in elegiac poetry. Before his time this class of poetry had been devoted to warlike, national, convivial or joyous subjects, or to satirical compositions. Mimnermus was the first to make it the vehicle for plaintive, mournful, or erotic themes. In sad strains he sings of the instability of human happiness, of the helplessness of man, of the cares, miseries and brevity of life, and of the pleasures of love. Most of his pieces are addressed to Nanno, a female flute player. The following, taken from the poem 'To Nanno,' illustrates his peculiar views of life and his practical merits.

What's life or pleasure wanting Aphrodite:
 When to the golden-haired goddess cold am I;
 When love and love's soft gifts no more delight me,
 Nor stolen dalliance, then I fain would die!
 Ah! fair and lovely bloom the flowers of youth;
 On men and maids they beautifully smile;

*Simonides
of Amorgos
about 660
B.C.*

*Mimnermus
about 620
B.C.*

But soon comes doleful eld, who, void of ruth,
 Indifferently afflicts the fair and vile ;
 Then cares wear out the heart ; old eyes forlorn
 Scarce seek the very sunshine to behold—
 Unloved of youths, of every maid the scorn—
 So hard a lot God lays upon the old.¹

*Simonides of
 Ceos 556-467
 B.C.*

Under Simonides, of Ceos, the elegy reached its perfection. He composed many epigrams, the most celebrated of which is that composed in honour of those who fell at Thermopylae:—

Go, stranger ! tell the Spartans here we lie ;
 Faithful to death because they bade us die.²

*Lesbian
 School.*

Lyrical poetry was cultivated in early times by the Aeolians of Lesbos. Of this school, the two chief representatives were Alcaeus and Sappho.

*Alcaeus
 about 590
 B.C.*

Alcaeus was a native of Mitylène, of Lesbos. He took an active part in politics and was the leader of the nobles against the rising power of the people. At length, when the popular party gained the upper hand, he and his brother were banished. His songs, of which only a few fragments remain, treat of a great variety of subjects. Politics, wine, women and war form the burden of his poetry.

*Sappho
 about 590
 B.C.*

The 'dark-haired' Sappho was, like Alcaeus, a native of Lesbos. She lived in the stormy days of Lesbian politics, of which, however, we find no mention in the existing fragments of her poetry, though numerous references to the politics of the period abound in the writings of her contemporary, Alcaeus. From her works we learn that she was not merely a contemporary of, but on intimate terms with, Alcaeus. It is said that she fled from Lesbos and died in Sicily. The story of her unrequited love for Phaon and of her leaping from the Leucadian cliff into the sea is probably a fiction of a later date. That she was a poetess of pre-eminent artistic ability is attested by the almost unanimous voice of antiquity. By some she was called 'the Tenth Muse'; by others she was styled *par excellence*, 'the Poetess,' as Homer was called 'the

¹Translated by John Addington Symonds.

²Translated by Sir Edwin Arnold.

Poet.' The musical rhythm of the metre called 'Sapphic,' in her honour, is an evidence of an ear exquisitely attuned to the harmony of sound. She possessed the liveliest imagination, and her poems express the most ardent passion of love. Her two best fragments are the following. Both are translations of Ambrose Philips.

ADDRESS TO A BELOVED MAIDEN.

Blest as th' immortal gods is he;
The youth who fondly sits by thee,
And hears and sees thee all the while
Softly speak and sweetly smile.

'Twas this deprived my soul of rest,
And raised such tumults in my breast;
For while I gazed, in transport toss'd,
My breath was gone, my voice was lost:

My bosom glowed; the subtle flame
Rose quick through all my vital frame;
O'er my dim eyes a darkness hung,
My ears with hollow murmurs rung.

In dewy damps my limbs were chilled;
My blood with gentle horrors thrilled;
My feeble pulse forgot to play.
I fainted, sank, and died away.

HYMN TO VENUS.

O Venus, beauty of the skies,
To whom a thousand temples rise,
Gaily false in gentle smiles,
Full of love-perplexing wiles;
O goddess, from my heart remove
The wasting cares and pains of love.

If ever thou hast kindly heard,
A song in soft distress preferred,
Propitious to my tuneful vow,
O, gentle goddess, hear me now;
Descend, thou bright, immortal guest
In all thy radiant charms confessed.

Thou once did'st leave almighty Jove,
 And all the golden roofs above ;
 The car thy wanton sparrows drew,
 Hovering in air they lightly flew ;
 As to my bower they winged their way
 I saw their quivering pinions play.

The birds dismissed, (while you remain),
 Bore back their empty car again ;
 Then you with looks divinely mild,
 In every heavenly feature smiled,
 And asked what new complaints I made,
 And why I called you to my aid.

What frenzy in my bosom raged,
 And by what care to be assuaged ?
 What gentle youth I would allure,
 Whom in my artful toils secure ?
 Who dares thy tender heart subdue,—
 Tell me, my Sappho,—tell me who !

Though now he shuns thy longing arms,
 He soon shall court thy slighted charms ;
 Though now thy off'rings he despise,
 He soon to thee shall sacrifice :
 Though now he freeze, he soon shall burn,
 And be thy victim in his turn.

Celestial visitant, once more,
 Thy needful presence I implore !
 In pity come and ease my grief,
 Bring my distempered soul relief ;
 Favour thy suppliant's hidden fires,
 And give me all my heart desires.

Anacreon
circa 530
B.C.

Anacreon was born at Teos, a city of Ionia. He is indirectly connected with the Lesbian school in the form and matter of his lyrics. He spent most of his life at the court of Polycrætes, tyrant of Samos, but afterwards at that of Hipparchus, of Athens, and finally in Thessaly, where he lived with the princely Aleuādae. The universal voice of antiquity represents Anacreon as a consummate voluptuary ; and his extant poems confirm the truth of this tradition. Love, wine, and

music were his chief themes. He had no desire except that of enjoyment.

We must not imagine that all the songs sung at the feasts of *Callistratus* the ancient Greeks were devoted to the praises of wine. Often the songs sung on such occasions were on patriotic themes. One of the most popular of such songs was 'the Ode to Harmodius and Aristogeiton,' composed by an obscure poet *Callistratus*. The translation is by the Marquis Wellesley :

I'll wreathe my sword in myrtle bough,
The sword that laid the tyrant low,
When patriots, burning to be free,
To Athens gave equality.

Harmodius hail ! though reft of breath,
Thou ne'er shalt feel the stroke of death !
The heroes' happy isles shall be
The blest abode allotted thee.

I'll wreathe my sword in myrtle bough,
The sword that laid Hipparchus low,
When at Athena's adverse fane
He knelt, but never rose again.

When Freedom's name is understood
You shall delight the wise and good ;
You dared to set your country free,
And gave her laws equality.

Besides the Aeolian, we have also the Dorian school of Lyrical *Dorian* poetry. Both schools represent the poetry of the aristocratic *Lyrical poetry.* classes of society, but the poetry of the Aeolians is nearly altogether *personal*, while that of the Dorian school is almost wholly *religious*.

The Aeolian writers gave vent through the medium of im- *Differences* passionate lyrics to their joys or sorrows, their hopes and fears, *between the* to their views of society or of politics, and they mirrored in *Dorian and* their verses all the fluctuating feelings that vex or delight *Aeolian* humanity. On the other hand, the Doric poets gave expression *poetry.* to the religious life of the Doric people as preserved in the traditions of the past. For this reason the Doric bard, like the

Homeric minstrel, says little of himself. He celebrates, it may be, the deeds of some hero who has won a victory at the Olympic games, or he sings the praises of Apollo or of Dionysus, the two deities especially worshipped by the Dorian people. Again, while the Aeolian song was sung by a single performer to the music of the lyre, the Doric poetry was generally sung and accompanied with the rhythmic movement of a chorus of dancers.

Alcman
about 630
B.C.

Alcman, the greatest lyric poet of Sparta, was by birth a native of Sardis. He was brought to Laconia as a slave, but was afterwards emancipated and naturalized as a citizen of Sparta. Most of his poems were composed at the time of the Second Messenian War, and the high estimation in which the poet was held may arise from the fact that he lived at a period when his adopted countrymen had learned to devote themselves to the refinements of poetry. He wrote hymns, processional songs¹ to be sung by maidens,² paeans³ or songs celebrating the health-giving powers of the gods, nuptial chants,⁴ and love songs.⁵ He is said to have introduced the choral lyric and to have invented the strophe⁵ and antistrophe.⁶

Stesichorus
about 610
B.C.

Stesichōrus obtained his name 'marshall of choruses' from his skill in conducting, or in training choruses. His real name was Tisias. He stands with Alcman at the head of the Dorian school. It is said that he relieved the monotony of the *strophe* and *antistrophe* by introducing the *epode*, which was sung by the chorus while remaining stationary, after executing the movements to the right and the left. The subjects of his poems were similar to those of Alcman.

Arion, of
Methymna
610 B.C.

Arion of Methymna in Lesbos, was the inventor of the dithyramb or chorus in honour of Dionysus. We know little of his life except the traditional story that Arion went to Sicily to take part in some musical contest and that he won the prize and returned home laden with presents on a Corinthian ship. The rude sailors viewed his treasures with covetous eyes and meditated murdering him. After in vain begging them to spare his life, he obtained permission to play on the *cithara*. In festal

¹ προσώδια. ² παρθένια. ³ παιᾶνες. ⁴ ἐπιθαλάμια. ⁵ ἐρωτικά. ⁶ στρόφή, the dance and song from the right to the left: the reverse of this was the ἀντιστροφή.

array, he placed himself on the prow, played on his instrument, and the song-loving dolphins collected at the sound. He leaped into the sea and was carried on a dolphin's back to Taenăron, and thence to Corinth.

Pindar, the greatest of the Doric lyric poets, was born at the village of Cynoscephălae, near Thebes. The art of flute playing seems to have been hereditary in the family and the youthful poet, at an early age, became devoted to the arts of poetry and music. He was sent to Athens, where he received instruction, but returned to Thebes, probably, before his twentieth year, when he wrote his first extant ode. He afterwards visited the courts of Alexander, king of Macedonia; of Hiero, tyrant of Syracuse; of Theron, of Agrigentum. He is said to have died in the eightieth year of his age. *Pindar about 500 B.C.*

The extant works of Pindar are his *Epinikian* odes, in which he celebrated the praises of the victors who gained prizes at the four great national festivals, the Olympic, the Pythian, the Nemean, and the Isthmian. These odes extol the wealth and the skill of the victor, the deeds of the family from the remotest times, and relate the legends connected with his ancestors and his native city. *Works.*

The early philosophers of Greece may be broadly divided into two classes. Under the first class may be included those philosophers who sought to discover the primary essence, substance or basis of all things in the universe. They asked the question, Of what do all things consist? They did not, however, attempt any explanation of the causes of the various phenomena of the universe, such as heat, light, motion, earth, air, water. The different attempts to find an essence or substance gave rise to *three* schools, the Ionic, the Pythagorean and the Eleatic, which flourished mainly in the sixth century. *Greek philosophy.*

The second class of philosophers, known as the Physicists of the fifth century, was the natural outcome of the speculations of the first. Men could not stop at endeavouring to find out the essence of all things. They were compelled to seek the causes of the various phenomena of the universe. 'How did the essence, the substance of all things give rise to such varied *First division.*

Second division.

phenomena? What is the explanation of growth and decay, of the perpetual changes going on, of the infinite variety of the animal, vegetable and mineral world ?'

As might be expected, the answers to these questions were often very crude and sometimes absurd ; nevertheless nothing shows the philosophic bent of the Greek mind more clearly than the ingenious speculations and profound observations of the chiefs of the different schools that made an attempt to solve these problems. The Physicists had three main divisions : the school of Heraclitus, of the Atomists, and of Anaxagoras. But Anaxagoras, by introducing thought, design or mind, as an explanation of the universe, made an important and marked advance on the speculations of his predecessors.

(1) *Ionic School.*

Thales, 640-550 B.C.

Thales, a native of Miletus, is regarded as the father of Greek philosophy. He did not confine himself to philosophical research, but he devoted himself also to mathematics and astronomy, and was the first to predict a solar eclipse. No doubt his investigations in science gave his mind a bent towards philosophy. As Grote tersely puts it, Thales did not concern himself with the question, 'Who sends rain, thunder and lightning, or earthquakes?' or, 'Why does he send it?', but with the problem, 'What are the antecedent conditions of, rain, thunder and lightning, or earthquakes?' Homer and the older poets would ascribe such to a personal deity. Thales rejects this, and laid down the dogma that *water* is the essence out of which all things arose.

Anaximander 610-540 B.C.

Anaximander, a native of Miletus, was also noted for his astronomical and geographical knowledge. He believed that the original substance out of which all things sprung was not water, but the Infinite mass of matter corresponding to the chaos of Hesiod, *i.e.*, matter not yet developed into any of the forms familiar to us. This Infinite chaos is in eternal motion, and from it are produced the four elements, *fire, air, earth and water.*

Anaximenes about 520 B.C.

Anaximenes, also of Miletus, was said to have been a disciple of Anaximander. He agrees with Thales in believing that there is a primitive element out of which all things are formed, and

with Anaximander that the essential qualities of this essence are Infinity and unceasing motion. *Air* was this essence—infinite in extent and eternal in duration.

Pythagōras was a native of Samos. In early life he travelled widely, chiefly in Egypt, where no doubt he obtained many of his doctrines. He finally settled in Crotona, in *Magna Græcia*, and established there a school of ascetics, known as the Italic or Pythagorean school. They lived under the strictest rule, had goods in common, abstained from flesh diet and woollen apparel, and were sworn to inviolable secrecy with regard to their order. They cultivated mathematics and illustrated their doctrines by means of numbers. Three things may be noted about their society: their high idea of friendship, the admission of female associates into their society, and the unquestioning submission of his disciples to the words of the master, whose *ipse dixit*¹ put an end to all controversy. After establishing this brotherhood at Crotona, he soon spread his doctrines to other cities, where similar societies were established. Pythagoras was finally banished from Crotona and took refuge in Metapontum, where he died.

Pythagōras sought the basis of the universe, not in substance, but in numbers and proportion. The key of the universe is, according to him, the law of development, which determines the nature of all things that exist. Number is the basis of the harmonies of music, the due proportion of sculpture and architecture, and the movement of the heavenly bodies. Hence, number is connected with form, substance and quality. All numbers are odd or even; the former limited, the latter unlimited. One represented the point; two, the line; three, the plane; four, the square. Again, one represented the Central Fire, the throne of Zeus, around which the ten spheres revolve in regular order. As the sum of the first four digits make up the number *ten*, so ten was the number of categories, or list of contraries given by Pythagoras: limited and unlimited, odd and even, one and many, right and left, male and female, rest and motion, straight and crooked, light and darkness, good and bad, square and oblong.

(2) *School of Pythagoras, about 520 B.C.*

Doctrine of numbers according to Pythagoras.

¹ αὐτὸς ἔφα.

Theology of Pythagoras. According to Pythagoras, there is one God, eternal and unchangeable, ruling all things, upholding all things. He taught that the soul was a 'harmony,' the body was its prison, in which it was punished for the sins of the past life and prepared for the life after death.

(3) *Eleatic School.* The third school of Philosophy that arose was the Eleatic, so called because its home was in Elea or Velia, of Italy, though the founder of it was Xenophānes, of Colophon, who emigrated to Elea. In his poem 'On Nature' he rejected the popular notions of the gods as represented in the poems of Homer and Hesiod. According to him God is One, 'all eye, all ear, all understanding; unmovable, unchangeable, a vast all-embracing Sphere.' Whether he meant by this that all nature was God or whether he wished to express that God was perfect and omnipresent is a matter of dispute.

Parmenides about 480 B.C. Though Xenophānes was the founder of the school, the chief representative of it was Parmenides. He ascribed to *Being* the attributes his predecessor had ascribed to God. According to him 'only Being is, non-Being is not and cannot be thought; all that exists has existed, and will exist the same for ever. Change and multiplicity are illusory. It is only by thought that we can become conscious of the really existent; being and thought are the same things, and the senses which show us a number of things as origin, decay and change are the cause of all our errors.' Everything, he taught, exists from opposites, as Light and Darkness, Good and Bad, and so on. Under Zeno and Melissus this school flourished, and the doctrines taught were nearly the same.

(4) *The Physicists of the Fifth Century.* The chief of the first school of Physicists was Heraclitus, of Ephesus, who belonged to the age of Parmenides. He agrees with the chief thinkers of the Eleatic school by insisting on the unity and eternity of nature. While the Eleatics believed in the continuance of matter and said that the universe has existed and will exist for ever, and that it is only change and multiplicity that are illusory, Heraclitus, on the other hand, held that all is change and motion, and that the appearance of fixity is only illusory, that everything is constantly passing over from some-

(a) *Heraclitus.*

thing to something else, that all death is birth into a new form, and all birth the death of a previous one ; that all things are in a state of flux. The only thing permanent, according to him, is Zeus, the all-pervading mind of the world. His theories were afterwards enlarged upon by Empedocles, of Agrigentum.

The nominal founder of the Atomistic school was Leucippus, ^{(b) *The Atomistic School. Democritus B.C. 460.*} but the real founder was Democritus, of Abdēra. His views have an interest to us in connection with modern science. According to him, all the visible universe is composed of atoms, indivisible, solid and incompressible, without any secondary qualities, differing only in size and weight, in figure, proportion and arrangement. Through their combination the visible world was formed. These atoms were so minute as not to be seen or felt.

The last of the pre-Socratic philosophers that we shall mention is Anaxagōras of Clazomenae, of Ionia. He taught that all material phenomena was full of design, and he attributed the plan to the work of a being or essence, rational and almighty, to which he gave the name of Mind (*νοῦς*.) In other words, he distinguished Mind and Matter. This Mind communicated to the inert mass of Matter a rotatory impulse by which the cognate particles were brought together. *Mind* is the soul of the world, dwells in all living things, even plants, as their principle of life. ^{(c) *Anaxagoras of Clazomenae 500 B.C.*}

We have already seen that poetry and philosophy had their birth in Ionia. The same is true with respect to history. Here lived the earliest historians, called *logographi*, or ‘writers of prose.’ The works of these early historians may be divided into two classes : compilations of ancient myths or legends of Greece, and especially of the genealogies of the noble families ; and narratives of rude history intermingled with geography and personal travel. ^{*Historical composition.*}

Cadmus, of Miletus, is usually mentioned as the earliest of these writers. According to traditions, he was the author of an historical work, ‘On the taking of Miletus and the colonization of Ionia,’ in four books. We know little about his mode of treating his subject, for the work that went under his name in the Augustan age is generally regarded as a forgery. ^{*Cadmus about 540 B.C.*}

Acusilæus
about 525
B.C.


Acusilæus, though of Argos, was so imbued with Ionic tastes and culture that he wrote in the Ionic dialect. The little we know of him proves that his work (three books of genealogies) were for the most part translations of Hesiod into prose.

Hecataeus
about 525
B.C.

Hecataeus, of Miletus, is often quoted by Herodotus. He lived in the troublous times of the Persian wars. When Aristagoras was endeavouring to persuade his countrymen to revolt, Hecataeus tried to dissuade them from the attempt. Again he induced Aristagoras on the invasion of Asia Minor by the Persians to occupy and fortify the island of Leros. His works were an "Itinerary" and "Genealogies" or "Histories." This work contains a description of Europe, Asia, Egypt and Libya, and the latter contains, in four books, poetical fables or traditions of the Greeks. Herodotus knew the work of Hecataeus well and often combats his views.



ASIA MINOR





CHAPTER XII.

THE LYDIAN AND PERSIAN MONARCHIES.

Hitherto the history of Greece has been confined to the development of isolated communities which had nothing to unite them in a common cause. A power was now, however, looming up in the East, which compelled the united action of the leading states of Greece, for the very existence of Greek nationality was threatened by the rising empire of Persia, which was extending its conquests towards the west. To get a clear view of the struggle in which Greece was now about to engage, it will be necessary to give a brief account of the history of Persia from the beginning down to the time when the Greeks and Persians struggled for supremacy, as well as to take a glance at the various empires on the ruins of which the Persian empire was founded.

It may be remarked at the outset that the most characteristic difference between the political communities of Europe and of Western Asia is the manner in which the nations of the two countries have developed. In Europe, nearly all the political communities have had small beginnings; have gradually developed their institutions and nationalities; and thus have, by progressive stages, grown into sturdy nations which have lasted for centuries. In Western Asia, on the other hand, the great empires suddenly sprang up, and as suddenly decayed. So long as these mighty nations were conquerors, they rapidly rose to the zenith of their power; but, after establishing that power, they sank into sensuality and sloth, and fell an easy prey to some nation, often obscure, which, in turn, became a victim to another hardier race.

*Differences
between the
European
and Asiatic
nations.*

The kingdom of Lydia was inhabited by a Semitic people, the *Lydia*. Hittites, who were of the same race as the Jews and Phoenicians. It occupied the central division of Western Asia, between Mysia on the north and Caria on the south, and between Phrygia on the

east and the Aegean on the west. The Tmōlus range of mountains divides the country into two plains of unequal extent; the southern, the smaller, is watered by the Cäyster, and the northern, the larger, by the Hermus. The fertility of the land, and the salubrious climate, as well as the variegated scenery, made this district one of the most favoured regions of the world, and contributed in no small degree to foster the effeminacy of the Lydian character. Tradition states that there were three dynasties of Lydian kings, but actual history concerns itself with the last only, the Mermnādae.¹ Under this dynasty, Sardis, the capital, became the centre of a commercial and civilized nation, and from its proximity to the Greek states, the effects of its civilization had an important influence on the character of the Greeks who inhabited the cities of Western Asia.

*The Mermnadae,
716-546 B.C.*

*Development of
Lydia.*

During the reigns of the kings of the Mermnādae, the Lydians became highly civilized and wealthy. They developed their manufactures and agriculture, and carried on an extensive commerce with the Greeks on the sea-coast, who, as enterprising merchants, disseminated the products of Lydia to the different parts of the Mediterranean. The river Pactōlus, on the banks of which their capital, Sardis, was built, abounded in sands of gold and, it is said, the Lydians were the first to coin money. The Greeks of Ionia learned from them the useful and ornamental arts of weaving and dyeing the finest fabrics, and the extraction of metal from the ore; but, unfortunately, they also learned from them luxury and effeminacy. Combined with this high civilization, the Lydians had a lax morality, which made them an easy prey to the hardy Persian warriors under Cyrus.

Assyria.

Further to the east was the great empire of Assyria, which, at the time of its greatest prosperity, extended over the south of Asia from the Indus on the east to the Mediterranean on the west. We know little of its history, but the greatness of Nineveh, its capital, is attested by writers of sacred and profane

¹ According to Herodotus, the kings of the Mermnadae were: Gyges, 716-678 B.C.; Ardys, 678-629 B.C.; Sadyattes, 629-617 B.C.; Alyattes, 617-560 B.C.; Croesus, 560-546 B.C.

history as well as by the excavations that have recently been made. Assyria was shorn of its power by a succession of *Nineveh* revolts. Finally Nabopolassar, a viceroy of Babylon, and Cyax- ^{*taken, B.C. 610.*}eres, a Persian prince revolted, attacked and destroyed Nineveh.

On the ruins of the Assyria was founded the empire of *Babylon*. Babylon, which up to the time of the capture of Nineveh seems to have been a dependent state. With the reign of Nabopolassar, Babylonian history really begins. Under the reign of his successor, Nebuchadnezzar, the empire reached its greatest height and extended its boundaries from the Euphrates to ^{*Nebuchadnezzar, 604-562 B.C.*} Egypt, and from Armenia to the deserts of Arabia. The boundaries were further extended to the Tigris by Labynētus, the Belshazzar of Scripture.

The Median empire seems to have been founded on the ruins *Media*. of the Assyrian, in consequence of the revolt of Cyaxeres, though Herodotus represents two kings¹ as reigning before the last named monarch. The country occupied the great table-land of *Iran*, between Armenia to the north and north-west, Susiāna on the west and south-west, Persia on the south, and the great deserts of Asia on the east, and Parthia, Hyrcania and the Caspian to the north-east. The land was densely peopled and exceedingly fertile, producing grapes, figs, oranges, citrons, and having an excellent breed of horses. *Persia*. Persia was a name originally applied to a small, mountainous district of Western Asia, lying on the north-east side of the Persian Gulf. This district is inhabited by a number of independent Aryan tribes, partly nomadic, and partly agricultural, and noted for their simple and warlike habits, which they preserved intact so long as they confined themselves to their native mountains. They clothed themselves in the skins of the beasts of the chase, lived on the plainest of food, eschewed the use of wine, and scorned the luxury of the neighbouring Medes.

Under Cyrus, who is represented by Herodōtus as the son of a *Cyrus*. Persian noble and Mandāne, daughter of Astyāges, king of Media, who was also brother-in-law of Croesus, king of Lydia, these

¹ The kings of Media were, according to Herodotus: Deioeces, 710-657 B.C.; Phraortes, 657-635 B.C.; Cyaxeres, 635-595 B.C.; Astyages, 595-560 B.C.

*King of
Persia, 559
B.C.*

fierce warriors swooped down from their mountain fastnesses, defeated the Medes in battle, took Astyages prisoner and established Cyrus on the throne. Though conquered, the Medes remained so closely associated with the Persians in nationality that the terms Medes and Persians were with the Greeks synonymous. It was but natural that Croesus, the rich king of Lydia, should attempt to take vengeance on the bold conqueror who had dethroned his brother-in-law. Cyrus invited the Greek cities on the coast of the Aegean to join his forces against those of Croesus, but they declined the offer, probably thinking that the Lydian king was stronger than the Persian. The armies advanced against each other and fought a bloody, but undecisive battle near Pteria, a city of Cappadocia. After this Croesus returned to Sardis and disbanded his army, but gave his soldiers orders to re-assemble in the following spring. Suddenly, however, Cyrus appeared before the walls of his capital and a decisive battle was fought between the remnant of the army of Croesus and the Persian troops. The city was taken and the Lydian monarch fell into the hands of Cyrus, to whom he for many years was a faithful counsellor. By Harpāgus, the general of

*Ionian cities
subdued and
Babylon
taken, 538
B.C.*

Cyrus, the Greek cities on the coast were reduced to submission, while Cyrus himself led his army against Babylon. He defeated the Babylonians in battle, and, after various vain attempts to take the city, at last succeeded by diverting the course of the Euphrates, which flowed through the city, so that his soldiers entered by the bed of the river. He subsequently crossed the Araxes to subdue the Massāgētae, a Scythian tribe, but was defeated in battle and slain.

*Slain in
529 B.C.*

*Cambyzes,
529-522 B.C.*

Cambyzes, his son, succeeded. He extended the empire of his father; conquered Egypt, but lost in the sands of the Libyan desert an army which he led in person against the Ammonians. Another army which he led against the Ethiopians was compelled to return for want of provisions. He subdued Phoenicia and Cyprus, and the Greek colonies of Cyrēne and Barca. On his return to Memphis, he treated the Egyptians with great heartlessness and openly insulted their religion. He was cruel and

reckless, for he slew his brother Bardes¹ with his own hand, and wasted his soldiers on wild and fruitless campaigns. While absent in Egypt a pretender named Smerdis by the Greeks, pre- *Smerdis.* tending that he was Bardes, appeared, and Cambyses at once marched against him, but died of a wound at Ecbatāna. The reign of Smerdis, who was a Mede, and belonged to the magi or priests of Persia, was short lived. After a reign of seven months, the impostor was slain by a number of Persian nobles who placed one of their own number, Darius Hystaspes, on the throne.

This king was the most liberal and energetic of all the Per- *Darius* sian monarchs. The two preceding kings, Cyrus and Cambyses, *Hystaspes,* had been too much engaged in conquests to regulate the affairs *521-486 B.C.* of the empire. It was left to Darius to organize the immense conquests of his predecessors into a well regulated empire. When he ascended the throne, he found the conquered countries a mass of disintegrated nations; when he died, he left them a highly organized empire. He divided his kingdom into twenty satrapies or provinces, each governed by a satrap or civil governor, a military governor and a royal secretary. These officers were directly responsible to 'the Great King' for the disposition of troops in their own satrapy as well as for the annual tribute which they had to pay into the royal treasury, and for the soldiers that were required for the royal army. Had his successors been men of the same energy as Darius, no doubt the system inaugurated by him would have been successful; but as often happened, the subsequent kings were either too indolent to administer affairs, or too weak in resolution or judgment, and, as a natural consequence, the power of the satraps often became a dangerous rival to that of the king, and thus the Persian empire fell by its own weight.

¹ Called by the Greeks Smerdis.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE PERSIAN WARS.

*Causes of
the Persian
wars.*

We shall now explain in what way the Persians and the Greeks came into direct conflict. Hitherto the ambition of the Persian king had found vent in extending his empire eastward and southward. But when Darius had organized his empire, and restored order and good government, he began to think of adding new dominions to his already great possessions. Instead, however, of proceeding westward across the Aegean sea, and conquering Greece, he turned his attention to the Scythians, who roamed over the great plains of Southern Russia, tending their flocks. Crossing the Bospörus with a large army, Darius received the submission of the Greek towns of the coast, and of the Thracian tribes of the Hebrus valley. He then marched north to the Danube, his fleet, made up largely of Greek ships from the Ionian towns, sailing along the coast and keeping the army company. When he arrived at the Danube, he formed a bridge of boats, and led the army across into the country of the Scythians. The latter, aware of the approach of Darius, drove their herds into the interior, and by their skilful horsemanship easily evaded every effort made by the Persians to bring them to battle. After more than two months of vain efforts to accomplish anything definite, Darius was forced to retreat, followed by the Scythian horsemen who cut off the stragglers and the sick of his army. He was glad to reach the Danube without having suffered any great disaster, and to find his bridge of boats intact. Fortune favoured Darius more than he knew, for, during his long absence in the Scythian country, the scheme was hatched in the subtle mind of Miltiades the Athenian, the tyrant of the Thracian Chersonesus, and one of the captains of the Greek fleet, to draw off the ships, thus destroying the bridge of boats, and to leave Darius to his fate. This step was seriously discussed and probably would have been carried out, had not Histiaeus, the tyrant of Miletus, persuaded the other tyrants of the Ionian

*Scythian
expedition,
B.C. 512.*

towns of Asia Minor, to remain. He pointed out that the death of Darius and the destruction of Persian rule would lead to a democratic revolt in every Greek town of Asia Minor. So when Darius returned from his fruitless expedition in Scythia, he found his bridge of boats awaiting him, and, by its means, was enabled to return to Thrace. The king was grateful to Histiaeus for the service he had rendered, and gave him a Thracian principality to rule. He subsequently became afraid that Histiaeus would prove dangerous in his new domain, and summoned him to his capital, Susa, on the plea of desiring his advice and companionship in the royal council. In the meantime, Miletus was ruled by Aristagōras, the cousin and son-in-law of Histiaeus. When Darius returned from Thrace to his own capital, he left behind him an army under the command of Megabazus to extend his domains in Thrace, Macedonia, and elsewhere to the west. Megabazus succeeded in reducing the Greek towns on the coast, and advanced to the frontier of Macedonia, whose king made a formal submission to the Persian monarch by sending him earth and water, the customary tokens of homage.

Darius seems to have been satisfied with his conquests westward, or else other projects arose, for Greece proper was now left unmolested for several years. How long the Persians would have refrained from further interference with Greek affairs it is difficult to say, had not a good ground for a quarrel been furnished by the Athenians. The story is as follows : The island of Naxos, the largest, wealthiest, and most populous of the Cyclādes, was distracted by internal strife and social anarchy. The condition of the island tempted Aristagoras, tyrant of Milētus, to conquer it for the Persian king. He therefore obtained permission from Darius to make the attempt, and for that purpose was given the command of two hundred vessels. But Artaphernes, satrap of Lydia, who disliked Aristagoras, sent along with him on the expedition a Persian noble, who soon managed to quarrel with Aristagoras, and, to revenge himself on his enemy, sent secret information to the Naxians of the approach of the fleet. It therefore happened that when Aristagoras reached Naxos he found the people of the island so well prepared to receive him

*Attack on
Naxos.*

that he could accomplish nothing. Aristagoras now found himself on the verge of ruin. Everything had been staked on the success of the expedition, and heavy debts had been incurred in equipping the fleet. He dreaded the wrath of Darius, and cast about him for some escape from his peril. Just at this juncture he received a message from Histiaeus, from Susa, who implored him to devise some scheme by which he could be restored to his own people: Histiaeus even going so far as to suggest the raising of a revolt among the Ionian towns in Asia Minor. The suggestion came at an opportune time, and was seized upon by the desperate Aristagoras. Resigning his own position as tyrant of Miletus, he headed a revolt of the Greek towns along the Ionian coast against the Persian power. Town after town banished or slew its tyrant, until nearly all the towns from Byzantium to Lycia had declared for freedom from Persian rule. Not only was there a general revolt among the Greeks of Asia Minor, but Aristagoras succeeded, after a vain effort to win over Sparta, in getting the aid of men and ships from Athens, and from Eretria in Euboea. The Athenians sympathized with their Ionian kinsmen in their struggle for freedom, while the Eretrians had a friendship of long standing with the people of Miletus.

*Plots of
Histiaeus
and
Aristagoras*

*Sack of
Sardis.*

The expedition that left Athens and Eretria sailed for Ephesus, where it was joined by the levies of neighbouring towns. An attack was then made on Sardis, the capital of Lydia. The Persian satrap was driven into the citadel, and the Greeks foolishly sacked and burned the city. This enraged the inhabitants, and the Athenians were forced to retreat to the coast, pursued by the infuriated populace of the surrounding country, who inflicted serious loss upon the invaders. Thus ended the attempt of Athens and Eretria to assist their friends in Ionia.

*Anger of
Darius.*

The effect of the attack on Sardis was two-fold. At first, as the story of the sack spread, it gave an impetus to the revolt. Towns that had hitherto remained quiet, now openly threw off the yoke of Persia. On the other hand, Darius was deeply incensed at the insult offered by what he deemed an insignificant Greek city. He vowed revenge, and only waited for the suppression of the revolt in Asia Minor to turn his arms against Greece, and, particularly, against Athens.

In the meantime the Persians were fully employed putting down the insurrection, which now had spread to the people of Caria and Cyprus. For six years the struggle went on with varying fortunes. At last Miletus fell before a force under Artaphernes, the satrap of Lydia, and, with its fall, all hope of a successful resistance was ended. Town after town acknowledged Persian supremacy, and was made to feel with greater or less severity the wrath of the Persian king. Miletus, as the chief offender, suffered the most severely. Her inhabitants were sold into slavery, and her greatness was never fully restored. Of the instigators of the revolt the end was equally tragic. Histiaeus had been sent by Darius to Sardis three years after the war began. There he was accused by Artaphernes of participation in the revolt, and thinking his life in danger, fled to Chios. The Chians distrusted him, and Miletus refused him admission. With eight ships from Lesbos he sailed to Byzantium, where he engaged in piracy. Finally he fell into the hands of Artaphernes, who promptly impaled him, greatly to the regret of Darius, whom he had once befriended. Aristagoras fled to Thrace in 497 B.C., where he was slain by a savage tribe, the Edonians.

*Fall of
Miletus B.C.
495.*

The Ionian revolt was happily ended. Darius spent a year in preparation, and then, B.C. 492, set forth to punish the Greeks for their interference in the affairs of the Persian empire. Under the command of Mardonius, an able general, a Persian army crossed the Hellespont and marched round the north shore of the Aegean, accompanied along the coast by a fleet. When rounding the promontory of Mount Athos, a terrific storm destroyed three hundred of the Persian galleys. A few days later the Persian land army was so roughly handled by the wild and fierce Thracian tribes that Mardonius thought it prudent to return to Asia. Thus the winds and waves fought for Greece, and for a time the wrath of the Persian king was foiled.

*First
attempted
Persian
invasion.*

Eighteen months were spent by Darius in preparing another and greater expedition against Greece. Six hundred ships were furnished by the Phoenicians and Ionians, while an army was gathered from thirty-six nations inhabiting the land between the Aegean sea and Eastern Tartary. One hundred thousand foot-

*Second
Persian
expedition,
B.C. 490.*

soldiers and ten thousand horse are said to have been mustered for this invasion. Greek exiles went along with the expedition as guides, most noticeable among whom was Hippias, the aged tyrant of Athens, who hoped at last to be restored to his lost power. It was late in the summer when the Persians set forth to subdue those Greek states that had not sent Darius earth and water. The previous expedition had suffered shipwreck off Mount Athos, and to avoid a repetition of this disaster, the Persians sailed directly across the Aegean, through the Cyclades. Landing in Euboea, the city of Eretria was attacked. The Athenian colony of Chalcis in Euboea sought to give assistance, but the gates of the city were closed, and the Eretrians did not dare to come out to give battle. After a siege of six days the city was betrayed into the hands of the Persians, and the inhabitants, bound in chains, were placed on board the Persian ships, which now were directed to the plains of Marathon, on the north-east coast of Attica. Here the Persians landed. It is uncertain whether they intended to march straight on Athens from this point, or, having drawn the Athenian army away from the city, to send the Persian fleet to attack Athens while undefended. Hippias had been promised by his friends in Athens that a bright shield would be raised on Mount Pentelicus, as a signal when a suitable time for attack should occur.

Athens was greatly alarmed at the fall of Eretria, and immediately sent for help to Sparta. But the Spartans were just beginning a great festival, and their superstition forbade them setting forth until full moon should come. Thus five days were wasted, during which time Athens almost alone had upheld the freedom of the Greek people.

When news reached Athens that the Persians had landed, the chief commander, or polemarch, Callimachus, called a council of war to decide whether the Athenian army should remain within the walls of the city, or march out to give battle to the enemy. Of the ten generals, or stratēgi, in command of the Athenian forces, Miltiades was the most experienced and renowned. His advice on a former occasion to the Greeks to abandon Darius to his fate in the land of the Scythians, had rendered it necessary that he should leave his tyranny in the

Chersonesus and seek safety in Athens. Although an aristocrat and an ex-tyrant, his ability had put him in the fore front of the state in this crisis. It was fortunate for Athens that he was one of the strategi at this time, for it was through his influence and eloquence that Callimachus decided to give battle to the Persians, and not to wait for an attack upon Athens.

The plain of Marathon, where the battle took place, is about six miles long and two broad, and lies between Mount Pentelicus and the sea. It borders a large bay, where the Persian ships could be moored or drawn up on shore. On either side of the plain running from the hills to the sea, is a marsh, so that the Persians were encamped between two marshes and between the mountain and the sea.

*Battle of
Marathon,
B.C. 490.*



The Athenians were posted on the slope of the mountains, facing the bay, and guarded the two roads leading to Athens. Their whole force mustered only ten thousand heavy-armed men, besides some slaves equipped as light-armed troops. Of the ten thousand, one thousand came from the little town of Plataea, in Boeotia, whose inhabitants did not forget in this crisis to repay the debt of gratitude they owed to Athens for protection and assistance against their enemies of the Boeotian league. Four or five days the opposing armies stood face to face, the

Athenians expecting to be attacked by the Persians. On the morning of the battle, Miltiades, not Callimachus, commanded. Tired of the delay, the Athenian general arranged his men in order of battle, with Callimachus on the right, Aristides in the centre, and the Plataeans on the left. At the word of command, the Greeks started down the hill at a running pace for the camp of the Persians, which was a mile distant. The Persians were not expecting an attack at this time, and so were somewhat unprepared. The two wings of the Greek army broke easily through the ranks of the enemy, but their centre was withstood by the Persians until help came from the victorious wings on the right and left. The Persians hurriedly sought their boats, fiercely pursued along the beach by the Athenians, who endeavoured to prevent their embarkation. In this they were only partially successful, as nearly all the Persian vessels managed to escape. At the moment of defeat the bright shield was raised on Mount Pentelicus by the friends of Hippias in Athens. The Persians made another attempt to retrieve the losses of the day. Sailing round the southern point of Attica they sought to attack Athens from the bay of Phalærum; but the Athenians had anticipated this new attack, and when the Persians reached the destined landing-place, they found the Athenian army drawn up in order of battle ready to receive them. Despairing of success, the Persian commanders set sail for Asia Minor. Thus, through the valor of the little army of Athens, and the patriotism of her citizens, Greece, and through her, Europe, was saved from the apparently resistless tide of Asiatic barbarism.

*Effect of the
victory.*

The moral effect of the victory of Marathon was very great. It is true not many fell on either side; six thousand four hundred Persians and one hundred and ninety-two Greeks were slain. But the lesson was learned that the Persians were not irresistible, and that the fear which had hitherto been inspired by them was based upon a false view of their skill and prowess. Ten thousand Greeks had defeated with ease one hundred thousand Persians, and it was but natural that the Athenians should feel greatly elated over their victory. Three great mounds, or *tumuli*, were raised over the bodies of the slain

Greeks, on the largest of which were erected ten pillars, one for each of the ten tribes of Attica.

The Spartans, it has been mentioned, delayed sending any assistance to Athens until the time of full moon. Then two thousand Spartans set forth, accompanied by the usual number of helots and Perioeci. When they reached the field of Marathon, the battle had already been fought and won, and nothing was left for the Spartans but to return home, reflecting on the fortune that had raised Athens to the position of one of the foremost states of Greece. The hero of the battle was, undoubtedly, Miltiades. His success gave him unbounded popularity at Athens—a popularity which he abused. The following year he obtained permission from the Athenian people to lead forth an expedition of seventy ships, which, he alleged, would be used in acquiring wealth and renown for the Athenian state. The armament was employed against the people of the island of Paros, with whom the Athenian people had no quarrel, to gratify a personal grudge of Miltiades. He demanded one hundred talents from the Parians for submitting to the Persians. The demand was refused, and Miltiades laid siege to the town of Paros. The siege failed, and Miltiades, wounded accidentally in the thigh, returned to Athens, only to meet with a charge of wasting the public funds and abusing the public confidence. He was brought into court on a litter in a dying condition, his wound, through neglect, having gangrened. Xanthippus prosecuted and demanded the death penalty. But the Athenians remembered Marathon, and contented themselves with inflicting a fine of fifty talents, which Miltiades did not live to pay. His son, Cimon, afterwards paid the debt, to clear the memory of his father from reproach.

The fate of the second invasion of Greece did not deter Darius from making further attempts. The failure at Marathon he ascribed to the employment of inadequate means. The next effort would be one worthy of the greatness of the Persian empire and would crush all opposition. Thus he reasoned. But an insurrection broke out in Egypt, B.C. 487, and Darius found full employment for his energies in that country. At the head of his army he set out for Egypt, B.C. 486, only to die on

*Arrival of
the Spartans*

*Expedition
against
Paros.*

*Death of
Miltiades.*

*Events be-
tween the
second and
third Per-
sian inva-
sions.*

Death of Darius, and accession of Xerxes. the way. He was succeeded by his favourite son, Xerxes, a monarch whose love of luxury, weakness of character, and capriciousness of temper, totally unfitted him for carrying out his father's great designs.

Themistocles and Aristeides.

The Egyptian war, and the death of Darius, gave Greece a respite of ten years from Persian attack. In the interval Athens was engaged in a struggle with Aegina, which led to a great increase in naval strength of the former. Athens was at this time divided in her allegiance between two leaders, Themistocles, and Aristeides, surnamed the Just. The former favoured a policy of naval construction and maritime enterprise. The latter thought a naval force too uncertain as a defence of the city, and placed greater reliance on the heavy-armed foot-soldier, or *hoplite*. It so happened at this time that the silver mines of Laurion produced a surplus of revenue over expenditure. Instead of dividing this surplus among the citizens, as had been the custom, Themistocles persuaded the Athenians to use it in constructing two hundred triremes, thus making the naval strength of Athens as great as that of Aegina and Corinth combined. This policy was opposed by Aristeides, who feared the growth of public corruption by the influx of a foreign population at the sea-ports, and by the free expenditure of public money. The fears of Aristeides were not groundless, for his watchful care over the public expenditure resulted in discovering instances of embezzlement, extending even to Themistocles himself. The result of this contest between the two leaders and the two policies was that Aristeides was sent into honourable exile by ostracism.

Exile of Aristeides, B.C. 483.

Constitutional changes.

Another event worthy of notice during this interval was a change of the practice of electing the chief magistrates or archons. Henceforth they were chosen by lot, but the choice was at first made from the wealthy candidates of good character who presented themselves. The effect of this change was to lessen the esteem in which the archons were held, and to increase the power of the strategi, or military leaders, who still continued to be elected by the popular assembly. The strategi, in fact, gradually became a kind of ministry, who managed the chief departments of state, under the supervision of the assembly.

The banishment of Aristeides left Themistocles free to carry

out his naval policy. The Peiræus became an important seaport, where a democratic population held sway, with a strong dislike for aristocratic privileges, and an equally strong feeling in favour of an aggressive foreign policy.

It was well that the naval policy of Themistocles prevailed. The two hundred triremes were scarcely built before alarming news came of the designs and preparations of the young despot of Persia. Xerxes had succeeded in crushing the revolt in Egypt, and was now turning his face westward. Ambition and vanity alike urged him to take up his father's scheme of conquering Greece, and of avenging the insult of the Athenian invasion and the burning of Sardis. Nor was Xerxes without inciters and prompters from unpatriotic Greeks, who flocked to his court and pointed out the weakness and discords of the divided Greek states. True, his father, Darius, had been unsuccessful at Marathon, but that defeat was due to the comparative smallness of the force employed. Now Greece should learn the real strength of the Persian empire. So, in 481 B.C., all the nations and tribes over which Xerxes ruled were called upon for men and supplies. From the far East to the Greek cities of Asia Minor, contributions were exacted. Maritime cities furnished ships and sailors; from Thrace and the Hellespont came provisions. The inland nations had each to supply its *quota* of soldiers, with such martial equipment as they could furnish.

*Xerxes King
of Persia
485-465 B.C.*

*Prepara-
tions by
Xerxes.*

Xerxes now sent heralds into Greece demanding the usual tokens of submission, earth and water. Sparta and Athens alone received no summons to submit. The treatment to which the Persian heralds are said to have been subjected, ten years before, was an offence which placed the guilty states beyond the reach of pardon. For, according to a tradition that grew and gained credence, the Athenians threw the heralds of Darius into a pit where the bodies of criminals were wont to be cast, while the Spartans flung them into a well.

The certainty of an invasion by a multitude of Asiatics led the principal Greek states to take united action in self-defence. Sparta was already the leading Greek state in the Peloponnesus, and her influence was sufficient to secure the aid of most of the states south of the gulf of Corinth. Athens, on the other hand,

Preparations by the Greeks.

had no allies, but was, instead, engaged in a war with Aegina. The threatened destruction of their independence brought about a congress of Greek representatives which met at the isthmus of Corinth, B.C. 481, under the presidency of Sparta. Most of the Greek states were represented, but Argos actuated by hatred of Sparta, and Thebes, of Athens, refused to take any part; otherwise there was a remarkable response to the appeal for concerted action against the barbarian enemy.

The congress first of all wisely determined to end the dissensions between the various Greek states. Athens and Aegina dropped their quarrel. Then an earnest appeal to outlying Greek colonies was made, with, however, little success. Gelo, the tyrant of Syracuse, offered aid, provided he were made commander-in-chief of the Greek army. This condition, of course, was not complied with, Sparta being unwilling to yield her time-honoured supremacy in Greek affairs. Thus the confederates were thrown upon their own resources. Although great dread of the Persians was felt by many of the states, a bold front was shown to the world. A proclamation was sent forth that any Greek state submitting to Xerxes, without being compelled thereto, would be punished by the confederates, and one-tenth of the booty obtained from it would be dedicated to Apollo.

The congress was held late in the summer, and the Persian attack, it was evident, would not take place until the following spring. The interval was a trying one. The oracle at Delphi was besieged with inquiries regarding the impending invasion, and the best means of averting calamity. It is evident that the oracle had been tampered with in the interests of Persia. Gloomy indeed were the answers received by Sparta and Athens. Sparta was told that 'either Sparta or a Spartan king should perish.' Athens was told in the ambiguous language so frequently employed by the priestess, that 'safety should be found in the wooden wall, and divine Salamis should destroy the children of men.' This prophecy, it is supposed, was inspired by the bribes of Themistocles, who saw in the navy of Athens her sole chance of success. What use was made of this prophecy by the crafty Athenian will appear in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE PERSIAN WARS—*Continued.*

The army gathered by Xerxes was a motley host. As one writer remarks, it was an 'ethnological museum.' Along with the trained and true Persians went Ethiopians, clad in leopard skins, carrying bows made of the central rib of the palm-leaf, and trusting to arrows tipped with fragments of stone. Horsemen there were with no better weapons than a lasso and a knife. The Libyans came armed with staves whose points were hardened by the fire. The best of the king's troops were to be found among the Persians, the Bactrians, the Lycians and the Carians. The whole host numbered not less than eight hundred thousand men, although some writers have not hesitated to state that fully double that number followed Xerxes across the Hellespont.

*The third
and last
Persian
invasion,
B.C. 480.*

It mattered little whether the army was five hundred thousand or five millions strong. The fighting men were only hampered by the untrained, undisciplined, and badly-armed mob that crowded upon them. To supply food for such a host was in itself a gigantic task.

The Greeks were not ignorant of the strength of Xerxes' army. Spies had been sent out to inspect and report, and Xerxes had offered every facility for making observations in the hope that the news carried home by them would instil fear into the hearts of the Greeks.

Early in the spring of 480 B.C. the army and fleet of the Persians began to move. The Phœnician cities of Tyre, Sidon, and Arādus furnished three hundred vessels. The Egyptians, Cypriots, Cilicians, and inhabitants of the Greek cities of Asia Minor furnished nine hundred more, so that fully twelve hundred war-vessels, not to mention transports and tenders, set sail. Each trireme carried thirty Persian soldiers, in addition to its ordinary crew.


Twelve years before the vessels of Darius had suffered shipwreck off the promontory of Mount Athos. Warned by this disaster, Xerxes had a canal dug across the peninsula of Acte, through which his fleet could securely pass. Another enterprise of a still more costly character was undertaken. To convey his army across the Hellespont he had constructed a bridge of boats, the vessels being lashed together with strong cables, and covered with a flooring of planks and earth. His first bridge broke to pieces under the stress of a storm, and Xerxes, it is said, inflicted three hundred lashes on the turbulent waters of the Hellespont, and cast in chains to reduce them to submission.

Having crossed the Hellespont into Europe, Xerxes led his army, accompanied by his fleet, along the coast of Thrace. From Thrace he passed into Macedonia, where he was joined by Alexander, the king of that state, with its whole army. As the huge army slowly wended its way southward through the hilly regions of Pangaea, his fleet passed in safety through the canal at Mount Athos, round the peninsulas on the coast of Chalcidice, and joined the army at the town which was afterwards called Thessalonica. From this point the march was into the plains of Thessaly through the mountain pass at Mount Olympus. To guard the vale of Tempe a large force of Spartans, Athenians, Thessalians, and other Greeks were sent. But Alexander of Macedon sent word to the Greeks that Xerxes intended to use the upland passes which led from Macedonia into north-western Thessaly. Thereupon the Greek allies made haste to abandon the pass of Tempe, fearing to be entrapped by the Persian army. Deserted by their allies, the Thessalians sent emblems of submission to Xerxes, and the great and fertile plains of Thessaly passed into his possession.

It was now necessary for the confederate Greeks to take immediate action if all Greece was not to be speedily subdued. From Thessaly Xerxes would have no opposition till he reached the plains of Boeotia, unless a stand were taken by the Greeks at the pass of Thermopylae. It was well known that Thebes, through hatred and jealousy of Athens, was prepared to cast in her lot with the Persians, and therefore would offer no hindrance to their movements on Attica and Athens. If Athens

were crushed, the next step would be to attack the Peloponnesus, which could scarcely hope to offer a successful resistance without the aid of Athens and her allies. So it was resolved to withstand the Persian army at the narrow and difficult pass of Thermopylae. To that end a fleet of two hundred and seventy-one ships, of which nearly one-half were Athenian, passed up the Euripus, under the command of the Spartan admiral Eurybiades, a man of little ability, and chosen for the position because he was a Spartan. Under him served Themistocles, who was kept busy correcting his blunders.

Greek preparations.



While the fleet was moving northwards, the Spartan king, *Leonidas*, was on the march to occupy the pass of Thermopylae, accompanied by a force, hastily collected, of nearly ten thousand men. From Sparta he chose three hundred men with sons living, for he knew not whether they would ever return. With each of the three hundred went seven or eight helots or slaves. Passing through Arcadia he collected two thousand hoplites, and, at the isthmus of Corinth, seven hundred more joined his ranks. On his march he forced Thebes to give a contingent of four hundred.

who were carried along as hostages for Theban fidelity to the Greek cause. Thespiæ gladly gave seven hundred men to swell the ranks of the little army, and at the pass he was joined by a force of Phocians and Locrians.

Leonidas occupies the pass of Thermopylae.

The pass of Thermopylae is admirably adapted for purposes of resistance. It is a narrow strip of ground between a spur of Mount Oeta and the sea, and opens westward into the plain of Malis. At its narrowest point it is only a few feet wide, its total length being about two miles. In the middle of the pass are the hot springs from which it derives its name. Near the springs were the ruins of an old wall, used at one time by the Phocians to keep back the Thessalian invaders. The camp of Leonidas was pitched near this wall, with the Maliac gulf on its right and a steep precipice, eight hundred feet high, on its left. So steep was this precipice that no road, save through the pass, was available to the invader except a circuitous route over the ridge Anopaea, from Trachis on the Malian side to Alpeni in the rear of the Greeks. To guard the latter route Leonidas placed his Phocian troops on the ridge, the remainder were kept by himself to defend the pass.

It was foreseen that the Persians might turn the position of Leonidas by using their fleet to land men in the rear of his army. To prevent such action, Eurybiades, the commander of the confederate Greek fleet, stationed his ships off the promontory of Artemisium, somewhat to the north of Thermopylae, to intercept any movement the Persian fleet might make southward. But their fleet was not pushed forward to explore the way for the army and when, after considerable delay, it began its onward voyage, it was overtaken by a terrible storm off Cape Sepias which strewed the shore with wrecks. The Greek fleet, taking advantage of the distress of the enemy, attacked them vigorously. A day's fighting ensued, when another storm arose which proved as destructive as the first. Two more days' fighting followed, in which the Greeks held their own against the still numerous Persians. On the fourth day, a swift row-boat was seen hastening from the south. It brought news of so serious a nature that the Greeks abandoned all intention of defending the strait between

*Battle of Artemisium
480 B.C.*

Euboea and the mainland. Retreat was the only thing open to them, and immediate retreat at that.

The news that was brought to the Greek fleet concerned the fate of the Greek army at Thermopylae. Leonidas had been some days in possession of the pass before the army of Xerxes appeared. The Persian king thought little of the resistance the small force occupying the pass could make. His scouts brought him news of the carelessness and apparent indifference of the Spartans and, laughing at their folly and temerity, he sent a body of troops to bring the madmen before himself as captives. Meantime Leonidas had awaited in vain the assistance promised from the Peloponnesus, and now saw that his little army of less than ten thousand men must stand the brunt of the attack of the whole Persian force. In this extremity his Spartan courage did not fail him. He resolved to hold the pass to the last extremity. Dividing his force into several sections he sent the different detachments in turn into the narrowest part of the pass, the place most easily defended, but the point where the onset of the Persians must be met. By this arrangement he prevented his little army from being exhausted and overpowered.

The command of Xerxes to take the Greeks prisoners, it was soon found, could not be carried out. In the hand-to-hand conflict which took place between the lightly armed Asiatics and the mail-clad Spartans, the destruction of the Persian king's troops was terrible. Force after force, each of increased strength, was sent against Leonidas, but all to no purpose. It was impossible in that narrow space to overpower the Greeks by numbers, and at the end of two days it looked as if all the vast preparations of Xerxes would count for nothing, and his carefully planned expedition utterly fail, frustrated by a handful of determined Spartan warriors. Despondency reigned in the Persian camp, when a base Greek named Ephialtes came forward and offered, for a large amount of gold, to guide the Persian army over the hills, by a winding path, to the rear of the Greek position. Xerxes was only too glad to accept the terms, and at midnight a chosen body of his troops, the famous Persian "Immortals," began the ascent. The Phocian force left by Leonidas to guard

Thermopylae, 480 B.C.

this route kept a careless watch, and at the noise of the approach of the Persian army hastily prepared for an attack, leaving the passage unguarded. The Persians paid no heed to the Phocians, but pressed on to surround the Greeks under Leonidas. The third morning the Greeks saw the Persian columns descending to take them in the rear.

Leonidas did not hesitate as to his course of action. A Spartan king and a Spartan soldier, he would hold the pass even unto death. His band of Spartan followers determined to die with their leader, but the Arcadians and Corinthians were allowed to save themselves. The Thebans were forced to remain as hostages; the Thespians volunteered to share the deadly peril. Altogether, Leonidas had about four thousand men in the last struggle against the foe. The conflict that followed was one of desperate courage. Determined to die rather than surrender, the little band of Greeks neither gave nor accepted quarter. Thousands of Persians fell before their fierce onslaught, and not until their swords were blunted, their armour hacked and hewn, their strength exhausted and their leader slain, did the enemy prevail. Retiring to a hillock, the Greeks made the final stand. There, under a shower of javelins and arrows, they fell before a foe that feared to come to close quarters. So ended the immortal struggle at the pass of Thermopylae. Xerxes was victorious, but he had lost twenty thousand of his best troops. The loss of men was little felt, but the fear of Greek strength and courage had entered into the hearts of his soldiers. To them henceforth every Greek soldier was a hero, prodigal of life, and endowed with almost superhuman strength and valour.

*Death
of Leonidas
and his
Spartans*

To the Greeks the disaster at Thermopylae seemed irreparable. Nothing now prevented the Persian army from pouring down with overwhelming numbers into the plains of Boeotia and Attica. The fleet had to retreat from the straits of Euboea, and for a time confusion and despair prevailed among the Greek confederates.

The delay of the Peloponnesians in sending reinforcements to Leonidas at Thermopylae brought the war close to their own doors. If Thermopylae could not be defended, it was a hopeless task to stem the tide of invasion in Boeotia, where the most of

the cities were prepared to espouse the Persian cause. It was evident the sole chance of successfully withstanding the Persian land army would be to fortify the isthmus of Corinth with all the force the Peloponnesians could muster. As the isthmus was narrow, it would be impossible for the Persians to turn the position of the Greeks unless the ships of Xerxes could land a sufficient number of men on the Peloponnesian coast and thus take the Greeks in the rear. To prevent such action on the part of the Persians, Themistocles saw that it was necessary to collect the whole Greek fleet in the waters between Attica and the Peloponnesian coast, and there give the Persians battle.

But before describing the policy pursued by the Greek allies, it is desirable to sketch the progress of the war after the death of Leonidas and his heroic band. The Greek fleet, as stated, retreated down the Eurîpus, and rounding Sunium came to anchor in the bay of Salâmis. Meanwhile the army of Xerxes leisurely pushed southward and westward. Passing through the country of the Phocians into the Boeotian plain, Xerxes received the submission of most of the Boeotian towns; Thespiæ, Plataea and Haliartus alone remaining true to the Greek cause. Haliartus was destroyed; the Thespians took refuge at Corinth, while the Plataeans sought the protection of their old allies, the Athenians. Perhaps the most notable incident of the Persian onward march was the attack made by them on the shrine of Apollo at Delphi. This famous shrine was rightly reputed to possess a vast treasure, the gifts of the thousands that from all parts of Greece, Asia Minor and the isles of Mediterranean, went to consult the oracle. Tempted, probably, by the tales of its wealth, and also by the desire to destroy the chief Greek sanctuary, a detachment of Persians marched to seize the coveted shrine. The story comes down to us that the Delphians left Apollo to protect his own shrine, and fled incontinently. But Apollo proved to be an able champion of his own interests, for, as the Persians marched through the defiles of Parnassus, massive pieces of rock came tumbling down on them, destroying many and filling with a great fear the others. A panic seized the sacrilegious invaders, and they fled back, pursued now by the Delphians, to the plains of Boeotia.

*Onward
march of the
Persians.*

*The Per-
sians at
Delphi.*

*Public
opinion at
Athens.*

Meanwhile consternation and confusion reigned in Athens. Three proposals were made, and each proposal found supporters. A few of the more base and cowardly counselled submission to Xerxes; but the orator that gave this advice was stoned on the spot. Another, and a more numerous, party wished to defend the city against a Persian siege. This proposal was, through the persuasive eloquence of Themistocles, overruled. He pointed out the impossibility of a successful defence against the Persian host, and reminded the Athenians of the counsel of the Delphic oracle that 'safety should be found in the wooden wall,' which he interpreted to mean the Athenian navy, so sedulously encouraged and developed by himself. The advice of Themistocles was taken by all, save a few who obstinately refused to leave Athens, and determined to defend the Acropolis to the last extremity. The great mass of the Athenian population, however, abandoned their homes. The aged, the women, and the children were placed in safety, while the able-bodied manned the vessels that were to defend Attic waters against the Persian fleet. Most of the exiled Greeks found a temporary home in Troezen, although some went to Aegina and Salamis. Before Athens was abandoned, an act of indemnity was passed, in this the hour of danger, recalling all exiles. Of the many that returned at their country's call, the most famous was Aristides, who had been living for four years in the Peloponnesus. His return was most opportune, and his advice and leadership were once more eagerly sought.

*Return of
Aristides.*

*Persians
enter
Athens.*

The Athenians abandoned their city none too soon. The Persians entered it to find it deserted, save by the few heroic but infatuated defenders of the Acropolis. Xerxes marked his anger against the Athenians by ordering the destruction of their homes, and by the levelling of their sacred buildings. The Acropolis was taken by assault after a brief and brave defence, and the little garrison put to the sword. All this took place almost under the eyes of the Athenian fleet, for the flames of the burning homes were clearly visible. In the meantime the Greek fleet had received accessions until it numbered three hundred and sixty-six vessels, of which two hundred, or more than one-half, belonged to Athens. Eurybiades was still


the nominal commander, although the soul of the armament was Themistocles. Unfortunately, the Greek admirals were not agreed as to the proper course to pursue. The Corinthians and the majority of the Peloponnesians wished to retire to the Isthmus and act in close concert with the army, which had begun to build a wall across the narrow neck of land joining the Peloponnesus to the main-land. On the other hand, Themistocles and the admirals of Aegina and Megaris wished to remain in Attic waters, and there withstand the Persian fleet. Both parties were actuated by motives more or less selfish, the one wishing to protect the Peloponnesus; the other, Salamis, Aegina, and Megaris. It was soon evident that some decision must be reached, for the Persian fleet rounded Cape Sunium and appeared in the harbour of Phalærum. With difficulty Themistocles secured a final meeting of the admirals at midnight, when a hot and excited discussion took place. Amid the reproaches and taunts of the Corinthian admiral, Themistocles resolutely urged that battle should be given to the Persians in the strait of Salamis, and backed up his arguments by vowing that if the allies retreated to the Peloponnesus the Athenian contingent would take on board the Athenian families, and sail away to build a home in Italy. The threat had the desired effect, and Eurybiades, throwing his influence on the side of Themistocles, decided to remain in the strait of Salamis and there give the Persians battle.

*Advice of
Themisto-
cles acted
upon.*

The Greek fleet lay in the harbour of Salamis, while the Persians were moored off Phalerum. By this arrangement the eastern passage of the strait was blocked by the Persian fleet, although the Greeks could, if they so desired, retreat through the western entrance towards Megaris and Corinth. Themistocles fearing that the allies might change their minds, resolved to hasten the inevitable contest. With his usual craft and unscrupulousness, he sent a confidential slave to the camp of Xerxes, with a letter to the king, stating that he, Themistocles, was in sympathy with the Persians, and informing Xerxes that the Greeks intended retreating during the night through the western exit. He pointed out to Xerxes that if the Greeks were

*Battle of
Salamis,
B.C. 480.*

thus allowed to escape the war would be uselessly prolonged, whereas, if both entrances to the Bay of Eleusis were seized the Greek fleet could be crushed at one blow. The stratagem succeeded. Xerxes gave orders that the western entrance should be occupied at once. Soon the Persian fleet was in motion, and troops were landed on the island of Psyttaleia to seize any Greek vessels that might run ashore at that point. Whatever inclinations the Peloponnesians might have to retreat were soon



rendered impossible of accomplishment by the gradual closing in of the Persian fleet. At nightfall of the day after the decision to fight was reached, Aristides appeared with the information that the blockade was nearly complete, and the arrival of deserters confirmed the news. It was determined to give the Persians battle the following morning.

The Persian fleet, in spite of its numerous disasters, was still a thousand strong, and had nearly three times the number of vessels possessed by the Greeks. Added to this strength, was the stimulus afforded by fighting under the direct observation of their king, for Xerxes had ordered a throne to be built on the slope of Mount Aegleus, and thus was able to see how well his

mariners fought his battles. The names of those that might distinguish themselves by brave deeds were to be taken down by the royal scribes, and the reward of merit was sure to follow.

The Greeks went into the engagement feeling that escape was impossible, and that for them it was victory or death. Everything possible was done by their commanders to excite hope and courage. Prophecies and oracles of an encouraging nature were recited ; the brave deeds of their ancestors when Greece besieged Troy, and Europe conquered Asia, were told. Better, however, than prophecies and oracles were the circumstances under which the Greeks fought. The narrow space, the numerous reefs, the islands and promontories, were all in favour of the skilled mariner accustomed to these waters. When the opposing armaments were drawn up in the order of battle, it was found that the Athenian contingent held the left wing ; the Euboeans and Aeginetans, the centre ; and the Corinthians and Peloponnesians, the right. Opposed to the Athenians, on the right of the Persian fleet, were the Phoenicians ; the Cilicians and Pamphylians occupied the centre ; the Ionians and the Egyptians, the left. The wind was from the south-west, and so against the Persians. The battle that followed was determined by the personal skill, strength, and courage of the combatants, for of strategy there was but little. For hours the conflict raged, apparently with little success to either side. At last, the king saw that some of his ships were retreating, while others were disabled and drifting ashore. Soon the Persian armament became a confused and huddled mass, and any fighting it did was on the defensive. Then as the sun began to sink, the great fleet, broken and disordered, sought the Attic shore to obtain the protection and help of the Persian land army. To add to the day's victory, Aristides landed some hoplites on the island of Psyttaleia, and slaughtered the Persian soldiers isolated there by the retreat of their fleet.

The battle of Salamis cost the Persians about two hundred vessels, and the Greeks, forty. Had the Persians been disposed to renew the conflict they still were strong enough to retrieve their defeat. But all hope of success had abandoned the dispirited Asiatics. The fleet simply sought safety in flight.

Xerxes was equally discouraged. He foresaw that his own return might possibly be intercepted, if his bridge of boats across the Hellespont was not well guarded by his fleet. On the other hand, the Greeks, especially the Athenians, were greatly elated over their almost unexpected success. To the Athenians, and above all to Themistocles, was the victory due, although the prize of valour was awarded to an Aeginetan, and a wreath of honour was given to Eurybiades.

Though defeated at Salamis, Xerxes was still in possession of Athens and the adjoining districts, and he held his ground for some days after the retreat of his fleet. Then, under the advice of Mardonius, he began a retreat to his capital, Susa, leaving with Mardonius three hundred thousand of his choicest troops to conquer Greece. It is said that Themistocles hastened the king's retreat by sending him word that the Greek admirals intended to destroy his bridge of boats across the Hellespont. As a matter of fact, the Persian fleet was allowed to retrace its course unmolested and unpursued by the Greeks, and Xerxes when he reached Abydos found his passage into Asia undisputed. The retreat, however, of Xerxes to the Hellespont was not accomplished without severe losses and privations. The lateness of the season, the lack of food and supplies, and the severity of the weather all told heavily on his dispirited army.

*Retreat of
Xerxes.*

The Greek vessels, as stated before, made no serious effort to pursue their enemies, but contented themselves with punishing the inhabitants of some of the islands of the Cyclades for their submission to Persia. The people of the island of Andros made resistance and their land was ravaged; the other islanders made their peace with the confederates by sending large bribes to Themistocles. Then the allies met at the Isthmus, and, from the booty taken at Salamis, made costly offerings to the national deities. After that the various contingents of the Greek fleet returned home to their own cities.

*Rebuilding
Athens.*

Mardonius and his army spent the winter of B.C. 480-479 in Thessaly, and this gave the Athenians an opportunity to return and begin the rebuilding of their city. Operations had not, however, been long carried on when Alexander, king of

Macedonia, appeared at Athens, bringing a message from the Persian commander. Mardonius had become convinced of the importance of detaching Athens from the Greek confederacy, and to that end offered to allow her to remain entirely independent, and, in addition, to annex to her territory as much of the land of her neighbours as she desired, provided she withdrew from the alliance and permitted the Persians to conquer, unopposed, the rest of Greece. The offer was, certainly, a tempting one, and a great compliment to the military and naval prowess of Athens. Nevertheless it was indignantly refused, and word was sent back to Mardonius that Athens would never desert the Greek cause, or become the ally of Persia. For this courage and constancy Athens had soon to pay a heavy penalty. Spring brought with it the army of Mardonius, which, unopposed, swept down on Attica. The Athenians had trusted that the Peloponnesians would come to their aid, and enable them to hold the passes of Cithaeron. In this they were sorely disappointed, and once more they were compelled to abandon their homes to the enemy and take refuge at Salamis and Troezen, for the Spartans, with their usual selfishness, had thought more of their own interests than of those of their allies. To them it was sufficient to guard the Isthmus of Corinth, and, by so doing, protect the Peloponnesus from invasion. This policy, they found, could not well be carried out, for the Athenians sent ambassadors to Sparta, who, after upbraiding the Spartans for their selfishness, threatened, unless help was at once forthcoming, to accept the terms brought by Alexander of Macedon. The threat accomplished its purpose. The Spartans, after some little delay, sent Pausanias, the cousin of Leonidas, with five thousand heavy-armed men. Five thousand more quickly followed, and soon all the states that acknowledged the leadership of Sparta had their contingents on the march towards Corinth. At Eleusis, the Peloponnesians were joined by eight thousand Athenian hoplites.


*Mardonius
returns to
Attica.*

The allies expected to encounter Mardonius in Attica, near Athens. But Mardonius, after destroying the recently erected buildings in Athens and doing as much harm as he could to

*Battle of
Plataea,
B.C. 479.*

what remained of the temples and walls, had retired into Southern Boeotia, and pitched his camp in a valley near the river Asōpis. Here he entrenched himself by building around his camp an earthen rampart, ten furlongs square. The Greeks took their position on the neighbouring hillsides, fearing to descend into the plain on account of the presence of a large body of Persian cavalry. So, almost face to face, the two armies awaited each the attack of the other. Mardonius would not begin hostilities so long as the Greeks held the hills, and Pausanias, whose military judgment and tactical skill were not of the best, hesitated to rush into the fray. The Greek army was now increased to fully one hundred thousand men, of whom forty thousand were well equipped and clad in brazen armour. Such an army had never before been put in the field by the Greeks. On the other hand, the Persians mustered nearly three hundred thousand men, including Greek allies. The struggle began by Mardonius sending out detachments of cavalry to harass and worry the Greeks, and entice them to leave their vantage ground on the slopes of the hills. In one of these preliminary skirmishes the Persian commander of cavalry was slain, and the Greeks overcame their dread of the Persians' hero. Pausanias now changed his ground, and took up a position further west, some two miles and a half in front of the little town of Plataea, his army being drawn up on a line of hillocks. For ten days more the situation remained unchanged. At last, as the Persian cavalry still continued to annoy the Greeks, stopping up the fountain whence they obtained their supply of water, Pausanias determined to fall back still nearer Plataea, to a position where the supply of water would be more abundant, and the exposure to cavalry attacks less serious. The Greek army began the retreat at night, and soon confusion reigned in its ranks. The Peloponnesians left hurriedly and went too far, the Spartans did not begin to move till daylight, while the Athenians delayed their retreat until they saw that the Spartans were beginning to retire. In the morning the Persian commander saw that the centre of the Greek army was missing, and that the wings were retreating towards Plataea. His opportunity for striking a decisive blow had come. To overwhelm the Greeks, while in this condition of disorder,

was his policy, and at once horse and foot were hurried forward to the attack. Pausanias, in this hour of peril, proved equal to the occasion. Bringing his Spartans, Laconians, and attendant helots to a halt, he boldly faced the oncoming Persians. Sending word to the Athenians that he had resolved to fight, he rushed forward against the disordered ranks of the pursuing



Persians. The latter were brave soldiers, and did not yield without a struggle. But their shields of wicker-work proved of little avail against the fierce assault of the heavy-armed Greeks, and after a short and determined resistance they fell back towards their entrenchments. Mardonius was struck down, and

this intensified the confusion among the Asiatics. Artabazus, who had command of the rear, led off forty thousand men in rapid flight to the north, while the rest of the Persians sought safety behind the earthen ramparts of their camp.

Meanwhile the Athenians had been hotly engaged with the Boeotian allies of the Persians. The contest raged until the *Slaughter of the Persians* Boeotians saw that the Persians were defeated, when they, too, fell back. The Athenians did not follow them, but pressed forward to join their allies in the assault on the Persian camp. The Peloponnesians had by this time arrived on the scene, and the whole Greek army, now united, broke through the Persian defences, when a ruthless and indiscriminate slaughter took place. The Asiatics offered little resistance to the deadly blows of their conquerors, and it was not until wearied with shedding blood the Greeks desisted. A great booty rewarded the victors; vessels of silver and gold, costly armour and inlaid weapons, numerous slaves, rich cloths, silks, and other stuffs, not to mention great numbers of horses, mules, and camels. Thus ended the last Persian invasion of Greece.

The remnant of the Persian army was hastily retreating northward, and from it nothing was to be feared. So the allies turned their attention to the perfidious Greeks who had helped the Persians against their own countrymen. Thebes was compelled to surrender, her leadership in Boeotian affairs was taken away, and her chief oligarchs were executed.

On the same day that the battle of Plataea was fought, the Greeks and Asiatics met in a decisive engagement on the coast of Asia Minor. A Greek fleet of one hundred and ten vessels, under the command of the Spartan Leotychides, and the Athenian Xanthippus, had been despatched to the Asiatic coast to watch the remnant of the Persian fleet, and to encourage any signs of disaffection that might appear in Ionia against Persian rule. Messengers from Samos met the Greeks at Delos, promising assistance. Encouraged by the news, the Greeks resolved to press forward in search of the Persian fleet. This they found drawn ashore at the promontory of Mycale, and near it a large land force of Persians from Sardis was encamped. The Greeks never

hesitated, but pushing their vessels ashore, landed and began a fierce attack on the Persians who came out to meet them. The result was much the same as at Plataea. The Persians were soon routed and, fleeing to their camp, were followed so closely by the Greeks that pursued and pursuers entered its gates almost simultaneously. A terrible slaughter followed, the Greeks also losing heavily. What was left of the Persian army fled to the hills, the passes of which were beset by hostile Milesians, who slew many of the unfortunate fugitives. The booty of the Persian camp and three hundred vessels fell to the conquerors. Still more serious for Xerxes was a general revolt against Persian rule in Ionia, which now threw off its allegiance to the Persian king.

CHAPTER XV.

GROWTH OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE.

The battle of Mycale ended all thought on the part of the Persians of conquering Greece. So far as Persia was concerned, the Greek states might 'go to play.' The Athenians, however, were not content with hurling back the barbarians: they wished to wrest from their power the cities along the Hellespont, where Persian garrisons were stationed. Of these, Sestos made a stubborn resistance. Its garrison finally managed to escape to the Thracian hills, only to be slaughtered by the natives. This occurred in 479 B.C. The following year the fleet of confederates, under the command of Pausanias, the victor of Plataea, set sail for the coast of Asia Minor. The chief strength of the expedition was the Athenian contingent, which was under the command of Aristides, and Cimon, son of Miltiades. The cities of Cyprus were assisted to throw off the yoke of Persia, and then the fleet sailed north and laid siege to Byzantium. This important town, after a gallant resistance, surrendered, and the fleet wintered in its harbour. It was now that the effect of his successes began to make itself manifest in the conduct of Pausanias. The victory at Plataea was claimed as wholly due to him, and his pride, arrogance, and love of luxury soon became intolerable. The simple, frugal life of the Spartan was abandoned, and soon to the love of luxury were added dreams of treasonable ambition. Secretly releasing some of the prisoners taken at Byzantium, he sent them to Xerxes with letters in which he offered to conquer Greece and hold it as a vassal of the Persian king, in return for the hand of the king's daughter. Xerxes was delighted at receiving such an offer, and promptly promised to place at the disposal of the traitor all necessary resources. Elated by the success of his intrigues, Pausanias began to affect royal state, surrounding himself with mercenaries, and carrying himself with so much haughtiness and insolence towards the allies as to render his leadership,

*Pausanias
becomes a
traitor.*

offensive and insufferable. The result was the fleet revolted and placed Aristides, the Athenian commander, in the position of admiral of the allies. Pausanias was recalled by the Spartan ephors, but not before his foolish conduct had caused the loss to Sparta of her time-honoured leadership in Greek affairs. Athens now became not only the real, but the recognized head of the confederacy. Her ships were more numerous, and her sailors more skilful than those of any other state. The victories at sea had been due mainly to her prowess, and now, through the wise and unselfish conduct of Aristides, she was chosen to fill the place she had so gallantly earned.

*Aristides
chosen to
lead the
allies.*

In the meantime the Athenians were rebuilding their city, now twice reduced to ruins. Very wisely its limits were considerably extended, and its fortifications greatly strengthened. These necessary precautions to meet future growth and attack alarmed the Spartans, who had no desire to see a rival power grow up north of the Peloponnesus. Sparta, therefore, sent an embassy to Athens to urge the inexpediency and needlessness of incurring so much labour and expense. The Peloponnesus, said the embassy, was always open as a refuge to the Athenians in the event of invasion and attack. The Athenians, at the time, were not in a position to speak out boldly against this interference with their undoubted rights, for the walls of Athens were but half-finished, and, for the present, could offer only slight protection. In this crisis the subtle craft of Themistocles came to the rescue. The Athenian assembly was advised to tell the Spartans that an embassy would at once proceed to Sparta to settle the matter in dispute. Themistocles and two others were appointed for this purpose, and Themistocles set out immediately. By a previous arrangement his colleagues delayed their journey, and whenever the Spartan ephors sought to complete the negotiations, Themistocles had the matter deferred until his colleagues could arrive. Meanwhile, the Athenians by the greatest diligence and exertions completed their walls, using the abundant material available from the ruins of the city, and working night and day. So, when the lingering ambassadors reached Sparta, the walls were well on the way to completion. By one excuse or another the Spartans were kept quiet and

*Athens ex-
tends and
rebuilds her
walls.*

their suspicions lulled, until the walls were finished, and then Themistocles boldly proclaimed the fact. It was now too late for Sparta to offer further opposition ; Athens had asserted her independence and right to manage her own affairs. Henceforth nothing but coldness and ill-concealed jealousy were manifested towards Athens by her former ally, and when the news of the deposition of her admiral from the command of the allies reached Sparta, she withdrew from the general confederacy, and headed one of her own, formed of her allies in the Peloponnesus.

*Sparta
withdraws
from the
allies.*

When the fortifications of their city were completed the Athenians, acting under the advice of Themistocles, proceeded to build strong walls around the harbours of Peiræus. By this wise policy Peiræus soon became a flourishing port, where not only commercial and seafaring citizens resided, but also a large colony of aliens, attracted thither by the special trading facilities of the town. As has been stated, the folly of Pausanias led to the deposition of Sparta from the command of the fleet of the confederates, and the election of Aristides, the Athenian leader, to the position of admiral. This was followed by the organization of a powerful Ionian league, known as the Confederacy of Delos. The object in view was the defence of Greece from Persian attacks, and the release of the Ionian cities in Asia Minor from Persian control. The terms of the treaty that was entered into, briefly, were as follows: The states or cities were to furnish ships, men, and money for the further prosecution of the war against Persia, and no state was to withdraw from the alliance without permission from the whole body of the confederates. The amount required annually for the war was fixed by Aristides at four hundred and sixty talents, and to him was assigned the task of fixing the contribution of each state, these contributions to be partly ships, and partly money. The Confederacy was to have its treasury on the island of Delos, and thither once a year delegates from the various states assembled to decide upon the needs of the war. Athens was given the leadership of the Confederacy, and to her was entrusted the execution of its decrees, and the collection of the quota assigned each state.

*Confederacy
of Delos.
477 B.C.*

The Confederacy was composed of states and cities scattered over a wide area, from Euboea on the west to Byzantium on the east. It included, among others, the Cyclades, the colonies of Chalcidice, the Ionian and Aeolian towns of Asia Minor, and the freed towns of the Hellespont. Its object was purely military ; the end aimed at being the defence of Greece, and the expulsion of the Persians from Europe and from the Greek towns of Asia Minor. In carrying out this design, the Confederacy was very successful. The Persian garrisons on the Thracian coast were driven out, but the heroic defence of Eion on the Strymon by the Persian commander Boges is worthy of remark. When food failed the garrison, Boges gathered his family and treasures on a great funeral pyre, and setting fire to the combustible material, he and his dearest possessions were consumed. This *Siege of Eion.* siege is also memorable for the part played in it by a rising Athenian general, Cimon, the son of Miltiades, the victor of Marathon. The expulsion of the Persians was followed by the extension of the Confederacy, through the admission of the liberated towns.

We have already noticed the intrigues of Pausanias with the Persian court while at Byzantium. On his recall to Sparta he was tried for treason, but the evidence was not conclusive and he was acquitted. Distrusted and avoided at Sparta, he sailed to the East, and was soon, again, secretly engaged in intrigues with the Persian governors. Expelled from Byzantium by the Athenians, he went to the Troad, and as his nefarious scheming did not stop, he was once more recalled by the Spartans to stand his trial. *Fall of Pausanias.* As no one seemed to have sufficient courage to become his accuser, he was allowed to go free, although under the ban of public opinion. A social and political outcast, he began to plan an insurrection of the helots, a class so oppressed that it was always willing to rise against its oppressors the Spartan oligarchy. The designs of Pausanias were frustrated by a discovery made by his confidential slave. This slave had been entrusted with a letter to the satrap Artabazus, but noticing that none of the messengers of Pausanias to Asia had ever returned, he became suspicious and opened the letter. To his horror, he found that Artabazus was expected to put the bearer to death, thus ensuring

the secrecy of his intrigues. The slave at once placed the letter in the hands of the Spartan authorities, who arranged to secure the necessary evidence of the guilt of Pausanias by secreting two of the Ephors within hearing of a conversation between him and his slave. As Pausanias was passing by the temple of Athena he noticed the Ephors with a body of attendants approaching him, and, fearing arrest, he fled to the sanctuary for protection. The Ephors left him there, but ordered the doors to be built up, so that he might die by starvation. A few days after, fearing that his death within the sacred walls would pollute the temple, the Ephors had it opened, and the dying general carried out. He expired, it is said, almost on the threshold of the sacred inclosure.

*Death of
Pausanias
469 B.C.*

The fall of Pausanias involved the ruin of Themistocles. The latter, after the close of the Persian wars, had lost much of his influence and popularity. Great and stirring events no longer gave him an opportunity to exhibit his marvellous powers, or served to conceal his baseness and venality. His old rival, Aristides, had recovered his popularity, and his purity was in strong contrast to the corruption of Themistocles. The strife of political parties that followed ended in the ostracism of Themistocles, who took refuge at Argos. There he was approached by Pausanias, who sought to enlist him in his treasonable projects, but apparently without success. Nevertheless, when Pausanias perished and his papers were opened, the Spartans found some traces of a correspondence between the two men, and the bitter malignity of the Spartans towards the man who had outwitted them, induced them to charge him with complicity in the treason of Pausanias. The Athenians sent for him to stand his trial; but he, fearing the fate of Pausanias, and knowing the fickleness of his countrymen, refused. He fled to Corcyra; but finding that he was safe in no part of Greece, with great difficulty made his way to the court of the king of Persia. Xerxes was dead, having been murdered in a family conspiracy, and his successor was his young son, Artaxerxes. The young king was overjoyed to secure the services of the renowned Athenian, and having listened to his plans for the subjugation of Greece, gave him, it is said, the tyranny of Magnesia, with an ample

*Fall of
Themistocles*

allowance for himself and his attendants. His friends at Athens managed to transmit to him the greater portion of his large, but ill-gotten fortune. Surrounded by the members of his family, living in almost ostentatious luxury, served by a princely retinue, he spent the few remaining years of his life, the dependent of the power he had done so much to humble. We do not hear of his making any attempt to injure his own country, notwithstanding the brilliant prospects he had placed before the young king. Vain, extravagant, corrupt, and unprincipled, he certainly was ; nevertheless he seems to have been loyal to his native city, and thus, not through want of opportunity, but of inclination, we find no attempt made by Themistocles to strike a blow at her power and prosperity.

*Exile of
Themisto-
cles.*

In 468 B.C. Athens was called upon to mourn the death of her unselfish patriot, Aristeides. His removal left Cimon, the son of Miltiades, the most important personage in Athenian affairs. Cimon belonged to the aristocratic element in the city, though he sought to win the favour of the masses by lavish gifts and an unbounded hospitality. He had shewn a keen sense of honour and integrity by paying the fine imposed by the state on his father. He had been a prominent supporter of Aristeides in organizing the Confederacy of Delos, and he had distinguished himself in the campaign by which the Persian garrisons were expelled from Thrace.

*Death of
Aristeides,
B.C. 468.*

Cimon

These services and qualities were not, however, sufficient to win for Cimon the full confidence of the Athenian democracy. This was due to Cimon's aristocratic tastes and sentiments, and to his pronounced admiration for Sparta and her policy. For a leader and statesman whose great anxiety was to be a useful ally of Sparta, the average Athenian could entertain no profound regard. Cimon's policy was to extend the maritime power of Athens, leaving to Sparta the supremacy on land. Persia was to be made the object of persistent attack ; friendly relations, in the meantime, were to be cultivated with the Spartans. This generous policy, as time showed, met with a cold response from the selfish Lacedaemonians.

*Cimon's
policy.*

Under Cimon's leadership numerous maritime expeditions took place. In 470 B.C., the island of Scyros was seized and

*Battle of
Eurymedon
466 B.C.*

occupied. A few years later, Cimon set sail with a large fleet to free the Greek cities of Lycia and Pamphylia from the control of the Persians. Near the mouth of the river Eurymedon he encountered a Persian fleet supported on the banks of the stream by a large land army. The Persian fleet was waiting for reinforcements from Phoenicia, and, to avoid a battle, retreated up the river. Cimon followed, and in a narrow, confined space, forced an action which resulted in a complete victory. The defeated Persians sought the protection of their land army, but Cimon threw his hoplites ashore and won another victory. Putting out to sea, Cimon was fortunate enough to meet eighty Phoenician vessels coming to join the Persian fleet, and these he almost completely destroyed off the coast of Cyprus. As the result of this three-fold victory the naval power of Persia was crippled, and the Greek cities of Asia Minor freed.

*Difficulties
of main-
taining the
Confederacy*

The main object of the Confederacy of Delos had now been accomplished. The danger of a Persian invasion no longer existed. Naturally, many of the members of the Confederacy began to think no good reason remained for the continuance of a heavy expenditure of men and money in the support of an alliance which had accomplished its purpose. Besides, the maintenance of the Confederacy gave Athens the power of taxing her allies, and using them for the furtherance of her own ends. The Greek states desired, above all things, independence of outside control, that is 'autonomy.' The Confederacy was in opposition to this desire, and it was endured only as the least of two evils.

*Naxos
endeavours
to secede,
B.C. 466.*

The first state that declared its intention of seceding from the Confederacy was Naxos, one of the wealthiest and most powerful islands of the Cyclades. This occurred in the year 466 B.C. Athens, the defender and upholder, hitherto, of Greek freedom and independence, now refused to allow her former ally the right to choose her own line of action. She saw that if one ally was permitted to secede, the others would speedily follow the example, and the Confederacy of Delos would dissolve and be a thing of the past. This did not suit the views and ambitions of the Athenian people, whose power and glory were closely

connected with their maritime supremacy and leadership in Greek affairs. So Naxos was blockaded by an Athenian fleet, and, after a considerable time, forced to surrender. The walls of the city were demolished, its warships forfeited, and a heavy fine imposed.

The fate of Naxos made it manifest that the nature of the Confederacy had undergone an important change. It was now seen that Athens was not merely one of many allies ; she had become mistress and tyrant of her confederates. The change had been a gradual one. The smaller states had grown weary of contributing their contingent of ships and men, and had compounded by paying to Athens, as leader of the Confederacy, a large annual contribution of money. This money was used by Athens in equipping a larger fleet of her own. Thus while the maritime power of the smaller states was allowed to decline, that of Athens was increased at their expense. Consequently, Athens became in a few years not only the leader of the Confederacy, but also the collector of a tribute from her former allies.

The fate of Naxos did not deter the people of the island of Thasos from making an attempt to secede from the Confederacy. The Athenians, after the capture of Eion, began the task of making that port an important commercial centre in Thrace. This led to a war with the Thracians, in which the Athenians suffered severe defeats. The Thasians had a deep interest in this struggle, for the wealth of Thasos was largely drawn from the rich gold mines of Mt. Pangaeus, and from her trade in the valley of the Strymon. This trade was threatened by the growth of Athenian influence in Thrace, so when the Athenian armies were defeated by the Thracians, Thasos thought it a good opportunity to secede and protect her rights. In the war that followed Thasos was aided by the Thracians and Macedonians, and probably would have been, by the Spartans also, had not Sparta when on the point of declaring war, been forced to withdraw by her own calamities. Left alone, Thasos had to stand a siege in which the whole force of Athens was employed. For two years she held out against the army of Cimon, when she was compelled to surrender. Her warships were taken from her,

*Change in
the nature
of the Con-
federacy.*

*Thasos
endeavours
to secede.*

*Thasos
besieged and
captured.*

and her fortifications destroyed, in addition to having to pay a heavy fine. Her trade, too, in Thrace passed into the hands of the Athenians.

*Troubles of
Sparta.*

Turning now to the affairs of Sparta we find that, in 468 B.C. she had to face the hostility of Argos, and, of many of the Arcadian states in alliance with that city. Two sharp encounters took place in which the Spartans were successful, and Argos was forced back to her old condition of inferiority and dependency. This war was just ended when the trouble began between Athens and Thasos, and the Spartans were preparing to respond to the appeal of the Thasians when the great earthquake of 464 B.C. occurred. This was the most terrible and disastrous that the Peloponnesus had ever experienced. Great chasms were opened in the earth, and nearly every house in Sparta was thrown down. To add to the horrors of loss of property and life, the cruelly oppressed helots rose in revolt. The people of Messenia, and the slaves of Laconia joined in this rising, and took as their base of operations the old Messenian citadel of Mount Ithōme. The Spartans, aided by the Perioeci, with their usual indomitable fortitude, struggled desperately to master the rebels. It was while engaged in this conflict for their old supremacy that the war with Thasos came to an end. Cimon, forgetful of the base enmity of Sparta, sought to persuade the Athenians to send help to their old ally in the Persian wars. This generous but foolish policy was opposed by Pericles and Ephialtes, the leaders of the democratic party at Athens. Cimon, however, with the strength due to his recent successes, prevailed, and an army of four thousand Athenians was sent to aid the Spartans in their siege of the rebels at Mount Ithome. The Athenians were no more successful than the Spartans had been in their operations and, in consequence, the Spartans suspected them of duplicity. Rudeness and discourtesy followed, ending in the Spartans sending the Athenian army home without a word of thanks. The failure of Cimon's generous plans, and the rude and insulting conduct of the Spartans, helped materially to strengthen the anti-Spartan party at Athens, of which Ephialtes and Pericles were the leaders.

*Athens
insulted by
Sparta.*

Henceforth the control of Athenian politics began to pass out of the hands of Cimon, into those of the leaders of the democratic party. Of Ephialtes we know little, as his career was brought to an early close. He seems to have been a thorough democrat, one whose object was to lessen the power of the nobility, and open wide the doors of office to all classes of Athenian citizens. Of Pericles, however, we know much. He, *Pericles.* probably, had a greater influence over Athenian affairs than any man in the course of her history. His birth alone entitled him to take a prominent place in public life. He was the son of Xanthippus, the accuser of Miltiades, while his mother was of the blood of the Alcmaeonidae. Related in this way to Cleisthenes, and his house opposed to that of Cimon, he naturally espoused the democratic cause. His foreign policy, which was that of Themistocles, was popular. It meant the *His foreign policy.* extension of the Athenian maritime empire, regardless of Spartan jealousies. He had none of Cimon's admiration for Sparta; nevertheless, while disposed to exalt the power and importance of Athens, he was never moved to indulge in a policy of irritation of her rival. Pericles had naturally a grave and dignified presence. He was reserved in his habits and manners; in fact, he was the very reverse of the popular idea of a successful demagogue. To these qualities he added an impressive and cultivated oratory. He took especial pains to master the difficult art of effective public speaking, of swaying by his eloquence the critical and often capricious audiences that assembled in the Athenian Ecclesia. Politics were with him a passion, and the knowledge of his fellow-citizens, with their prejudices and aspirations, a profound study. Success was not won in his case by being on familiar and easy terms with all classes of the community, for he kept himself secluded from the ordinary everyday intercourse of life, and he seldom spoke in the great public gatherings, save when important issues were to the front. This reserve, taken in connection with his abilities as an orator, heightened the popular admiration for him. His policy was, moreover, one that commended itself to the masses. We must bear in mind, however, that none but Athenian citizens exercised the franchise, and that the electorate

at Athens was a very select one, compared with the electorate of a large city in a modern republic.

*The power
of the Areo-
pagus less-
ened.*

The Areopagus was the one political institution whose members held office for life, and this venerable body now became the object of attack of Ephialtes and Pericles. While Cimon was absent assisting the Spartans against the revolted helots, a decree was forced through the Ecclesia by which the Areopagus was deprived of its power of censorship, and its authority reduced to that of trying cases of homicide. Its ancient functions of censorship, and guarding the constitution against the encroachments of the Ecclesia, were now transferred to the Bule, the Ecclesia, and the law courts.

*Rivalry of
Pericles and
Cimon.*

When Cimon returned home from the Peloponnesus, he was very indignant at the changes made in his absence, and endeavoured to have the decree reversed. This brought on a struggle between the two factions, which ended in the ostracism of Cimon, and, a little later, in the assassination of Ephialtes. Cimon and Ephialtes both removed, Pericles was left as the sole and undisputed leader of the Athenian assembly. The policy of Pericles brought Athens into foreign difficulties. He formed alliances with Argos and Thessaly, both enemies of Sparta. He offended Corinth by forming an alliance with Megara, and he encouraged the democratic faction in Boeotia to get rid of the oligarchies which ruled in most of its cities. The result of these alliances and intrigues was a war with Corinth and Aegina in 458 B.C. The war was entered into at a time when Athens was supposed to be weakened by having sent a fleet of two hundred vessels to aid Inärus of Egypt in his struggle to throw off the Persian yoke. Inärus was the king of some Libyan tribes in the west of Egypt, and had succeeded in securing the allegiance of the greater part of that country, when the Persian king sent a large army against him. Inarus appealed to the Athenians for help, and a fleet of two hundred ships, lying off Cyprus, was dispatched to his aid. This fleet sailed up the Nile and besieged Memphis, which held a Persian garrison. It was while engaged in this siege that the war with Corinth and Aegina began.

*Athenians
interfere in
Egyptian
affairs.*

CHAPTER XVI.

THE ZENITH OF ATHENIAN GREATNESS.

The beginning of the war with Corinth was marked by a very important step, viz., the removal of the treasury of the Confederacy of Delos from the sacred island of Delos to Athens. This step was a precautionary one. It was thought that the treasury would be safer at Athens than on an island exposed to the assaults of an enemy. The treasury being established at Athens, it soon began to be felt that the latter was exacting tribute from her allies. This was the real state of affairs, for, ere long, Pericles and his party did not hesitate to use the contributions of the league for Athenian purposes, excusing the breach of trust on the ground of the services rendered to the Confederacy by Athens. Another important step was the commencement of the building of the 'long walls' of Athens. These walls were about four miles long, and connected Athens with her sea-ports, Phal rum and Peiraeus. The building of these walls placed Athens and her two sea-ports at the angles of a triangular fortification, which enclosed a large space which could be used as a place of refuge for the people of Attica, with their flocks and herds. A second wall to the Peiraeus was erected later on, thus making still more secure the communication of Athens with her chief sea-port.¹

*Removal of
treasury of
Confederacy
to Athens.*

*Building of
long walls
of Athens,
B.C. 468.*

The war with Corinth and Aegina began with two naval engagements in which Athens was victorious, in spite of the fact that two hundred of her vessels were absent in Egypt. Aegina was now besieged by the Athenians. The Corinthians, to relieve Aegina, attacked Megara, but Myron des, the Athenian general, raised an army of old men and boys, and in two engagements inflicted crushing defeats on the Corinthians.

*War with
Corinth and
Aegina.*

The war between Athens and Corinth was not the only struggle that was going on at this time. Phocis had attacked the inhabitants of the little district of Doris, and the Dorians had

¹ See page 122.

*War in
Boeotia, 457
B.C.*

appealed to their kindred, the Spartans, for help. Sparta, although the insurrection of the helots was not yet ended, sent an army of Peloponnesians, eleven thousand in number, across the Gulf of Corinth into Boeotia. Joined by the Thebans, the Phocians were defeated and driven out of Doris. On their return to the Peloponnesus, the Spartans and their allies had to pass through Megara, but when they reached the frontier of that state a passage was refused them. The Athenians felt their interests were involved in supporting Megara, and they determined to cut off the return of the Peloponnesians. Hastily collecting an army of Argive hoplites and Thessalian cavalry, which was aided by levies from Athens, Megara and Plataea, they gave battle in front of the passes that led from Boeotia towards the Isthmus. Before the battle was joined, Cimon, then in exile, appeared and asked permission to fight in the ranks. He was refused the privilege; and he retired, calling on his friends to show their devotion and loyalty to the Athenian cause. The armies met near Tanagra, and owing to the treachery of the Thessalian horse, which deserted the allies at a critical moment, the Spartans won the victory. The friends of Cimon, it is said, fought in the forefront of the battle, and their courage was shown by the number of their slain. The Peloponnesians now returned to the Isthmus unmolested, without making much use of their victory.

*Battle of
Tanagra,
457 B.C.*

Athens had now added Sparta and Boeotia to the list of her foes. At a time so critical, domestic quarrels were not in order, and we find Pericles personally proposing in the Ecclesia the recall of his great rival, Cimon. Domestic faction, for the time, being hushed, Athens put forth all her strength to strike a vigorous blow before her enemies could unite and crush her. Winter had not ended when Myronides invaded Boeotia with a strong force, and meeting the Thebans and their allies at Oenophyta, in the valley of the Asōpus, won a signal victory over them. The victory was followed by the expulsion of the oligarchs from the different towns and cities of Boeotia, and by the establishment of democratic institutions in every state. The Boeotian League was dissolved and each state became independent of the controlling influence of Thebes. The influence

*Battle of
Oenophyta,
456 B.C.*

of Athens was now felt throughout Boeotia, as the new democratic institutions could be maintained only through Athenian support and sympathy.

The fall of Aegina was now close at hand. The long blockade had brought the garrison to the verge of famine, and it was forced to surrender on the conditions that the Aeginetans should destroy their walls, give up their warships, and enter the Delian Confederacy as payers of tribute. In the Peloponnesus, the long struggle of Sparta against the helots came to an end in 455 B.C. Ithome was given up to the Spartans, its brave defenders being permitted to depart from the Peloponnesus. They were taken on board an Athenian fleet and landed at Naupactus, where they found a permanent home, repaying the Athenians for their kindness by proving faithful allies. The work of subjugating their helots left the Spartans for a time comparatively powerless to resent the aggressions of the Athenians, whose good fortune seemed to know no check. In the year 454 B.C., however, their career of success was suddenly arrested. It has been mentioned that an Athenian expedition went to the assistance of Inarus of Egypt, and laid siege to Memphis. The siege lasted five years, when another Athenian fleet of two hundred vessels was sent out. The Persians, however, sent a very strong force, and managed to surround the Athenians on a small island in the Nile. A desperate conflict ensued, in which most of the Athenians were slain and their ships burnt. The effect of this disaster was to make the Athenians more inclined to think of peace, and, as Sparta was also wearied with her long struggle against the helots, a five years' peace was arranged in 451 B.C. The truce found Athens with her influence predominant in Megaris, Boeotia, Locris, Phocis, Achaia, and Troezen, while nearly every city in the Aegean and Propontis recognized her supremacy and leadership.

The truce with Sparta left Athens free to avenge her defeat in Egypt by the Persians. Cimon, once more popular, was sent with a fleet against the enemy. He laid siege to Citium in the island of Cyprus, but was stricken down by disease, and carried off in the prime of his manhood. Although successful in their

*Death of
Cimon,
449 B.C.*

operations, the Athenians returned home after the death of Cimon, and made no further attacks on Persia.

Scarcely had the Athenian land empire been won before it was lost. Boeotia led in the revolt, and an Athenian force of one thousand hoplites sent to aid Boeotian democrats was defeated at Coronēia. The result of this defeat was the withdrawal of Athens from interference in Boeotian affairs, and the restoration of oligarchy and the influence of Thebes in the Boeotian cities. Locris followed the example of Boeotia and withdrew from the Athenian alliance.

*Revolts in
Euboea.*

Still more serious was the revolt of the cities of Euboea. So dangerous was this revolt considered that Pericles himself took command of five thousand men and crossed over to the island to subdue it. He was almost immediately recalled to meet a rising in Megara, where an Athenian garrison had been massacred. To add to the troubles of Athens, when the five years' truce with Sparta was ended, it was found that Sparta was preparing a formidable force for the invasion of Attica. In the year 446 B.C. the young Spartan king and his guardian led a large army into the Megarid; but, for some unexplained cause, it almost immediately returned. It was more than suspected that Pericles had bribed the Spartan generals, who were notorious for their venality. Relieved of the Spartan invasion, Pericles pushed the war vigorously against the Euboean cities. Soon the whole island was reconquered, and a second Athenian military colony was established on the lands taken from the oligarchs of Histiaea.

*Thirty
Years' Peace
445 B.C.*

Athens now recognized the hopelessness of retaining her land empire, and Callias was sent to Sparta to negotiate a peace. The result of these negotiations was The Thirty Years' Peace by which the hegemony of Sparta in the Peloponnesus was recognized, while the supremacy of Athens in the Confederacy of Delos was left undisturbed. In brief, Athens renounced her land empire, retaining, however, her naval supremacy.

The war with Persia, also, came to an end about this time. No treaty seems to have been made, but an understanding was reached with the Persian satraps by which the Greek cities on

the coast of Asia Minor were left free from Persian control, while Athens and her allies refrained from further attacks on Persian territory.

The Thirty Years' Peace was observed for a little less than half that time ; and this period is marked by the paramount influence of Pericles in Athenian politics. His great rival, Cimon, was dead, and no other leader of equal eminence on the aristocratic side came forward to dispute his claims to supremacy. Thucydides was the conservative leader, but his following was comparatively small and uninfluential, and he himself was ultimately ostracised.

The domestic policy of Pericles was one which has been both greatly lauded and severely censured. It may be described briefly, as a policy of popularizing Athenian institutions so as to bring all offices under the direct control of the citizens, regardless of their rank, wealth, or fitness for the exercise of the franchise. It was a 'government by plebiscite.' The Areopagus, as already noted, was shorn of its time-honoured privileges in the time of Ephialtes. The archonship was now opened to nearly every class of citizen, although, nominally, none with a rank less than that of the Zeugitæ could hold it, and the jurymen in the law courts or dicasteries were paid for their services. There was some excuse for the latter step. The law courts, after the archonship was degraded, were given more important cases for adjudication ; besides, the custom had been gradually introduced of bringing nearly all the important suits between Athens and her allies, and between the allies themselves, for settlement to Athens. Thus Athens became the seat of the supreme court of the Delian Confederacy. Under these circumstances, the duties of the dicasts or jurymen were made so heavy and continuous as to become a serious encroachment on the time of the Athenian citizen. Pericles undertook to make the position of jurymen not only honourable, but profitable. True, at first, the pay¹ was small, but it sufficed to support the poorer class of Athenian citizens ; afterwards, it was considerably increased and made

¹ The ordinary daily pay of a jurymen was two obols or six cents ; afterwards it was increased to three obols or nine cents.

equal to that of a heavy-armed soldier. A class of professional jurymen now grew up, who spent their whole time in the law courts. Pericles has been charged, also, with introducing the vicious system of paying the citizens for attending the Ecclesia, or public assembly. This step was not taken, however, till some forty years later, although it may be said that the policy of Pericles logically led to it. No doubt this policy made the average Athenian familiar with the ordinary processes of the law courts and with current politics, and must have had a greater or less educational effect. Nevertheless, the evil results seem to have over-balanced the good. It taught the Athenian to render public services, not as a duty he owed to the state, but as a hireling of that state. Besides, it flooded Athens with a talkative, idle, and often corrupt class of professional politicians.

A still more serious invasion of the domain of public morality was the introduction by Pericles of the practice of paying small doles to the poor on the occasion of public festivals, so that they might witness state pageants, and buy themselves wine and meat on occasions of public rejoicing. To make matters worse, the money that was thus squandered was often taken from the treasury of the Confederacy. It is said Pericles was led to propose this system of wholesale bribery by his financial inability to cope with Cimon's profuse expenditure of money on the masses. Cimon, however, spent his own money; whereas Pericles plundered the treasury of the Athenian allies for what may be rightly considered personal ends.

More excusable, perhaps, was the expenditure made for the adornment of Athens, in the construction of magnificent temples and public buildings. Money, too, was spent in building a second, the southern, long wall from the upper city to the Peiræus. Temples, outside of Athens, were begun, and great buildings were erected in the Peiræus for purposes of trade and exchange. The most magnificent and famous, however, of the works completed by Pericles were the Propylæa, or entrance halls to the Acropolis, and the Parthēnon, the world-famous temple to Athene. The Propylæa was situated on the western slope of the Acropolis, and consisted of a flight of marble steps seventy feet broad,

*Adornment
of Athens by
Pericles.*

leading to a double colonnade, through which the Acropolis was entered. The Parthenon was the greatest production of Athenian architectural genius. The architect was Ictinus; the sculptor of its reliefs, and the numerous figures and scenes that adorned its walls, was Pheidias. Four thousand square feet of surface passed under the hands of this sculptor. Specimens of the work of Pheidias on the frieze of this temple are to be seen to-day in the British Museum, under the name of the 'Elgin Marbles.' In the front half of this temple was placed a colossal figure of Athene, wrought in marble, bronze, ivory, and gold. Her robes contained nearly \$50,000 worth of gold, while her armour was decked with precious stones. This statue was not only the masterpiece of Pheidias, but the masterpiece of the ancient world. The funds that made this profuse expenditure possible, and furnished the world with its finest models of architecture and sculpture, were drawn mainly from the Delian treasury. When the critics of Pericles called attention to this embezzlement of trust-money, his reply was that Athens kept Greece free from Persian invasions, and so long as this end was attained, it was matter of indifference to the allies how their money was expended. All that Athens did, however, in the interests of the Confederacy was to send out annually a small fleet of sixty galleys to cruise in the Aegean. The amount received each year by Athens from the allies in the form of tribute money was about six hundred talents, or \$700,000; so that it became possible for the Athenians to spend large sums in beautifying and strengthening their city, and yet permit of nearly ten thousand talents being accumulated in the treasury in the Acropolis.

The tributaries of Athens were very numerous at this time, consisting of two hundred and forty-nine states, only three of which, Samos, Lesbos, and Chios, had refused to compound for a money payment, and maintained vessels of their own. At stated times, tax-gathering galleys went out from Athens and collected the assessment on each city, the money on their return being placed in the Acropolis. Every four years the amount to be paid by each city in the league was revised; and had not it been felt by the allies that the tribute went to serve Athenian ends,

*Tribute re-
vised every
four years.*

the amount and manner of the assessment would not have been deemed oppressive or unjust.

*Colonies
founded.*

The policy of Athens at this time looked forward to the establishment of colonies at important outposts. Of the many colonies founded during these years, Amphipolis on the Strymon, and Thurii in Southern Italy, are the most noted. The latter had among its founders such famous men as Herodotus, the historian, Protagoras, the sophist and Lysias, the orator.

*Samos
revolts,
440 B.C.*

Only one war of importance marks these fourteen years of peace. This resulted from the revolt of Samos in 440 B.C. Samos and Miletus disputed about some territory on the mainland of Asia Minor, and Athens, to whom the dispute was referred, decided in favour of Miletus. But the oligarchical government of Samos refused to surrender the territory, until Athens sent a fleet and entered her harbour. Pericles, who was in command, deposed the oligarchic government of Samos, established a democracy, and carried off one hundred hostages for safe keeping to the island of Lemnos. Aided by the Persian satrap, Pisuthnes, the remaining oligarchs at Samos upset the democratic government established by Pericles, and boldly renounced their alliance with Athens. Samos now called upon the other members of the Confederacy to throw off the Athenian yoke, but Byzantium alone responded to the appeal. The war that followed lasted less than a year. Although the Samians had a brief success in a naval engagement, their city was soon blockaded by the Athenians under Pericles and other generals. For nine months the besieged held out, hoping for relief from Sparta, or from other quarters. The Spartans did think seriously of attacking Athens, but were dissuaded by Corinth. Despairing of outside help, Samos surrendered, and was punished in the usual manner. Her warships had to be given up, her fortifications were destroyed, and a fine of a thousand talents exacted. Byzantium surrendered as soon as the fate of Samos was known.

*Samos
surrenders,
439 B.C.*

CHAPTER XVII.

CAUSES OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

Fourteen years of peace had enabled the Spartans to fully recover from their desperate struggle with their helots and the Messenians. A new generation of warriors had grown up, that knew little of the miseries and misfortunes of the previous war, and as the whole tenor of Spartan customs and laws was to make a nation of soldiers, the young men were anxious to measure their strength with the forces of Athens. There was a deep-rooted antagonism between Sparta and Athens, based on the difference of their institutions, tastes, and ambitions. To this natural antipathy was added one arising out of the marvellous growth of the Athenian power, and the consequent lessening of the influence of Sparta in Grecian affairs. A war, then, between these two rival states was almost a matter of necessity. But Sparta was always slow to move, and to Athens herself must be assigned the blame for precipitating a conflict which ended for her so disastrously. *General causes.*

The story of the events that led to the declaration of war between Sparta and Athens is a somewhat involved one. Among other things that paved the way was the harsh treatment of Megara by Athens. Megara had joined the Peloponnesian alliance, and Athens had not forgotten her massacre of the Athenian garrison in 446 B.C. Picking a quarrel with Megara about an alleged act of sacrilege of that state in tilling some land belonging to Demeter, Athens not only closed her own ports to the trade of Megarian merchants, but compelled her allies to do the same. The result was ruin to the trade and prosperity of Megara, and Sparta was frequently appealed to for redress.

Aegina, too, had her grievance. Forced by Athens to become a member of the Delian Confederacy, she was no longer her rival and equal; she was merely a tribute-payer to her more fortunate and successful neighbour.

*Quarrel
between
Corinth and
Coreyra.*

The quarrel between Corinth and Coreyra was, however, the immediate cause of the Peloponnesian war. The story of this quarrel is as follows: Coreyra, an island on the west coast of Greece, was colonized by Corinth. This colony was only one of many colonies founded by Corinth on the western coast, and it was the only one that refused to pay proper respect to the mother city. Unlike Ambracia, Leucas, and other colonies, she had renounced all allegiance to Corinth, and, in matters of trade with Southern Italy, had become her enemy and rival. Coreyra, in turn, became the founder of colonies, and established one on the Illyrian shore, known as Epidamnus, or later on, in Roman times, as Dyrrhachium. In 435 B.C., Epidamnus was the scene of a bitter struggle between the democratic and oligarchic factions within its walls, in the course of which the oligarchs were expelled. The exiled oligarchs sought the aid of a neighbouring Illyrian tribe, and began the siege of the city. The democratic faction, in its extremity, appealed for assistance to Coreyra, the mother city, but the appeal was disregarded. Being in desperate straits, the democrats turned to Corinth for support, the ruler, or chief man of Epidamnus, being a Corinthian. The opportunity of injuring Coreyra, and obtaining a valuable ally on the western coast was so tempting, that the Corinthians readily promised to send assistance to Epidamnus. A small fleet was despatched to strengthen the garrison, and through the help thus given Epidamnus was able to prolong its resistance. The news of Corinth's interference aroused the wrath of the Coreyraeans, who sent a fleet of forty ships to blockade Epidamnus from the sea, and to form an alliance with the oligarchs and Illyrians already besieging the city from the land. Corinth now sent a large expedition to aid the besieged, but her vessels were met off the promontory of Actium by an equally large Coreyraean fleet, which succeeded in defeating them. The same day Epidamnus fell, and the Corinthian garrison was made prisoners of war. War was now fully declared between Coreyra and Corinth. The latter city made great preparations to avenge her defeat, and in 434 B.C. sent out a fleet so strong that Coreyra, unaided, could not hope to cope with it. Under these circumstances it was decided by the Coreyraeans

to apply to Athens to admit them to the Delian alliance, thus preferring to sacrifice their independence rather than submit to the rule of Corinth. Envoys were accordingly sent, in the spring of 433 B.C., to Athens, to ask for admission to the alliance. Corinth having heard of this move on the part of her opponents also sent ambassadors to Athens. The two embassies appeared before the Ecclesia on the same day, and made their appeals to the Athenian people. The Coreyraeans appealed to the self-interest of the Athenians, pointing out the importance of having an ally on the western coast with a large fleet, which might be used, in the event of a war with the Peloponnesians, against Corinth and her allies. War, they declared, must occur sooner or later, with Sparta and Corinth, and instead of the alliance with Coreyra hastening it, the increased strength Athens would obtain on the west coast would tend to deter her enemies. The Corinthians, on the other hand, pointed out that Corinth had prevented an invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians when Athens was engaged in suppressing the revolt of Samos, and had also befriended Athens in other ways. If Athens joined in an alliance with Coreyra, it would furnish a precedent for the interference of the Peloponnesians in Athenian affairs when the next revolt broke out in the Delian Confederacy. As to the danger of a war occurring between Athens and the Peloponnesians, that would depend on the actions of Athens, the majority of the Peloponnesians being opposed to the renewal of hostilities.

The whole matter was fully discussed by the Athenian orators; *Athens enters into an alliance with Coreyra.* but it was the speech of Pericles which decided the vote of the assembly. Convinced in his own mind that war must come, he concluded that the wiser policy was to secure the alliance of Coreyra. This being also the opinion of the Ecclesia, a defensive alliance was entered into, in which Athens promised to help the Coreyraeans in the event of their being attacked. In pursuance of this policy, a small fleet of ten ships was sent to cruise in Coreyraean waters. Although Corinth realized the full import of this action of the Athenians, she determined to push the war against Coreyra. With a fleet of one hundred and fifty vessels she met the Coreyraean fleet of one hundred and ten

*Battle of
Sybota, 432
B.C.*

vessels at the islands of Sybōta, off the coast of Epirus. The Corcyraeans were accompanied by the small Athenian fleet, which had instructions not to fight unless compelled by circumstances. In the battle that followed the Corinthians were successful, and one half of the fleet of their opponents was taken or destroyed. The Athenian vessels now interfered to protect the retreat of their allies. The Corinthians, after a pause, were preparing to renew the conflict when they suddenly halted at the sight of the approach of twenty Athenian ships, which had been sent to reinforce their first fleet. The Corinthians mistook this small force as the mere vanguard of a larger fleet, and hesitated to advance further. Instead of that, the Corinthian admiral sent an officer to the Athenian commander charging him with breaking the peace between Corinth and Athens. The Athenian replied that he intended to protect Corcyra in the event of an attack. Thereupon the Corinthians returned home, determined to bring the matter before the Peloponnesian allies. The same year saw the revolt of Potidaea, a town of Chalcidice, which though belonging to the Delian Confederacy, was of Corinthian origin, and received her magistrates from Corinth. This revolt was caused by the intrigues of Perdiccas, the king of Macedonia, and by secret promises of assistance from Corinth, who wished to avenge herself on Athens. Two thousand men were secretly sent from Corinth to Potidaea, and on the arrival of this force the Potidaeans openly threw off their allegiance. An Athenian force which was operating against Perdiccas now turned its attention to Potidaea, and meeting the rebels before the walls of the town won a victory over them. The town was besieged, but owing to the Potidaeans having a large supply of provisions the siege was long and tedious.

*Revolt of
Potidaea,
432 B.C.*

This condition of affairs, in which war was actually being carried on while peace was nominally continued, could not long exist. In the year 432 B.C. Sparta summoned the Apella, or public assembly of her citizens, and Corinth, Megara, and other states having grievances against Athens, appeared by their representatives to state their wrongs. The chief complaint against Athens was her constant attacks on the autonomy of the weaker states of Greece, a charge which the change in the

*Sparta listens to the
grievances
of the Greek
states.*

character of the Delian Confederacy amply proved. Athens was spiritedly defended before the Apella by some ambassadors who happened to be at Sparta on other business ; but although the Spartan king, Archidāmus, was opposed to a declaration of war at that time, the assembly by a large majority voted in favour of immediate hostilities. A congress of the Peloponnesian allies was held to ratify this decision of Sparta. No opposition worth mentioning seems to have been made to Sparta's action. Before hostilities actually commenced, some diplomatic negotiations between the leaders of the two leagues took place. Sparta demanded that the Megarians should be restored to their former trade privileges, that Aegina should be granted her independence, and that the blockade of Potidaea should be raised. These demands Athens refused. A little later came another demand from Sparta, that Athens 'should restore their autonomy to the states of Greece.' It was expected this demand would be indignantly rejected by Athens. Instead of that, it led to an important and prolonged debate in the Ecclesia. The reason of this was the temporary unpopularity of Pericles, the leader of the war-party at Athens. Pericles was made to feel the resentment of all the various classes opposed to war. He was attacked through his friends, who were accused of various offences against the state. Anaxagōras, the famous philosopher, was accused of impiety and forced to leave Athens. Pheidias, the master sculptor, was charged with embezzling some of the gold set aside for the statue of Athēne Parthēnos, a charge he was able to disprove by weighing the gold used. Nevertheless, he did not escape. He was imprisoned for introducing his own portrait and that of Pericles among those of the ancient heroes in the sculpture of the Parthenon. Before he could be brought to his second trial he died in prison.

*Attacks on
Pericles.*

A blow was struck at Pericles in a still more sensitive place. It was well known at Athens that Pericles had formed an illegitimate connection with a beautiful and accomplished woman, named Aspasia, a native of Miletus. Aspasia, who belonged to a class only too numerous at Athens, had intellectual and social charms of the highest order. Her home was the meeting-place of the choicest intellects of Athens, and there Pericles found

that sympathy, advice, and encouragement which went so far to make his career successful. This lady was now accused of impiety and evil-living. When she was brought before the magistrates to answer her accusers, Pericles appeared as her counsel. He was so greatly moved, it is said, that he shed tears, and his impassioned appeal in her behalf, secured her acquittal.

It was at this time that the Spartan ambassadors placed the ultimatum of the allies before the Athenian people. The discussion that took place was ended by a speech of Pericles, wherein he succeeded in convincing the people that it was their duty to refuse the Spartan demands. A short time later, in the year 431 B.C., the famous Peloponnesian war began.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR TO THE DEATH OF PERICLES.

In the war upon which Greece now entered, nearly every state was involved. The whole Peloponnesus, with the exception of Argos and Achaia which remained neutral, was allied with Sparta. So, too, were Megara, the Boeotian League, Phocis, Locris, and the Corinthian colonies along the coast of Acarnania. Athens, on the other hand, had few allies on the main land. Plataea, her always trusty friend, the Messenians of Naupactus, and the Acarnanians, comprised the whole of these supporters. Sparta was strong in her land army, which mustered, when the contingents from her allies were drawn out, one hundred thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry. Athens had a land army of thirty thousand men, of whom fourteen thousand were fit to take the field, the remainder being serviceable for garrison duty only. If Athens, however, was relatively much inferior to her opponents on land, she was greatly their superior on the sea. The allies of Sparta, save Corinth and Sicyon, had few vessels, whereas Athens had a fleet of three hundred, thoroughly equipped. Not only were the Peloponnesians inferior to the Athenians in the number of ships, but they were decidedly inferior in the knowledge of naval tactics. The Athenians had adopted new and improved methods of naval warfare, whereas their opponents were content to follow the old and beaten paths. The Athenians had adopted the artifice of 'ramming' the vessels of their opponents, that is, driving the sharp beaks of their own ships into the sides of their antagonists, and so sinking or disabling them. The Peloponnesians still adhered to the old plan of placing their ships alongside those of the enemy, and then making the conflict one of a hand-to-hand struggle between the soldiers and marines on board. The Athenian tactics puzzled and disheartened their enemies, and for years the Peloponnesians did not dare to encounter on the seas the Athenians,

*Allies of
Athens and
Sparta.*

*Relative
strength of
Athens and
Sparta.*

unless greatly superior to them in numbers. The Athenians had another great advantage in this struggle. The Spartans were lacking in the financial strength necessary to carry on a long war. They could put a large army in the field, but their poverty prevented them from maintaining it there more than a few weeks or months. Athens, on the contrary, had a full treasury, thanks to the tribute she levied from her allies, the members of the Delian Confederacy. In spite of the lavish expenditure that had taken place on public buildings, and the equipment of a magnificent fleet, there still remained in the treasury six thousand talents, while her annual revenue was estimated at one thousand. The public opinion, however, of Greece was with Sparta in this conflict. The encroachments Athens had been making gradually on the autonomy of the smaller states had excited a general alarm and distrust throughout Greece. The Athenian allies felt that in the conflict which had been precipitated they had nothing to gain from victory, as the result would be to strengthen their mistress and rivet their own chains. Fear alone kept them faithful to the cause of Athens, and they were ready to secede if it chanced the fortunes of war proved favourable to the Peloponnesians.

*Surprise of
Plataea, 431
B.C.*

The war began with an act of base treachery, which was punished by an equally blamable act of perjury and cruelty. The declaration of war had not actually taken place when the Thebans made an effort to surprise and seize Plataea, the faithful ally of Athens. A plot was formed with the oligarchic minority of Plataea, to admit on the evening of a festival a Theban force into the city, and thus take the citizens by surprise. On a stormy night in March, an advance guard of three hundred Thebans was secretly admitted by the Plataean traitors. Taking possession of the market-place, the Thebans boldly called upon the people of the city to take up arms and join them. At first the Plataeans were disposed to submit quietly, not knowing how many their enemies were. They were, besides, somewhat confused by the sudden attack in the middle of the night. After the temporary consternation had passed away, the loyal inhabitants recognized that their enemies were few, and steps were taken to cut off their retreat, and to prevent their being

joined by Theban reinforcements from without. The gates were quickly closed, and the enemy surrounded in the market-place. A fierce street fight followed, in which many of the invaders were killed, and most of the survivors forced to surrender. Some hours afterward the main portion of the Theban army appeared before the walls of Plataea, its advance having been delayed by the rise of the river Asôpus. Fearing for the safety of the entrapped Thebans, their friends without seized the inhabitants of the surrounding country, and held them as hostages. The Plataeans sent out word that, unless the Thebans released their hostages and abandoned Plataean soil, every Theban prisoner would be put to death. Moved by this threat, the Theban army freed those in their possession and returned home. The Plataeans now drove all their cattle into Attica, brought all their movable property into the city, and then, despite the warnings and advice of the Athenians, slew their prisoners. The Athenians were much annoyed at this unwise act, for they knew they could bring pressure to bear on Thebes so long as they held Theban citizens in their possession. The war had now commenced in earnest, and precautions were at once taken to put the flocks and herds of Attica out of danger. Accordingly they were taken across the water to Salamis and Euboea. The inhabitants, too, of Attica were warned to be in readiness to take refuge within the walls of the city, and all the women and children of Plataea were brought to Athens, leaving a garrison of four hundred and eighty soldiers behind.

*Massacre of
Theban
prisoners.*

The first invasion took place in June, 431 B.C., when nearly the whole strength of the Peloponnesian allies, under the leadership of Archidāmus, the Spartan king, marched northward, where it was joined by the Boeotian contingents. On the approach of this formidable army of seventy or eighty thousand men, the Athenian land owners, with their families, slaves, and movable property abandoned their homesteads, and retreated to the safe shelter of the Athenian walls. The invading host descended into the plain of Eleusis and, it being near the time of harvest, destroyed the standing grain, cut down the orchards and olive groves, and burned the deserted farm houses. Sweeping down into the plain of Attica, the same work of destruction

*Invasion of
Attica, June
431 B.C.*

was carried on within the sight of the injured proprietors, who looked on from the walls of Athens. It was with difficulty that the excited and indignant sufferers were prevailed upon to refrain from rushing out of the gates, and meeting the despoilers in desperate and avenging conflict. Pericles, instead, sent out thirty triremes to ravage the coast of Boeotia and Locris, and one hundred more to coast along the sea-board of the Peloponnesus, and to do all possible injury to the inhabitants of Laconia, Messenia, and Elis. The latter expedition was later on joined by fifty galleys from Corcyra, when the Corinthian colonies on the coast of Acarnania were harried. The result of this western expedition was to bring over the cities of Cephallenia into the Athenian alliance. Having spent forty days in Attica, Archidamus withdrew the allies to the Peloponnesus. It was now the turn of the Athenians to ravage and destroy. Thirteen thousand Athenians marched into Megara, carrying desolation to the homesteads of the inhabitants. Year after year, for eleven years, were these visits made.

It was now seen that the war promised to be one of long continuance. Neither party could strike a fatal blow at the other. The Peloponnesians could not carry on an effective siege of Athens. Her walls were too strong, her circuit too great, and her navy could always keep the road to the sea, and therefore to ample supplies, open. On the other hand, Athens could inflict no serious hurt on her chief antagonist, Sparta, by her ravaging expeditions along the sea-board of the Peloponnesus. It was the policy of Pericles thus to prolong the war and weary Sparta into making terms of peace. He persuaded the Athenians to set aside one thousand talents as a reserve fund in the event of any emergency. The same cautious spirit actuated him in keeping one hundred triremes, fully manned, in home waters.

*Expulsion
of the Aeginetans, B.C.
431.*

An apparently harsh, but perhaps necessary step was taken in the first year of the war, when the Aeginetans were expelled from their city. This act was the result of the fear due to the known hostility of the inhabitants of Aegina towards Athens, and to their secret intrigues with Sparta. Although these unfortunate people had not committed any act of open revolt,

the close proximity of Aegina to the chief port of Athens made her a dangerous neighbour. The act has its parallel in our own history, when the Acadians were expelled from Nova Scotia. The homeless people found a refuge in Thyreātis, near Argolis—this land being granted them by the Spartans.

The campaign of the year 431 B.C. was brought to its close by a noble oration of Pericles, on the occasion of a solemn funeral festival in memory of those who had fallen during the year in defence of the state. Not only was a lofty panegyric of the dead given, but the social and political life of Athens came in for the highest praise, in a speech which has been accounted the masterpiece of the orator.

The year that followed was marked by the outbreak of the plague at Athens. The Spartan army had scarcely begun its second invasion of Attica, when this fearful pestilence began its deadly ravages. It is said to have originated in Egypt, and thence to have been carried to Asia, from which it was brought to Athens by trading merchants. The sanitary condition of Athens at this time was such as to furnish the best possible means for the spread of the plague. The city, the spaces between the long walls, every available nook, were crowded with those that had fled from the approach of the Peloponnesian armies. They dwelt in camps, booths, even in tubs, and cleanliness was out of the question. The hot season of the year was also favourable to the pestilence, which spread with fearful rapidity. It is estimated that one-fourth of the people died during that terrible season. Crime and debauchery abounded, for desperation drove the wretched people to all manner of excess. The dead were so numerous that the living could scarcely dispose of their bodies, and corpses were found lying on the streets, and in the alleys. The plague was not confined to Athens alone, for we find that two expeditions sent out by Pericles to relieve overcrowded Athens, were affected seriously by it. One of these was sent to assist the army still besieging Potidaea, and its arrival was sufficient to infect the soldiers before its walls. Fifteen hundred heavy-armed men are said to have died in the Athenian camp.

*Events of
430 B.C.*

*Plague at
Athens.*

The calamities of this year made it possible for the Pelopon-

nesians to harry Attica without molestation. They also made Pericles for a time unpopular, and gave rise to a demand, from the Ecclesia, that envoys should be sent to secure terms of peace from the Peloponnesians. The request was refused, and the supremacy of Pericles in Athenian affairs was gradually restored.

The same year the Peloponnesians made a feeble and timid attack on Zacynthus, and then returned home with their fleet. Money was the great need of Sparta and her allies. To secure this, Aristeus, a leading Corinthian, and five others started out for Asia to secure the aid of the Persian king. Proceeding by land, they fell into the hands of Sitalkes, king of Thrace, and by him were sent to Athens, where they were immediately put to death, without a trial, by the enraged Athenians.

Aristeus was personally objectionable to the Athenians, as he had been largely instrumental in causing the revolt of Potidaea. *Surrender of Potidaea, 430 B.C.* This city managed to hold out till November, 430 B.C., when, obtaining no help from the Peloponnesians, and being on the verge of famine, it surrendered on very favourable terms. The Athenians were angry at their generals thus losing the fruits of a desperate siege of over two years, for the Potidaeans and their auxiliaries were allowed to depart whither they chose. The Athenians hoped that the sale of their prisoners, as slaves, would compensate them for the two thousand talents that had been expended on the siege.

The third year of the war was important on account of the death of Pericles by the plague. His last days had been darkened by the loss, also through the plague, of his sons, his sister, and his intimate friends. When his younger legitimate son died, the heart of Pericles seemed to break. It was with difficulty he could control himself when called upon to place the funeral wreath on the head of his child. After this he seemed to lose all interest in public affairs, although the Athenians gave him a marked tribute of their affection and esteem by legitimatizing Pericles, his son by his favourite companion, Aspasia. When the end came, it found Pericles calm and resigned. His death marks a turning point in the war. Henceforth, Athens failed to produce a man equal to the gravity of the occasion, or one whose control over the Athenian people was equally strong and beneficial. *Death of Pericles, 429 B.C.*

CHAPTER XIX.

FROM THE DEATH OF PERICLES TO THE SURRENDER OF THE
SPARTANS AT SPHACTERIA.

The death of Pericles left Athens without a strong hand and a cool head to control and advise her. His policy of wearing out the Spartans and their allies by refusing to be drawn into a land battle, and by retaliating on their unprotected coasts with the Athenian fleet, was one which required great patience and self-control. For a time after the death of Pericles his policy was continued, and then the Athenians grew weary of such a simple and conservative plan of campaign. The year 429 B.C. saw Attica free from the invaders. Perhaps, the plague had something to do with this. At any rate, Archidamus passed by Attica, and turned his attention to Plataea. This town had a small garrison of nearly five hundred men, of whom about eighty were Athenians. The object sought by the allies was to dislodge the garrison of this Athenian outpost, a thing greatly desired by the Boeotians. The Plataeans remonstrated with Archidamus, reminding him of the promise of Pausanias, that in consideration of the services rendered by Plataea during the Persian war, her territory should be held sacred. The Spartans offered to leave them unmolested if they would join the allies, or remain neutral. The Plataeans pointed out that they could not decide the matter without permission of Athens, who held their families and possessions in her safe-keeping. Accordingly messengers were sent to Athens to obtain her permission to accept the mild terms offered by Sparta ; but Athens refused to release her ally, promising that the necessary assistance would be sent to her relief. The siege then began, and lasted till the summer of 427 B.C. The handful of Plataeans and Athenians forming the garrison made a gallant defence, but it was of no avail. For some reason or other the Athenians made no attempt to raise the siege, or relieve their distressed friends. Failing to

take the town by assault, the Peloponnesians had recourse to a blockade, hoping to starve the garrison into a surrender. Towards the close of the winter of 428-427 B.C., nearly one half of the gallant band succeeded in escaping through the lines of circumvallation, and reached Athens. Those that remained were finally forced to surrender through famine, and as a reward for their bravery were put to death, after going through the mockery of a trial. The walls of the historic little town were razed to the ground, and nothing left to mark its site, save a temple of Hera, and a vast inn for strangers, built with the stones of the ruined dwellings.

*Fall of
Plataea,
B.C. 427.*

Beyond beginning the siege of Plataea, the Peloponnesians did nothing of note in 429 B.C. True, a naval expedition set out from Corinth to attack Naupactus, the ally of Athens, and a land army was sent to operate against the Acarnanians. But both expeditions proved sad failures, the fleet being disgracefully defeated by the Athenian admiral Phormio, with a much smaller number of vessels; while the land army was badly led, and easily defeated in an attack on Stratus. Brasidas, a young Spartan officer, who was to win great renown later on, alone distinguished himself by a daring and sudden attack on Salamis, with a number of men carried over from Megara, in forty old and leaky vessels. Before the Athenians could rally, Brasidas succeeded in destroying considerable Athenian property, in carrying off many persons and much spoil, for the Athenians, as stated before, had driven their cattle to this island, thinking it perfectly secure.

*Brasidas
makes a
raid on
Salamis.*

428 B.C.

The following year there was the usual invasion of Attica, with the usual fruitless result. Before the season closed, however, a new and startling danger to Athens appeared. Lesbos was one of the two islands in the Aegean which maintained a navy, and paid no tribute to Athens. The island had been treated with exceptional favour by Athens, and was thought to be thoroughly loyal to the Confederacy. Mitylene, the chief of the five towns of the island, was a city of considerable wealth and resources. It was governed by an oligarchy, which, like all oligarchies, bore no love to Athenian rule and institutions. This oligarchy began secretly to make preparations for revolt, accumulating stores, and engaging foreign

mercenaries. But, before the plans of the conspirators were complete, information of their designs was conveyed to Athens by their neighbours of Tenedos and Methymna. At first, the Athenians tried to pacify Mitylene, but their overtures were of no avail. The whole island of Lesbos, save Methymna, where a democracy was in power, joined Mitylene, and applied to Sparta for aid. Negotiations having proved useless, the Athenians determined to push the war, with vigour, against the rebels. *A Revolt of Lesbos.* A fleet of forty ships was dispatched, which succeeded in forcing back the Lesbian fleet into the harbour of Mitylene. The Lesbians now sought, by carrying on insincere negotiations for surrender, to gain time, while their envoys were urging their claims before the Peloponnesian representatives assembled at Olympia. The Peloponnesians were delighted at the prospect of a revolt among the Athenian allies, and readily enough promised assistance. Meanwhile, the siege of Mitylene was begun with vigour and determination. Athens soon proved to her enemies that the strain of the war, and the plague, had not exhausted her. Not only was Mitylene closely blockaded, but a powerful fleet cruised through the Aegean to intercept any supplies being conveyed to the city, while another squadron harried the shores of the Peloponnesus with unwonted ferocity. The effect of this vigorous campaigning was soon seen. The Peloponnesians found themselves unable to send any assistance by sea, and their land army was compelled to stay at home to protect their own shores, and save their harvests. The sole aid that Sparta was able to give was to send a Spartan officer to Mitylene to take command of the garrison.

All through the winter the siege continued, although the unusual effort called for considerable sacrifices on the part of the Athenians. They levied a special tax on themselves, and called for an extra contribution from their allies. When spring came, the Spartans, ashamed of their inactivity, determined to send aid to Lesbos. A fleet was despatched, but so fearful was the admiral of encountering the Athenians that he took a circuitous course, and when he reached Ionia, he found that Mitylene had surrendered a week before.

*Fall of
Mitylene,
427 B.C.*

The surrender took place under somewhat unusual circumstances. The growing scarcity of provisions induced the commander of the garrison to arm the lower class of citizens, in the hope of being able to make a sally, and break through the Athenian lines. When, however, these citizens got arms in their hands, they threatened to hand the city over to the Athenians unless the provisions of the town were placed in their possession. Rather than do this, the magistrates asked the Athenians for terms of surrender. The Athenian general, Paches, stipulated that no one should be put to death until the Athenian assembly had decided on the case. The Mitylenians accepted these terms. The oligarchical leaders were put in bonds, and a garrison was placed in the city, the rest of the citizens being left, for the time being, undisturbed.

Cleon.

The question of what should be done with the Lesbians was made the subject of a famous debate. Indignant at the ingratitude of a favoured ally, and alarmed at the prospect of a general revolt in Ionia and Aeolis, the Ecclesia decided to slay every adult male in Mitylene, and to sell their women and children as slaves. The adviser of this policy was one Cleon, a leather merchant, who during the latter days of the rule of Pericles had proved himself a dangerous demagogue, and who now was, perhaps, the most influential leader at Athens. Of Cleon's true character we cannot well judge, as it is painted for us by his enemies, Thucydides, the historian, and Aristophanes, the comic dramatist. If their descriptions are correct, he was a coarse, ignorant, boisterous demagogue, whose patriotism was of the narrowest and most selfish type. He seems to have had the power of swaying the Ecclesia to an unusual extent, and must, therefore, have been a man of more than ordinary ability as an orator. He has been charged with cruelty, cowardice, and utter lack of principle. Nevertheless, he seems not to have been afraid to speak his mind, and to oppose the popular wish.

Messengers were forthwith despatched to Paches to inform him of the decision of the Ecclesia. The next morning, however, the Athenians were in a different mood. Their feelings revolted at the thought of such wholesale massacre, and a meeting of the Ecclesia being hastily summoned, the decree of the previous day,

in spite of the opposition of Cleon, was rescinded. Another galley was immediately despatched to prevent the slaughter of the Mitylenians, and, by extraordinary exertions, the rowers were able to reach Lesbos before the first decree could be carried into effect. Nevertheless, not less than a thousand of the leading citizens were put to death; the land of the Lesbians was divided into three thousand lots, one-tenth of which was dedicated to the gods, the remainder being divided among Athenian colonists, who rented it out to the original owners. An episode, characteristic of the Athenians, marks the end of these dramatic events. Paches, the victorious general, was charged with offering violence to two ladies of Mitylene, whose husbands he had killed. So indignant were the Athenian people at this outrage, and so outspoken in their anger, that Paches fell on his sword in the presence of his judges, without waiting for a formal sentence.

*The decree
against
Mitylene
rescinded.*


Other incidents of this year were the intrusion of Athens into the affairs of Sicily, where a struggle was going on between Syracuse and her allies, on the one side, and the three Ionian cities of Naxos, Catana and Leontini, joined with Camarina and Rhegium on the other; and a fierce strife in Corcyra between the two factions, aristocratic and democratic. Athens sent a small fleet to Rhegium, which accomplished nothing against Syracuse; and the rising in Corcyra ended in a bloody victory for the democrats, the allies of Athens.

The next year saw a still further departure from the cautious and conservative policy of Pericles. Demosthenes, a general in command of the fleet in the Corinthian Gulf, was induced by the Messenians of Naupactus to attack the rude Aetolians who had maintained their neutrality in this strife. The attack was most unsuccessful, the Athenians being driven back with heavy loss. A few months later, Demosthenes redeemed his reputation by winning a victory over the Corinthians and Ambraciots at Olpae in Acarnania.

*Battle
of Olpae,
426 B.C.*

Hitherto the war had practically accomplished nothing in settling the superiority of the combatants. But the year 425 B.C. changed materially the relative position of the rivals for supremacy. It would seem that chance had as much to do with what occurred as design. The Athenians sent out a fleet of

forty ships under Eurymēdon to continue the war in Sicily. Accompanying this fleet was Demosthenes, who was returning to his command in the vicinity of Acarnania, after a visit to Athens. Rounding Cape Taenārum, the fleet was compelled by a storm to put into the harbour of Pylos, on the Messenian coast, where it was delayed several days. The sailors went ashore, and while there, to protect themselves from attack, threw up a slight



fortification on a rocky headland which forms the northern point, or horn of the bay of Pylos. The position was so strong, naturally, and so easy of defence, both landward and seaward (see map), that Demosthenes formed the plan of strengthening the fortifications, placing a few Athenian hoplites there, and making it a base of operations against the western Peloponnesians. The position could not without great difficulty be assailed from land; and, on the side of the sea, the steep cliffs permitted approach

at one narrow landing-place only. Besides, the fort was situated in a district where the helots were numerous, and generally disaffected. The Athenians went to work with such vigour that the position was made almost impregnable before the Spartans were aware of the importance of the action taken. Then Eurymedon set sail for Sicily with thirty-five vessels, leaving Demosthenes, with the remaining five, to hold the position.

The Spartans soon became alarmed at this landing and occupation; and the strength of the Athenian force being much exaggerated by report, the ephors thought it wise to recall the Peloponnesian army which had started for the annual invasion of Attica. The Peloponnesian fleet, also, was sent to blockade Pylos. Demosthenes was just able to send out two vessels to tell Eurymedon the state of affairs, when he found himself shut in by land and by sea.

By referring to the accompanying map, it will be seen that fronting the bay of Pylos is the island of Sphacteria, which lies *Sphacteria.* about one hundred yards from the shore. It is a rocky strip about two miles long, and covered with underwood and thickets. This island the Spartans seized to prevent any Athenian force coming to the relief of the besieged, and making it a base of operations. Over four hundred hoplites, with their accompanying helots, were landed on the island; and the narrow inlets, to its north and south, it was proposed to close by a line of vessels moored across the entrances.

The garrison had now to endure from both land and sea the combined assault of the Spartans. The attack from land was repulsed without any serious difficulty, but a prolonged and desperate conflict took place on the narrow beach to prevent the Peloponnesians from gaining a foothold. The intention of the Spartans to close the inlets to the north and south of the island of Sphacteria was not carried out, and, in consequence, before anything could be accomplished against the Athenian garrison, Eurymedon, who had returned on receipt of the message from Demosthenes, was able to enter the bay between the island and the mainland, with fifty galleys. The Spartan fleet was

easily defeated, the vessels not taken or destroyed being forced to go ashore to obtain the protection of the land army. This left the Spartan hoplites on the island completely cut off from their friends. They were of the best blood of Sparta, and their fate was a matter of the utmost concern to their fellow-citizens. Provisions could not be obtained on the island itself, and the supply they had on hand would last them but a few days at most. This alarming state of affairs forced the Spartan ephors to ask for an armistice, during which an embassy could be sent to Athens to treat for terms of peace. The Athenian commanders consented to a cessation of hostilities, provided the Spartans gave up their vessels as security. In the meantime, the blockaded Spartans were to be given a daily ration of food. Ambassadors were now sent with all haste to Athens to arrange for an honourable ending of the war. It was, indeed, a favourable opportunity for Athens to bring a costly and uncertain conflict to a satisfactory termination. Sparta was willing to give Athens all the rights she possessed at the time of the outbreak of hostilities, and to arrange for a permanent peace. Had Pericles been at the head of Athenian affairs his influence would probably have ended the war there and then. But, unfortunately, Athens had Cleon, instead of Pericles, to sway her assembly; and this blatant demagogue used his influence to the utmost in demanding terms of peace from Sparta which she could not concede. Cleon's proposals went so far as to ask that the Athenian land empire of twenty years before should be restored. These terms the Spartans refused, and when they asked that commissioners should be appointed by the Athenians to treat with them, so as not to leave such a grave matter to be decided by an excited popular assembly, Cleon took advantage of the request to denounce the Spartan envoys for being unwilling to declare their intentions publicly. The Spartan ambassadors, full of regret, were forced to withdraw from Athens without having accomplished the object of their mission. Hostilities were again renewed at Sphacteria, and it seemed a matter of a few days only when the unfortunate Spartan hoplites would have to surrender through famine. That this did not take place immediately was due to the desperate exertions made by their friends to keep

*Attempts
to secure
peace.*

them supplied with food. In spite of the close watch kept by the Athenian vessels, Spartan boats, or swimmers, succeeded on dark or stormy nights in eluding the vigilance of the Athenian guards, and conveyed to the imprisoned hoplites sacks of flour, or skins of wine and honey. In this manner, two months wore away without anything being accomplished. Autumn, with its storms, was approaching, and the Athenians at home began to grow both angry and anxious. Many regretted that the offers of Sparta for peace were not accepted, and Cleon was blamed for the failure of the negotiations. Cleon retorted that the blame was with the generals at Pylos, who lacked the courage and energy necessary to bring the blockade to a successful conclusion. He went so far as to say that had he been in command Sphacteria would have been taken. This rash speech was too good an opportunity to be lost by Cleon's enemies. Nicias, a leading and wealthy citizen, and one of the strategi, at once proposed that Cleon should be sent out to Pylos. It was intended for a grim joke at the expense of the loud-mouthed tanner, and he saw the trap into which he had fallen. He, in vain, refused to accept the honour; but his tormentors were relentless. Finally, what was brought forward as a jest was taken up in earnest. Cleon's friends urged his fitness, and when Nicias would have withdrawn his proposal he found it too late. Cleon now *Cleon sent to Sphacteria.* put on a bold face, consented to go, and promised to take the Spartans captive in twenty days. He made very moderate demands for assistance, taking with him only four hundred archers, a few hoplites, and some Thracian light infantry. Thus accompanied, he sailed for Pylos, leaving his enemies to exult that some good must come out of this expedition. 'Either Cleon would fail,' they said, 'which was likely, and thus be politically extinguished forever, or he would succeed, and a heavy blow be inflicted on Sparta.'

Cleon was, however, not so rash in his plans as his opponents supposed. Although knowing little of actual warfare, he saw that it was quite possible to capture or destroy the small number of Spartans on the island, by sheer force of numbers. In fact some such plan, it is said, was in process of being carried out by Demosthenes when Cleon arrived at Pylos.

*Surrender
of Spartans.*

Wisely distrusting his own military skill, Cleon placed the execution of his plans in the hands of Demosthenes. A fire having swept over the island, which destroyed the woods, the number and manœuvres of the Spartans could be more easily observed. Eight hundred hoplites were landed by night on the southern part of the island, and an outpost of thirty Spartans was cut off. Against this force, the Spartans brought up the rest of their men, some three hundred and fifty. In the meantime a large force of bowmen, light troops, and men from the ships had landed. The Spartans found themselves attacked on all sides by slingers and bowmen, and, failing to bring the foe to close quarters, retreated to an old fort at the north end of the island. But their position was found to be such that they could be picked off at the pleasure of their enemies, and when an offer of surrender was made them, to the surprise of the Athenian commander, they lowered their shields and became prisoners. Of the original force, numbering four hundred and twenty, two hundred and ninety-two surrendered, and of these one hundred and twenty were of the best families of Sparta.

The success of Cleon was a great surprise to all Greece, and an equally great humiliation to Sparta. The immediate effect was to make Sparta still more anxious for peace, and Cleon still more puffed up and exacting. In consequence, when a Spartan embassy reached Athens to treat for the restoration of their prisoners, they found the Athenians too much elated with their recent success to concede any but the most humiliating terms. The Spartans were forced to return home, having failed to secure the restoration of their friends, and the Athenians lost an opportunity, never to occur again, of obtaining 'peace with honour.'

CHAPTER XX.

PEACE OF NICIAS.

Their success at Sphacteria encouraged the Athenians to undertake other land enterprises. The Corinthians were defeated in a pitched battle at Solygeia, on the Isthmus, and a second sedition at Corcyra was cruelly suppressed. Under the malign influence of the now powerful Cleon, the tribute of the allies was doubled, and good grounds given for future disaffection.

The year 424 B.C. furnished further instances of Athenian success, although it ended with a most disastrous defeat. Early in the year, the island of Cythëra, near Cape Malea, was seized by the Athenians, much to the annoyance of Sparta who now was constantly exposed to raids from its harbours. Sparta had reached the very lowest point of her fortunes at this time. Many of her leading citizens were prisoners; she could obtain no honourable terms of peace and her shores were constantly subject to the predatory incursions of her foes. At any time her helots might rise in revolt; and the distrust felt was so great, that her secret police was put to work to lessen the danger by treacherously and stealthily assassinating these unfortunate slaves. Some two thousand, it is said, were thus quietly removed.

Under these discouraging circumstances, Sparta consented to Brasidas undertaking what was looked upon as a risky enterprise against the power of Athens. Brasidas was a young officer, who had already highly distinguished himself at Aegina and Sphacteria. He seems to have been possessed of qualities very uncommon among Spartans: tact, kindness, and courtesy of manner, together with an unusual spirit of venture and daring. His project, now, was to lead an army of volunteers northwards through Thessaly, Macedonia, and Thrace, and attack the Athenian allies on the peninsula of Chalcidice, and on the coast of Thrace. There still existed in that quarter, after the fall of Potidaea,

some smouldering disaffection towards Athens, and this discontent Brasidas hoped to turn to good account. The difficulty that presented itself to Sparta was how to reach Thrace with an army, owing to the friendliness of the Thessalian towns towards Athens. Brasidas recognized the perilous nature of his enterprise, and therefore asked for volunteers only to carry out his designs. Helots, who were promised their freedom, formed the nucleus of the expedition ; and seventeen hundred men, altogether, were gathered on the Isthmus to start northwards, when work nearer home called for their assistance. The Athenians, in their new-born zeal for land expeditions, had, in concert with a discontented democratic minority of Megara, succeeded in making their way within the 'long walls' connecting Megara with its port Nisaea, and had captured the latter. Megara itself would probably have fallen, had not Brasidas with an army marched to its relief. Athens contented herself with the capture of Nisaea, and with planning another expedition of a more difficult and comprehensive nature. This new expedition, or rather expeditions, had for its object the recovery of the territory lost in Boeotia in 456 B.C., and the campaign was to be carried on somewhat late in the season, when aid from the Peloponnesus would be unavailable. Demosthenes was to lead a force from the Corinthian Gulf to attack Boeotia on its western side, while Hippocrâtes was to attack simultaneously at Tanagra, on the east. Chaeronēa was to be seized by a body of Boeotian exiles of the democratic party. But the Athenian plans miscarried. Demosthenes moved too soon, or Hippocrates moved too late, and the project to seize Chaeronea was divulged by an informer. Demosthenes drew out against him the full force of the Boeotian army, and finding that the army under Hippocrates had failed to advance and make the necessary diversion in his favour, he retreated to his ships. Two days later Hippocrates appeared in the territory of Tanagra, and fortified himself at Delium, waiting in the meantime for news of Demosthenes. After four days, hearing nothing, he started to return home, only to encounter the Boeotian army returning from its march on Demosthenes. The two armies were both large, and nearly equal in numbers, each having about eight thousand hoplites,

besides several thousand light-armed men. The Boeotians had, *Battle of Delium, 424 B.C.* however, a thousand cavalry, a branch of the service in which the Athenians were very deficient. At first the Boeotians hesitated to attack, but the objections of their leaders were overborne by the Theban Pagondas. The battle that followed was at first fiercely contested, both sides winning a partial victory. The Boeotian cavalry, however, decided the issue by a successful charge. The Athenian army wavered, broke, and fled, having lost one thousand hoplites, the Boeotians escaping with the loss of one half that number. The battle of Delium was a serious blow to the military strength of Athens, as so many of her best soldiers fell. For a time, it checked the growing disposition of the Athenians to undertake land expeditions, and it marked the beginning of her waning fortunes.

Trouble was brewing for Athens in other directions at this time. Sicily had brought her useless wars to a close by a general peace at Gela, and the Athenian armament had been compelled to return home. In Asia Minor there were symptoms of revolt and disaffection. But it was in the north that the most serious trouble began. Brasidas had succeeded, by pretended negotiations, in getting past the Thessalian envoys *Brasidas in Thrace.* who had met him at their frontiers and had forbidden him a passage through their territory. By three forced marches he crossed the Thessalian plain and reached Macedonia, where he entered into an alliance with Perdiccas, its king, who facilitated his entry into Chalcidice. An active campaign was now begun against the allies of Athens in that district. Brasidas met with but little opposition in his operations. His kindness and generosity made hosts of friends for the Spartans, and few places seemed anxious to retain the Athenian alliance. Acanthus, Stagīra, and even Amphipolis on the Strymon, were taken with little effort, the last mentioned being the key to the road that led eastward to the cities on the Thracian coast. So sudden was the fall of Amphipolis that Thucydides, who commanded a small Athenian fleet at Thasos, only a day's sail distant, was unable to save it. He had to be content with preserving Eion, the port at the mouth of the Strymon. For this stroke of ill luck Thucydides had to bear the brunt of the

Exile of Thucydides. wrath of Cleon, who secured from the Athenian populace a decree sending the luckless commander, but great historian, into exile.

Truce, 423 B.C.

The disloyalty, or indifference, of the Athenian allies in Chalcidice, aided by the tact and fine qualities of Brasidas, soon brought about the loss of nearly all the towns in Chalcidice, and Athenian influence in all that region was threatened with almost complete annihilation. These accumulated misfortunes in the north brought Athens to a more reasonable state of mind. So when, in 423 B.C., Sparta once more made advances to secure peace, her overtures were received with less haughtiness, and a desire to negotiate was evident. A truce for a year was agreed upon, during which the terms of a permanent peace could be discussed. Short as was this breathing spell, it was a boon to both Athenians and Peloponnesians. The desired peace was not, however, attained. The truce required that each party should retain the places it had taken, and the refusal of Sparta to compel Brasidas to restore to Athens Sciône and Mende, important towns in Chalcidice, that had opened their gates to Brasidas while negotiations were pending, caused the war to continue in the north, while the truce was observed in the south. When the year had expired, hostilities were renewed between Athens and her opponents.

Renewal of the war, 422 B.C.

Nothing important marks the year 422 B.C., save the campaign in Chalcidice against Brasidas. Once more Cleon, who was loud in his complaints against the Athenian generals, was put in command of an Athenian army. This time he was less fortunate than at Sphacteria. After winning some successes, he undertook to attack Amphipolis, where Brasidas and his army were gathered. By a foolish movement and gross carelessness, he exposed his men to a sudden and fierce attack of the Peloponnesians from the gates of Amphipolis. Cleon was overtaken in flight, and speared by a Thracian peltast. Six hundred Athenians fell in the struggle and rout that followed, the Spartans losing only a handful. Of these, however, one was Brasidas, and his loss more than counterbalanced the brilliant victory over the Athenians. He was sincerely mourned by the

Death of Brasidas, B.C. 422.

people of Amphipolis, who built a temple to his memory, and established games in his honour.

Peace was now possible, for Cleon and Brasidas, the leaders of the two parties, were removed. Cleon had always been the chief advocate of war at Athens, and Brasidas, by the confidence and admiration he had inspired at Sparta, had become the head and front of the party opposed to peace. With his death, too, came to an end the spread of Spartan influence in Chalcidice. Negotiations for peace were now resumed, and through the instrumentality of Nicías, at Athens, and Pleistoanax, the king, at Sparta, a treaty was made, which provided for a fifty years' peace, together with a mutual restoration of prisoners and places captured. Thebes, however, refused to surrender Plataea, on the ground that it had capitulated. Athens, therefore, on the same ground, retained Nisaea, Anactorium, and Sollium. Pylos and Cythera were to be given up by Athens in return for the surrender of Amphipolis in Chalcidice, and the abandonment of Thrace by Sparta. As Sparta did not compel the people of Amphipolis to admit an Athenian garrison, Athens retained Pylos and Cythera, as compensation. Amphipolis was never recovered by Athens, but Scione fell after a somewhat lengthy siege. In accordance with a savage decree obtained by Cleon at the time of its revolt, the men of the town were slain, and the women sold as slaves.

*Peace of
Nicías, 421
B.C.*

All the allies of Sparta did not ratify the treaty made by their leader. Thebes concluded a temporary armistice only, renewable every ten days; and the Megarians and Corinthians made no terms whatever, simply refraining from hostilities.

The war had lasted ten years, and despite a great expenditure of blood and treasure, nothing had been accomplished, except to shake the influence of Athens in Thrace. The Confederacy of Delos was left existing, and the maritime power of Athens was but little, if at all, lessened. Athens had shown herself to be the 'mistress of the sea,' while Sparta had proved herself to be practically unconquerable by land.

CHAPTER XXI.

FROM THE PEACE OF NICIAS TO THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION.

The Peace of Nicias lasted, nominally, six years and ten months. Nominally, because while the Athenians and Lacedaemonians abstained 'from marching against each other's territory, they did each other as much harm as possible.' The chief incidents of this breathing spell may be briefly summarized. Sparta had been anxious to conclude a peace with Athens, because a thirty years' truce with Argos, entered into by Sparta in 457 B.C., was nearing its end. She rightly suspected that Argos would take advantage of her misfortunes to renew the war, and depose her from her time-honoured leadership in the Peloponnesus. Other states besides Argos were unfriendly to Sparta. Corinth was annoyed by the sacrifice of her interests in the Peace of Nicias; the Mantinēans had schemes of aggression to carry out; and the Eleans had a grievance about the border town of Lepreum. The cities of Chalcidice were also supposed to be angry, on account of the way they had been abandoned to the tender mercies of Athens.

The result of these various dissatisfactions was the formation of an offensive and defensive alliance by Argos, Elis, Mantinēā, and the states of Chalcidice, Corinth refusing to join. Hostilities began in 421 B.C., but nothing of importance took place that year. Athens was placed in a delicate position by the outbreak of this war. She had the choice of two policies. She could break the Peace of Nicias, and, aided by Peloponnesian allies, strike a crushing blow at the supremacy of Sparta on land; or she could maintain a strict neutrality, utilizing the Peace to recover the ground she had lost in Chalcidice. Excuses were not wanting for violating the Peace of Nicias. Sparta had not restored Amphipolis, nor had she forced her allies, Corinth and the Boeotian states, to ratify the Peace. There was at Athens a peace-party and a war-party. The first was headed by

the rich, respectable, and vacillating Nicias ; the second, by *Alcibiades*. Alcibiades, one of the most remarkable characters of ancient times. Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, belonged to an ancient and wealthy family, which traced its descent from the kings of Salamis. His high birth, brilliant abilities, handsome form and face, and fascinating qualities, made him the idol of the gay and thoughtless youth of Athens. He had received the best instruction from the lips of the best teachers of a time which claimed Socrates, Plato, and Xenophon. Socrates, stern moralist though he was, was strongly attached to his brilliant pupil Alcibiades ; and the fact that each had saved the life of the other in battle, had strengthened the bond of affection between master and pupil. Nevertheless, Alcibiades seems to have profited little from the moral precepts of his teacher. In dissipation, revelry, debauchery, wanton disregard for conventional decencies, open violation of the law, cruel and senseless practical jokes at the expense of his neighbours, Alcibiades was the recognized leader of the rich and reckless youth of Athens. To us, it seems strange that a youth with such an unenviable notoriety should have stepped into the shoes of Pericles, and have become an influential leader of the Athenian people. The explanation lies in the fact that he was an excellent type of the best in mind, and the worst in morals of the Athenians themselves. A gifted orator, a fine scholar, of fascinating address, rich, of high birth, of wonderful readiness, resource, and ingenuity, he possessed many of the great qualities that characterized a Themistocles, or a Pericles. His faults were fickleness, falseness, and shameless unscrupulousness. At first a leader of the aristocrats, his antagonism to Nicias led him to identify himself with the cause of the democracy. The death of Cleon opened the way for his leadership. Hence we find him, while still a young man, the avowed champion of the people, and the mouthpiece of the war-party, at the time when ambassadors from both Argos and Sparta came to Athens, in 420 B.C., to plead the cause of their respective states. By a characteristic piece of treachery, Alcibiades, who was resolved to cause the failure of the Spartan embassy, induced the unwary Spartans to state to the Athenian assembly that they had no power to make or accept definite pro-

*Alliance
of Athens
with Argos,
419 B.C.*

posals of alliance. Alcibiades then denounced them in public, as deceivers, they having stated only a few days before that they had been given full powers to make terms with the Athenians. The trick accomplished its purpose : the Spartan overtures were rejected, and Athens entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with Argos, for one hundred years. Nevertheless, the truce with Sparta was still maintained.

*War between
Argos and
Sparta.*

The war in the Peloponnesus, between Sparta and the Argive alliance, went on for some time with little success on either side. The allies had many advantages and opportunities which they failed to utilize. On the other hand, the Spartan leader, king Agis, was unequal to the occasion, and permitted many opportunities of striking a decisive blow to escape him. The benefit of an important victory won at Argos was lost through the simple-hearted folly of Agis, who agreed to allow the Argives to retire, on the promise that Argos would submit her dispute with Sparta to arbitration. Meanwhile Athens, having angered Sparta by joining the Argive alliance, was doing little or nothing to injure her old foe, or aid her new-found friends. Nor was she able to recover the ground lost in Chalcidice, being forced to consent to a truce, renewable every ten days, with the revolted towns.

*Battle of
Mantineā,
B.C. 418.*

At last the war in the Peloponnesus was brought to an issue. King Agis had been made to feel the anger of the Spartan ephors on account of his folly at Argos, and was burning with a desire to redeem his lost reputation, and to punish the Argives who had deliberately repudiated their promises. He finally succeeded in bringing his opponents to a decisive conflict at Mantineā, B.C. 418. On the Spartan side were their allies, the Tegeans and Heraeans ; while opposed to them were the Argives and Mantineans, aided by a body of thirteen hundred Athenians. The forces of the two armies were nearly equal, and a stubborn fight followed in which little could be gained by military tactics. The battle was won by the Spartans, their enemies losing eleven hundred heavy-armed men, while the Spartans lost only three hundred. This victory restored the military reputation of Sparta, and compelled Argos to ask for peace. Internal dissensions, however, at Argos, led to a

renewal of the war, the democratic faction, which was in sympathy with Athens, having overthrown the oligarchs, who were anxious for peace with Sparta. The new war led to nothing, the Spartans contenting themselves with keeping the Argive armies at home.

The year 416 B.C. is memorable for one of those dastardly and atrocious outrages so common in Grecian history. Mēlos, an island colony of Sparta, had refused to aid Athens in the war against the mother state, but, nevertheless, had remained neutral. Athens now made the people of this little state the object of her cowardly attack. They were besieged by sea and by land, and after a brave defence their city was taken by assault. The male population was slain, and the females sold as slaves. For such an act of barbarity Athens could offer no excuse save the desire to destroy the independence of a state which might, perchance, aid her enemy and rival Sparta in some future war.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION.

Athens had suffered much from the Peloponnesian war. Her overflowing treasury was well-nigh empty. She had lost most of her allies in Chalcidice; Boeotia, Corinth, and Megara were unfriendly, and bound by nothing stronger than a ten days' truce to refrain from hostilities. Sparta was justly angered at the intervention of Athens in the affairs of Argos, and might righteously enough bring the truce to an end at any moment. The fields of Attica were once more beginning to resume their former aspect of cultivation and prosperity. Under these circumstances, prudence should have been the watchword of the Athenian people. Unfortunately, the leaders they generally followed were men like Alcibiades, versatile, clever, ambitious, but also rash, over-confident, and unscrupulous.

The disposition to embark in great schemes of adventure was just now uppermost at Athens, and a favourable opportunity to gratify it seemed to arise. Sicily, it will be remembered, had some eight years before terminated, for a time, her quarrels by the Peace of Gela. On that occasion the Athenian force operating in Sicily had been compelled to return home, much to the annoyance of the Athenian people. Circumstances now gave the Athenians another chance to interfere in Sicilian affairs, and to carry out their ambitious project of founding a western empire. Once more war broke out in Sicily. Syracuse, on the east, attacked and took Leontini; while Selinus, in the west, pressed hard upon Egesta. The people of the latter town sent ambassadors to Athens soliciting aid, and promising large sums of money with which to assist in waging war against their enemies, including, among the latter, the Syracusans. Before acceding to this request, the Athenians sent out envoys to examine into the state of affairs in Sicily, especially in Egesta. It is said that the envoys were deceived, and by a very simple

artifice led to believe that Egesta was a very wealthy city. The silver-gilt of the temples was passed off as pure gold, and the guests were met at every table, when they dined with prominent citizens, with a profusion of gold and silver plate, and other costly decorations. This was accomplished by sending round to each house in turn, where the envoys were feasted, all the available plate the citizens possessed. Surprised at such a display of wealth, the gullible envoys gave a glowing account on their return of the riches and prosperity of Egesta, and brought with them, as an earnest of what was to follow, sixty talents. These flattering accounts excited the cupidity as well as the ambition of the Athenians; and, led by Alcibiades, they determined to equip ^{*Aid*} and send out sixty galleys, well manned, to aid the Egestans ^{*promised*} and carry on a campaign in Sicily. ^{*Egesta.*} The decree that passed the assembly was sufficiently indefinite in its terms to leave the widest latitude to the Athenian commanders. There is little doubt that aid to Egesta was the smallest part of the project, nothing less than the conquest of Sicily being contemplated by Alcibiades. This seemed feasible enough, when the distracted condition of the island was considered. The whole project was strongly opposed by Nicias and other leaders of the aristocratic and peace party, but their seasonable warnings were put aside with characteristic levity. Three generals were appointed to take charge of the expedition, Nicias, Lamachus, and Alcibiades. Of Nicias we have heard before. He seems to have been a prudent, cautious, and somewhat vacillating individual, with only very moderate abilities. His wealth and general respectability made him the leader of the aristocratic party, and more than once we find he was appointed to command Athenian ^{*Character*} armies. ^{*of generals*} Lamachus was a good soldier, but his poverty and low ^{*appo nted.*} birth caused him to have little influence. Alcibiades was undoubtedly possessed of great abilities, and, besides, had the advantage of being enthusiastic in support of the war. Nevertheless, his fickleness and unscrupulousness caused him to be viewed always with more or less distrust.

Nicias, having been appointed one of the generals against his will, proceeded to magnify the greatness of the task before them, hoping thereby to discourage the Athenians, and induce them

*Sicilian
expedition,
415 B.C.*

to abandon the expedition. His words had, however, an effect the very opposite to what he intended. If sixty galleys were not enough, he was told, then he could have an hundred. If he was not satisfied with the number of hoplites promised, he could have as many as he chose. Thus it happened that the size of the fleet and army, originally proposed, was greatly increased, and the most costly and extensive armament ever equipped in Athenian ports was sent out. One hundred and thirty-four galleys, five thousand one hundred hoplites, four hundred and eighty bowmen, and seven hundred slingers, were accompanied by thirty transports and one hundred boats.

*Busts of
Hermes
disfigured
and
destroyed.*

When, however, the fleet was just ready to set sail a mysterious event occurred, which helped materially to lessen its chances of success. The streets and public places of Athens, and even the doors of private houses, were profusely adorned with the busts of the god Hermes. One morning it was discovered, to the dismay of the superstitious citizens, that nearly all of these busts had been mutilated or otherwise disfigured. Who the perpetrators were could only be guessed. The enemies of Alcibiades insinuated that he was the instigator of this sacrilegious deed. His numerous and notorious acts of wanton mischief and injury gave colour to the charge. It has been surmised that the whole affair was a plot devised by the opponents of the war to injure Alcibiades and frustrate his plans. Great rewards were offered for the discovery of the perpetrators of the deed. Informers were, in consequence, numerous enough, and those denounced, knowing the uselessness of offering a defence, fled to escape the unreasoning wrath of the excited people. Nevertheless, they were condemned to death, and their property confiscated. It was not, however, until the expedition had actually sailed that the name of Alcibiades was mentioned as that of the chief culprit.

*The expedi-
tion sails,
July, 415
B.C.*


The fleet first sailed to Aegina, and thence to Corcyra, where it was to meet the allies. From Corcyra it proceeded to the south of Italy, halting at Rhegium. In the meantime, three vessels had been sent forward to Eggesta to make inquiries and to report. The news they brought back was decidedly discouraging. Eggesta was not the wealthy city its citizens had made the Athenian

ambassadors believe it to be. Thirty talents were all it could contribute to the cause of the allies. This news rendered it necessary that some definite line of action should at once be adopted. Nicias proposed to attack Selinus, and then return home. Lamachus wished to strike a sudden blow at Syracuse, and capture or cripple it before its inhabitants could prepare for a defence. But Alcibiades opposed both plans, and advised a middle course, which was adopted. His plan was to seize some *Different plans proposed.* city in the western part of the island, and make it a base of operations; in the meantime, the disaffected Sicilian towns were to be incited to make common cause against their enemy, Syracuse. The summer was spent in cruising along the coast of Sicily seeking allies, and gaining few. Naxos and Catana were won over; Hyccara was captured, and its inhabitants were sold as slaves.

The operations of the Athenian armament were interrupted by the arrival of the state ship, to take Alcibiades home to stand his trial for the profanation of the Eleusinian mysteries, a charge which had been brought against Alcibiades before his departure, but which had for a time been allowed to drop. During his absence, however, his enemies had been active, and they had succeeded in getting a summons issued for his recall. *Alcibiades recalled to stand a trial.* Alcibiades made no opposition to the summons, and went on board the state galley, accompanied by a few friends. At Thurii, however, he quietly left the ship, and, evading his enemies, finally succeeded in reaching Sparta. He now cast in *Alcibiades escapes to Sparta.* his lot with his country's enemies, and through his intimate knowledge of Athenian affairs was able to do a great deal of harm to his native city. His failure to return to Athens had been taken as a sign of guilt, and the sentence of death was pronounced against him.

Turning to the Sicilian expedition, the command of which was now left with Nicias and Lamachus, we find that nothing further was accomplished that summer beyond defeating a Syracusan army on a plain south of the city, and then returning to go into winter quarters at Catana. The effect of this attack and retreat was to induce the Syracusans to make more strenuous efforts in preparation for a siege.

The accompanying map will explain the situation of Syracuse at this time, and her chances of offering an effective resistance to a well-conducted siege. The oldest part of the city was on the peninsula of Ortygia, while the larger and newer portion was built around the heads of the two harbours. Each part had its own wall, one running across the peninsula, and separating it from the mainland; the other, forming an outer line of



defence, and extending in a direction not clearly defined. North of the city lay the rocky plateau of Epipolæ, which overlooked the sea and the city. It will be seen that a city so situated could easily be blockaded once the heights of Epipolæ were seized, and the narrow entrances to the harbours closed. To prevent this, the Syracusans took advantage of the inertness

of the Athenians to build a new line of fortifications across Epipolæ from north to south, thus greatly extending the front offered to the attack of an enemy. Hermocrâtes, their most skilled and experienced general, was put in command of the Syracusan forces. Alliances were concluded with friendly neighbours; while Corinth, the mother city, and Sparta were appealed to for aid. Corinth at once responded heartily; but Sparta hesitated until Alcibiades threw the weight of his influence in the scale against his native city. He advised that an experienced general should be sent immediately to Syracuse, with some disciplined troops, to give courage and hope to the besieged city. He also urged that a body of Spartan troops should be sent to take possession of Decelæa, a stronghold in the heart of Attica, from which the Athenians could be harassed and molested. Decelæa was to be used by Sparta against Athens, as Pylos had been used by the Athenians against Sparta. The advice of Alcibiades was taken in both cases. Gylippus, a skilled and experienced officer, was despatched with a small force, and four ships from Corinth were prepared to accompany him. Nevertheless, war was not yet openly declared against Athens by Sparta.

The siege of Syracuse began, in earnest, in the spring of 414 B.C. With some reinforcements from Athens, in the shape of cavalry, and a few hundred horse from friendly Sicilians, the Athenian army landed at Leon, a port a few miles north of Syracuse. Gaining the heights of Epipolæ, the Athenians began, according to the custom of the time, to build a line of circumvallation opposite the new Syracusan wall running across the plateau. The Athenian wall was to extend from the sea on the north to the Great Harbour on the south. In addition, a fort was built at Labdålum, the highest point of Epipolæ, and a circular entrenchment further south. The latter was intended to be the central point of the line of circumvallation. Attempts were made by the Syracusans to put a stop to the Athenian project of encircling them, but the cross walls thrown out for this purpose were taken and destroyed by the Athenians. Unfortunately for the Athenians, their most experienced general, Lamachus, was slain in an attack on one of

*Siege of
Syracuse,
B.C. 414.*

*Death of
Lamachus.*

these counter-walls, and the army was left with no more competent head than the cautious and irresolute Nicias.

The Athenian fleet was now brought round from Thapsus to the Great Harbour of Syracuse; the stores were landed, and the ships drawn up on the beach. The southern part of the line of circumvallation was pushed forward and completed, but the northern half, across the plateau of Epipolæ, was left, for the time, unfinished. No danger was apprehended from that quarter, a mistake in calculation which cost the Athenians dear.

Syracuse was apparently shut in, both landward and seaward, and her people were becoming disheartened. Some went so far as to talk of asking for terms of peace. On the other hand, the fortunes of Athens being in the ascendant, allies were forthcoming from both Sicily and Italy. The tide, however, was soon to turn. The Spartan Gylippus, with his four ships, reached the shores of Sicily. Landing at Himera with seven hundred soldiers, he was joined by several thousand men from that city, Selinus, and Gela. With these reinforcements he advanced rapidly towards Syracuse. He easily made his way into the city through the unfinished line of circumvallation on the northern side of Epipolæ. Adding the Syracusan army to his own forces, he offered the Athenians battle, an offer which Nicias prudently refused. Gylippus then proceeded to demolish the unfinished northern wall of the Athenians, and, in spite of all the efforts of Nicias, succeeded in building a cross-wall from the Syracusan lines westward to Euryelus, fortifying it by four strong forts. It now looked as if the Athenians, not the Syracusans, were to be besieged. To add to the troubles of Nicias, twelve Peloponnesian triremes ran the blockade, and made their way into the small harbour of Syracuse. More ships were to follow, it was said, and the good news and recent successes induced the Syracusans to bring out and refit their small and hitherto unused fleet of forty or fifty vessels. Meanwhile, the Athenian fleet was suffering from lying exposed on the beach. The crews were out of condition, and the slaves and others, who manned the oars, were taking advantage of the turn of the tide of fortune to desert.

*Gylippus
arrives at
Syracuse.*

Alarmed at the successes of Gylippus, Nicias took possession of the projecting point of land, called Plemmyrium, and removed to it a great part of his stores, and a portion of his fleet. Three forts were erected to protect the new position. Had he been wise he would now have returned to Athens ; but he was afraid to face Athenian public opinion by withdrawing from a dangerous situation. Instead, he sent to Athens asking for immediate assistance, or liberty to return. It was now autumn, and relief from Athens could not well be received before the following spring. In the meantime Athens had been provoked, by the aid sent to Sicily by Sparta, into making an attack on the Laconian coast. Sparta, in revenge, began to make preparations to invade Attica once more, keeping in mind the advice of Alcibiades to seize and fortify Decelea. Under these circumstances one would think that Athens would have hesitated to weaken her forces at home by sending men to help Nicias in Sicily. So great, however, was the Athenian self-confidence, that Demosthenes, their most experienced general, was despatched as soon as possible to Sicily, with an armament nearly as strong as that which had sailed forth a short time before under Alcibiades and his colleagues. The new expedition was supposed to be strong enough to bring the siege to a speedy and successful termination. Nicias, meanwhile, was growing weaker as the winter wore away, and his opponents were becoming stronger and more confident. The army of Gylippus was strengthened by recruits from Sicilian cities, and eighty galleys were made ready for immediate service in the Syracusan harbours. When spring arrived, Gylippus made his way to the rear of the Athenian camp, and concealed his forces near the Athenian camp at Plemmyrium. His ships then came out boldly from the harbour, and offered the Athenian squadron battle. The conflict that followed was favourable to the Athenians ; but while their land army was intent upon the sea-fight, Gylippus had stormed the three forts that protected the Athenian camp, and had seized a great quantity of their stores. Matters were in this discouraging condition for the Athenians when news of the expedition under Demosthenes was received. In spite of

*Demos-
thenes sent
to Syracuse.*

the fact that Sparta had seized Decelea and ravaged Attica, the Athenians, with remarkable confidence in their own good fortune, had sent out seventy-five triremes, four thousand hoplites, and a large body of light-armed men. Sparta, too, despatched a body of two thousand men for the Syracusan war.

The near approach of Demosthenes induced Gylippus and the Syracusans to attempt to crush Nicias before his reinforcements could arrive. The Athenians were attacked from both land and sea. The land army repulsed the attack on their camp, but the Athenian vessels were so imperfectly manned that, after two days' fighting, they were compelled to seek refuge on shore under the protection of the land army. The Syracusans were greatly elated over this naval victory, while the Athenians were correspondingly depressed. But the arrival of Demosthenes once more gave the advantage to the Athenians. The new general, as soon as he had landed his men, began to assume the offensive. The Syracusan counter-wall across the plateau of Epipolæ was made the object of an immediate attack. Repulsed in an effort to storm the works, Demosthenes under cover of night led his army inland, and around the most western point of Epipolæ, where the wall terminated. He succeeded in getting to the rear of the enemy, and took them by surprise. For a time all went well, and then for some unexplained reason, his men became confused and fell into disorder. The enemy rallied and, after a desperate conflict in the dark, turned the confusion of the Athenians into a hopeless rout. The disordered mass fled down the steep slopes and cliffs, losing more men by falling from the precipices than by the swords of their enemies. This unexpected defeat was so discouraging that Demosthenes decided that nothing remained but immediate retreat from the scene of so many misfortunes. For a time Nicias opposed this policy, but the arrival of reinforcements for Gylippus from Sparta, and the wasting effects of marsh fever, compelled him to recognize the wisdom of this step. Once more, however, the timidity and irresolution of Nicias, stood in the way of escape. An eclipse of the moon occurred, and the soothsayers said that the retreat must be delayed thrice nine days, and the superstitious Nicias agreed to

*Defeat of
the Athen-
ian fleet.*

*Failure of
attack on
Epipolæ.*

*Athenian
departure
delayed.*

postpone the embarkation for that time. The Syracusans had noticed the preparations for departure, and at once began a series of attacks, with the evident intention of making the position of the Athenians unendurable. The Athenian fleet was again defeated and its commander, Eurymedon, slain. Emboldened by success, Gylippus now laid his plans to prevent the escape of the enemy, aiming at nothing less than their destruction. To this end, the narrow mouth of the Great Harbour was blocked by mooring merchantmen across the channel between Ortygia and Plemmyrium. The design of this was so obvious, and the menace to the escape of the Athenians so alarming, that Nicias was at last aroused to a sense of their great peril. It was decided that the blockade must be raised at all costs. Every seaworthy vessel was launched, and manned with both heavy-armed and light-armed men from the land forces. One hundred and ten galleys were sent out under the command of Demosthenes to break through the barrier at the harbour's mouth. Nicias himself stayed on shore to guard the camp. The Syracusans with eighty vessels put out to meet Demosthenes, when a life and death struggle began. To the Athenians, breaking through the boom meant escape from imminent danger, and they fought with desperation. On the other hand, the Syracusans were resolved not to allow their enemies to escape, and fought with equal determination. The struggle ended with the Athenians being beaten back, and compelled to return to their camp. The loss had been heavy on both sides, and Demosthenes pleaded with his men to renew the conflict, pointing out the weakened condition of the Syracusan fleet. All his commands and entreaties, however, were in vain, and the thoroughly cowed and disheartened Athenians refused to try again on the sea the fortunes of war.

*Escape by
sea cut off.*

There was now only one course for the Athenians to follow, and that was to break up their camp, destroy their boats, and by a march inland, endeavour to reach Catana. The distance to be traversed was forty miles, and the road lay through the defiles of a hilly and rocky country. The fatal march was delayed for two days by the slow-moving Nicias, and thus ample time was given the Syracusans to seize the difficult passes, to

*Athenians
retreat
inland.*

throw up barricades at the fords, and break down the bridges. At last, the retreat began. Thousands of wounded soldiers were left behind, in spite of heartrending appeals for help. But the army was now no longer an army; it was little better than a mass of fugitives, every man intent on securing his own escape. Nicias led the van, while Demosthenes commanded the rear. Space will not permit to tell the full story of the horrors of this retreat. At every step the unfortunate Athenians were harassed by the vindictive enemy. Desertions were of daily occurrence, thousands taking to the hills in the hope of finding their way to a place of safety. Passes were blocked by the Syracusans, and the Athenians were thus forced out of their way towards the interior. Day by day saw the wretched army wasting away under the attacks of the enemy, and through desertion. In an effort to escape from their pursuers, Nicias, with the smaller part of the army, got separated from Demosthenes, who was bringing up the rear. The latter was overtaken by the Syracusans as he was endeavouring to make his way through a narrow pass. A brief struggle took place, and then the Athenian army of six thousand men surrendered on condition of their lives being spared. Demosthenes fell on his sword, but the wound was not fatal, and he was borne back to Syracuse. In the meantime, Nicias, unconscious of the fate of Demosthenes, had made some progress southward. Elated by their success, the Syracusans again took up the pursuit. Nicias was soon overtaken, surrounded, and forced to surrender. To the unfortunate Athenians whose lives were spared in battle a terrible punishment was meted out. Nicias and Demosthenes were executed, although they had been promised their lives. Their followers were shut up in the quarries on the hill-sides of Epipolæ, without any protection from the weather. They were given barely enough food to keep them alive. The cruel treatment, added to the hardships they had already undergone, told heavily on their ranks when the unhealthy autumn season began. The corpses of the dead were left unburied among the living prisoners, and the stench was so great that, by a righteous judgment, an infectious fever spread to the city of Syracuse. After seventy days, the bulk of the prisoners were sold as slaves,

*Horrors of
the retreat.*

the native Athenians and their Sicilian allies being left for eight months more in the quarries, where death came often to relieve the unhappy inmates of their miseries. At the end of that time the few survivors were also sold into slavery. Of these, it is said, several were ultimately given their freedom.

‘Thus ended’ says Thucydides, ‘the greatest adventure that the Greeks entered into during this war, and in my opinion the greatest in which Greeks were ever concerned; the one most splendid for the conquerors, and most disastrous for the conquered; for they suffered no common defeat, but were absolutely annihilated—land army, fleet, and all; and of many thousands only a handful ever returned home.’

CHAPTER XXIII.

FALL OF ATHENS, AND END OF PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

*The news of
the disaster
in Sicily
brought to
Athens.*

The news of the terrible disaster that had befallen their armies in Sicily was a long time in reaching the people of Athens. It is said, by Plutarch, that the first tidings came from a sea-faring stranger who entered a barber's shop at the Peiræus, and while there casually mentioned it as a fact well known. The barber immediately hastened to Athens with the tidings. When asked by the magistrates whence he obtained his facts, he was unable to prove the truth of his statements, his informant having in the meantime disappeared. The poor man was then put on the wheel as a bearer of false tales, and had been enduring the torture some time before a few soldiers, who had escaped prior to the final surrender, appeared to corroborate his story. Even then to the Athenians it seemed incredible that so great and powerful an expedition should suffer so terrible a fate.

*Condition of
Athens.*

It might have been expected that a disaster so overwhelming would have caused the utmost despondency in Athens. But these wonderful people soon rallied from the first shock caused by the bad news, and began to make the best of their circumstances. Their navy had been almost blotted out by the Sicilian expedition, nearly two hundred ships having been destroyed. There still remained a small fleet of twenty-seven vessels at Naupactus, and thirty or forty in the neighbourhood of the Athenian ports. Out of a total of ten or eleven thousand men available for foreign service, three thousand seven hundred had perished. The treasury, too, of the state had been nearly exhausted in equipping the second Sicilian force. There still remained, however, one thousand talents in the Acropolis, which had been set aside by Pericles to be used only in the event of Athens being attacked by an enemy's fleet. To increase their troubles, the Spartans, acting under the advice of Alcibiades, had fortified and taken possession of Decelæa, in Attica. The nearness of this Spartan force was a direct incentive to the slaves

of the Athenians to desert their masters, which they did by the thousand.

At this time the Spartans might easily have ended the war by the capture of Athens, had energetic action at once been taken. But, true to their manner of waging war, the Spartans delayed their attack so long, and spent so much time in making elaborate preparations for the final struggle, that Athens was able to recover somewhat from the almost mortal blow that had been dealt her in Sicily. The news of ship-building at Corinth, Gythium and other ports of the Spartan Confederacy, simply nerved the Athenians to put on the stocks, and equip as rapidly as possible, another fleet. *The Athenians prepare for defence.* The thousand talents were now used to provide a new fleet, and the resources of their allies, in the shape of money and ship-timber, were drawn on for the same purpose. Expenses were cut down that the money saved might be used in the defence of the city. The Sicilian disaster occurred in September, 413 B.C., and by the next summer it was estimated that a fleet of one hundred vessels would be ready for service.

A greater danger than an attack upon their city now threatened the Athenians. Their allies of the Confederacy of Delos began to realize that their leader and mistress had received a serious blow ; and that her greatness was on the wane. The aristocratic faction, that existed in each city of the Confederacy, was always favourably disposed to Sparta. The weakening of Athens encouraged this faction to propose a revolt from her rule, to be aided by the Spartans and their allies. *Disaffection of Athenian allies.* On the other hand, the democratic party, which had hitherto supported Athenian rule, had become lukewarm in its assistance. Athenian rule now meant increased burdens, in the shape of heavy taxes, to prop the falling fortunes of the once redoubtable city. So we find that the leading states of Ionia began to send secretly to Sparta and Thebes for help, promising to rise and throw off the Athenian yoke as soon as a Peloponnesian force appeared on the coast of Asia Minor. The people of Chios, Lesbos, and Euboea, along with Pharnabazus, the satrap of the Hellespont, and Tissaphernes, the satrap of Lydia, were among those that appealed to Sparta for aid and co-operation.

*Revolt of
Chios and
other cities.*

These advances were gratifying to the Spartans, who resolved to send aid first of all to Chios, this city being the most powerful of the disaffected Athenian allies, and therefore the most likely to succeed in a revolt. The Spartans unwisely, however, sent out small detachments of vessels at a time, and it therefore happened that the first contingent of twenty vessels was intercepted by the Athenian fleet. Five vessels at length escaped the watchful eye of the Athenians, and, with Alcibiades on board, succeeded in reaching Chios. The city at once revolted, and placed her fleet of thirty ships at the disposal of the Spartans. This revolt was soon followed by that of Clazomenae, Erythrae, and Teos, which took place in spite of the efforts of the Athenians to bring vessels to the disaffected district. The naval war that now followed on the Asiatic coast was one of varying fortunes. Sometimes the Athenians were successful, sometimes the Spartans and the rebelling Ionians. The balance, however, was in the favour of the latter. As the autumn approached the Sicilian fleet appeared to aid the revolt, revenge being sought for the Athenian invasion of Sicily. The Spartans had, besides, other allies of a different description. They did not disdain to ask aid from the Persian satraps in the neighbourhood of Ionia. They actually entered into an agreement with Tisaphernes, which practically pledged the Spartans to look on while the Persians asserted once more their power over the Greek cities of Asia Minor. The price paid for this disgraceful surrender of Greek independence was money from the Persian treasury.

*Sparta seeks
aid from
Persia.*

The Athenians, during the remaining period of the war, made Samos the base of their operations. The democratic faction of that island had, a short time before, risen and massacred many of the oligarchs. Fear of vengeance at the hands of their enemies, should the oligarchical form of government be restored by the Spartans, bound the democrats to the Athenian alliance. The situation of Samos was peculiarly favourable for the operation of the Athenian armies, lying, as it did, not remote from Athens, and midway between the two centres of revolt, Chios and Miletus.

*Revolt of
Rhodes.*

The year 411 B.C. marked a new disaster to Athenian influence. The island of Rhodes revolted, and when the Athenian

fleet sailed from Samos to restore the lost supremacy, the combined fleet of the Peloponnesian allies forced it to retire.

The Spartans had won their recent successes mainly through the aid given by Persian gold. Sparta, herself, was too poor to keep a large fleet in constant pay. When Persian money ceased to be forthcoming, her fleet was brought to inaction, and her power to assume the aggressive was paralyzed. At this juncture, a change in the policy of the Persian satrap, Tissaphernes, took place. The supplies that had been poured into the Spartan treasury were now suddenly reduced. The cause of this apparently strange conduct is said to have been the influence of Alcibiades. This versatile traitor had made his way to the coast of Asia Minor to assist in spreading the Ionian revolt. By this time he had rightly become distrusted by the Spartans, and had rewarded their hospitality by seducing the wife of their King Agis. This distrust increased to such a height that Alcibiades was forced to leave the Spartan camp. He then betook himself to the court of Tissaphernes, with whom he succeeded in winning favour. His knowledge of both Athenian and Spartan affairs was particularly useful to the Persians. He now began to point out to Tissaphernes the folly of assisting the Peloponnesians to conquer and crush the Athenians. By so doing the Persians were simply replacing an Athenian empire in Asia Minor by a Spartan; and of the two the Spartan would be the much more dangerous to Persian power. The wisest plan to pursue, he pointed out, would be to allow the two Greek confederacies to so weaken each other that Persia could step in and reap the fruit of their struggles by seizing the Ionian cities.

Tissaphernes saw the force of the argument, and at once began to reduce his grants of money to the Spartans. He also kept the Spartans inactive by promising them the aid of a Phœnician fleet which never arrived; and when complaints were made by the commanders, he quieted them by bribes. Alcibiades now thought that the time had come when his influence with Tissaphernes could be turned to good account in obtaining for himself an honourable return to Athens. His offences against Athens were many, and not to be easily forgiven. He had, since his exile, used his ability and his knowledge of the circum-

*Alcibiades
betrays the
Spartans.*

*Persian aid
to Sparta
withdrawn.*

*Alcibiades
prepares the
way for his
return to
Athens.*

stances of his native city with fatal effect. His advice to the Spartans to establish themselves at Decelea, was a blow so serious to Athenian power that Alcibiades might well seek to render her some great service before he could hope for pardon. That service he thought was now within his reach. He hoped to so influence Tissaphernes that the Persians would drop the Spartan alliance, and throw their weight into the Athenian scale. Persian money was what supported the Peloponnesian fleet, and Persian money was what the impoverished city of Athens most needed.

To carry out his plan, Alcibiades began to sound the army at Samos. Taking advantage of the fact that the war was unpopular with the wealthier classes at Athens, which had been well-nigh ruined by the burden of taxation and that the democratic party had been blamed for undertaking the disastrous Sicilian expedition, he suggested that if the democratic constitution of Athens were overturned, and an oligarchic government established instead, the Persian satrap would cast in his lot with the Athenians. The dislike of Tissaphernes to democracies, it was urged, was so great that his assistance could be obtained only on the condition of the overthrow of the Athenian democratic government.

The poison so subtly instilled soon made itself felt. Many officers of the army at Samos welcomed the base proposal, and, headed by Peisander, a deputation sailed to Athens to carry out the scheme. One general of prominence, however, Phrynichus, opposed the plan ; while the rank and file took no action at first, not fully understanding the scheme, and yet gladly welcoming any aid the Persians could give.

*Peisander
advises the
overthrow of
the Athen-
ian constitu-
tion.*

When Peisander and his colleagues arrived at Athens, they at once began to urge the acceptance of the proposals of Alcibiades. To every objection urged against the recall of the traitor, and the destruction of their cherished form of government, Peisander replied by calling attention to the helpless and impoverished condition of Athens, and the advantages of a Persian alliance. A noisy and lengthened debate was ended by the people voting to send Peisander and ten delegates to Asia,

with power to treat with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes, and to make the best terms possible.

The commissioners started on their errand, but when they reached Asia they found that Alcibiades had over-estimated his influence with Tissaphernes, who refused to join the Athenian alliance, contenting himself with paralyzing Spartan activity by refusing their fleet the supplies necessary to carry on an aggressive war. After some abortive attempts at making a treaty of alliance, the Athenian ambassadors were forced to return to Samos, having accomplished nothing.

The failure of the negotiations with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes did not deter the oligarchic party at Athens from carrying on an active intrigue against the democratic government of the city. Of these traitors the orator Antiphon was, perhaps, the most skilful wire-puller. The various political clubs with anti-democratic leanings were stirred into vigorous life, and when the leaders of the democratic party opposed changes having for their object the lessening of the power of the Ecclesia, and the transfer of the management of the war to a less unwieldy body, they were promptly slain by oligarchic assassins. The effect was to deter the people for further opposition, and the plot went on.

*Oligarchic
conspiracy
at Samos
and Athens.*

It was now decided to have a simultaneous rising at Athens and Samos. But the conspirators miscalculated their strength with the army and fleet at Samos, and, after slaying a few of the democratic party, they were easily crushed by the Athenians on board the fleet, and the Samian democracy. The state galley *Paralus* was immediately despatched to Athens by the victors to tell the good news.

The conspiracy was, however, more successful at Athens than at Samos. Peisander, Antiphon, and Phrynichus (who had been won over to the oligarchic faction) brought forward a motion that ten commissioners should be appointed to prepare a new constitution to be submitted to the people. The motion carried, and the commissioners were chosen from the oligarchs. A few days after, the Ecclesia was summoned to meet at Colonus, in the suburbs of the city, and not on the Pnyx, the usual place

A new constitution adopted.

of assembly. The meeting was but scantily attended, as the people feared a plot, and perchance an attack from the Spartan garrison at Decelea. This gave the oligarchs a chance to consummate their plot. The gathering at Colonus was composed of the friends of the conspirators, and speedily voted that five men should be elected, who again should choose a hundred, and each of these hundred three more, and the whole body of four hundred thus chosen should assume the government of the state. The Four Hundred then chose five thousand citizens to be given the franchise, the rest of the Athenians being practically disfranchised. The Four Hundred, aided by a body of hoplites, then dispersed the senate, giving each senator his pay as he passed out, and assumed the reins of government. Thus, apparently without any opposition, the noble constitution of Cleisthenes and Solon, was swept out of existence.

The Four Hundred inaugurated its rule by sending envoys to the Spartans at Decelea, and asking for terms of peace. The Spartans endeavoured to take Athens by surprise, thinking the city was given over to civic strife ; but the attempt failed. They then sent the oligarch envoys to Sparta to treat with the Ephors.

Action of the army and fleet at Samos.

It was under these circumstances that the state galley from Samos, bringing the news of the suppression of the oligarchic conspiracy on that island, reached Athens. The captain of the vessel succeeded in effecting his return to Samos, and told the story of the oligarchic revolution to the army there. The soldiers, at least, were loyal to the old constitution. They at once deposed every officer of oligarchic sympathies, and put in command Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, two officers of undoubted loyalty. The soldiers then, in solemn assembly, swore 'to hold to the democracy, to live in concord, to zealously prosecute the war with Sparta, and to be foes to the Four Hundred, and have no intercourse with them.' The whole Athenian fleet was in the hands of the army at Samos, and by its instrumentality it was hoped that Athens could be rescued from the conspirators. In the event of failure, however, it was proposed to make Samos, not Athens, the capital of the empire.

Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, anxious to secure the aid of

Tissaphernes, now proposed to the army that Alcibiades should be recalled. Consent was given, and after four years of exile Alcibiades appeared once more among his own people. He was profuse in his promises to bring the Persians over to the Athenian cause, and he succeeded so well in impressing the army with a sense of his influence that he was elected as the colleague of Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, and given full power to treat with Tissaphernes.

*Return of
Alcibiades
to Samos.*

In the meantime, Tissaphernes had thought it prudent to allay the wrathful feelings of the Spartans by, at last, bringing up to their aid the Phoenician fleet. The fleet, more than a hundred strong, was lying at Aspendus when Alcibiades arrived there to begin his negotiations with Tissaphernes. Alcibiades succeeded in getting the satrap to send the ships away, to the great indignation of the Spartans, and to the corresponding joy of the Athenians at Samos.

Turning now to Athens, we find that the rule of the Four Hundred was but of short duration. The action of the army at Samos, and dissensions among the oligarchs themselves, both tended to weaken the power of the usurpers. The more extreme faction, headed by Phrynichus and Antiphon, proposed to call in the Spartans, and took steps to carry out the treasonable project. These designs were opposed by Theramenes, one of the more crafty and moderate oligarchs. The civil strife that now began to prevail, encouraged a Spartan admiral to attempt the seizure of the Peiræus, hoping to find an easy entry into the city through the treachery of Phrynichus. But Phrynichus had been slain by a young soldier, and there was no one to carry out his plans. The Spartan fleet then set sail for Euboea, where disaffection against Athenian rule was rife. A small Athenian fleet was hastily manned and started in pursuit. Off Eretria, the Spartans were overtaken, but the ill-equipped Athenian fleet was easily defeated, and nearly destroyed. The result of the battle was the loss of all Euboea, save Histiaea, and the connection of the island with the mainland by a bridge opposite Chalcis. The loss was both serious and disheartening to the Athenians. It had been the custom of the people of Attica, in times of peril, to keep their flocks and herds on

*Overthrow
of the Four
Hundred.*

that island. In fact, it was the convenient storehouse of Athens. The defeat, too, had occurred so near their own doors, that the sense of deadly peril was brought home to every Athenian. The one good result of the defeat at Eretria, was the immediate downfall of the Four Hundred. The people gathered once more at their old meeting place, the Pnyx, and deposed the usurpers. The old constitution was practically restored, Alcibiades' recall was authorized, and the action of the army at Samos endorsed. Peisander and many of his colleagues made their way to the Spartan garrison at Decelea. Some of the more notable conspirators, however, paid for their treason with their lives. Of these, Antiphon made a most eloquent speech in his own defence; but he failed to secure an acquittal, and met a well-deserved death.

The civil strife at Athens furnished the Spartans with an excellent opportunity to bring the war to a successful close. The usual slowness, caution, and incapacity for decisive action were, however, displayed by the Spartan authorities. Instead of blockading the Peiræus after his victory at Eretria, a matter which could easily have been accomplished at that time, the Spartan admiral sailed away to Asia Minor to reinforce the Peloponnesian fleet on that coast. The respite to Athens was a welcome and timely one. Her fleet at Samos, which had intended to go to Athens and assist in driving out the Four Hundred, was dissuaded from the project by Alcibiades, who counselled leaving the people of Athens to settle their own difficulties, the fleet in the meanwhile being used to operate in Ionia against the enemies of the empire. The seat of active warfare was now shifted to the region of the Hellespont. The different cities in that district were ripe for revolt, and Pharnabazus, the Persian satrap of northern Asia Minor, was ready and eager to aid the Spartans against the Athenians. Accordingly Mindarus, the Spartan admiral, sailed northwards to the Hellespont with seventy-three vessels. His intention was to block the straits against the Athenian corn-ships from the Euxine, and seize the cities along the shores. But the Athenian generals, Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, were in close pursuit, and overtaking Mindarus in the narrow stretch of water between Sestos and

Abydos, inflicted at Cynossema a severe defeat on the Spartan fleet. This check upon the Spartans did not prevent several cities on the Propontis from revolting from Athens. Mindarus, too, encouraged by reinforcements from Rhodes, gave battle again to the Athenians. This time Alcibiades, who had just arrived with a small fleet, was able to turn the tide of battle against the Spartans. In spite of the aid given by Pharnabazus, the Athenians were successful in capturing thirty Spartan ships, leaving Mindarus, for the time being, crippled and helpless.

*Battles in
the Helles-
pont, B.C.
411.*

Winter was now close at hand, and hostilities were temporarily suspended. Alcibiades made a visit to his old friend and ally Tissaphernes, but instead of a hearty welcome found chains and imprisonment awaiting him. He was sent to Sardis, whence he succeeded in making his escape a month later, and joined once more the Athenian fleet.

The spring of 410 B.C. saw a renewal of the war. Mindarus had managed to collect a fleet of sixty vessels, and with these he put out to sea. As he lay off Cyzicus, the Athenian fleet, under Alcibiades, Thrasybulus and Theramenes, surprised him during a day of storm and rain. He endeavoured to run his ships ashore, and seek safety and support from the army of Pharnabazus, which was near at hand. In this attempt he was only partially successful, many of his vessels being cut off and captured before they reached the shore. The Athenians did not rest with the victory so far obtained, for Alcibiades landed and inflicted a signal defeat on the combined forces of the Peloponnesians and Persians. Mindarus was slain, and every vessel was taken or destroyed, save a few Syracusan ships. This was the most complete victory that had fallen to Athens during the war, and the glory of it was freely bestowed on Alcibiades.

*Battle of
Cyzicus,
410 B.C.*

The battle of Cyzicus had destroyed the main fleet of the Peloponnesians, and had opened up the Hellespont to the unimpeded passage of Athenian trade-ships. It also relieved Athens of any immediate danger of attack, besides promising the early subjection of her revolted allies in Asia Minor. So discouraged were the Spartans at the turn affairs had taken that they proposed terms of peace, which the Athenians, had they been wise, would have accepted. Rhodes, Chios, Miletus, and

*Peace
proposed by
Sparta.*

the Euboeans were to remain independent, Sparta was to withdraw her garrison from Decelea, and those members of the Confederacy of Delos which had remained true to the Athenian alliance were to be left in their present relations. But the Athenians, always easily elated by any temporary success, and influenced by blatant demagogues, refused any terms of peace which would leave their revolted allies their independence.

*Recovery of
some of the
revolting
cities.*

It was very soon evident that the confidence of the Athenians in their power to reassert their authority over their allies had very little foundation. For more than a year they were left free to carry on the war of subjugation, the Spartan fleet having been almost entirely destroyed, and great difficulty being experienced in building new ships. The Athenian generals, Alcibiades and Thrasyllus, were men of genius and energy, whereas the men sent by Sparta to Asia Minor were lacking in both ability and vigor. Nevertheless, all that the Athenians were able to accomplish was the recovery of the cities on the Hellespont and Propontis which had thrown off the Athenian yoke. Perinthus and Selymbria were taken in the autumn of 410 B.C.; the island of Thasos came back to the Athenian alliance during the following winter; and Chalcēdon was besieged in 409 B.C., and taken in the spring of 408 B.C. When, however, the Athenian arms were turned against the cities of Ionia, Colophon, alone, was recovered. Byzantium, after a long siege, was starved into surrender, and this left the passage of the Bosphorus, Hellespont and Propontis free to the Athenian corn-ships from the Euxine. Almost as important to Athens was the offer of Pharnabazus to retire from the Spartan alliance and make peace.

*Alcibiades
returns to
Athens, 408
B.C.*

Alcibiades now thought that the services he had rendered his native city were such as to warrant him a friendly reception by his fellow-citizens. He, therefore, with some hesitation, set sail for the Peiræus, and after seven years of absence, once more set foot on the soil of Attica. Whatever fear he may have left of the wrath of his fellow-countrymen, was speedily dissipated by the kindness of his reception. After a hearing before the Senate and Ecclesia, the sentence pronounced against him was revoked, and his civil rights were restored. Besides being

continued in his office as general, he was given the sole command of one hundred ships, and fifteen hundred hoplites, to be used as he thought best. His first use of his new power was to escort, by the Sacred Way, the annual procession that went from Athens to Eleusis. This was followed by an unsuccessful attempt to recover the island of Andros, after which he returned to Asia Minor.

In the meantime an important change had taken place in the aspect of affairs on the Asiatic coast. Sparta had at last wakened up to the necessity of sending an able man to take charge of her fleet. The man chosen for the office of High Admiral was Lysander, one of the two great men produced by Sparta during this war, Brasidas being the other. Unlike Brasidas, however, Lysander was haughty and self-seeking, unscrupulous, cruel, and treacherous. In ability he was not the inferior of Brasidas, and his energy is illustrated by the fact that he had forced his way to the very front from a position of obscurity and poverty. *Lysander.*

The cause of Sparta was now to find a new and important ally. Tissaphernes had been recalled from Ionia, and his position given to Cyrus, the second son of the Persian king, Darius II. *Cyrus.* Cyrus was to be ruler of Lydia, and to have, in addition, a general supervision over other satrapies. He was an ambitious and energetic prince, with a strong desire to avenge on Athens the defeats suffered by Persia at Marathon and Salamis. He at once put a stop to the peace negotiations of Pharnabazus with Athens, and summoned Lysander to a conference at Sardis. He then promised him all the money necessary to equip a new fleet, and engaged to pay the seamen four obols a day, a greater sum than the Athenians were able to give. Very soon Lysander found himself at the head of a fleet of ninety vessels, twenty-five from Syracuse having joined him. He took his station at Ephesus, where he was watched closely by Alcibiades, with a fleet of one hundred ships at Notium. After a time, however, Alcibiades left the fleet in the command of one of his subordinates and boon companions, while he sailed away to levy contributions from the cities of Aeolis. During his absence, his substitute in command rashly began an engagement with Lysander, in which the Athenians were defeated with the loss of

*Battle of
Notium,
407 B.C.*

*Alcibiades
deposed.*

*Lysander
superseded.*

*Conon
defeated by
Callicratidas.*

fifteen vessels. After his victory Lysander went back to his post at Ephesus, refusing to risk a second battle with Alcibiades after his return from Aeolis, where he had aroused much indignation by his high-handed and unjust attempts to levy contributions. The people of Athens, when the news of the proceedings of Alcibiades were received, blamed him severely for his conduct at Notium. By the vote of the Ecclesia he was deposed from his command, which was put in the hands of ten generals or strategi. Alcibiades then retired to the Thracian Chersonesus, where he owned an estate, and took no further part in the war. The fleet at Samos was given to the care of Conon, an officer who for a time played a prominent part in naval affairs.

Changes were made also in the command of the army, Thrasyllus and Pericles, the son of the great Pericles by Aspasia, being among the new leaders. Sparta, too, appointed a new admiral, Lysander's year of office having expired; the rule being that the office of high admiral should not be held by the same person twice. The successor to Lysander was Callicratidas, an able officer, capable of carrying on the war energetically and successfully. He was, however, hampered in his movements and thwarted in his plans by Lysander, whose influence with Cyrus was used to make the task of his successor as difficult as possible. Callicratidas found an empty military chest, the seamen urgently demanding their pay, and Cyrus cold and indifferent. To his appeal for a subsidy Cyrus lent a deaf ear, and Callicratidas cursed the necessities of the Spartans which forced them to apply to a barbarian for money. He finally succeeded in raising money enough to pay his seamen in part, and he got his fleet in motion. Collecting all the scattered forces of the Spartans, he sailed with one hundred and seventy ships to Lesbos, where he took the town of Methymna. Conon, coming up with seventy galleys, and unaware of the strength of his opponent, was drawn into an action in which he lost half of his vessels. The remainder were with difficulty saved by drawing them up on shore under the walls of Mitylene. There Callicratidas blockaded them, confidently anticipating an easy victory and an early surrender. But Conon managed to send out a swift galley, with the news of his distress and danger, to

Athens. The appeal for help was answered by the Athenians hastily equipping a fleet out of vessels undergoing repairs or in the process of construction. One hundred and ten ships were made ready, and manned with all the available men the city could furnish. For the first time, it is said, the knights were sent to sea. This raw and ill-equipped fleet was put under the command of eight of the ten generals, and immediately set sail to relieve Conon. Picking up on the way fifty ships from Samos and Ionia, the Athenian commanders met Callicratidas near the southernmost point of Lesbos, off the Arginūsæ islands. Callicratidas had left fifty galleys to maintain the blockade of Conon at Mitylene, and with the remainder of his vessels had gone out to intercept the Athenian fleet. The Athenians were so new and inexperienced in naval warfare, that their generals were forced to go into battle with their ships drawn up in an unbroken line. The Spartans came on in open order, hoping to turn the flank of the Athenians, or break their line. But the Athenians were numerically superior to their opponents, and in spite of their want of skill and experience, succeeded in winning a most decisive victory. Callicratidas himself was slain, and seventy of his vessels destroyed or taken. The remaining fifty escaped to Chios. Of the Athenian fleet fifteen were sunk; while a dozen were left water-logged, and in a helpless condition.

*Battle of
Arginūsæ,
406 B.C.*

The want of discipline in the fleet, and the rawness of the seamen, caused the Athenians to lose much of the legitimate fruits of the victory. The generals had resolved to follow up their success by pushing on to Mitylene to prevent the escape of the Spartan squadron there, when a storm arose which compelled the Athenian ships to seek the safety of the shore. This timidity led to two serious results: the Spartan fleet at Mitylene escaped to sea, and several Athenian ships went down in the gale with all their crews aboard.

Its results.

The successful Athenian generals naturally expected nothing but praise for a victory won under such disadvantageous circumstances. But when the news of the loss of the crews reached Athens, a loud clamour was raised against the generals for their neglect in allowing some hundreds of Athenian seamen

*Execution
of the
generals.*

to perish, without an effort being put forth to save them. The fatal demagogic influence once more made itself felt. The generals were at once deposed, and when six of them returned to Athens to justify their conduct, an iniquitous decree was passed at the instigation of one Callixenus, which condemned the generals to death. The decree was both unjust and illegal, as it condemned the generals *en bloc*, instead of one at a time ; and as such it was strongly opposed by all the better class of citizens. Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, on this occasion, as on several others, remained firm and fearless in his resistance to the madness of the Athenian mob. But it was all in vain ; those who had stood out against the popular passion were terrorized into silence, and the decree was carried into instant effect. Among those who thus unrighteously suffered was Thrasyllus, the victor of Cyzicus, and Pericles, the son of Pericles the statesman. When too late, the impulsive people of Athens repented of their madness, and ordered the impeachment of Callixenus and his abettors. The impeachment was eventually dropped, but Callixenus remained an object of universal detestation, and died at last of hunger in the streets.

*Lysander
put in com-
mand of the
Spartan
fleet.*

The victory of Arginusæ had the effect of inducing Sparta once more to offer terms of peace, on the basis of each state retaining its actual possessions at the time. Once more, too, demagogic influence defeated the proposals, and the war was renewed with Lysander again in command of the Spartan fleet. Lysander gathered together the remains of the fleet of Callicratidas, and to these added all he could obtain from his Asiatic allies. Cyrus, now that his friend Lysander was at the head of the Spartan armament, was willing to open the Persian purse freely to aid him. By this means a large fleet was built at Antandrus. Still Lysander did not think himself strong enough to risk an engagement with Conon, the Athenian commander, and therefore sailed away to the Hellespont to block the passage there of the Athenian corn-ships. Conon was soon in pursuit with a fleet of one hundred and eighty galleys. He found Lysander at Lampsacus, which place he had taken by storm. For four days he offered him battle, but Lysander prudently refused. The Athenian admiral then took his post just opposite Lamp-

sacus, on the coast of Thracian Chersonese, and waited for his opponent to move. The Athenian position was at Aegospotami, a barren place, two miles from Sestos, from which town all the supplies for the fleet had to be drawn. As day after day passed without Lysander stirring, the Athenians grew careless. The men would leave their ships, and disperse throughout the neighbourhood in search of food. Alcibiades, who was living in the near vicinity, observing the danger, warned the Athenian generals, and advised them to remove their fleet to Sestos. The advice was received with insolence, and Alcibiades withdrew.

The wisdom of this advice was very soon to be made manifest, *Battle of Aegospotami, 405 B.C.* for the next day Lysander, who had been patiently biding his time, came across the strait, and caught the Athenian fleet with their seamen scattered abroad on the Chersonese. An effort was made by the men to reach their vessels, but it was too late. Lysander with his fleet had fallen upon the half-manned Athenian ships, and the work of destruction began. It was not a battle, for resistance was out of the question. Most of the Athenians escaped to shore, leaving one hundred and seventy ships in the hands of the Spartans. Conon, with a few vessels, managed to make his escape, and fled to Cyprus, where he took service under the king of Salamis. Four thousand prisoners fell into the hands of the Spartans, and were ordered to execution the day after the battle, by the cruel Lysander. Conon had taken the precaution to send home the state-galley, the Paralus, with the news of the crowning disaster at Aegospotami. The tidings reached the Peiræus at the close of the day, and soon the sound of wailing was heard all up the Long Walls into the city. None slept that night, all being filled with dreadful forebodings of a terrible fate. For Athens was helpless. Her sole fleet was destroyed, her treasury empty, her arsenals bare. Her very supply of food was cut off, the Spartans holding the key of the Euxine and Hellespont.

Lysander knew well enough the helpless condition of Athens, and he acted accordingly. Step by step he took possession of the cities and towns along the Hellespont and the coast of Thrace that held Athenian garrisons, sending, it is said, the garrisons

*Siege of
Athens.*

*Terms of
surrender of
Athens, 404
B.C.*

home to add to the starving population of Athens. Soon all the cities and towns of Asia Minor held by Athens, save Samos, were in the hands of the Spartans. Lysander then sailed with two hundred ships to the gulf of Aegina and blockaded the Peiraeus. At the same time a large Spartan army moved down from Decelea and closed in the doomed city landwards. In this dire extremity the courage of the Athenians did not desert them. The most strenuous efforts were put forth to hold the city against the besiegers. But where force failed, hunger succeeded. After months of siege the starving city sought for terms. The Peloponnesians held a conference, and in spite of the protests of Corinth and Thebes, who would have utterly destroyed Athens, it was decided to spare a city which had in times past done good service to the Greek cause. Athens was, however, to be reduced to a condition in which she could do no further harm to the allies. With that object in view the demand was made that her long walls and fortifications should be demolished; her fleet, with the exception of twelve ships, given up; and that she should become the subject-ally of Sparta. Also, her oligarchic exiles were to be recalled.

The conditions were hard and humiliating, but they were better than the Athenians expected. So great was the famine in the city that when Theramenes, the negotiator of the treaty, announced the terms, they were greeted with shouts of joy, and promptly agreed to by the Ecclesia. The gates were then thrown open and the enemy admitted. Lysander landed at the Peiraeus, and soon the whole city was in his hands. With accompaniments of music and choric dances the Long Walls were broken down, and a great shout went up from the Peloponnesian army at the downfall of what they considered the tyrant of Greece, and the destroyer of the autonomy of the smaller towns and cities.

Thus ended the Peloponnesian war, in the year 404 B.C., having lasted twenty-seven years.

CHAPTER XXIV.

LITERATURE AND PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE, FROM THE PERSIAN TO
THE END OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

We have seen that epic and lyrical poetry were early developed among the Ionians of Asia Minor, while choral poetry of a religious nature was brought to perfection among the Dorian states. *Origin of the Drama.* It was from these two elements, epic and choral poetry, that the Greek drama arose. The language of the two essential parts of a Greek tragedy—the dialogue and the chorus—shows that the former abounds in Ionic forms of dialect; the latter, in Doric.

The Greek drama arose out of the Dionysia, or festivals of Dionysus or Bacchus. Of all the deities, none appeared to the Greeks so closely connected with man as Dionysus, the god of *Tragedy and Comedy arise out of the worship of Bacchus.* fertility and of wine, the giver of good cheer, merriment and happiness. At his festivals, boisterous and extravagant merriment manifested itself and took possession of the whole people. In the processions in his honour, his followers, adorned with ivy leaves and bearing the sacred *thyrsus* in their hands, sung around the blazing altar the sacred odes in praise of the wine-god. From this rude dithyrambic song, detailing the adventures of the god, arose the germs of Tragedy and Comedy. A second step was reached when some one in the chorus, acting as leader¹, assumed the character of the god himself, and from the steps of the altar recited the deeds of the god or held a dialogue with the chorus, or with some one member of the chorus who was called the *answerer*², afterwards the ordinary word for an *actor*.

There were four festivals of Dionysus; the oldest was the *Lesser* or *Rural Dionysia*, held throughout the country townships³ of Attica in December, when the grapes were gathered; the *Lenaea*⁴, held in January, when the wine-press was busy; *Festivals of Bacchus.* the *Anthesteria* or ‘feast of flowers,’ in February, when the cask of last year’s wine was opened, and the *City* or *Greater Dionysia*, held in March.

¹ κορυφαῖος. ² ὑποκρίτης. ³ δῆμοι. ⁴ ληνός, ‘a wine press.’

Tragedy was exhibited at all these festivals, except at the Anthesteria, but the exhibition of new tragedies took place at the Lenaea or at the greater Dionysia. From the *dithyrambic* odes and *phallic* song sprung Tragedy¹ and Comedy.² The former meant originally 'the goat song,' because a goat was offered up to Dionysus before the choral ode was sung; while the latter meant 'the village song,' and from it sprung the rude jests and scurrilous jokes that were characteristic of the rural Dionysia. At first the chorus was of a rude kind—nothing more than a band of revellers led by a flute-player. Arion is said to have given the dithyramb a regular form. He organized a trained band of fifty persons, arranged around the altar of Dionysus, and hence called by the name *Cyclic* or *Circular* chorus.

Arion, 600
B.C.

Thespis, 535
B.C.

Though the Athenians brought tragedy to its perfection among the Greeks, it did not originate with them. The reputed father of tragedy was Thespis, of Icaria, one of the townships of Attica. He is said to have introduced an actor to give rest to the chorus, and to have invented the mask. The immediate successor of Thespis, Phrynichus, still employed one actor, but he improved the organization of the chorus by sub-dividing it into separate groups, representing different sets of characters, according to the theme of the ode sung. For example, in the *Phoenissae*, in which he celebrates the deeds of the Athenians, one group of the chorus represents Phoenician women who had been sent to the Persian court, and another group, Persian elders. We are told that he moved the Athenians to tears by representing to them '*The Taking of Miletus*.'

Phrynichus
512-476 B.C.

Choerilus,
524-495 B.C.

To Choerilus or to Pratinas is ascribed the invention of the Satyric drama. There can be no doubt that from the time of Thespis, the subjects of tragedy had less and less to do with events connected with the life and sufferings of Bacchus, and that the accompanying satyrs would hardly be suitable to a tragedy celebrating the deeds of heroes. Pratinas, accordingly, reserved the satyric chorus for the *after piece*, called the satyric

Pratinas,
about 500
B.C.

¹ τραγωδία, from τράγος, 'a goat'; ᾠδή, 'a song.'

² κώμη, 'a village'; ᾠδή, 'a song.'

play, which usually ended the *tetralogy* or set of four plays, namely, the tragic trilogy and the satyric play. After the audience had listened to the woeful details represented in the tragedies, their feelings were enlivened by the boisterous mirth and laughable scenes of the satyric play or farce.

The real father, however, of Attic tragedy was Aeschylus, a native of Eleusis. At the age of twenty-five he first competed for the tragic prize against Pratinas, though without success. Phrynichus, however, was his chief rival in the earlier part of his career. He fought along with his two brothers Ameinias and Cynaegirus at Marathon, and also at Salamis and Plataea. He was defeated by Sophocles in 468 B.C., and is said, in consequence, to have left Athens and to have gone to the court of Hiero, tyrant of Syracuse. It is probable that he visited Athens again in 458 B.C. He died at Gela.

The innovations that Aeschylus introduced into the drama would justly entitle him to be called the *Father of Attic Tragedy*. At the beginning of his literary career, he found tragedy very much like a sacred oratorio is with us, the choral element predominating and interrupted occasionally by the recitation of an actor, or a dialogue between the actor and the chorus. By adding a second actor, he made the dialogue independent of the chorus. He also limited the choral parts, which he made subservient to the dialogue. He is also said to have introduced scenic painting, furnished his actors with appropriate dresses and masks, and paid due regard to the choral dances. With him also originated the custom of exhibiting plays in *trilogies*, or groups of threes, each play complete in itself, but all three having an intimate connection. The only extant trilogy is that called by the name of *Oresteia*, and embraces the Agamemnon, Choephori and Eumenides.

When a Greek poet wished to bring out a play, he applied to one of the first two archons; to the chief archon, if the festival was the greater Dionysia; to the king archon, if the Lenaea. If the archon approved of the play, he granted a chorus, or rather he assigned to each dramatist a *chorêgus*, three actors, a teacher of the chorus or choir-master, and a flute-player. The choregi

Aeschylus,
525-456 B.C.

Innovations
of Aeschylus

How Greek
plays were
exhibited.

were wealthy citizens, one chosen from each tribe, who undertook to defray the expenses attending a dramatic representation. They had to collect the chorus, pay for the teacher and flute-player, find a place for them to practice, and defray all expenses connected with rehearsals and the performance. Often these performances cost very much,—a tragic chorus usually about six hundred dollars, equal to many times that sum now; still, so public-spirited were the Athenians that wealthy men vied with each other in the magnificence of their choruses. The *choregus* who had the best chorus obtained a prize of a *tripod*, and a street of Athens was filled with tripods of the successful *choregi*.

The lessee of the theatre provided the costumes of the actors, the scenery and assistants needed. A selected number of persons acted as judges and awarded the prize to the successful poet. The admission fee was probably about *six* cents of our money, and this in the days of Pericles was supplied to the poorer classes out of the public funds.

The Greek theatre.

Before the time of Aeschylus, the Athenians had only a temporary wooden theatre. It is said that at the first contest between Aeschylus and Pratinas the scaffolding fell, and the handsome stone theatre of Dionysus was begun, 500 B.C. It was situated on the S.E. descent of the acropolis in a place called Lenaea, and could hold thirty thousand spectators.

Parts of a Greek theatre.


The essential parts of a Greek theatre were: the part occupied by the spectators,¹ the dancing floor² for the evolutions of the chorus, and the stage.³ The part occupied by the spectators consisted of rows of parts of concentric circles cut in the solid rock, rising tier upon tier, with broad passages running round the tiers and stairs, radiating from the *orchestra*. The entrance was by two doors in front of the stage. The *orchestra* was a level space extending in front of the stage and somewhat below the level of the lowest benches of the audience. It was not completely circular, as one segment was wanting. In it, the chorus performed its evolutions and dances, and in the centre was the altar of Bacchus.⁴ The stage was connected by steps with the *orchestra*, and was higher than the *orchestra*,

¹ θέατρον. ² ὀρχήστρα. ³ λογεῖον. ⁴ θυμέλη.

probably on a level with the altar of Bacchus. The back ground usually represented scenery suitable to the play exhibited.

The old dithyrambic chorus consisted of fifty performers. *The chorus.* Aeschylus broke up the chorus and assigned twelve to each play of a tetralogy. Afterwards, in the time of Sophocles, this chorus was increased to fifteen.

GREEK THEATRE.



Plan of Greek Theatre.

A, seats of the spectators ; B, passage between concentric rows of seats ; c, steps ; D, altar of Bacchus ; E, F, G, entrances for the actors ; H, stage ; I entrance for the people and chorus.

While plays with us are exhibited at all seasons of the year, and generally at night, the Greeks confined their dramatic representations to the seasons of the Dionysia and to the day-time. They did not, as with us, exhibit single plays, but dramas

Differences between a Greek and an English play.

(1) *in exhibition.* in tetralogies ; that is, three tragedies (composing a trilogy) and a satyric drama, or farce. As we have said, the three tragedies usually formed a connected story. Again, these tetralogies were placed in competition by rival poets for the tragic prize. The theatre, also, did not hold a few hundred spectators, but often many thousands. The play of emotion expressed by facial expression, so important a matter to a modern actor, was unknown to the Greeks, as all the actors wore masks.

The Greek drama was essentially religious. Around the *thymèle* or altar of Bacchus, the movements of the chorus were executed. Again, the Greek drama dealt with stories connected mainly with the mythological period, and as the actors in the events of that period were either gods or heroes, a sacredness attached itself to every character. With the main features of the narrative the Greek was well acquainted, and in this he differed from the modern spectator, who knows little or nothing of a story unless he has previously read the play or seen it exhibited. What Shakespeare says in *Hamlet*, that the object of the drama, 'both at the first and now, was and is, to hold as 'twere the mirror up to nature ; to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure,' is peculiarly applicable to the dramas of the Greek tragedians.

Sophocles, 495-405 B.C. Sophocles, a native of Colōnus, a suburb of Athens, was an ideal Athenian, uniting in himself beauty and gracefulness of person and elegance of mind. In the public rejoicing that took place after the victory of Salamis, the youthful poet was selected to be the leader of a chosen chorus of youths who sang the *paian* or song of victory to the accompaniment of his lyre. At the age of twenty-seven he gained his first victory over Aeschylus, who for thirty-one years had been the undisputed monarch of the tragic stage. We know nothing of the next twenty-five years of his life. In 440 B.C. he was appointed general, along with Pericles, in the war against Samos, that had *Gains first prize, 468 B.C.* revolted. He died in the year of the battle of Aegospotāmi.

Though Aeschylus excels all other Greek tragedians in the lofty flights of genius, Sophocles possesses in his characters more dra-

matic truthfulness and more human interest. The persons in the dramas of the former are too awful, and too superhuman to appeal directly to the sympathies of mankind. Sophocles, on the other hand, is a master in depicting the primary emotions of our nature, in the construction of his plots, and in the finish and polish of his language. He also maintains the moral tone that is essentially characteristic of the plays of Aeschylus.

Euripides was born in the year of the battle of Salamis. *Euripides, 480-406 B.C.* Though removed by only fifteen years from Sophocles, he represents a wholly new order of things. In early life he tried painting, and under the sophists Prodicus, and philosopher Anaxagoras, he received instruction in rhetoric and philosophy. No doubt, to these he owed his taste for disputation, which is manifest everywhere in his plays, and which was so severely censured by his great critic, the comic poet Aristophanes, who lashed him with unsparing severity as an atheist, a quibbler and a bad artist. He left Athens in disgust and took refuge *Goes to Macedonia, 406 B.C.* with Archelaüs, king of Macedonia, at whose court he died.

No Greek poet has suffered so much from detraction as Euripides, and this detraction was mainly at the hands of the comic poet Aristophanes. No doubt the poet was ascetic in nature, imbued with the philosophical spirit of the age, and looked with favour on the new ideas propounded by the sophists, to all of which Aristophanes was opposed. No doubt, too, his choral odes had less connection with the dialogue than those of Sophocles ; no doubt, too, he represents his characters as arguing like sophists or reasoning like atheists ; still, no tragic poet made his dramas conform more to the Shakesperian idea of the design of the drama. His heroes are not the heroes of Homer, Aeschylus and Sophocles. They are the Athenians whom he saw every day discussing politics in the Ecclesia, wrangling in the schools of philosophy, or arguing in the law court of Athens.

Nothing strikes the modern writer more than the number *Prolific writings of Greek dramatists* of dramas composed by the Greek poets. Out of seventy dramas, seven of Aeschylus remain ; seven also of Sophocles survive out of upwards a hundred ; while Euripides left seventeen out of ninety-two.

Comedy. Comedy, like tragedy, arose out of the festivals of Bacchus, which the village people of Attica celebrated with boisterous revelry at the time of the vintage. At such celebrations rude, biting jests, humorous and boisterous songs, accompanied with appropriate jestures and broad jokes, delighted the admiring crowd.

Susarion, about 580 B.C. Susarion, a native of Megara, is said to have been the inventor of comedy. Tradition states that he conveyed his company of strolling players in carts from one place to another. The faces of his players were not covered with masks, as was the case with the actors of tragedy, but with the *lees* of wine. Comedy in his day is said to have been extemporary effusions.

Epicharmus 540 B.C. Epicharmus, a Sicilian of Megara, is supposed to have been the earliest writer of Greek comedy. Little, however, is known of him.

Old Attic Comedy, characteristics of. Attic comedy began with Crates, Cratinus, and Eupolis. These were the forerunners of Aristophanes, the chief exponent of Attic comedy among the Greeks. Along with Aristophanes, these belong to the old Attic comedy. The characteristics of this school of comedy were : the presence of a chorus and the representation of real characters under real names. The peculiarity of the comic chorus was the *parabasis*, which was an address of the poet through the mouth of the chorus, and so called because they passed from the position they occupied previously, to one in front of the audience. The comic chorus was twenty-four. In the hands of the comic poet, the play was to the people of Athens what the newspaper, review, satire, pamphlet, and comic paper is to the people of the present day. Nothing was safe from the ridicule of the comic poet. Not only were public men attacked with merciless scurrility, but political institutions, often venerable for their age, were assailed, and the whole administration of education, law, finance, held up to ridicule and scorn. The comic poet thought that he had a right to direct his shafts against any abuse whatever, and he even invaded the sanctity of the home, and ridiculed the private life of not a few of the leading statesmen of the day.

Aristophanes was born near Athens. We know little about

his personal history, and this seems strange in the case of so public a man. With unsparing severity he lashed in his comedies the abuses of the day. The system of education introduced by the sophists, statesmen like Pericles and Cleon, Socrates, the rights of women, the Utopian ideas of Plato, and especially the poet Euripides, were all ridiculed and held up to public derision in his comedies.

When Sparta had reduced Athens and established an aristocratic despotism, the liberty of the comic poets was restrained ; personal satire was discarded, or if the characters were real, which sometimes was the case, their names were fictitious. According to Schlegel, the distinguishing characteristics were : absence of personal satire, introduction of real characters under fictitious names, or purely fictitious characters, and the dismissal of the chorus.

New Comedy sprung up at the accession of Alexander the Great. It discarded the personal satire we find in the Old Comedy, and resembled more the society-play. Coarse jests gave way to refined humour, and typical, rather than individual, characters were brought on the stage, while the *prologue* was substituted for the *parabasis*.

Herodotus is the earliest Greek historian whose works have come down to our own day. He was born at Halicarnassus, a Dorian city of Caria, but having a large Ionian element among its people. He left Halicarnassus to escape the tyranny of Lygdāmis, and went to Samos, where he probably met with Sophocles and Pericles. He assisted his countrymen in expelling Lygdamis, and afterwards went to Athens. Subsequently he joined a colony to Thurii, where he died.

In early life Herodotus travelled far and wide. From Ecbatāna, Susa, and Babylon in the east, to *Magna Graecia* in the west, and from the northern shores of the Euxine to the first cataract of the Nile, he explored the vast region. His greatest work was his *History* of the great struggle between the East and the West, between Asia and Europe. This hostility was first manifested in historical times by Croesus, of Lydia. Thus he describes the history of Lydia. But Lydia was conquered by

Aristophanes, 445-375 B.C.

Middle Comedy, 372-330 B.C.

New Comedy 330-280 B.C.

Historians.

Herodotus, 484-429 B.C.

Visits Athens.

Travels of Herodotus.

History of Persian wars.

Cyrus, the great king of Persia, who after conquering the Medes, overthrew the Babylonian and Assyrian monarchies. The expedition against Egypt under Cambyses, and that of Darius against Scythia, suggests the history of these countries. In this way the history of Herodotus involves the history of Persia, Media, Babylonia, Assyria, Lydia, Egypt.

Thucydides,
471-400 B.C.

Though Herodotus is called the Father of History, Thucydides may be said to be the first philosophic historian. He was an Athenian, and a younger cousin of the statesman Cimon. In the year 424 B.C. he was in command of an Athenian fleet on the Thracian coast. For an alleged neglect of duty, a charge was brought against him by Cleon and he was exiled, and lived during that period either at Sparta or in places under Spartan power.

Exiled, 423-
403 B.C.

Works.

His great work was the history of the Peloponnesian War, or rather the part of it that preceded 411 B.C. From personal knowledge he relates many of the events. In fact he often describes many of the scenes as an eye-witness, weighs the testimony direct and indirect in cases on which he cannot get information, and exhibits great care and accuracy in chronological events. He is brief and concise, and consequently is often obscure. His speeches are political essays, especially the celebrated funeral oration of Pericles over those who died of the plague in the second year of the Peloponnesian war.

*Greek
philosophy.*

In a previous chapter* a brief account was given of the earlier Greek philosophy, and its exponents. The sketch closed with the views of Anaxagoras, who introduced into his explanation of the universe the idea of *thought*, of *mind*, of *intelligence*. Mere physical causes were not deemed sufficient for the explanation of the phenomena of the universe; and so the very important step in advance was taken of recognizing that only intelligence operating on or through matter could give rise to the harmony and variety existing in the world. The philosophy of Heraclitus, and the logic of the Eleatics, gave good grounds for the doctrine that things have no reality apart from the perceiving mind, and that our knowledge is measured by our feelings, emotions, and

* Chapter XI.

ideas. In brief, the opinion that 'man is the measure of all things' began to be taught. We can be sure of nothing, said these thinkers, beyond our sensations and emotions. An external reality beyond ourselves, and independent of ourselves, cannot be proven. To men of this way of thinking, the name 'sophist' was applied. The word 'sophist,' or 'wise man,' was at first used as a term of honour, to designate men like the 'seven sages,' but, in process of time, it became a term of reproach. It is easy to understand why it should be so. To challenge the reality of knowledge soon led men to question all the time-honoured beliefs of the people. The sophist developed into the free-thinker of his day. No belief, no superstition, was too sacred for his merciless satire. The age in which the sophists flourished was pre-eminently an age of self-seeking, and of self-indulgence. Authority in the state, as well as in philosophy, was held in little respect. Men were taught that to acquire wealth, enjoy sensual pleasures, gain notoriety among their fellows, were among the principal objects in life. But to attain success in these pursuits, a certain training was essential. Nothing so much promoted the interests of the individual as skill in public speaking. A brilliant oration in the Ecclesia before the assembled Greek citizens often brought glory, honour, power, and eventually wealth. Hence it was natural that teachers of rhetoric should be in high esteem, and be well rewarded. The instructor who could teach his pupil to fence skilfully in words, to be ready in debate, to employ successful and specious arguments to make the 'worse appear the better part,' was in great demand. In this line of instruction the sophists acquired great renown. Their schools were thronged with the youth of the rich and the ambitious. They had all the arts of eloquence at their command, and were masters of the theory and practice of rhetoric.

The sophists.

But the sophists were more than free-thinkers, scoffers, and venal instructors of youth. While it has been charged against them that they were unscrupulous, and taught others to disregard the distinction between right and wrong, it is also true that many of them rendered great service to the state. If they denied the *absolute* character of knowledge, they taught a

valuable truth when they called attention to the *relative* character of our ideas. They scoffed at time-honoured beliefs, but they taught men to apply the touchstone of reason to all things. Before their time eloquence was an unknown art, and to great teachers like Isocrātes we may ascribe the founding of a school of oratory that has made Greece famous. Many of the sophists were learned men ; some acquired a just fame in the realms of letters, philosophy, and rhetoric. Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias were employed as ambassadors. Protagoras taught morals ; Prodicus was a grammarian and etymologist. Others taught military exercises and the art of war. In short, 'the sophists made general culture universal.' They were not only founders of eloquence, but the founders of Attic prose ; and the attention they gave to style in literature produced the happiest results.

The first so-called sophist was Protagoras, of Abdēra, who flourished about 440 B.C. Among the most celebrated of those who followed him may be mentioned Gorgias, who came to Athens from Leontini in Sicily ; Critias, Polus, Thrasymāchus, Hippias of Elis, and Prodicus of Ceos. Of these it may be remarked that the early sophists were of a higher character, and more cautious in their statements, than their successors. For instance, Protagoras and Gorgias were less audacious in their speculations and utterances than Critias, Thrasymachus and Hippias.

Socrates.

Confounded with the sophists by Aristophanes, but wholly different from, if not antagonistic to them, was Socrates, the greatest of Greek teachers and, perhaps, the most enlightened of the heathen world. Born near Athens, 469 B.C., his station in life was humble, but respectable. His father, Sophroniscus, was a statuary, and Socrates himself is said to have worked at the trade with marked success. He, however, soon abandoned this occupation, for he is found, while a comparatively young man, spending his whole time in the gynnasia, market-places, public walks and schools, engaged in conversation with the people he met, or engaged in teaching in his own peculiar fashion such youths as felt drawn to him. Unlike the sophists, he taught without fee, his sole desire being to lead others to see and

acknowledge what was true and right. He seldom left Athens, although he served with distinction, as an hoplite, at Potidaea, Delium, and Amphipolis. His physical constitution was of the best. He seemed wholly indifferent to cold or heat, and was capable of enduring great hardships. Clad, summer or winter, in the simplest and most sparing of garments, barefoot in all weather, with a face remarkable for its ugliness, he was soon a conspicuous figure at Athens, and known to every one. He is said to have possessed a broad, bent, upturned nose, thick lips, and protruding eyes, and was frequently compared in appearance to the god Silenus. Socrates, himself, was indifferent to his personal appearance, although to a Greek ugliness was almost synonymous with wickedness.

Like the typical Athenian of his day, Socrates was fond of the society of his fellows, urbane and good-humoured. His own family, as was the fashion with the men of his class, was almost wholly neglected while he was busy in the work of instructing the youths of other men. Hence, it is not surprising to find that his domestic relations were decidedly unpleasant, his wife, Xantippe, being often goaded to violent displays of temper by her philosophic husband's neglect of his home duties.

It is impossible to separate the teaching of Socrates from his daily life and practice. He never wrote anything, nor did he attempt to formulate any scheme of philosophy. He was pre-eminently a *teacher of morals*. Early disgusted with the fruitless and unfounded speculations in physics of his predecessors, he abandoned the study for an investigation of the nature of *virtue*. His method, known as the Socratic, was that of interrogating his associates and pupils, with a view to exhibiting to them, by the nature of their replies, their ignorance and errors. Pretending to know nothing himself of the question under consideration, he generally succeeded by a skilful cross-examination in making the questioned contradict himself so hopelessly that he was fain to admit the error of his opinions. This was not done through any desire of fame as an expert logician, but solely as a means of reaching the truth, and convincing others of the unsoundness of their opinions. Such a system, while it had its attractions for the sincere and earnest seeker after the

*The Socratic
teaching.*

truth, could not fail to irritate many who little relished being put to shame and confusion before their associates. So ceaselessly was Socrates engaged in his eager and public pursuit of knowledge, and so ready was he always to enter into conversation with all comers on his favourite themes, that he became one of the best known, if not the most disliked, citizen of his time. Hence Aristophanes, who disliked innovations, satirized him in his *Clouds* in a most shameless manner.

Socrates
'demon.'

A remarkable feature in the career of Socrates was his constant avowal of the possession of an inner voice or 'demon,' which warned him against certain actions, and thus regulated and controlled his conduct. Socrates was a believer in the gods, and was faithful in his religious duties and sacrifices; nevertheless he seems to have risen above the prevalent belief in many gods to the conception of a Supreme Being who governs the universe. Perhaps it was his frequent mention of his guiding voice or 'demon,' and his broader teachings of the nature of the gods and of truth, that led to his being accused, in his seventieth year, of instilling, by his teaching, contempt for the gods, introducing new deities and corrupting the youth of Athens. His accusers were men of little note, and doubtless were moved by political dislike to attack him. His manner of life, his contempt for popular follies, his justness of conduct, were constant reproaches to the venal and fickle citizens of Athens. When charged with these offences, he made his defence, but refused to ask for mercy. He boldly told the Athenians that he deserved to be supported at the expense of the city, as a public benefactor, instead of suffering any penalty. The members of the jury, or dicasts, were irritated by such language, and the vote being taken, a small majority decided against him and he was condemned to die. His sentence could not be carried out for thirty days, and this time he spent with his friends and disciples, calmly conversing on the problems of life and the immortality of the soul. His friends made provision for his escape, but he refused to accept it. Surrounded by his sorrowing disciples, he calmly drank the deadly hemlock, in the year 399 B.C.

His character has been well summarized by Xenophon, one of his devoted disciples: 'He was so pious that he did nothing

without the sanction of the gods ; so just that he never wronged any one in the least degree ; so much master of himself that he never preferred the agreeable to the good ; so wise, that in deciding on the better and the worse he never failed.' 'He was the best and happiest man that could possibly exist.'

The teaching of Socrates was so many-sided that his disciples were able to emphasize its various aspects, and, hence, there arose different schools of philosophy, all based on the Socratic ideas. As already stated, Socrates himself founded no school, but in his teaching were the germs of many schools. But the consideration of these—the Cynic, Cyrenaic, and Megaric schools—must be deferred until a later period of the history.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE SPARTAN SUPREMACY.

The tragic close of the Peloponnesian war ended the Confederacy of Delos, and the Athenian supremacy. An opportunity had been furnished the Athenians to prove their capacity for leadership, and to bring about the unification of Greece under that leadership. The result showed that Athens was alike unfit for, and unequal to the task. Her rule had degenerated into one characterized by narrow selfishness. The interests of her allies were made subordinate to her own. Their money was spent on enterprises having in view the benefit of Athens alone. Their citizens were dragged into wars which served merely to gratify the lust for conquest and gain of the Athenian people. True, their rule was comparatively mild ; nevertheless it was the rule of a tyrant, and sometimes that of a tyrant none too merciful.

The love of their autonomy, or independence, was the most profound sentiment of the Greek states, small or great. It was this sentiment which really destroyed the leadership of Athens, and shattered the Confederacy of Delos. The result of the Peloponnesian war was to show that Greece was not yet prepared to be a nation. The idea of a united Greece was apparently as far off as ever.

*Spartan
supremacy
restored.*

For a short time, however, Sparta was now to exercise the chief influence, and, in a certain sense, to dominate over the Greek states. The allies had rejoiced over the downfall of Athens, seemingly unaware that they had thrown off the mild yoke of Athens, only to take upon themselves the hard one of Sparta.

At the outset, Lysander did a few things to conciliate Grecian public opinion. He restored the Aeginetans and Melians to their island homes, although there were few to take advantage of the long-delayed act of justice. The Messenians were expelled from Naupactus, and forced to take refuge in Libya.

The Locrians were then brought back to Naupactus, from which they had been driven by the Athenians. Spartan governors, or *Harmosts*, each with a body of Spartan soldiers under him, were placed in the cities of Ionia and the Hellespont. Supported by committees chosen from the most pronounced Spartan sympathizers in each city, they exercised the power of *Policy of Lysander*. despots. It was expected that after the downfall of Athens, all danger from that quarter having disappeared, these Harmosts, with their troops, would be recalled. But such was not the policy of Lysander. He seems to have followed, to some extent, in the fatal footsteps of Pausanias, and like him to have been carried away by his military successes, and the fulsome flatteries of his servile followers. The Harmosts were retained in the personal interests of Lysander himself, and were chosen from his own followers. They were used by the oligarchs in each city to prevent the constitutional magistrates from discharging their duties, and soon the free democratic government of the cities in Asia became a shadow. The power passed into the hands of the oligarchs, and the Spartan garrison. The oligarchs in return for the support of the Harmost in repressing democratic sentiment, allowed him to plunder the people and steal the public money. Very soon the cities of Asia learned to regret that they had listened to the specious promises of Sparta, and had thrown off their allegiance to Athens.

Spartan tyranny and misgovernment were not the sole evils that resulted from the overthrow of the Athenian empire in Asia. Persian encroachments soon followed. It was by the aid of Persia that Sparta had triumphed, so when Cyrus and Pharnabazus began to threaten the liberties of the Greek towns on the coast, Lysander and his Spartans stood idly by, unwilling to oppose the aggressive action of the Persians. In this way, by the tacit consent of Sparta, many Greek towns were relegated to Persian slavery, although they had been free for seventy years.

The personal rule of Lysander in the Aegean soon became so pronounced, and his vaulting ambition so apparent, that the ephors in alarm summoned him to return to Sparta. He obeyed, and being confronted with many charges of misgovern-

*Lysander
called to
account.*

ment and insubordination, was told to defend himself. Instead of so doing, he left the city and went to Libya. After a short stay there he came back to Sparta, and assuming the position of a private citizen was left unmolested.

*Oligarchie
government
at Athens.*

Perhaps, however, no city felt more keenly the evil results of Spartan supremacy than Athens. When the gates were opened to the forces of Lysander, there came with the Spartans the oligarchs belonging to the Four Hundred, who had, during their exile, taken refuge in the Spartan camp. Their return was signalled by the appointment of a committee of thirty oligarchs to revise the Athenian constitution. When opposition was offered to this flagrant attack upon the liberties of the people, Lysander appeared in the Ecclesia, and by his threats silenced the democratic leaders. The committee thus appointed had for its chief members Critias, a former member of the Four Hundred, and Theramenes, the 'Turncoat,' who once more had joined the oligarchs, their fortunes being now in the ascendant.

*The Thirty
Tyrants.*

The members of this committee of thirty soon became known as the 'Thirty Tyrants.' Having revised the constitution so as to destroy every vestige of popular government, they showed no signs of resigning their office. The Dicasteries and the Ecclesia were abolished, all power being left in the hands of the Bûle, every member of which was an oligarch. Not content with this destruction of the time-honoured, free constitution of Athens, the 'Thirty' asked for a Spartan garrison, by whose aid they could retain their ill-gotten power. Lysander sent them seven hundred soldiers, under the command of a Spartan harmost, who took possession of the citadel.

Firmly entrenched in power, as they thought themselves, the 'Thirty' proceeded to work their will at the expense of the wealthy and prominent democrats of Athens. Some were put to death on frivolous charges; others, like Thrasybûlus, were sent into exile. The motives that led to the perpetration of these dastardly deeds were fear of revolt and greed of gain. Covetous eyes were cast on the property of every wealthy man not belonging to the party of the 'Thirty.' Alcibiades, although living far distant from Athens, was an object of dread and suspicion;

and, through their machinations, he was murdered as he passed through Phrygia to the court of the Persian king at Susa.

So numerous and wanton were the murders of prominent men, that the more moderate members of the 'Thirty' protested, fearing that the Athenians, through sheer desperation, would rise against their oppressors. Theramenes, in particular, urged upon his colleagues the necessity of greater moderation and caution. But Critias would brook no advice. He, however, took the precaution to disarm the Athenian populace, leaving weapons in the hands of the friends of the oligarchs only, a body of men three thousand strong. After this, feeling themselves secure, the misdeeds and atrocities of the 'Tyrants' were more frequent and hideous than ever. Plunder, and murder for plunder's sake, became the order of the day. It soon became apparent to every one, except Critias and his immediate followers, that this state of things was too terrible to last. Theramenes, thoroughly alarmed, became so emphatic in his protests, that Critias began to suspect that he was meditating another of his periodical political somersaults. He now resolved to rid himself of a troublesome and, perhaps, perfidious colleague. Arming a number of his friends and followers, he entered with them into the Senate and forced that body to pass a decree condemning Theramenes to death. The sentence was at once carried out, and Theramenes partially atoned for his political instability by the courage with which he drank the fatal hemlock.

*Death of
Theramenes*

As Theramenes foresaw, the high-handed tyranny of Critias and his colleagues brought about their downfall. The story of the destruction of their power is as follows :

Thrasybulus, the exiled general, took refuge, along with many others, at Thebes. Encouraged by the disaffection at Athens, he gathered together a body of one hundred men, who resolved to make an attempt to free Athens. Armed and provisioned by the Boeotians, the little band crossed the Attic frontier and took possession of the fort at Phyle. The 'Thirty,' after a time, sent an armed force to take the fort, but the attempt failed. A second and stronger expedition was sent, which was equally unsuccessful, as the force of Thrasybulus, by this time, had

*Downfall of
the Thirty
Tyrants.*

increased to seven hundred men. Encouraged by their success, the patriotic exiles seized the Peiræus, and ranging themselves on the slope of the hill Munychia, awaited the attack of their enemies. Very soon Critias appeared on the scene with the three thousand, and the Peloponnesian garrison of seven hundred men. A fierce struggle took place in the narrow streets, which ended in the exiles, in spite of their deficiency in weapons and armour, repulsing their opponents with heavy loss. Among the slain was Critias and seventy of his followers.

Anarchy now set in at Athens. The people rose against their oppressors ; and, finding themselves in the minority, the remaining members of the 'Thirty' fled to Eleusis. From this point they sent urgent messages to Sparta for help. Fortunately for Athens, Lysander, who wished to restore the oligarchs, was at this time in bad odour with the ephors. His advice was not heeded ; the ephors instead sent Pausanias, the king, to take command of the army in Attica. Pausanias was a man of more than ordinary liberality and moderation, and he sympathized with the afflicted people of Athens. His energies were now bent to restoring peace and order to the troubled city ; and he succeeded. The oligarchs were deposed, and replaced by elected strategi ; and the exiles were given back their property and rights of citizenship. A solemn thanksgiving was held to mark the close of the period of anarchy, and new archons were chosen. The old constitution was restored sixteen months after the city had fallen into the hands of Lysander.

*Restoration
of the old
constitution,
Sept. 403
B.C.*

The disturbances at Athens being satisfactorily settled, Sparta turned her attention to Elis. An old grudge, revived by some new grievances, led Sparta to invade her neighbour's territory. The Eleans were completely defeated in two campaigns, and their subject districts given their independence.

The year 401 B.C. was an important year in the history of both Greece and Persia. Three years before, King Darius II. of Persia had died, and, much to the disappointment of his younger son, Cyrus, left his throne to his eldest son, Artaxerxes II. Cyrus was not to be deprived thus easily of the royal power. He levied a large body of native troops in his satrapy,

and to these he added thirteen thousand Greek mercenaries, under the command of Clearchus, the Spartan harmost of Byzantium, and other leaders. It was a mixed throng that enlisted in the service of Cyrus. Spartan and Athenian were equally ready to serve a master who gave good pay, and who challenged their admiration by his daring and ability. Cyrus, however, knowing the dread the average Greek felt in penetrating into the heart of the Persian empire, did not at first tell his followers the object of his expedition. They were led to believe that they were expected to operate against some tribes in Southern Asia Minor. But when they had gone eastwards as far as the Euphrates, and retreat was difficult, he told them that their enemy was the king of Persia himself. Great rewards were promised in the event of Cyrus proving successful in dethroning his brother, and the expedition went boldly on towards Susa. When within a few days' march of Babylon, the Persian king and his army were encountered.

*Cyrus rebels
against the
Persian
King.*

Although greatly outnumbered, Cyrus' little army of Greeks and natives would have won the day had not Cyrus, in a rash attempt to reach his brother and slay him, been killed himself. The death of Cyrus caused his native troops to scatter, and the Greeks were left stranded in the heart of the Persian empire. Their leader being dead, they had no cause for which to fight. They were without guides familiar with the country, and they were hundreds of miles from the nearest sea. To add to their distress and embarrassment, their leaders, Clearchus and others, were drawn into a conference with Tissaphernes, the satrap, and then treacherously assassinated. 'Perplexed, but not cast down,' they elected other officers—of whom Xenophon, the Athenian and historian, was one—and began their march northwards, through the mountains of Armenia, in hopes of reaching the sea. The story of this journey is told by Xenophon in the *Anabasis*. In spite of the inclemency of the season, of roads blocked by snow, of attacks by the hostile and warlike tribes of the hilly regions, the heroic band, ten thousand strong, succeeded in reaching the Euxine, after a year of wandering and of deadly peril. Even then, their troubles were not at an end. Looked upon with suspicion by the Greek cities in the north of

*The Ten
Thousand*

Asia Minor, they were sent first on one expedition, then on another, until they were left desperate and starving in Thrace. But war broke out between Persia and Sparta, and the services of the Ten Thousand were gladly accepted by the Spartan general, Thimbron, 399 B.C.

*Lesson
taught by
the expedi-
tion of the
Ten Thou-
sand.*

The expedition of the Ten Thousand, as this little army was called, taught the Greeks a very important lesson. A small Greek army, disciplined and well-officered, had passed through the heart of the Persian empire practically unscathed. The result proved conclusively that the great Asiatic monarchy was at the mercy of the Greeks whenever the latter chose to settle their internal disputes, and to combine against the common enemy. Soon after this a far-seeing Spartan general and king attempted to carry out the project of destroying the Persian monarchy; but the time had not yet arrived for the Greek states to cease their fratricidal strife, and to act unitedly in any great enterprise for the common good.

*War between
Sparta and
Persia.*

A war between Sparta and Persia grew out of the assistance promised Cyrus by the Spartans. Tissaphernes was sent to Asia Minor to rule in the place of the ambitious Cyrus, and he began the task of subduing the Greek towns on the Ionian and Aeolian coast. Sparta at once declared war and sent a small army to Asia Minor under Thimbron, who succeeded, as previously mentioned, in enlisting what was left of the Ten Thousand. Under Thimbron the war was feebly conducted, and little success attended the Spartan arms. But Thimbron was removed, and Dercyllidas, a more energetic officer, placed in command. Before the new commander many cities in the Troad and Aeolis fell; and later on, when Dercyllidas moved against Tissaphernes, in Lydia and Caria, he found the Persian satrap more disposed to negotiate than to fight.

*Agésilas
chosen king
of Sparta,
399 B.C.*

The course of Greek history was now to be seriously influenced by the appearance on the scene of a remarkable personage in Spartan political life. This was Agésilas, the brother of King Agis, and his successor on the throne. Agis dying, the throne was claimed by Leotyichides, his nominal son. It was, however, strongly suspected that Leotyichides was the son of Alcibiades, who had seduced the young wife of Agis during his residence at

Sparta. The doubtful parentage of Leotychides led the Apella, under the influence of Lysander, to choose Agesilaus as the successor of King Agis.

Agesilaus had reached the age of forty when he attained this dignity. Hitherto he had shown no marked ability, nor given any indication of the energy and decision of character for which he was soon to become famous. He was small of stature, insignificant in appearance, and lame of one foot. He had been the friend and companion of Lysander, and it was under his auspices, and through his influence, that he was chosen king. Lysander thought he had secured a ready tool to carry out his projects; he was very soon to realize that he had furnished himself with a master. *Character of Agesilaus.*

It was the policy of Agesilaus, encouraged by the success of the expedition of the Ten Thousand, to wage a vigorous campaign against the Persians in Asia Minor, with the hope and expectation of driving them out of that province. In this policy Lysander agreed. Dercyllidas was in consequence removed from his command in Asia, and Agesilaus appointed his successor. The new commander was given a council of thirty Spartans to guide him in the war, and in this council Lysander held the chief place. Two thousand Laconians and six thousand allies were to be taken on the expedition against Persia; but Thebes, Corinth, and Athens, discontented with Spartan supremacy, refused to furnish their contingents, pleading various reasons for their refusal. Thebes, not content with an open refusal to contribute, actually prevented Agesilaus from completing a sacrifice he was offering to the gods at Aulis, prior to his departure on his eventful expedition. The insult sank deep into the heart of the Spartan king. When Agesilaus reached Asia Minor, Tissaphernes, frightened at the great accession to the strength of the Spartan army, entered into negotiations with him to bring about a truce. Agesilaus at first listened to the wily satrap's proposals, but discovering that he was treacherous and faithless he set to work to subdue Lydia and Mysia. He now found himself hampered by Lysander and his followers, who thought to use the king for their own purposes. *His policy.* *Agesilaus invades Asia Minor.*

gave Lysander to understand that he expected to be obeyed and treated with proper respect, and told him not to presume too much on his past services. The result of the breach was that Lysander was glad to take service on the Hellespont, far removed from the main Spartan army, so that his humiliation and loss of prestige might not be too evident. Relieved from the officiousness and presumption of Lysander, Agesilaus began to exhibit his hitherto hidden qualities as commander and statesman. In the course of a few months he drove Pharnabazus out of his satrapy, and defeated the armies of Tissaphernes in several conflicts. So rapid was the progress of the Spartan leader that King Artaxerxes came to the conclusion that Tissaphernes was faithless, and had him beheaded. But the new satrap, Tithraustes, was no more successful than the old ; and the troops of Sparta continued to force their way inland. Success begets success. The Greeks of Ionia, encouraged by the progress of Spartan arms, began to take an interest in the campaign. They went so far as to contribute money, and furnish a strong body of cavalry. Agesilaus, however, hoped to use their new-found zeal in another and better way. He asked for a fleet of one hundred and twenty ships from the Ionian and Carian cities. At the head of this fleet he placed his brother-in-law Peisander with instructions to attack Southern Asia Minor ; while he himself, with an army now twenty thousand strong, hoped to conquer the central portion.

*Persia
bribes the
Greek states
to rise
against
Sparta.*

The Persian empire was, apparently, in great danger. Alarmed at the rapid advances of Agesilaus, the Persian king had recourse to a weapon of defence seldom powerless when Greeks were the attacking parties. This was the employment of money to stir up strife among his enemies. The venal character of the Greeks, added to the well-known disaffection felt by Athens, Thebes, and other states to Spartan supremacy, offered an encouraging field for intrigue and bribery. So Tithraustes sent a Rhodian named Timocrates, with fifty talents of silver, to bribe the leading men of the disaffected states to stir up opposition to Sparta. The fifty talents did their work well, and the conquest of Persia by Greek arms was put off for half a century.

Foremost among the states ready to throw off the Spartan

supremacy were Thebes and Athens. The former was held in check by Sparta in her various efforts to dominate the smaller cities of Boeotia. The latter could not well forget her former greatness and glory, and writhed under the yoke of her conqueror. The Thebans were the first to move. Ismenias, a popular leader among them, put himself in communication with the disaffected of Argos and Corinth, and later on with the Athenians. An occasion for war was soon found or made. The Locrians of Opus were induced to make a raid upon the land of the Phocians, a people thoroughly loyal to the Spartan rule. The injured Phocians appealed to the Spartans for aid, and King Pausanias and Lysander proceeded northwards with two armies to the relief of their allies.

War in Central Greece.

Athens was now drawn into the struggle. Ever since the downfall of the Thirty Tyrants Athens had been suffering from petty civil strife, and excessive political bitterness. Sometimes it happened that the innocent and worthy fell victims to the party enmity and foolish prejudices that so extensively prevailed. Of these victims the most illustrious was Socrates. The friend and tutor of many of the worst oligarchs, like Critias and Theramenes, he fell under the suspicion of the democrats. His love of disputation, and his boldness in challenging and criticizing every opinion, whether religious, philosophical, or political, had made him many enemies among the timid and conservative. This long-cherished dislike and enmity was at last to find expression. Charged with irreverence and unbelief in the gods, and with 'corrupting the youth and practising impiety,' he made no effort to save his life, contenting himself with vindicating his conduct and actions. Condemned by his judges to die, he refused to listen to the solicitations of his friends to effect his escape, and calmly drank the fatal hemlock.

Socrates condemned and put to death, 399 B.C.

The continuous political strife that prevailed at Athens, it was thought, would be hushed by a foreign war. Theramenes, too, in grateful recollection of the aid given by Thebes against the 'Thirty,' wished to make some return for her kindness. So, ill-prepared as she was, without a navy, and her Long Walls in ruins, Athens once more took up arms against the Spartans.

Athens rises against Sparta.

In the year 395 B.C. Lysander made his way into Boeotia ;

*Lysander
slain, 395
B.C.*

and expecting to effect a junction with King Pausanias at a specified time, he marched to the attack of Haliartus. But Pausanias did not appear until too late to prevent a disastrous defeat of the forces of Lysander. The people of Haliartus made an unexpected sortie on the besiegers; and the Thebans came up on their rear, at the same time, with a large army. Lysander was slain, and his body was found the next day, by Pausanias, lying unburied by the wall. Before the privilege of burial was conceded, Pausanias had to consent to withdraw his troops from Boeotia. On his return to Sparta he was impeached for his dilatoriness and want of vigour and courage. He fled from Sparta, but was condemned and deposed in his absence.

The death of Lysander removed one of the greatest, if not the greatest, of the Spartan generals. His death was not seriously deplored at home or abroad, for the man's ambitious and despotic temper made him many enemies in Sparta and throughout Greece. The ephors felt more at ease now that his commanding genius no longer threatened to upset their plans. Henceforth they could travel in the old paths, undisturbed.

*General
revolt
against
Sparta.*

The defeat at Haliartus brought more friends to the cause of Thebes and Athens. Argos, Corinth, Acarnania, Euboea, and many Thessalian cities joined in the revolt against the power of Sparta. Her supremacy in the Peloponnesus was threatened, as well as her leadership in general Greek affairs. It was under these circumstances that Agesilaus was recalled from his victorious career in Asia Minor, to aid in reasserting the power of his own state over her enemies. The year 394 B.C. opened with an invasion of the Peloponnesus by the combined forces of the allies. They had an army twenty thousand strong when they reached Corinth, and they were preparing for a direct attack on Sparta, when they were brought to a halt by a Spartan army under the command of the regent Aristodemus. With forces of nearly equal strength, a fierce battle was fought at Nemea, near Corinth, in which both armies lost heavily, the allies suffering the most. Three thousand of their number were slain, the survivors escaping to the protection of the strong walls of Corinth.

*Battle of
Corinth, 394
B.C.*

Agesilaus, with a heavy heart, now began his homeward march. He complained that he had been driven out of Asia by Persian gold, which had incited Thebes and Argos to war. Leaving Peisander in command of a fleet, and another officer, with four thousand men, to carry on the war against Tithraustes, he crossed the Hellespont, and took his way southward by the coast-road through Thrace and Macedonia. A month after the battle of Corinth was fought he was in Phocis among friends, with a strong, well-disciplined and devoted army at his back. Joined by the Phocians and other allies, he advanced along the valley of the Cephissus, until he came to Coroneia. Here he found his way barred by the enemy. Thebans, Argives, and Athenians made their stand under the walls of the town. The battle that ensued was one of the most desperate in all the annals of Greece. The Thebans vied with the Spartans in their determination to conquer or die. The result was a barren victory for Agesilaus, for he lost as heavily as his opponents. He made no further attempt to force his way through Boeotia, but after offering to the oracle at Delphi costly gifts from his Asiatic spoils, he made his way to the Peloponnesus by sea.

*Return of
Agesilaus
from Asia.*

*Battle of
Coroneia,
394 B.C.*

Agesilaus was now to realize how futile had been all his efforts to establish a Spartan supremacy in Asia. Scarcely had he left Asia when the Persian satraps put at the disposal of the Athenian Conon a considerable fleet of Phoenician vessels. Conon set forth at once to attack the Spartan fleet under the command of Peisander. Peisander was encountered off Cnidus, and although greatly outnumbered did not hesitate to give battle. His captains and sailors, however, offered but little resistance; Peisander was slain, and half of his ships were taken or destroyed. Conon now sailed along the coast of Asia Minor, inciting the Greek cities to throw off the Spartan rule, an invitation very readily accepted. Soon all the important Greek towns and cities, with the exception of Abydos, had expelled their Spartan garrisons and opened their gates to Conon, and Spartan rule in Asia was at an end.

*Peisander
defeated
and slain,
394 B.C.*

The following year Conon with his fleet crossed the Aegean Sea, and sailed into the Gulf of Aegina. With the permission of the Persian satrap, he employed his seamen in rebuilding the

393 B.C.

*Long Walls
of Athens
rebuilt by
Conon, 393
B.C.*

fortifications of the Peiraeus, and in restoring the Long Walls, which had lain in ruins since their destruction by Lysander in 404 B.C. Once more the work of building war-ships was begun in the Athenian docks ; and soon a small fleet of ten vessels was ready to sail. Two years after, Thrasybulus was able to put to sea with forty vessels, and Athens was again in a position to take an active part in the war against her ancient enemy.

*Iphicrates
introduces
new tactics.*

The most noteworthy event of the war that follows was the introduction of new and improved military tactics by the Athenian general, Iphicrātes. He sought to make the light-armed men, or *peltasts*, as effective for the general purposes of war as the heavily-armed hoplites, who, weighted down with their armour, found rapid movement impossible. Arming his peltasts with a long sword and pike, he gave them, for defensive armour, a linen corslet and a small shield, instead of metal breastplates and large bucklers. Beginning with attacks upon small bodies of heavily-armed infantry, he gradually accustomed his men to victory. At last he ventured to attack a Spartan battalion of four hundred men, and so harassed them by his rapid and dexterous assaults, that he brought them to a stand-still on a hillock. Here they were surrounded by the peltasts, and a force of Athenian hoplites coming on the scene, the Spartan ranks were broken, and some two hundred and fifty of them slain. The victory had the effect of bringing the light-armed infantry into greater prominence, and of casting a shadow on the reputation of the Spartans for stubborn courage. It remained, however, for Alexander the Great to realize the benefit of employing light-armed men in conjunction with hoplites.

*Persia and
Sparta
negotiate.*

Another of those rapid changes of front, with which Grecian history abounds, now took place. Sparta having lost everything in Asia Minor, began, through an officer named Antalcidas, to make approaches to the Persians. Antalcidas was sent to Sardis to interview the satrap of Lydia, one Tiribazus. The satrap was made to believe that the Persian king in aiding Athens was building up a power which would prove antagonistic to his interests. In consequence, Conon was recalled and thrown in prison, and the Persian fleet was, some time after, placed under the command of Antalcidas, to act in conjunction with the

Spartans. Tiribazus went to Susa to convince the king that it was desirable to enter into an alliance with Sparta. The negotiations were prolonged three years, during which time Sparta recovered Ephesus, and part of Lesbos. The Athenians had a small fleet under Thrasybulus in the Aegean, and they succeeded in forming an alliance with the Byzantines, Rhodians, and Chalcedonians. But Thrasybulus was slain at Aspendus, and the war in the Aegean was undecisive until the return of Tiribazus from Susa in 388 B.C. The king had given him permission to conclude an alliance with Sparta, and immediately the Persian fleet was put at the disposal of Antalcidas, who now was able to sweep the Aegean, and drive the Athenian fleet back to the Peiraeus.

All parties were now anxious for peace, and Tiribazus taking advantage of this feeling, had, in conjunction with Antalcidas, a treaty drawn up which he invited the Greek states to sign. A congress of deputies was called at Sardis, and when the representatives of the various cities met, what is known as the Treaty or Peace of Antalcidas was put before them. The terms demanded the surrender of all the Greek cities in Asia to King Artaxerxes, with the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus. All the other Greek cities, small and great, were to be independent, with the exception of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which were to belong, as of old, to Athens. If any state or states refused to sign this treaty the Persian king, aided by those accepting it, would make war upon it or them. All the states accepted the terms, being tired of war and afraid of the united strength of Sparta and Persia, although Thebes for a time held out against the surrender of her supremacy over Boeotia.

*Peace of
Antalcidas,
387 B.C.*

So ended the 'Corinthian War' in a peace which left Sparta supreme in the Peloponnesus, the other Greek states weak and divided, and the Greek cities in Asia Minor, which had been free since 480 B.C., the subjects of the Persian king. The disgrace of thus destroying the freedom of these Greek communities lies at the door of Sparta, whose selfishness once more had led her to sacrifice the best interests of the Hellenic race.

*End of the
Corinthian
war.*

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE RISE OF THEBES.

*Effect of
the Peace of
Antalcidas.*

The Peace of Antalcidas served well the purpose of its authors. It left Sparta in undisputed control of the Peloponnesus, and it divided and weakened her enemies, especially Thebes. Sparta's control over the Peloponnesian states was due to separate treaties made with them, whereas Thebes had dominated Boeotia as the head of a confederacy. The Boeotian towns now became 'free and independent,' and nearly all of them cast off the Theban supremacy.

*Chalcidian
League.*

The terms of the Peace of Antalcidas did not, however, prevent Sparta, under the leadership of Agesilaus, from encroaching on the rights of her neighbours, Mantinea and Phlius. The spirit of aggression was as manifest in Sparta as ever; a notable illustration of which is the attitude assumed by that state towards the Chalcidian League. In the year 392 B.C. a number of cities in Chalcidice, headed by Olynthus, formed themselves into a Confederacy. Soon the League became powerful and was able to put in the field eight thousand hoplites and one thousand horse. Its growth was so rapid that two cities, Acanthus and Apollonia, which had not entered into the League, became alarmed and applied to Sparta for help in retaining their independence. Sparta had no ground for interference, except to gratify the unscrupulous ambition of Agesilaus and his party. There was another party at Sparta headed by the other king, Agesipolis, which was opposed to the policy of aggression; but Agesilaus was too strong for it, and succeeded in getting the vote of the popular assembly in favour of a war against the Chalcidian League. An army of ten thousand men was to be raised for service; the main body of which was to start the following spring. It was, however, thought advisable to despatch immediately two officers, Eudamidas and Phoebeidas, with two thousand men, to garrison Acanthus and Apollonia. The march of this force was through Boeotia, and close by the

walls of Thebes. As Phoebidas camped near Thebes he was visited by Leontiādes, one of the two polemarchs of the city. This Leontiādes was a strong and violent partizan of the oligarchy, and was engaged at the time in a political struggle with his fellow-polemarch, Ismenias, who had espoused the popular, or democratic cause. Determined to crush his opponent at all costs, Leontiades invited the Spartan leader to take possession of the Cadmeia, or citadel of Thebes, with the understanding that the Spartan force was to be used in his favour against the democrats. It happened that the festival of Thesmophoria was being celebrated at that time, and in accordance with the usual custom, the citadel was put in the hands of the women of Thebes for a few hours. Leontiades, too, as one of the polemarchs, was in charge of the gates of the city, so that everything favoured the treacherous scheme. The conspiracy succeeded. The gates were opened to Leontiades, and the Spartans entering during the noontide heat, when the streets were deserted, were soon in possession of the citadel, with a large number of women as prisoners and hostages. Leontiades now announced to the senate that the city was in the hands of the Spartans, and taking advantage of the terror and surprise of the people he seized and imprisoned Ismenias his rival. Cowed by this sudden attack a packed assembly voted submission to Spartan rule. Several hundred of the prominent men in the democratic party fled the city and took refuge in Athens. Ismenias was sent to Sparta where he was tried for 'Medism' and executed, he having invoked the aid of Persia some years before against Spartan tyranny. The Spartan people administered a mild rebuke to Phoebidas for acting without orders, but they showed no unwillingness to take advantage of his treachery.

*Treacherous
occupation
of Thebes by
the Spartans*

For three years Sparta maintained her hold upon Thebes, Spartan harmosts being sent to command the garrison which controlled the city. In Chalcidice, too, she was successful. After a brave struggle, Torōne and Olynthus were captured, the Chalcidian League was dissolved, and its members were enrolled separately as subject-allies of Sparta. The destruction of this League proved eventually to be a very serious matter for Greece.

*End of
Chalcidian
League.*

The wrongs of Thebes had appealed strongly to the other Greek cities, and to none with greater effect than to Athens. As the years passed by, and the Spartan hold showed no signs of relaxing, the more daring and patriotic Theban exiles grew desperate. They entered into correspondence with their friends in the city, and arranged a scheme for the assassination of Leontiades and the two polemarchs who were oppressing their fellow-citizens, through the aid given by the Spartan garrison. The tyrants dead, the exiles hoped to arouse the citizens, and by an assault capture the citadel and expel the Spartans. Accordingly seven exiles, headed by Pelopidas and Mëlon, undertook the risk of slaying the oppressors. They were promised a safe hiding-place in Thebes while the secretary of the polemarchs arranged a wine-supper for his masters, to which Pelopidas and his friends were to come dressed as women. Every detail of the plot was successful. The polemarchs, attracted by the promise of meeting the most beautiful women in Thebes, willingly and eagerly accepted the invitation to the supper. At a pre-arranged signal Pelopidas and his companions entered the room, arrayed and disguised in female robes. Rushing on their amorous and half-drunken victims, they speedily despatched them by well-aimed blows. They then sought out Leontiades at his home, and after a hand-to-hand fight cut him down. The public prison was now attacked, the jailer killed, and one hundred and fifty prisoners released and armed. The conspirators appeared openly in the streets, proclaimed the death of the tyrants, and called upon the citizens to rise and recover their freedom. The Spartan governor of the citadel now grew alarmed, and shut himself up in the Cadmeia. Soon thousands of angry and infuriated Thebans, aided by exiles and a small Athenian volunteer force, were making fierce assaults on the citadel, where one thousand five hundred Spartans stood on the defensive. At last the garrison surrendered the stronghold and marched out, leaving the Theban oligarchs to their fate. The Spartan force on its retreat met, at Megara, a large Peloponnesian army under King Cleombrötus, coming to its rescue. It was, however, too late, and Spartan anger found vent in putting two of the harlots to death, and sending the third into exile.

*Pelopidas
frees Thebes.*

Thebes had made a bold stroke for freedom ; but few thought that, unaided, she would be able to long withstand the full strength of Sparta. Nevertheless she resolved to fight to the bitter end, rather than submit to the rule of her enemy. Fortunately, Thebes had within her walls two able generals and unselfish patriotic statesmen, Pelopidas and Epaminondas. Pelopidas, the leader in the rising against the Theban tyrants, was an excellent cavalry officer, full of dash and daring. He deserved and possessed the entire confidence of his men, who were prepared to follow him anywhere. His unselfishness and devotion to his city were as conspicuous as his courage. Epaminondas was the close friend of Pelopidas, and like him patriotic and unselfish in the highest degree. But his abilities as a general and statesman far surpassed those of Pelopidas. As a general he revolutionized the art of war, introducing tactics which in his hands were invariably successful. As a statesman, his breadth of view and honesty of purpose and action placed him high above the most illustrious of the Greeks. He excelled Pericles as a general ; while, unlike Pericles, his patriotism and statesmanship were not confined to his own city, but took into consideration the best interests of the Hellenic race. Modest and unassuming to a remarkable degree, he never allowed personal ends and ambitions to affect his conduct. There was no rivalry between him and Pelopidas ; on the contrary, there was the closest friendship and the most implicit confidence. Epaminondas had taken no part in the conspiracy to slay the Theban tyrants, being restrained by his almost too chivalrous sense of honour. But after the deed had been done, Epaminondas was among the first to come forward as a volunteer in the Theban cause, and his remarkable military qualities soon led to his being recognized as the undisputed leader in the war against Sparta. He is credited with introducing a new system of attack on the field of battle. The Greeks were wont to draw up their armies on the eve of conflict in a straight line, twelve ranks deep, with the cavalry on the wings or flanks. The different parts of the army generally moved forward at the same moment, and struck at the enemy almost simultaneously. Epaminondas resolved to change this formation, and mode of attack. His plan was to put his best troops in one of the

*Pelopidas
and Epami-
nondas.*

*Epaminon-
das intro-
duces his
military
tactics.*

wings of his army, and hurl these in columns fifty deep, at the strongest point in the opposing force. By this method first one wing, then the centre, and last of all, the remaining wing came into action, in order of succession. If the first attack was successful, the enemy found little chance of retrieving the day elsewhere, and the battle was usually won.

Against such leaders as these Sparta had no general worthy of the name, save Agesilaus, to place in the field. Agesilaus, too, was growing old, and was not always able to take command of the Spartan army. The war began by King Cleombrotus leading an army into Boeotia in the depth of winter. Finding the Thebans in possession of their citadel he returned home, leaving an army several thousand strong at Thespiæ under the command of one Sphodrias. The latter, encouraged by the example of Phœbidas, sought to carry out at Athens the policy which had been so successful at Thebes. He formed the scheme of surprising Athens by night, but daylight found him on the Thriasian plain, ten miles from the city. Athens had been making friendly advances to Sparta, fearing that the part taken by a few of her citizens in assisting to expel the Spartans from Thebes would bring down on her the wrath of that city. The treacherous conduct of Sphodrias caused a complete revulsion of feeling at Athens, and war was declared at once against Sparta. In this way Thebes won an important ally.

*Attempt to
surprise
Athens.*

*Athens joins
Thebes
against
Sparta.*

*Boeotia
invaded by
Agesilaus.*

In the year 378 B.C. the old general, Agesilaus, took the command of the Peloponnesian army, and made his way into the heart of Boeotia. But beyond destroying fruit trees, burning hamlets, blocking wells, and committing kindred barbarous acts, he accomplished nothing. The Thebans declined fighting in the open field, and Agesilaus was not able to besiege Thebes. During two campaigns this policy of invasion and destruction was pursued ; but it was of no avail. After this Agesilaus met with a serious accident at Megara, and he was not able to lead the Spartan armies for some years. Cleombrotus now took charge of the invading army, but being a general of little skill he was not able to even enter Boeotia.


The Athenians, in the meantime, were showing something of

their old-time vigour on the sea. A naval league, in which *Naval league* Byzantium, Rhodes, Chios, Mitylene and other states took part, *against Sparta.* was formed to free the Aegean of Spartan vessels. This new confederacy never reached any great strength, its members fearing that Athens, as during the Confederacy of Delos, might prove too strong. While it lasted, however, it did good service. The Spartan fleet was completely defeated off Naxos by the Athenian Chabrias, the result of this brilliant victory being that the Aegean was cleared of Spartan ships. The Athenians were also successful on the western coast of Greece, and Corcyra and Cephallenia joined the league. Want of money, however, brought their operations to a standstill, and public opinion, always fickle, once more began to veer around in favour of Sparta and against Thebes. This was due to the action of Thebes in compelling the towns of Boeotia to acknowledge once more her leadership and supremacy. It will be remembered that *Boeotian League restored.* the Peace of Antalcidas freed these towns from Theban control. The Boeotian League was restored, and Thebes installed as its president.

The war was not proving a success, so far as Sparta was concerned, and as signs of disaffection were appearing in the Peloponnesus she made an abortive effort to bring about a peace. The basis of this peace was to be the Treaty of Antalcidas, and this nearly all the states were prepared to accept. Thebes alone refused, and declined to surrender her control over the Boeotian towns. The war now narrowed down to a life-and-death struggle between Thebes and Sparta, although there was a brief and unimportant conflict on the western coast between the Spartans and the Athenians under the command of Iphicrates. A treaty framed in 371 B.C. brought this strife to an end. *Vain efforts to obtain peace.*

The renewal of hostilities between Sparta and Thebes was marked by the invasion of Boeotia by King Cleombrotus, at the head of a large army. He entered by Mount Helicon, a route which brought him speedily to Leuctra, eight miles from Thebes, without meeting any opposition. Epaminondas had expected the invading army to advance by the valley of the Cephissus, and to enter Boeotia further north; and he had barely time to place his army between the advancing Spartans and *Battle of Leuctra. 371 B.C.*

Thebes. The two armies faced each other on the slopes of Mt. Helicon (see map), and awaited the signal to engage in a contest which was to be fraught with the most momentous consequences. The Spartans, apparently, had much in their favour. They considerably exceeded their opponents in numbers; and many of the soldiers in the Theban army were supposed to be disaffected towards Thebes, and therefore not to be relied upon. This was known to the Boeotian generals, who were, in consequence, some-



what unwilling to engage in battle. But Epaminondas felt confident of the soundness of his new military tactics, and was anxious to put them to the test. Like Themistocles, before Salamis, he had to become an interpreter of the oracles. He recalled to the memory of the Boeotians the prophecy that 'the Spartans should be defeated at the tombs of the maidens,' and pointed out that they were drawn up near the graves of two virgins who had suffered outrage at the hands of Spartan soldiers. This was decisive, and it was resolved to give the enemy battle immediately.

It remained now for Epaminondas to bring his new tactics into successful operation. He resolved to mass his best soldiers, the Thebans, fifty deep against the right wing of the Lacedaemonian army, where he knew the picked men of Sparta were placed. He hoped by hurling his troops at this point to break the Spartan ranks, and then he expected the rest of the Lacedaemonian army would waver and scatter, having seen their accustomed leaders routed. The Spartan king was also anxious to fight, as his want of success, hitherto, had been frequently ascribed to his incapacity. He took his stand in the middle of the right wing of his army, surrounded by seven hundred native Spartans, and flanked by Lacedaemonian Perioeci. Battle was begun in the afternoon, and at once Epaminondas flung his left wing against the right of the Lacedaemonians, bearing down immediately upon the point where the Spartan king stood. The struggle was brief and desperate, the Spartans upholding their well-earned renown for steadiness and unyielding courage. But the weight of the solid Theban column was more than the Spartan line could withstand, and soon it was rent in twain, and rolled up to the right and to the left. In this deadly hand-to-hand conflict four hundred Spartans out of the seven hundred fell, and these included the king and most of the officers. Epaminondas' anticipations of the result of defeating the Spartan contingent of the Lacedaemonian army were fully met. The rank and file of the centre and left wing refused to continue the struggle, and retired before they could be attacked by the centre and right of the Theban army. The Spartan officers wished to renew the battle, but their men refused to follow them. The defeat of the Spartans by an inferior force had to be acknowledged, and heralds were sent to Epaminondas to ask permission to bury the Spartan dead.

The battle of Leuctra was decisive of Spartan rule in Greek affairs. It also led to the downfall of the old military tactics, for the theory of attack adopted by Epaminondas had been amply proved to be sound by his remarkable success.

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE THEBAN SUPREMACY.

*Effects of
the Theban
victory.*

For nine years (371-362 B.C.) Thebes, under the wise leadership of Epaminondas, was the recognized head of the Greek states. The battle of Leuctra opened the eyes of the other cities to the fact that a new power had appeared in Greece, and that, henceforth, a new policy was to be pursued. The decisive victory of the Thebans brought to their side the neighbouring states of Phocis, Locris, Euboea, Aetolia and Acarnania, but it repelled the Athenians, who were annoyed that the balance of power had passed out of their hands, through the genius of Epaminondas. Hence when Thebes sent ambassadors to Athens they were refused a friendly reception.

*The
Spartans
retreat to
the Pelopon-
nesus.*

The Spartans were greatly weakened by their defeat, although with true Spartan self-control they gave utterance to no wailings and complaints. An expedition was immediately sent to Boeotia to secure the safe retreat of the remnant of the Spartan army, which had taken refuge in an entrenched camp. But the expedition was unnecessary, for Epaminondas had refused to follow up his attack on the Spartans, feeling well-assured that the demoralization existing among them would soon compel them to make a retreat. And so it happened. The Spartan officers were unable to control their allies, and were forced to submit to the humiliation of asking Epaminondas for permission to retire to the Peloponnesus. Permission was readily granted, and the Spartans crept away during the night, meeting on their retreat their friends coming to their relief. So weak had Sparta become that the defeated soldiers were, contrary to usage, permitted to retain their citizenship.

*Jason of
Pherae.*

About the time of the battle of Leuctra, a new danger to the central states of Greece loomed up in the north. Jason of Pherae was a man of great ability and of equally great ambition. He had succeeded in reducing nearly all Thessaly under his

control, and had reorganized the Thessalian League, of which he was made the leader or commander-in-chief. So just and strong was his rule that the factions of Thessaly were for the time being stilled, and Thessaly gave indications of becoming the most powerful state in Greece. Thebes had watched anxiously for some sign of Jason's attitude towards herself and Sparta, and considerable relief was felt when Jason declared in favour of Thebes. He marched southwards to join Epaminondas, but he arrived too late to take a part in the battle of Leuctra. After the battle he hovered in its vicinity for some time, and then returned to Thessaly, seizing on his return march an important fortress near the pass of Thermopylae.

The next year (370 B.C.) was an important year in Grecian history. Jason of Pherae, in the spring, greatly to the alarm of Northern and Central Greece, announced his intention of visiting Delphi, to offer costly sacrifices to Apollo. Not only victims for the altar, but a large army also, were to be brought. The alarm proved needless, for Jason was murdered at Pherae by seven young men who appeared before him in the guise of petitioners. His successors were men of little force of character, and the fear of Thessalian aggression passed away. *Death of Jason.*

One effect of the overthrow of Spartan leadership and control was the outbreak of disorder and anarchy in the Peloponnesus, the most noticeable event being a dreadful massacre, at Argos, of the oligarchic party by their political opponents, the democrats. It is said that twelve hundred men perished at the hands of the mob. *Club-law in Argos.*

So weak was Sparta that she made little or no attempt to assert her control over her former allies. Mantinea, which had rebuilt her walls, alone was attacked by the Spartans under the command of Agesilaus; and he was content with driving the Mantineans within their fortifications.

Still more threatening to Spartan influence was the federation of the towns of Arcadia for the avowed purpose of maintaining their independence. Old feuds and animosities were forgotten, and the new Federation began the building of a 'great city,' Megalopolis, to be the future capital of the united tribes. This *The Arcadian Confederacy 370 B.C.*

city, which was destined to have but a brief career, was located in the fertile valley of the Helisson, a tributary of the Alphæus. Settlers from all parts of Arcadia were invited to take up their residence there. The federation was to be governed by a body composed of numerous delegations from the different towns and cities, and which were to meet at stated times at Megalopolis. A federal army was to be maintained out of a federal revenue, five thousand hoplites being the number of men chosen. But the law-making body was too large and unwieldy; and the expense of supporting such a large standing army proved too great a drain on the resources of the confederacy.

Epaminondas invades the Peloponnesus.

The year 370 B.C. is also remarkable for the first invasion by Epaminondas of the Peloponnesus with a large and mixed army of Thebans, Locrians, Phocians, and other allies. He was joined at once by the Arcadians, Eleans, and Argives. The Achæians remained neutral, while the Corinthians and the people of Sicyon, Epidaurus, Hermione and Phlius maintained their loyalty to Sparta. Epaminondas was soon at the head of an army of seventy thousand men, and with this, one of the largest forces ever gathered together in Greece, he determined on the attack of Sparta itself. Sparta was a long and somewhat scattered city or town, without any walls or defences save such as the surrounding hills afforded. When the news of the approach of Epaminondas was brought to the city, there were loud cries of lamentation from the women, 'who had never yet seen the smoke of an enemy's camp fire.' Deserted by, or cut off from, her allies, Sparta had only two thousand citizens to place in the field. Her Perioeci were not to be fully trusted, yet to them and the helots the Spartans had to look for assistance. A bold front was, however, maintained towards the enemy. Agesilaus was once more given the command, and told to do his best under the circumstances. He promised freedom to every helot who would fight for Sparta, and by this means was able to raise six thousand men. Small reinforcements, too, came in from Corinth and Orchomenus. Barricades were erected at the passes leading into the town, and every precaution taken against surprise. In vain Epaminondas sought to find an unguarded place, and when he attempted to force his way into the city he

Sparta attacked by Epaminondas.

was repulsed with heavy loss. At last he abandoned any attempt at a general attack, and contented himself with destroying the villages of the Perioeci, and the naval arsenal at Gythium. He now turned westward, crossed Mount Taygetus, and entered Messenia. His entry marked the restoration of the ancient independence of the long-oppressed Messenians. The descendants of the exiles in Sicily, and those driven from Naupactus by Lysander, were invited to assist in laying the foundations of a city on the southern slope of their old stronghold, Mount Ithome. The helots, availing themselves of the presence of the Theban army, rose and threw off, once for all, the rule of the Spartans.

*Messenia
recovers her
independ-
ence.*

This year, so fruitful of great changes in the Peloponnesus, was also marked by an exhibition of the peculiar fickleness of the Athenians. Athens, as already noticed, was dissatisfied with the pronounced victory of Thebes at Leuctra, and this dissatisfaction became so strong that the Ecclesia received an embassy from Sparta pleading for help. More generous than wise, the populace voted to enter the Spartan alliance, and Iphicrates was instructed to lead an Athenian army into the Peloponnesus, to aid the distressed Spartans. By the terms of this alliance the combined forces of Sparta and Athens were to be commanded alternately by Spartan and Athenian officers.

*Athens joins
Sparta.*

The value of this alliance was soon to be tested, for Epaminondas the next year (369 B.C.) again invaded the Peloponnesus. The allied armies of Sparta and Athens tried to check his advance by rebuilding the old line of defences across the isthmus of Corinth. Behind this they took their stand; but Epaminondas broke through the Spartan ranks, and made his way into the Peloponnesus, where he was joined once more by his former allies. Sicyon fell before his attack; but Epidaurus and Corinth made a successful resistance. This second invasion thus accomplished little beyond the capture of Sicyon, and the opportunity it gave the Arcadians and Messenians to build the walls of their cities, Megalopolis and Messene. This comparative failure of the great Theban led to his being refused election the next year to the office of Boeotarch, or commander of the Theban armies.

*Second
Theban
invasion of
the Pelopon-
nesus, 369
B.C.*

Trouble in Thessaly now prevented Thebes for a time from actively continuing the war in the Peloponnesus. A new tyrant, Alexander, had begun to rule over Pherae and the confederacy of which it was the head. Alexander's violence and recklessness soon shattered the league formed by Jason and one of the towns of Thessaly, Larissa, invited to its aid the Macedonians. Other towns called in Pelopidas and his Theban army. He soon compelled the Macedonians to retire from Thessaly, and forced Alexander to recognize the independence of the other cities of the league. Pelopidas then marched into Macedonia and dictated terms of peace to the Macedonian king. The latter had to give, as hostages, thirty youths of the noblest families, of whom Philip, the king's brother, was one.

*Pelopidas
invades
Thessaly,
368 B.C.*

*The Tearless
Battle, 368
B.C.*

In the meantime the Arcadians and Eleans had begun to quarrel about the allegiance of the Tryphylians. The consequence of this senseless wrangling was that when the Arcadian general led an army against the Spartans, at Midea, he met a severe defeat, in which it is said not a Spartan perished. Hence the name given to this engagement, 'The Tearless Battle.'

The part played by Pelopidas in Thessaly was not to be easily forgiven by Alexander, the tyrant of Pherae. He bided his time to take his revenge. Shortly afterwards, Pelopidas was returning home through Thessaly, when he was captured by Alexander and thrown into prison. Thebes at once sent an army of seven thousand men to rescue Pelopidas; but this force would probably have been destroyed had not Epaminondas, who was serving as a soldier in the ranks, taken the command and rescued the imperilled army. The result was that Epaminondas was restored to his old position as Boeotarch by the Theban people. In a short time the effect of this change of commanders was seen. Alexander was soon reduced to such straits that he was glad to surrender Pelopidas, and accept such terms of peace as he could secure.

*Pelopidas
taken
prisoner.*

The Spartans, after the 'Tearless Battle,' felt somewhat encouraged, and their hopes were raised still higher by promises of assistance from the Persian monarch. This hope, however, of Persian aid proved fruitless, for Pelopidas went to Susa, and induced the Persian king to withdraw from the Spartan

alliance, and give his support to the Theban cause. The king, with an air of authority, which under the circumstances was ludicrous, commanded the Spartans to acknowledge the independence of Messene, and the Athenians to call in their warships. The command was, of course, unheeded. Although the Persians were weak and far away, the Thebans were not. They were once more ready and eager to invade the Peloponnesus, under the leadership of their ever-victorious general, Epaminondas. The year 367 B.C. saw the Theban army again in motion. The Isthmus was passed in spite of opposition from Corinth; and the towns of Achaia were induced to join the Theban alliance, on condition of their political constitution and internal affairs being left untouched. This condition, however, was openly violated by Thebes, which sent garrisons to take possession of the Achaian cities. The result was that the Achaians, indignant at Theban treachery (for which Epaminondas was not responsible), withdrew from their alliance, and joined that of Sparta. This desertion of the Theban cause by the Achaians seriously affected the success of the campaign. Nothing of any importance was accomplished this year, save the seizure of Orôpus, a frontier town of Attica, long a subject of dispute with the Athenians. The following year Corinth, Epidaurus, and Phlius entered into a treaty of neutrality with Thebes. This action on the part of Corinth was caused by her fear of Athens, who had treacherously endeavoured to seize the Corinthian Acropolis, in revenge for the refusal of the Peloponnesians to assist Athens in recovering Oropus.

Third invasion of Peloponnesus, 367 B.C.

Although Sparta had lost her ally, Corinth, she was stronger than before. This was due to the fact that Elis, having quarrelled with Arcadia about their frontiers, decided to cast in her lot with Sparta. The strength of the parties in the Peloponnesus was now nearly equal. Argos, Arcadia, and Messene were pitted against Sparta, Elis, and Achaia. The Arcadians for a time showed much activity and strength. In the year 364 B.C. they marched into the Alpheus valley and seized Olympia, proclaiming their right to preside over the Olympic games. The Eleans and Achaians came to the rescue, and a battle was fought at Olympia while the festival was in progress.

*Battle of
Olympia,
364 B.C.*

The struggle ended in the repulse of the Eleans, and the Arcadians were left in possession of the control of the games. This state of affairs did not last long. Public opinion was against Arcadia, as Elis was the proper guardian of the sanctuary. Arcadia was compelled by her financial necessities to seize the treasure in the temple at Olympia, and when Mantinea, among other towns, refused to approve of the act, her magistrates were ordered to be imprisoned by the Arcadian Council. The gates of Mantinea were then closed against the troops of the Arcadian League. So pronounced, however, was public opinion against these high-handed actions of the Arcadians, that peace had to be made with Elis, and the guardianship of Olympia restored to her, 363 B.C.

Thebes was not consulted in making this new peace, and Epaminondas was indignant at what he considered an act of treachery. It happened that a number of prominent men of Mantinea were at that time visiting Tegea. A Theban officer, aided by the magistrates of Tegea, had these Mantineans arrested and thrown into prison. They were not detained very long; but the act could not be forgiven. Mantinea showed her resentment by leaving the Arcadian League, and making peace with Sparta.

*Death of
Pelopidas,
364 B.C.*

In the meantime Thebes had lost her old general and deliverer, Pelopidas. Alexander of Pherae had renewed hostilities, and Pelopidas, eager to avenge his imprisonment in 368 B.C., started to lead an army against the tyrant. An eclipse occurred at the moment of starting, and the soothsayers counselled delay. Pelopidas, as impetuous as of old, paid no attention to the advice, but pushed on with a few followers. Entering Thessaly, he soon roused the subjects of Alexander to revolt. Having collected a few thousand men he marched against Pherae. He met Alexander at Cynoscephalae, with a large army of mercenaries. In spite of numbers, Pelopidas broke the ranks of his enemies, and was pressing forward to cut down Alexander with his own hand, when he was surrounded and slain before his followers could rescue him. He was buried amid the lamentations of the Thessalians on the field of victory. Alexander was soon afterwards murdered by his near relatives, having lost all his possessions except Pherae.

For the fourth and, as it proved, the last time, Epaminondas led an army into the Peloponnesus. His force was composed of Boeotians, Thessalians, and Euboeans. Later on he was joined by Argives, Arcadians and Messenians, until his army reached the number of thirty thousand. He then took a position between Sparta and Mantinea, so as to separate their forces. But the Spartans resolved to send Agesilaus to the aid of Mantinea, and with him went nearly the whole of the Spartan army. As soon as Epaminondas became aware of the march of Agesilaus he set out for Sparta, hoping to take the city by surprise while undefended. His ruse very nearly succeeded. That it did not was due to the treachery of a Theban, who secretly informed Agesilaus of his leader's intentions. Agesilaus immediately set out for Sparta, and by great exertions managed to reach the city in time to occupy its inlets before Epaminondas arrived. A general attack followed, and the Theban general succeeded in forcing a body of his troops into the market-place, but the defeat of the other attacking forces compelled him to abandon the advantage he had gained.

Fourth invasion by Epaminondas,
362 B.C.


Second attack on Sparta fails
362 B.C.

Foiled in his plan to take Sparta by surprise, he suddenly changed his tactics and marched against Mantinea. Here again he failed to take his enemies unawares. As it happened, the Athenians were sending a reinforcement to Mantinea of six thousand men, and the cavalry of this body had just entered the gates of Mantinea when that of Epaminondas arrived. Wearied though the Athenians were, with a long day's march, they charged the Theban force and drove it back to Tegea.

The Spartans now arrived on the scene, and succeeded in effecting a junction with the Mantineans and Athenians. A force from Elis and Achaia also arrived, and the army of Sparta and her allies now numbered twenty thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry. The Theban army was still nearly one-third more numerous than the Spartans; nevertheless, the latter resolved to fight, urged, it is said, by the Mantineans who wished to save their country from plunder. Epaminondas moved forward from Tegea, and drew up his army in accordance with his usual military tactics.

Battle of Mantinea,
362 B.C.

The right wing of the Spartans and their allies rested on Mantinea, their left on a wooded height to the south. The accompanying map explains the relative position of the Mantineans and Spartans, Eleians and Achaïans, and Athenians. It also explains the relative positions and mode of attack of the Thebans and their allies. Epaminondas arrived somewhat late in the day, and he apparently showed no eagerness to begin the battle. His enemies thought he intended to defer his attack until



the next day, and their ranks became in consequence somewhat disordered and broken. As soon as Epaminondas saw the condition of his opponents, he hurled his forces at them with great impetuosity. The order of attack was the same as at Leuctra, and the results were much the same. His cavalry put the Spartan horse to rout, and his massive Boeotian column broke through the Spartan ranks 'as a war-galley ploughs through the waves with its beak.' But in the moment of victory the

great leader was slain. A Spartan soldier seeing Epaminondas approaching, in sheer desperation, thrust him through the breast with his pike. Soon the news spread that the loved general had fallen, and the pursuit of the victorious troops was checked. Epaminondas was carried to a rising ground in the rear, the broken spear still in his breast. Casting his eyes over the battle-field, he asked if his shield was safe. He then sent for the two officers next in command, but was told that they were dead. 'Then,' said he, 'you had better make peace.' He bade them draw out the spear-head, a rush of blood followed, and death quickly ended his sufferings.

With Epaminondas, one of the greatest of Greeks, ended the supremacy of Thebes. Conscious of their weakness, now that the great leader was gone, the Thebans made peace before the summer was over. All the contending parties were content to sign the agreement except Sparta, her ephors refusing to acknowledge the independence of Messenia.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

RISE OF THE MACEDONIAN POWER.

The supremacy of Thebes was wholly due to the genius and patriotism of Pelopidas and Epaminondas. The latter had never sought to establish an empire for his native city, as Athens did for herself after the victory of Salamis. Nor did he seek to give Thebes the position of leadership in Greece that Sparta so long enjoyed in the Peloponnesus. Thebes, with him, was to be one of many equals, although, doubtless, he sought to make her the first among these equals. So with the death of Epaminondas came a period when no one state enjoyed an acknowledged supremacy.

*Death of
Agesilaus,
361 B.C.*

Sparta, too, lost her last great general, Agesilaus, very shortly after the death of the Theban leader. Agesilaus, although a very old man (eighty-four years of age, it is said), had gone to Egypt to assist an Egyptian prince in a revolt against Persia, his object being the procuring of subsidies to aid Sparta in her war against Messene. He, however, quarrelled with his employer, deposed him, and placed another prince on the throne, obtaining for his services two hundred and thirty talents. While conveying this money home, Agesilaus took ill and died on the coast of Libya.

The Arcadian League had also its share of misfortunes. The 'Great City,' founded with such high hopes, soon became a 'great desert.' Systematically weakened by the older cities, it was captured by the Spartans, but restored to independence through the agency of a Theban army. Henceforth its history was one of rapid decline in numbers and influence, until it practically ceased to exist.

*Revival of
tyrannies.*

A peculiar feature of this time was the attempt at a revival of tyrannies in the Peloponnesus. Probably the success of tyrants at Syracuse and Pherae encouraged other ambitious men to aim at supreme power in their native cities. Sicyon and



Corinth were both troubled with would-be tyrants, but happily were able to rid themselves of the enemies of their liberties. In Euboea, however, tyrannies were established in many towns.

The war in which Thebes won so great renown was less hurtful to Athens than to most of the other Greek states. She was able to add to her possessions several cities and towns in Thrace and Macedonia, including Pydna and Potidaea. Samos, also, was wrested from Persia, and made the home of a large body of the poorer citizens of Athens. Fortunately for the latter, she was the only state that had a navy, and this gave her great influence in the Aegean. The memory of her former imperial position among her allies was still strong, and it appears that Athens began to nourish hopes of re-establishing once more an empire. Her allies in Asia Minor soon recognized the disposition of Athens to destroy their independence; but it was not until 357 B.C. that Chios, Byzantium, Rhodes, Cos, and other cities took up arms to assert their freedom. Athens *Social War, B.C. 357.* was not slow to answer the challenge and made an attack on Chios. An expedition of sixty vessels, led by Chabrias, entered the Chian harbour, and an attempt was made to land. Chabrias was slain, and his force retired with considerable loss. Encouraged by this success, the allies turned their attention to Samos, where Athens had established a cleruchy. To relieve Samos, Athens sent Iphicrates and Timotheus with another fleet, which, however, proved insufficient for the task, and retreated. This prudent action of the generals brought on them the wrath of the Ecclesia. Iphicrates was deprived of his command, and Timotheus heavily fined. The conduct of the war was then put in the hands of Chares, a general of some ability, whose character was of the Alcibiadian type. He, too, failed to accomplish anything, and finding himself in need of money, sold the services of himself and his soldiers to the satrap of the Hellespont, who was rebelling against his master, Ochus, the Persian monarch. The Athenian troops won many victories over the Persians, and by so doing brought down on Athens the wrath of Ochus. He began to fit out three hundred Phoenician ships to assist the allies. News of this action brought Athens to her senses. Chares was dismissed, the king's pardon was

besought, and the revolting allies of Athens were allowed to withdraw from the League. Athens, however, still retained Samos and the cities she had gained on the coasts of Thrace and Macedonia.

Macedonia

Greek history was now to assume another and important phase. The struggles for supremacy, the victories and the defeats, the various treaties and leagues which have been outlined, were incidents occurring among the states of Central and Southern Greece. Macedonia had hitherto played no important part in Grecian history, although mention has frequently been made of its people and its kings. Its population was of a mixed character, although the language employed resembled Aeolic Greek. Probably the inhabitants of Macedon were a fusion of Greek and native races. One thing seems clear, and that is that the kings of Macedon were recognized as of Hellenic blood, but their subjects were regarded and treated as foreigners by the Greeks proper.

The Macedonians.

The Macedonians were a wild, semi-barbarous people, until brought into contact with Greek civilization through the Greek colonies established along their coast. The ruder of the inhabitants dwelt in the highlands, but those living in the plains were more or less accustomed to city life, and some important towns, such as Pella, had been founded by them. The upper classes were quick to learn Greek manners and customs, as well as the Greek language. Greek names for their nobility and their gods became common as time passed. The form of government was a monarchy, limited by the power of the nobles, and 'tempered by assassination.' In material resources, extent of territory, and population, and physical courage, the Macedonians possessed advantages sufficiently great to have made them feared and respected by the other Greek states. For centuries, however, the disorder which ensued from misrule, the lack of civilization and enlightenment of the people, the turbulence and violence of the nobility, the frequent assassinations of kings and claimants for the crown, kept Macedon weak and made her the prey of her neighbours. Greek colonies had been founded along her coasts to such an extent as to threaten Macedon with being deprived of a sea-port. Invasions from Thessaly and Illyria were

of frequent occurrence, and at times it seemed as if the nation must succumb to the hostilities of its neighbours, and the faction fights of its kings and nobles.

The kings of Macedon were like the Czars of Russia, more enlightened and ambitious than their subjects. Like the Czars, too, they sought to introduce into their realm the civilization and learning of older nations. Alexander of Macedon, for instance, was a friend and imitator of the Greeks; while his grandson, Archelaus, entertained at his court Greek poets, employed Greek sculptors and painters, and sought to secure the services of Socrates as the instructor of the Macedonian youth.

*Character of
Macedonian
kings.*

But civil strife and the hostility of the Illyrians and the Chalcidian League had well nigh ruined Macedon, when the Spartans saved the kingdom by destroying the League. This was in the time of Amyntas, father of the renowned Philip.

It has already been mentioned that in the time of the Theban supremacy the Macedonians invaded Thessaly and were driven back by Pelopidas who compelled Amyntas to give, among others, his third son, Philip, as a hostage. Philip was taken to Thebes, where he spent many years in honourable captivity. The importance of his residence at Thebes cannot well be over-estimated. Although a mere lad when he entered the city, his powers of observation and reflection were already very great. He mastered the Greek language and philosophy, and became one of the greatest orators of his day. He studied also, closely, and, as subsequent events proved, successfully, the Greek character. At that time Epaminondas was the great master of the art of war, and, young though he was, Philip seems to have obtained a clear insight into his tactics and methods.

*Philip of
Macedon.*

Three or four years were spent in Thebes, and then domestic troubles caused Philip to return to Macedon. His elder brothers had both died, the one by assassination, the other in battle with the Illyrians. The latter, Perdiccas, left a son, but he was too young to rule alone, and Philip was appointed his guardian. At this time Philip was twenty-three years of age.

B.C. 359.

It was a heavy task which fell to the lot of the young regent.

*His
character.*

The Illyrians were forcing their way into Macedon, and two royal pretenders were claiming the crown. But Philip was quite fitted to grapple with even greater difficulties. Perhaps, few rulers and generals have shown greater genius for statecraft and war than he. Gifted with all needful physical accomplishments, he was peculiarly adapted to win the regard of men who valued great physical courage and skill in arms. He is said to have been an excellent horseman, a strong swimmer, and a keen hunter. He was equally worthy of admiration, in the eyes of the men of his day, for his feats at the wine tables, and for his successful gallantries. It was not, however, by physical accomplishments that Philip won his renown. Intellectually, he towered head and shoulders above the kings and statesmen of his generation. His mind was the subtlest, his power of dissimulation the greatest of all the Greeks, a people that stood pre-eminent among other nations for subtlety and dissimulation. With him 'the end justified the means.' He relished keenly outwitting an opponent. Considerations of truth and honesty never caused him any trouble, for he would, with the utmost coolness and indifference, break the most solemn oaths and promises. He had, while in Thebes, made a thorough study of the Greek character, and was quite familiar with its weaknesses. He knew how venal, false, and corrupt the politicians of the Greek cities were. Acting on this knowledge, he made it his policy to bribe the leaders of the factions in the cities of his enemies. He was wont to say that 'No town is impregnable, if once I can get a mule-load of silver passed within its gates.'

To outward appearance, Philip was affable, courteous, and frank. He masked his deep-laid schemes behind a manner charmingly pleasant and good-natured. And, in truth, he was not by nature cruel, although against him, as against other ambitious and unscrupulous men, cruel deeds, where an end was to be gained, could sometimes be truthfully charged. He was a warm friend of education, and valued highly the Greek culture and civilization.

The difficulties that surrounded Philip when he assumed the regency were soon removed. The pretenders were crushed, and the Illyrians were driven out. Philip then deposed his

nephew, and assumed the crown of Macedon, 358 B.C. His next task was to introduce order and good government into his kingdom. The army was little better than a mob, and Philip undertook its thorough organization. His refractory nobles were induced to join his own horse-guard, and were soothed and honoured with the name of the 'King's Companions.' The best men of the tribes were formed into regiments of light and heavy armed infantry. Following the example of Epaminondas, he arranged his choicest soldiers in deep columns, and armed them with very long spears, three times the length, it is said, of the ordinary Greek lance. This arrangement, which is known as the Macedonian phalanx, seldom failed to win the day, the mere weight of the attacking body often proving sufficient to break through the ranks of the enemy.

*The
Phalanx.*

The Macedonians had long felt the need of a sea-port, and Philip turned his attention to its acquisition. He knew the Athenians were anxious to recover Amphipolis, which they had lost in the time of Brasidas. He now proposed to seize Amphipolis and give it into the possession of Athens, in consideration of Pydna being handed over to him. The bargain was struck, and Philip marched against Amphipolis. In a short time it fell into his hands, and then he demanded the surrender of Pydna. It was given him; but as soon as he was in possession he refused to carry out his bargain regarding Amphipolis, and kept it for himself. This breach of faith, he was aware, would involve him in a war with Athens. He immediately attacked Potidaea, an important Athenian city, and captured it before assistance could arrive. He then handed it over to the Olynthians, hoping in this way to involve them in a war with Athens.

*Amphipolis
seized.*

Athens was not, however, in a position just then to punish Philip for his perfidy, the Social War having begun. Philip used the respite to invade Thrace, and build a city, called Philippi after himself, in the heart of the gold-producing district of Mt. Pangaeus. So productive were the mines of this region that the Macedonian king was soon in the receipt of a thousand talents a year from them. The gold was coined into *staters*,¹ which soon

*Philip
seizes the
gold mines
of Mt. Pan-
gaeus.*

¹A Macedonian *stater* was worth 25 shillings sterling, or about \$6.

became the gold currency of Greece, and the most potent of all Philip's weapons against his enemies.

*Cause of
'Sacred
War.'*

Turning now to Thebes, we find that state, after the death of Epaminondas, involved in a strife with Phocis, her old-time enemy. Phocis had been compelled, during the time of the Theban supremacy, to join the Theban alliance; but had shown her real feelings towards her ally by neglecting to send a contingent of soldiers to the army at Mantinea. This excited the wrath of the Thebans, who bided their time to take a fitting revenge. The opportunity soon arrived, for the Delphians accused certain Phocians of tilling some waste land sacred to Apollo. The matter was brought to the notice of the Amphictyonic Council, a venerable, but now somewhat effete, assembly. The members of this council were the tools of Thebes, and readily pronounced the Phocians guilty of sacrilege. A heavy fine was imposed on the culprits; but the council had no power to enforce the sentence, and the fine was not paid. Exasperated at the contempt shown for its authority, the council doubled the fine, and threatened the Phocians with the loss of their lands, unless prompt reparation was made.

The Phocians reply to this demand was quick and expressive. Two of their leaders, Onomarchus and Philomēlus, organized secretly an expedition which, taking advantage of the night, seized the temple at Delphi. The accusers of Phocis were captured and slain, and the priests were forced to make the oracle pronounce a benediction, instead of a curse, upon the invaders. The Locrians of Amphissa then came to the relief of Delphi, but their force was defeated with heavy loss by Philomēlus.

*'The Sacred
War,' 355
B.C.*

The Phocians were aware that their resources were not sufficient to support a war waged against them by Thebes and Thesaly; and such a war they saw was now a certainty. Recognizing that 'money is the sinews of war,' they promptly seized the treasures of the Delphic temple, amounting in value, it is said, to \$12,000,000. With this vast sum at their disposal, no difficulty was experienced in obtaining soldiers. Good pay was offered heavy-armed men who would join the Phocian army. A strong force was soon collected which, under the generals,

Onomarchus and Philomelus, undertook the defence of Phocis against the Thebans, Thessalians, and Locrians. Sparta was in no mood for taking part in the struggle, and Athens had troubles enough of her own to keep her out of the fray.

The Phocians and their mercenaries proved themselves more than a match for the Thebans and their allies. The Thebans were defeated, and although Philomelus was slain in battle in the first year of the war, Onomarchus took his troops into the lands of the Locrians, Dorians and Octaeans, and destroyed their homesteads by fire. Pherae, too, was induced by bribes to abandon the Thessalian League, and cast in her lot with the Phocians.

Defeated and discouraged, what proved to be a fatal step for Grecian freedom was taken by the Thessalians. Philip of Macedon was invited to come to the assistance of the allies against Phocis. The invitation was one specially agreeable to Philip, as it gave him a long looked for opportunity to interfere in Greek affairs. He had prospered greatly since the seizure of Amphipolis and Potidaea. Taking advantage of the exhaustion of Athens since the Social War, he had seized Methōne, her last port in Macedonia, although the siege cost Philip the loss of one of his eyes by an arrow. He now increased his army, and commenced to build a fleet, a matter hitherto impossible to Macedon, as her ports were in the possession of foreigners. Not least of his successes, in Philip's estimation, was his victory in the chariot race at the Olympian games.

Crossing Mount Olympus, the Macedonian king advanced against Pherae. He was first met by Phayllus, the brother of Onomarchus; but this opposition he overcame. Onomarchus then arrived on the scene with his Phocian army. He defeated Philip in two engagements and drove him back into Macedonia. Following up his success, the Phocian leader took Coroneia by storm, and persuaded Orchomenus to leave the Theban league and declare itself independent.

Philip was not discouraged by his first repulse, and invaded Thessaly again in 352 B.C. Once more Onomarchus met him in battle; but this time the fortunes of war were adverse to the

*Battle of
Pagasae,
352 B.C.*

Phocian general. The Macedonian phalanx broke through the ranks of the Phocians. Onomarchus was slain, and with him fell six thousand of his army. Pherae was forced to expel her tyrants, and the city was declared free and self-governing. Philip, however, put garrisons in the city of Pagasae and other strongholds of Thessaly, thus making himself master of the strategical points of that district.

*Philip
checked at
Thermopy-
lae.*

The Grecian states, not involved in this self-destructive strife, saw with great alarm and indignation the advance of Philip southward. That a barbarian king should presume to invade Grecian territory was not to be borne. Hence, when Philip moved onwards against Phocis, he found to his surprise the straits of Thermopylae held by an Athenian army and fleet. Spartan and Achaian troops, too, joined the remnant of the army of Onomarchus, now led by Phayllus. The temple treasures were not yet exhausted, and Phocis was soon able to put another large army in the field. Philip saw that he could not hope to force a passage through Thermopylae, and with his usual prudence and foresight made the best of the situation and retreated. He left the Sacred War to take care of itself, while he bent his energies to other conquests nearer to his hand.

CHAPTER XXIX.

DOWNFALL OF GREECE.

Philip of Macedon now turned his attention to Thrace, and for five years left the Greeks to themselves. The Sacred War still lingered on, Thebes persisting in her efforts to wear out her enemy, and Phocis, under the leadership of Phalaecus the son of Onomarchus, managing by means of the aid procured through the temple-treasure to hold her opponents at bay.

In the meantime, Philip pushed his conquests north of the Aegean eastward, until he reached the Euxine. The city of Aenus marks, however, the limits of his authority in that direction. So far he had not touched the Athenian cities in the Thracian Chersonese, and the free cities on the Propontis. He then marched westward into Illyria and Epirus, building forts in the former district and compelling the Epirots to acknowledge his supremacy. *Philip's movements.*

These extensive conquests left the Greek cities of Chalcidice isolated and unsupported; and Philip had been careful not to interfere with their freedom, from some cause best known to himself. This immunity from attack did not however, prevent Olynthus from becoming alarmed. The fate of Amphipolis, Potidaea, and Pagasae was ever before the Olynthians; and their anxiety soon showed itself in their concluding a peace with Athens, and in giving shelter to a step-brother of Philip, who had fled from Macedon.

These straws showed Philip how the wind blew from Chalcidice, and he began to gather his forces on its frontier. Thoroughly frightened, the Olynthians sent ambassadors to Athens to ask for aid, regardless of the fact that they were holding Potidaea, the gift of Philip, from Athens, its rightful possessor. The Athenians had paid little attention to Philip's successes in the north, preferring to wage a useless and expensive war against the tyrants of Chalcis and Orëus in Euboea. *Olynthus alarmed.*

The embassy from Olynthus recalled Athens to a sense of the necessity of taking a definite position in the great struggle that was impending. As was usual at Athens, the people were divided in their opinions. The leaders of one section advocated a policy of indifference or neutrality ; while those of the other, pronounced in favour of a vigorous campaign against Philip. In the struggle that followed for Grecian freedom, no name stands

*Demosthenes
the Orator.*

out more prominently than that of Demosthenes, the Athenian orator. His orations against Philip, for force, clearness, and all the other qualities that tend to move and sway the masses, and mould public opinion, have never been excelled. These orations are an almost perfect expression of thought. The language is chaste to the point of severity, the selection of words and images simple and easily understood. Vigorous, animated and graceful in expression and gesture, his name is synonymous with all that is highest and best in the annals of the forum.

Demosthenes belonged to a wealthy family of the middle class. His father dying, he was left to the care of guardians who proceeded to waste and mismanage his property. When old enough to act for himself, he began a lawsuit against his guardians to recover his inheritance. It was while pressing his suit that he acquired a taste for public speaking. He had ideas in abundance, but he found that he could not give them satisfactory expression. His manner was awkward, his gestures uncouth, and his delivery too rapid and indistinct. These defects prevented him from getting a favourable hearing in the Ecclesia, and he proceeded in the most thorough and painstaking manner to overcome his faults. It is said that he declaimed on the seashore with his mouth full of pebbles, to accustom himself to the noise of a tumultuous popular assembly, and to acquire the art of a clear, distinct utterance. His efforts at self-improvement were crowned with complete success, and the critical audiences at Athens which had laughed and scoffed at his early speeches, soon learned to listen with breathless interest to his impassioned orations.

Unfortunately for Demosthenes he was born too late. His ideas were those of the time of Pericles, when Athens was the

mistress of a naval empire and the first of Greek cities. He had read the story of Athenian greatness as told by Thucydides, and he longed for the day when that greatness should be restored. Hence, we find him, at the close of the Social War (354 B.C.), urging the Athenians to increase and organize their navy. Other projects also, all looking towards the revival of the old Athenian policy of interfering in the interest of oppressed states, were brought by him before the people. He was not a soldier, like Aristeides and Pericles; hence his schemes, from a military standpoint, were often impracticable.

Demosthenes had watched with ever-increasing interest and alarm the gradual growth of the power of Macedon, under the subtle and able policy of Philip. His feelings, at last, found vent in the 'First Philippic,' an oration on the state of the Athenian army and navy. From that time onward Demosthenes made Philip and his designs the burden of his speeches, his aim being to arouse his fellow-citizens to a sense of the danger threatening Greek liberties.

*First
Philippic,
352 B.C.*

When the envoys from Olynthus arrived at Athens to plead for help, Demosthenes urged that a strong force of Athenian hoplites should be at once sent to attack Macedon. In accordance with his advice an alliance was made with Olynthus; but the army of Athenian citizens that it was advised to send dwindled down to a small fleet of thirty-eight vessels under Chares, and four thousand peltasts, mercenaries, led by Chari-dēmus, an Euboean, whose fidelity was none of the truest. Such a force was powerless to accomplish anything against Philip, who captured, one by one, the Chalcidian towns. At last Olynthus was left to bear alone the brunt of Philip's wrath. Twice defeated in open battle, the Olynthians took refuge behind their walls. But Macedonian gold gave Philip an easy entrance into Olynthus. A traitor opened the gates of the city, which Philip caused to be burned. Many of its inhabitants were sold into slavery as a punishment for their ingratitude to their former friend and ally.

*Olynthus
taken, 347
B.C.*

The fate of Olynthus does not seem to have greatly worried the majority of the Athenian people. Some were indifferent to

Phocion

everything but the material prosperity of the city, its trade and commerce. Others thought Athens too weak to engage in a struggle single-handed against Philip, and saw no good reason why she should sacrifice herself for the benefit of Greece. The leader of the party of this way of thinking was Phocion, a general of considerable ability, an aristocrat who despised the masses, nevertheless a prudent, brave and honest man. Phocion found himself in almost constant antagonism to Demosthenes, whose fiery speeches and impracticable proposals filled him with disgust.

Philip's control of Chalcidice placed the Athenian possessions in Thrace in great peril. It was confidently expected that they would be the next to be attacked. Some fear was also felt that the Macedonians, having gained a good sea-board, would put forth vessels to prey on the Athenian merchantmen. But Philip did not make any immediate attempt to molest Athenian commerce or interfere with her possessions in the north. These indications of peaceful inclinations induced the Athenians to send an embassy of ten members to Pella to negotiate a treaty with Philip. The embassy was a proposal of Philocrâtes, and he was sent as one of the ten. With him went, also, Demosthenes and his great rival in oratory, Aeschines. As was his wont Philip received the Athenians courteously, but did not fail to bribe several of the members of the delegation. The result was that the embassy returned to Athens without accomplishing anything definite. Philip took advantage of the respite to go on another expedition into Thrace, when he completed the conquest of that district. His ambassadors at Athens, in the meantime, were pretending to negotiate a treaty, and to cause delay were raising all manner of objections to the terms. The Thracian war ended, Philip stated the conditions of peace. Athens was to leave in the possession of Macedon all she had lost to the latter, and was to rest content with what still remained in her hands. The pacification was to include all the Athenian allies except Phocis. The exclusion of this state was agreed to on the representations of Philocrates and Aeschines that Philip had no intention of attacking it. The gold of the Macedonian king had once more

*Peace of
Philocrates,
346 B.C.*

done its work effectively, for Philocrates and Aeschines were the paid tools of Philip.

The Athenian assembly agreed to these humiliating conditions, and sent again the ten ambassadors to Philip at Pella, to obtain his solemn ratification of the treaty. But the embassy, the most of whose members were in Philip's pay, purposely lingered on the way, in spite of the expostulations of Demosthenes. Delay followed delay, and the oath was administered to Philip only when he had reached Pherae, and was on the threshold of Greece. In a few days the pass of Thermopylae was seized, and Phocis was at his mercy. The Phocian leader, Phalaecus, got permission to leave the country, and took with him eight thousand mercenary troops. Deserted by their leader and army, the Phocian towns surrendered, accepting such terms as Philip chose to give them. *Philip seizes the pass of Thermopylae, and enters Phocis.*

Having summoned the Amphictyonic Council to meet at Delphi, Philip brought before it the question of punishing Phocis for her sacrilegious actions. The members of the council were prepared to take a terrible revenge; but Philip proposed milder measures. The sentence was that the towns of Phocis were to have their walls torn down, and the inhabitants were to be scattered, so that not more than fifty families could dwell in the same village. The people were to be disarmed, and were to pay fifty talents a year until the temple-treasure of Delphi was restored. On this basis, it is estimated that it would take two hundred years to pay the debt. *Phocis punished.*

But the punishment meted out to the Phocians was of little moment compared to the next step taken by the Amphictyonic Council. Phocis had been represented in the council by two votes. These votes were now transferred to Philip, thus recognizing formally his right to take part in Greek affairs. This recognition of Philip as a Greek was an honour he highly prized: besides, it gave him the right to interfere in Greek politics, a right he was not likely to hold in abeyance. *Philip admitted to the Amphictyonic Council*

While the Delphians were rejoicing over their success, and in conjunction with the Thebans and Thessalians were celebrating the Pythian games, Athens was indulging in helpless wrath.

The treachery of their ambassadors was now evident enough. Philocrates was impeached, but fled from the city. Aeschines made a most eloquent and skilful defence, and barely succeeded in averting a verdict of guilty.

*Thessalian
forts seized
by Philip.*

The Thessalians hoped that now the Sacred War was ended Philip would leave their country and return to Macedon. Instead of that, however, he seized the citadels of Pherae and other cities, and placed them under the control of his friends. In this way Thessaly soon became, virtually, a Macedonian possession.

*Philip in
the Peloponnesus.*

We next hear of Philip gaining a foothold in the Peloponnesus. This he was enabled to do through the fatal selfishness and narrow patriotism of the Greeks of Elis, Argos and Messene. The oligarchs of Elis were the first to invite Philip's interference. Pressed by their political enemies, an exiled democratic party, they asked aid from Macedon, and concluded an alliance with its king. Then Argos and Messene, which were engaged in a war with Sparta, called for Macedonian help. Aided by Philip's troops, the Spartans were driven back into their valley. Ever watchful of Philip's movements, Demosthenes saw the danger of permitting him to get a foothold in the Peloponnesus. Crossing over to Argos and Messene, Demosthenes earnestly warned their leading statesmen of the probable results of Philip's intrigues and professed friendship. But to all his pleadings and warnings the infatuated Peloponnesians turned a deaf ear. The Greek states were ripe for conquest and slavery, and the 'man of destiny' had already arrived.

*Second
Philipptic,
344 B.C.*

Some time now elapsed before Athens and Philip came again into direct collision. Philip, although angry at the interference of Demosthenes in the affairs of the Peloponnesus, did not care just then to engage in hostilities with Athens. His arms were, instead, turned against Epirus, whose king he dethroned in the interests of Alexander, the brother of his wife Olympias, who was herself an Epirot. It was the policy of Athens at this time, under the guidance of Demosthenes, to harass and check Philip in every way possible, without engaging in open war. The Acarnanians were assisted with troops when threatened by Philip, and emissaries were sent into Thessaly to stir up

rebellion against his authority. Philip's operations in the west of Greece were brought to an end by the news from Thessaly. He immediately crossed Mount Pindus, and marching into Thessaly placed its discontented towns under a rigid supervision and control.

The patience of the Macedonian king with Athens seems difficult to explain, except on the ground of a strong desire to be on friendly terms with her. He offered to surrender to the Athenians the island of Halonēsus; and he was repaid by the Athenian general Diopēithes, then commanding in the Thracian Chersonese, invading Macedon for purposes of pillage and securing prisoners to be sold as slaves. Philip's wrath at this news was great, and instant reparation was demanded from Athens. To enforce his claim he began to move his army towards Thrace.

The cross-roads had now been reached, and the Athenians were asked to make a choice. Phocion and his party, those engaged in trade and commerce, and Philip's purchased friends led by Aeschines, were all for peace. But Demosthenes, in two great speeches (of which one was the 'Third Philippic'), carried the Ecclesia with him, in favour of a policy of check-mating Philip. 'Let Athens,' he said, 'keep the peace in name, but imitate the king by prosecuting a vigorous war in reality.' He advised the formation of a strong and enduring alliance against the common enemy, and suggested a heavy property tax, as a means of raising money to support a permanent army. The party of peace was defeated, and although war was not for a time openly declared, it was actually begun. Demosthenes sailed to Byzantium, and succeeded in securing the alliance of that city. The Chalcidians of Euboea, alarmed at the growth of Philip's influence in that island, also joined the Athenian alliance. Later on in the year, Achaia, Acarnania and Leucas were, through the magic eloquence of Demosthenes, induced to cast in their lot against Philip. Still more important to the alliance was the adhesion of Corinth and Megara.

*Third
Philippic
342 B.C.*

*Athens
forms an
alliance
against
Philip.*

The downfall of Athens at the close of the Peloponnesian war was hastened by Lysander blocking the Hellespont against the

*Perinthus
and
Byzantium
besieged.*

passage of the Athenian grain vessels from the Euxine. Philip now endeavoured to carry out the same tactics, and to that end he marched against Perinthus and Byzantium. If he could seize these strategic points he would be able to command the straits, and have Athenian commerce at his mercy. Perinthus was the first city to be besieged; but so vigorous was the defence made under the guidance of an Athenian general, and so much assistance came to the beleaguered city from Byzantium and the Persian satraps of Asia Minor, that Philip suddenly abandoned the siege, and marched against Byzantium, hoping to take it by surprise. Here again Philip was foiled, for the citizens of Byzantium were found prepared to repel his attacks. Siege operations were begun by the king, and his fleet was brought from the Aegean to blockade the city from the sea. An attempt to scale the walls on a dark night was defeated by the sudden appearance of a bright light in the sky, supposed to have been the Aurora Borealis.

*Siege of
Byzantium
raised.*

While these things were occurring in the north-east, Athens and her allies were expelling the troops of Philip from Euboea. Pagasae, in Thessaly, was taken by storm, and many of the king's merchant vessels captured. The news of the siege of Byzantium caused Athens to declare war against Philip, and Phocion, the best of the Athenian generals, was sent with one hundred and twenty triremes, and a large force, to relieve the city. Phocion's expedition was entirely successful, for Philip, despairing of accomplishing anything with his greatly reduced army, raised the siege and struck into the heart of Thrace.

The Athenian successes in Euboea and along the Hellespont raised the spirits and hopes of that volatile people to a high pitch. Demosthenes was the hero of the hour. His suggestions had now the force of law, and whatever he proposed to the people received at once their hearty endorsement. He was voted a golden crown for his services as a citizen. His influence was so great that he was able to persuade the pleasure-loving Athenians to devote the Theoric fund (a sum put aside for public festivals) to war purposes. Important reforms in the navy were also carried out, and so successfully that, it is said, not a single vessel was lost during the war.

In the meantime Philip was engaged in a severe struggle with the Scythians for the maintenance of his northern frontier. *Philip returns from Thrace.* Returning from his campaign in the inland, he was fiercely attacked by the Triballi and lost many men, he himself being dangerously wounded. His long absence of nine months led his enemies to believe that all danger of further attacks from him was over. The Byzantines disbanded their forces and declared for neutrality. The Athenians took no steps to weaken seriously Philip at home, contenting themselves with making petty invasions on the Macedonian coast line.

The sense of security that prevailed among Philip's antagonists was destined to be of short duration. A plot was being hatched by the crafty Macedonian, by means of which his interference in the affairs of Central Greece could be excused. A ready and clever tool was found in Aeschines, the Athenian orator, who had succeeded in having himself appointed an Athenian delegate to the Amphictyonic Council, which met in 339 B.C. Pretending to get angry at the deputies from Amphissa, in Locris, he charged the Locrians with having committed sacrilege against Apollo, as waste lands dedicated to the god had been utilized by the Locrians for the sites of houses, barns, and potters' kilns. Excited by the vehement eloquence of the orator the Delphians, accompanied by many of the Amphictyonic deputies, made a raid upon the forbidden structures and destroyed them. News of the attack was carried to the Locrians of Amphissa, who armed themselves, and marching on the mob drove it back to Delphi. A special meeting of the Amphictyonic assembly was now called to consider what action should be taken against the sacrilegious Locrians. The farcical nature of the proceedings was so apparent that Athens withdrew her delegates, and the Theban representatives declined to take any part. The remaining delegates were mainly from Thessaly and other states under Philip's influence. The council resolved to declare war against the Locrians, and appointed Philip the commander-in-chief of the forces, which he was himself expected to provide.

Philip had now an excuse for marching his army into Central Greece. In a short time he had reached and passed Thermo-

*Philip in
Central
Greece.*

pylae. Soon the news was brought to Athens that he had reached Elateia, a Phocian fortress on the frontier of Boeotia. A painful uncertainty prevailed at Athens as to Philip's intentions. Did he intend to attack Amphissa, or had he in view the invasion of Attica? Consternation prevailed when it was known that Elateia had been seized, for it was feared that Thebes had given Philip permission to march through Boeotia. Demosthenes, almost alone, was found prepared to face the danger, and his bold and undaunted attitude rallied the drooping courage of his fellow-citizens. The Ecclesia was summoned before daybreak, and Demosthenes mounted the platform. He pointed out the necessity of looking well to the fortifications of Athens, in the event of a siege. But he also volunteered to go to Thebes to

*Thebes joins
Athens
against
Philip.*

use his powers of persuasion against the Thebans giving Philip permission to pass through their territory, and in favour of the Thebans joining the Athenian alliance. His mission to Thebes was crowned with success, in spite of the bribes openly offered by the Macedonian ambassadors, and in spite of the ill-will that had long existed between Thebes and Athens. The Thebans refused Philip a passage through Boeotia, and entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with the Athenians.

The Crisis.

It was recognized on all hands that a crisis had arrived in Greek affairs. Philip was on the Boeotian frontier with an army of about thirty thousand men, and was seeking to advance southward. He found the two main routes into Central Greece guarded, one by the Locrians and an army of mercenaries hired by Athens; the other by the citizen-soldiers of Thebes and Athens. Fighting began along the frontier, but nothing decisive occurred for some months. The allies were subsequently joined by the forces of Corinth, Megara, Achaia and other states, until their army numbered over thirty thousand. Philip expected reinforcements from the Peloponnesus, and from the Eleans and Argives, but his expectations were disappointed. Some skirmishes took place before the battle was joined, and in these the allies were successful. At last, on the 2nd August, 338 B.C., the army of Philip found itself face to face with its foes, in front of Chaeroneia, and the decisive struggle began. The incidents of the battle which was to determine whether

Greece should continue to consist of a number of small and independent states, or be united under the rule of a semi-barbarian, are not very well known.

When the allies were drawn up in order of battle, it was found that the Athenians were on the left, the Thebans on the right, and the Corinthians with the other allies in the centre. Philip commanded the wing of the Macedonian army opposing the Athenians, while the command of the Macedonian phalanx, *Battle of Chaeroneia, 338 B.C.* the main strength of the force, was entrusted to Alexander, Philip's son, then a young man of eighteen years of age. The phalanx was pitted against the Thebans, whose prowess since the days of Epaminondas was greatly feared. At the outset, the allies were in a measure successful, for the Athenians drove Philip back. But the Thebans, despite their courage and steadiness, could not withstand the furious charges of young Alexander with the almost invincible phalanx, whose long pikes proved entirely too much for the short spears of the Thebans. There was no lack of courage on the part of the latter; they could not have fought better had Epaminondas himself been leading them. Their general, Theagenes, was slain, and the three hundred picked men known as the 'Sacred Band' were killed to a man. The work of destruction and demoralization was completed by a charge from the Macedonian cavalry. The defeat of the Thebans left the centre of the allied army exposed, and it was soon compelled to retreat with heavy loss. The Athenians had now to bear the whole weight of the Macedonian attack, and although successful in their own part of the field, could not hope to withstand the combined forces of Philip. They, therefore, took refuge in flight, but not before they had lost three thousand men, one thousand being slain, and two thousand taken prisoners.

Philip had won the victory, and its full significance was apparent to him. He was now the master of Greece. His *After the battle.* years of planning, plotting, bribing, and lying had brought forth the desired result. Semi-barbarian that he was, his exultation displayed itself in a drunken carouse after the battle. He is said to have gone to the battle-field and danced among the corpses, singing as a song the preamble of one of the decrees of Demos-

thenes. His drunken bout over, his usual good sense and moderation were shown. Harsh terms were expected by the defeated, so that it was with some surprise they learned that Philip was disposed to exact so little. Thebes had to admit a Macedonian garrison within her citadel, accept the Macedonian alliance, and grant the smaller cities of Boeotia their independence. Athens prepared for a stubborn resistance, and Philip recognizing the difficulty of besieging a city so capable of a long defence, thought it the wiser policy to disarm opposition by offering extremely favourable terms. The Athenian prisoners were returned without ransom, and peace was promised on condition of Athens assenting to the leadership of Macedon in Greek affairs, and to the surrender of her possessions in the Thracian Chersonese. A treaty embodying these conditions was signed by Athens, and then Philip gave her as a pledge of his good intentions, the town of Orōpus, which had been wrested from her by the Boeotians thirty years before.

The submission of Megara and Corinth, which soon followed that of Athens, enabled Philip to summon a congress of Greek states on the Isthmus. All the cities responded save Sparta, who in spite of her weakness, refused to bow the knee to the Macedonian king. With the courage and calmness that was exhibited in her palmy days, Sparta sent out her little army under king Agis III., grandson of Agesilaus, to meet the overwhelming force of Philip. Defeat was a matter of course, and Sparta was punished by having part of her territory taken from her and given to the Argives and Arcadians.

*Congress at
Corinth, 338
B.C.*

The congress at Corinth met under the presidency of Philip, who now revealed the ultimate object of his ambition. Partly to occupy the attention of the Greek states with foreign enterprises, and thus prevent them from realizing too keenly the loss of their freedom ; and partly to gratify an apparently boundless desire for dominion, Philip laid before the congress a scheme for the conquest of Asia by the Greek armies. It is true the feasibility of such an enterprise had long ago impressed itself on the minds of Cimon and Agesilaus ; but not until now had the Greek states been sufficiently under a common control to carry the project into execution. Philip, however, had accomplished

the unity of Greece. At the congress he placed before the delegates a political constitution for Greece, which while apparently leaving each state 'free and independent' really bound it to the chariot wheels of Macedon. The hegemony or supremacy of Macedon was to be recognized by all the members of the Greek federation. A federal council was to aid Philip in governing the new Greek nation, and the Amphictyonic Council was to be a supreme board of arbitration between the different states. Macedonian garrisons were, however, placed in Thebes, Corinth, Chalcis and Ambracia, and Philip was appointed commander-in-chief of the army of the confederacy, with power to compel each state to furnish its contingent of troops and supplies.

Preparations were immediately begun for gathering an adequate force to undertake the mighty project of conquering Persia. Two hundred thousand men were to be raised, and the invasion was to take place in 336 B.C. But 'man proposes and God disposes.' The year 336 B.C. came, and the vanguard of the Greek army had crossed into Asia, when Philip was cut down by the hand of an assassin. He fell for no good cause. Unlike the Greeks, Philip was polygamous; but his chief wife and recognized queen was an Epirot princess, Olympias, the mother of his son Alexander. Fickle in his affections, the king had divorced Olympias and sent her back to Epirus, and had taken in her place Cleopatra, the niece of his general Attalus. The insult to his mother roused the young Alexander to fury and to projects of revenge. Olympias and her friends were not less disposed to resent her wrongs, and a fitting instrument was soon found. A young Macedonian noble, Pausanias, had a wrong of his own to avenge, and he had in vain endeavoured to move the king to grant him justice. Disappointed and angry, he was found only too willing to carry out the designs of the friends of Olympias. The opportunity came when Philip was walking unprotected in a procession which was part of a festival given in honour of the marriage of the king's daughter. Clad in white and crowned, his own image along with those of the great gods of Olympus borne before him, he was proudly proclaiming to his assembled subjects his confi-

*Death of
Philip,
336 B.C.*

dence in their good-will, when Pausanias rushed from the throng and ran him through the body with a short sword. The death of the king was immediate ; and the assassin was slain in his efforts to escape. So died king Philip of Macedon in his forty-seventh year, having reigned twenty-three years. He had reached the age when great things are expected of men. What his career would have been had his life been spared it is difficult to conjecture. His son, Alexander the Great, conquered Asia with comparative ease, and few historians are to be found who do not place Philip on an equality with Alexander with respect to genius for war, diplomacy, and statesmanship. His unexpected death was good news to most of the recently-enslaved Greek states, and they rejoiced in the quick recovery of their freedom. But their rejoicings were premature ; for in Alexander they found a more ruthless conqueror and a sterner master than in the subtle and diplomatic Philip.

CHAPTER XXX.

LATER PHILOSOPHY.

In a previous chapter the life and teachings of Socrates were briefly discussed. It was also pointed out that while Socrates himself founded no school, his many-sided character and philosophy gave rise to several schools, each of which emphasized or exaggerated some particular doctrine of the great master. *Later Greek Philosophy.* The founders of these schools were personal disciples of Socrates who failed to grasp his philosophy as a whole, and seizing upon one or more of its aspects proceeded to develop, sometimes illogically, their meaning and import. These 'incomplete Socratics' as they have been called, are the schools founded by Aristippus of Cyrene, Antisthenes of Athens, and Euclides of Megara, and are known as the Cyrenaic, the Cynic, and the Megaric.

Socrates had taught that virtue and happiness were the main objects of life, and that to be virtuous was to be happy. Aristippus of Cyrene proceeded to enlarge and exaggerate this doctrine, and taught that to attain happiness was the sole object of life. *Aristippus of Cyrene.* He may be said to have reversed the Socratic theory of life, making happiness the test of virtue. What he taught he practiced, for he was widely known by his contemporaries as one who made it his aim in life to enjoy himself to the utmost, regardless of moral considerations. He, however, recognized the value of prudence, self-control, and moderation, as requisites of the highest enjoyment. The followers of Aristippus agreed with him in the pursuit of pleasure; but they held different opinions as to what pleasures were the highest and most worthy of pursuit, some placing stress on mental, others on bodily enjoyments.

All through his life Socrates had shown a great disregard for luxury, dress and physical comfort. He had taught constantly the value of limiting your desires and wants, and thus making

Antisthenes the Cynic. your happiness independent of your circumstances. Antisthenes seems to have been greatly impressed with this portion of the teaching of Socrates, for he founded a school which had for its principal tenet the necessity of freeing oneself from all physical, mental, or moral desires. The moral life alone was sufficient for happiness. Virtue with the Cynic was a *negative* thing, and consisted mainly in avoiding evil. The wise man is indifferent to family, riches, honour, power, and pleasure. This philosophy carried into practice was exemplified by Diogenes of Sinope, who not content with living the life of a beggar and eschewing all the comforts of life, openly and shamelessly outraged public and private decency. The story of this philosopher and his tub are among the common-places of history. To the Cynic the ideal life was the life of nature, meaning by that the life of the brute creation. After the death of Antisthenes his school held their meetings in the Cynosarges, the gymnasium of those who were not full-blooded Athenians. Hence the name *Cynic*, although some have ascribed the term to the mode of life of these philosophers.

Euclid of Megara. A third school was established by Euclid or Euclides of Megara, another of the pupils of Socrates. The tenets of this school are so metaphysical that anything in the nature of a popular explanation is impossible. It seems, however, that Euclid went back to the doctrine of Being held by the Eleatics, and combined it with the doctrine of the Good, held by Socrates. With Socrates virtue consists of knowledge, insight, understanding, and so Euclid taught that there is but one good, and one virtue, which is the knowledge of this good. Such a philosophy could have very little application to the practical side of life, and hence we find that it soon ceased to spread and exercise any influence.

Plato. The best exponent of the Socratic philosophy was Plato, the son of Ariston. He not only developed fully the ideas of his teacher, but went far beyond him in working out a complete system of philosophy. Born (427 B.C.) of parents belonging to the old nobility, he had all the social, political, and educational advantages available in his day. His artistic tastes were early shown by his poetical effusions. When twenty years of age he came under the instruction of Socrates, with whom he remained

eight years. Although not directly stated by himself, it is evident that Plato was admitted to a close intimacy with the great teacher. The impression that Socrates left on his pupil was very profound. It is Socrates he makes the centre of his dialogues ; and Socrates is the mouthpiece of his most cherished opinions. Plato also made himself familiar with the philosophical opinions of his predecessors, and it was this thorough and wide knowledge of all that had been thought and written before him that fitted him so well for the task of developing a complete philosophical system.

After the death of Socrates (399 B.C.), to escape persecution, he went to Megara, where his fellow-disciple Euclid lived and taught. His somewhat brief stay there was not without considerable effect on his views ; for we can trace distinctly the impress made by the Megaric school of thinkers. From Megara he travelled to Egypt and Cyrene. Returning to Athens, he spent eight years in writing and teaching. Then he went to Magna Graecia and Sicily, and visited the court of Dionysius the Elder, tyrant of Syracuse. Falling under the tyrant's wrath he was sold as a slave in the market of Aegina, from which condition he was ransomed by a friend. Once more we find him at Athens, conducting a school in the Gymnasium of the Academy, and afterwards in his own gardens, which were close at hand. His teaching was not confined to philosophy, for mathematics claimed much of his attention. He also instructed in the art of conversation. He seems for many years of his career to have abandoned politics, which at that time were so corrupt as to repel honest men. Evidently he considered that Athens had gone too far on the downward grade to be saved by the exertion of any individual. Later on, he seems to have had an interest in politics awakened in him, for he again visited Syracuse to instruct its young ruler in the arts of government. We also find him discussing the relation of the state to philosophy, and, it is said, he drew up constitutions for several states at their solicitation. On his return from Syracuse, where he had but little success with his pupil, he went again to Athens where he died (347 B.C.), in his

*Sketch of
his life.*

*The
Academy.*

eightieth year, venerated and beloved by a large circle of pupils and friends.

Authorship. Plato was an industrious and voluminous author, his work extending over fifty years. Thirty-five dialogues, a collection of definitions, and thirteen letters are ascribed to him. Among his best known works are his 'Republic,' the 'Phaedo,' and the 'Apology.' The first sketches his ideal commonwealth; the second discusses the immortality of the soul; while the third gives an apocryphal account of Socrates' defence before his judges.

Ethics and Religion. To attempt giving anything but the most meagre outline of the philosophy of Plato would in this place be absurd, for Plato's investigations covered a very wide field. Physics, Dialectics, Ethics, Politics, came under the survey of his all-embracing mind. He examined the foundations of the different philosophical systems that went before him; he sought for the 'Summum Bonum,' or 'highest good'; he discussed the relation between morals and politics; and he endeavoured to give an explanation of the nature of the universe. Like Socrates, he began with defining virtue as insight, or knowledge. His examination into the nature of conceptions led him to the belief that instead of ideas being obtained from particular objects, particular objects and the things of sense and perception are but imperfect copies of 'ideas' that are eternal and unchanging. He taught that the 'highest good' is to free oneself from the dominion of the senses, to rise above the sensual affections to the higher life of the soul, which he held was distinct and separate from the body, although connected with it during our earthly existence. Death did not end all, for the souls of those that freed themselves from carnal affections and fleshly lusts while in the body would ascend to the higher world and live for higher objects; whereas those that were tainted and held in bondage by the things of sense would undergo punishment in the next world by being compelled to pass into new bodies; perchance into those of lower animals. This doctrine of the transmigration of the soul seems to have been borrowed from the Pythagoreans, with whom Plato came into close mental contact during his residence in Magna Graecia. Closely related to this theory was his belief

in the pre-existence of the soul, a theory, it may be remarked, not wholly without supporters in modern days.

Plato's ideas of the Good and of God were, evidently, the *Idea of God*, same; yet we have no warrant for saying that he believed in a personal God. He condemned in strong language the mythological tales of the Greeks regarding their gods, whose immoralities he considered degrading not only to divine beings but also to men. He was not, however, a scoffer at the Hellenic religion with its myths; for he wished to retain it in a purified form in his ideal republic. He, doubtless, recognized that a belief in some form of religion is essential to save mankind from degradation and anarchy.

Summing up his Ethical ideas, we find he believed in one God, one Good, the immortality, pre-existence, and transmigration of the soul, future rewards and punishments, and the divine nature of the soul.

To a mind so comprehensive in its grasp as Plato's, the *Politics*, question of the relation of man to the state could not fail to be of great interest. With him, philosophy was applicable to every department of thought and action. Hence he viewed the state as something more than a means of obtaining security for person and property. It was through the state alone that virtue could be maintained in the world, and men's highest happiness secured. The state should aim at the education of the citizen in virtue, and it should be under the guidance and control of philosophers who alone have mastered the secret of wise government. The few, the wise few, then, should govern; not the many. Plato was always more in sympathy with the Doric system of government than with the Ionian. He favoured an aristocracy, that is 'a government by the best.' This government of philosophers required power to execute its will; and this again necessitated an order of warriors. All the other members of the state, the artisans, farmers, labourers, and merchants were to be left without political power, and were to devote their energies to trade, commerce and other material pursuits. Slavery was recognized as an essential part of his political system. Community of goods and women were also

prominent features in the ideal republic ; private property and marriage, with all that it implies, being forbidden. It was the duty of the government to consider first the interests of the state, to regulate carefully the education and pursuits of the citizens, to see that feeble or deformed children were removed, and the sick and dying left unattended. Great stress was placed upon gymnastics and music as means for properly educating the governing classes ; and the girls, as well as the boys, were to be carefully instructed. In brief, Plato's ideas regarding men were much the same as those of an intelligent manager of a stock-farm with respect to the animals under his charge. Subsequent, however, to the enunciation of these views, Plato retracted many of his opinions. He recognized the necessity of the people having some share in the government, and he conceded the desirability of private property and the maintenance of family life. He was always favourable to the principle of one public education for boys and girls, and was strongly opposed to free intercourse with foreign states.

Little has been said here of Plato's metaphysics, a subject too wide and profound for the general reader. For the same reason his system of physics has been almost entirely passed over. Those wishing fuller information regarding this great thinker's philosophy would do well to study Zeller's or Schweigler's *History of Philosophy*.

By this time education had made so much progress in Athens that institutions for higher culture were established, and the work of instruction was carried on systematically. As one teacher passed away, his place in the school was taken by another. The school founded by Plato is known as the 'Old Academy,' in contradistinction to one that flourished at a later period, and was called the 'New Academy'.

Plato had many disciples who essayed to expound their teacher's doctrines ; but 'as Plato was the only true disciple of Socrates, so in turn the only true disciple of Plato was Aristotle.' Aristotle was born at Stagira, a Greek colony in Thrace, in the year 384 B.C. His father, Nicomachus, was a physician, and a friend of the Macedonian king, Amyntas. Both these facts are important ; the one explaining Aristotle's taste for science, and

the other his residence; at a later time, at the court of Macedon. When in his seventeenth year, Aristotle went to Athens, and attached himself to Plato, whose teachings he attended for twenty years. After the death of Plato, Aristotle went to the court of Hermias, prince of Atarneus, in Mysia, whose sister he married. In the year 342 B.C., he was appointed by Philip, king of Macedon, tutor to his son Alexander, a lad of thirteen years of age. In this responsible position he was able to make a strong impress on the plastic mind of the young prince. Philip and Alexander both esteemed Aristotle highly, and it was through the kindness and generosity of the latter that the philosopher was placed in a position to pursue his studies and carry on his investigations without being embarrassed by a want of means. When Alexander started on his expedition against Persia, Aristotle returned to Athens and opened a school in the Lyceum, where he taught Rhetoric as well as Philosophy. It was the teacher's custom to give instruction while walking through the shady groves of the Lyceum; hence the name, Peripatetic, given to his school. The friendship between Aristotle and Alexander the Great suffered considerable diminution by the violent death of Callisthenes, Aristotle's nephew, who was executed by the order of Alexander for alleged treason. When Alexander died, Aristotle found his life in danger at Athens, as he was charged by his political enemies with blasphemy. He, thereupon, left Athens, after thirteen years of teaching there, and retired to Chalcis of Euboea, where he died in the year 322 B.C.

Aristotle was a most voluminous author, and wrote, it is said, one thousand books, of which probably about one-sixth have come down to us. His versatility and breadth of knowledge *Writings* are shown by the wide range of subjects which he discusses. From him we have Treatises on Logic, Natural History, Metaphysics or 'First Philosophy,' Ethics, Politics, and Rhetoric.

The main lines of his philosophy are the same as those of Plato; but, in many instances, his views are in direct opposition to the opinions of his teacher. He abandoned and disproved Plato's doctrine of ideas. While Plato sought to explain the facts of experience by assuming 'Ideas,' Aristotle began with

the facts of experience and from them deduced 'Ideas.' Plato's system was one of *deduction*, Aristotle's one of *induction*. To Aristotle facts are everything, and his love of them explains his unwearied investigations into the realm of nature. Hence he is the founder of several sciences: Logic, Botany, Psychology, Natural History, Morals. Unlike Plato, he employed a scientific terminology to express his ideas, and rejected poetic forms and myths in favour of a prose style. In brief, Aristotle's mind was of the scientific order; he was content to investigate patiently the multitudinous facts of the universe, and from these facts he sought to deduce their natural causes. The supernatural he seems to have almost wholly discarded, although he believed in a One God as the ultimate source of all order and harmony in the Universe. But he did not ascribe the phenomena of nature to God as a cause; he had no belief in a Providence; and he was equally sceptical regarding future rewards and punishments.

Man.

For Aristotle the facts relating to animal nature had a peculiar charm. Hence, we are indebted to him for a multitude of careful observations regarding animals, their habits, structure, and functions. Man he considered to be an animal endowed with a *spirit* (*voûς*), which is combined, in life, with the animal soul. The animal soul is born and dies with the body; the *spirit* is eternal, it has neither beginning nor end. It came from without into the body; it is incapable of suffering and change; and it is no way affected by the death of the body.

Ethics

Few Greeks doubted that the end of all our activity is to secure happiness; and in this respect Aristotle did not differ from his countrymen. But Aristotle did not consider happiness as mere bodily pleasure or sensual enjoyment. With him it consisted of the perfect employment of all our powers. The activity of reason is the highest of all forms of activity, and reason acting in harmony with our mission is *virtue*. Whatever tends to further the perfect exercise of our powers is good. Hence wealth, honours, influence, and all other favouring circumstances, are to be prized, although inward worth, or excellence of character, is the main source of happiness. The will, with Aristotle, is the seat of virtue, and that will which causes

us to choose the proper mean between the extremes of excess and defect is a *good* will. Virtue, then, consists in choosing the right mean between two extremes. What is the right mean? To this Aristotle answers that it depends upon the individual, and the choosing of this mean is the work of insight or knowledge.

In no realm of investigation is the scientific character of Aristotle's mind better shown than in that of *Politics*. His habit of studying facts before framing theories led him to the belief that there is no one *best* form of government; that form of government being the best which is most adapted to the people governed. Nevertheless, his sympathies were in favour of a republic ruled by an aristocracy, that is, by those best qualified for the duties of citizenship. He defended slavery on the ground that some men are unfitted for any other work besides bodily labour, while others are possessed of the mental and moral qualities which mark them out as the rulers of their less fortunate fellow-creatures. He also contended that the necessary leisure and opportunity for acquiring the highest excellence demands a population of slaves who would perform all the hard labour connected with the material support of a State. His views of the duty of the State with regard to the education of the citizen coincided closely with those of Plato, but he differed widely from the latter in his opinions of the relation the State should bear to the citizen in some other matters. He argued in favour of marriage and the family, and in favour of the institution of private property. He held that the family precedes the State, the order being: first, the family; second, villages formed of families; then village communities; and, last of all, the State. It is in the State alone that the highest excellence of human character can be reached; hence it is the duty of the State to secure the virtue and greatest happiness of the people. To that end the State should not devote its energies to war and conquest, but should cultivate the arts of peace, and promote science and education. Probably no man has exercised a profounder influence upon human thought during the centuries that have elapsed since he taught in the Lyceum at Athens than Aristotle. During the middle ages his authority was unquestioned in

the schools and universities of Europe, and although the revival of learning dethroned him from his position of intellectual despot, his works are yet studied and admired as among the masterpieces of the human intellect. With Aristotle ended the line of great thinkers of Greece. Henceforth, philosophy gains no new ground, the systems which follow being one-sided and partial, and representing faithfully the general decline of Greek life and character that took place when political liberty disappeared with the victory of Philip at Chaeroneia.

CHAPTER XXXI.

ORATORY, ARCHITECTURE AND ART.

We have already seen the importance of oratory to an Athenian who aspired to any prominence as a political leader or as a pleader in the law courts. It is not to be supposed that eloquence arose with the establishment of the *Ecclesia* of Solon, or of the Heliastic court of Cleisthenes. Oratory was a natural gift of a Greek. Eloquence abounds in the speeches of the heroes of Homer, in the dialogues of Plato, the pages of Herodotus, and especially in the set orations of Thucydides. The first professors, however, of oratory as an art, were not Athenians, but foreigners. Protagōras, of Abdēra, and Prodicus, of Ceos, two sophists, are said to have been the first who instructed the Athenians in the technical principles of formal oratory. Again, a school of oratory had lately arisen in Sicily under Corax and Tisias. The most celebrated of the rhetoricians of Sicily that had an influence on the oratory of the Greeks was Gorgias, of Leontini, who came to Athens as an ambassador during the early years of the Peloponnesian War. His oratory is described as being turgid and poetical. It is certain, however, that his appearance in Athens gave a great impulse to oratory, for amongst his pupils he numbered the historian Thucydides. The Greeks generally regarded the following 'Ten Attic Orators' as their chief representatives of this branch of learning.

Oratory

Sicilian School.

Gorgias, 427 B.C.

Antiphon was rather a writer of speeches and a teacher of rhetoric than an orator. His style was practical, searching and argumentative, and directly opposed to the showy and ornate style of the Sophists, but it was deficient in grace and ease of expression. He was put to death in 411 B.C. for the part he took in connection with the revolution of the Four Hundred. Of the fifteen speeches of his that remain, twelve are merely rhetorical exercises composed on supposed cases of homicide;

Antiphon, 479-411 B.C.

the other three were written for clients. The style of Antiphon is said to have influenced that of Thucydides, and, through him, that of Demosthenes.

Andocides,
about 400
B.C.

Andocides lived in the stormy days of Athenian politics. At first suspected of being implicated with Alcibiades in the mutilation of the Hermae he was banished 415 B.C. After two unsuccessful attempts to obtain a repeal of the sentence, he lived a roving merchant's life (410-403 B.C.) in Sicily, Italy, Greece, Ionia and Cyprus. In 402 B.C., in the general amnesty, he returned and defended himself by his speech, still extant, '*On the Mysteries*,' when the old charge on which he was originally banished was brought up against him. After this, during the Corinthian War, he was sent as an ambassador to Sparta and delivered another speech '*On the Peace with Lacedaemon*,' in which he advised the Athenians to accept the terms offered by Sparta. His speeches are valuable only for the historical and political information they contain.

Lysias,
458-378 B.C.

Lysias, though born at Athens, was of Syracusan parentage. He, therefore, had not all the rights of an Athenian citizen, but belonged to the class of *metics*, or resident aliens. He is said to have been one of the colonists of Thurii, where he remained till 411 B.C., when he returned to Athens. The fact that he was a *metic* prevented him from taking any active part in the assembly or the law courts.

The language of Lysias was of the purest Attic, and he combines in his speech simplicity with dignity and elegance with clearness. He was regarded by the ancients as a model of the plain style of oratory, which aims at being natural and at using the language of every-day life.

Isocrates,
436-338 B.C.

Isocrates was the founder of a style of literary prose which became a model for a subsequent age. He seems to have been the first who took a broad view of the end and object of eloquence. Avoiding poetical language and wordy declamation, he paid especial attention to the rhythm of his periods and the smoothness of his sentences. The most brilliant of all his writings—the *Panegyricus* (B.C. 380)—is a plea for a united war of the Greek states against Persia.

Of the life of Isaeus we know little. He was born either at Chalcis or at Athens, and his teachers are said to have been Lysias and Isocrates. We have eleven speeches of his left relating to will cases. These are valuable, as showing many important points of the Athenian laws of inheritance.

Demosthēnes was born near Athens. At the age of seven he and his sister, two years younger than himself, were left orphans. The father, at his death, had left the property of fourteen talents to three guardians, who so wasted the estate that when Demosthenes came of age only seventy *minas*¹ remained out of the fourteen talents. After a protracted suit, lasting for three years, the young orator recovered ten talents from his dishonest guardians. Naturally of a weak constitution, with an impediment in his speech, he prepared himself by steady practice to overcome his natural diffidence before the stormy assembly of Athens. The difficulties that he met with in early life fostered his determined will and unflinching purpose in whatever he undertook. What is most to be admired in Demosthenes is his hatred of dishonesty, his unselfish patriotism to Athens, and his utter regard for consequences, if he believed that right was on his side. He saw clearly that the ambitious schemes of Philip of Macedon would ultimately lead to the extinction of Greek liberties, and from the day that the orator pleaded the cause of the besieged Olynthians till his death, his one object was to thwart the policy of the enemy of Greek liberty. Of his political career, little need be said, for this has been detailed at length. To avoid falling into the hands of the emissaries of Macedon he took poison and died at Calauria, a small island off the coast of Argolis.

Isaeus,
about 400
B.C.

Demosthe-
nes, 385-322
B.C.

Death of
Demosthe-
nes, B.C. 322

The ancients ascribed sixty-five orations to Demosthenes, of which sixty-one remain to us. His most celebrated speech, 'On the Crown,' arose from a proposal of Ctesiphon that Demosthenes should receive a golden crown in the temple of Dionysus for his services to his country. Naturally this was opposed by Aeschines, his rival and the chief of the Athenian orators on the side of Philip, and who attacked the whole public career of Demosthenes.

'On the
Crown'
330 B.C.

¹ A mina was about \$18.

The greatest oration of antiquity was delivered in reply by Demosthenes, with the result that his rival, not receiving the fifth part of the votes, had to withdraw into exile.

Demosthenes combined in himself all the requisites of an orator. His chief characteristic is his intense earnestness, his fearless denunciation of what he believed was wrong, his unswerving devotion to the cause of Athens, his honesty approaching even bluntness, and his tenacity of purpose that faced all danger, regardless of consequences. To these moral qualities were added a studied diction and polished style, while he paid the utmost regard to delivery.

*Aeschines,
389-314 B.C*

Aeschines was a native of Attica. Of his family we know little or nothing, for we have the contradictory statements of Demosthenes and of Aeschines himself. While Demosthenes states that the family of Aeschines was low-born, that his father was a petty schoolmaster and his mother a dancer, Aeschines, on the other hand, says that his family was of high descent, but lost its property during the Peloponnesian war. Whatever may be said of the family of Aeschines, certain it is that he had a brother who was one of the strategi, and another was entrusted with a mission to Persia. At different times of his life, Aeschines was an assistant in the school of his father, a tragic actor and a soldier. To a varied experience in life, he united a natural eloquence, fluent and ornate, which was set off by a handsome person and fine voice, which his stage training had taught to effectively modulate. At first he was a democrat, and on three separate occasions he was chosen as an ambassador between the Athenians and Philip, who won him over to his side. Henceforth he was a steady opponent of Demosthenes and his policy. The speech 'against Ctesiphon' called forth the oration of Demosthenes 'On the Crown.' Aeschines, as we have stated, went into exile and lived for a while at Rhodes, where he established a school of oratory, but finally went to Samos, where he died.

*Joins the
Macedonian
party, 346
B.C.*

*Died at
Samos.*

Superior to Demosthenes in natural gifts, Aeschines was far inferior to his great rival in untiring industry, steadfastness of purpose, patriotic devotion to his native land, and in moral earnestness. We have three speeches of his remaining.

Of the four remaining orators, we have only a few speeches left, and these have little interest. Two of these orators, Hyperides and Lycurgus, were steady supporters of Demosthenes, while the other two, Dinarchus and Demades favoured the Macedonian party. Demades was not reckoned in the canon of Attic orators.

Hyperides,
360 B.C.


Lycurgus,
360 B.C.

Dinarchus,
340 B.C.

Demades,
330 B.C.

The city of Athens was situated a little more than three miles from the sea, in the central plain of Attica, which is hemmed in on all sides by hills, except on the south, where it is open to the sea. The most prominent of these hills is Mount Lycabettus to the north-east of the city and outside the walls built by

The city of
Athens.



Themistocles. Within this wall the chief hills were the *Acropolis*, an irregular, oblong, rugged rock rising to the height of one hundred and fifty feet, about one thousand feet from east to west, and five hundred from north to south. West of the *Acropolis* is the *Areopagus* (Mars hill), and to the south-west of this the *Pnyx* hill, on which the assemblies of the people were often held. South of the *Areopagus* was the *Agora* or market place, where also the people assembled, and south of this was the *Musæum* hill.

It was not till the days of the Peisistratidae, that Athens attained any degree of splendor. Under their rule the foundations of the Olympëum, the great temple of Olympian Jove, were laid, which was not completed till many centuries afterwards.

*Long Walls
and
harbours.*

After Athens had been reduced to ashes at the time of the Persian invasion, Themistocles built a wall around the city seven and a half miles in circumference, and also connected the city proper with the sea-port Peiræus, four and a half miles distant, which contained three natural harbours, the Peiræus proper, Zeia, and Munychia. The harbour of Phalerum was also connected with a wall. Soon it was found that the space between the Peiræic and Phaleric walls was too great to defend, and that the Phaleric harbour was unsuitable for large ships of war. A second wall, the Southern, leading to the Peiræus, was built. This port, too, was surrounded by a wall of about the same extent as that which surrounded the city. These walls were about fourteen or fifteen feet thick and about sixty feet in height.

In Athens the private dwellings were in striking contrast to the stately public edifices. None of the private houses had more than one storey, which often projected over the narrow street. Most of these private dwellings were of wood or unburnt brick dried in the sun. The streets were narrow and crooked, few of them paved, unlighted at night, without drainage, and no doubt very dirty.

*Population
of Athens.*


The population of Athens has been variously estimated from one hundred and twenty thousand to one hundred and ninety-two thousand. Of the people, probably the majority were slaves, and many of the remainder *metics* or resident aliens. The citizens probably did not number more than twenty thousand.

Sculptors.

It was during the period succeeding the Persian wars that statuary and painting were brought to their highest perfection in Greece. Of the sculptors who preceded Pheidias the most noted was Agelâdas, of Argos. It was, however, under Pheidias that sculpture and architecture were brought to their highest perfection. His great abilities were devoted to the adorning of Athens with the works of art which were executed under the


administration of Pericles. Besides these, he carved the celebrated statue of Olympian Jove at Olympia. On his return to Athens he was condemned on a charge of impiety, and died in prison. All his works combine dignity and sublimity, without the stiffness that characterized the artists of the preceding age, or without the effort after gracefulness that marked the degeneracy of sculpture in a subsequent period. Contemporary with him were Myron and Polycleitus, who were little inferior to Pheidias as sculptors.

Painting was soon developed after statuary. The Greek *Painters*. paintings were either in water colours or in wax, for oil colours seem to have been then unknown. Under Polygnotus, Apollodorus, Zeuxis and Parrhasius, painting reached its highest perfection.



The architectural beauty of Athens was due, not merely to the almost limitless amount of fine building material of limestone and marble, but also to the fact that the highest ambition of the Athenians during the patriotic period succeeding the Persian war

was to ornament the city with monuments of architectural skill. Of the chief buildings many were adorned by the artists named. Under the direction of Cimon the temple of 'Wingless Victory'¹, the Thesēum and the *Painted Porch*² were erected. The temple of 'Wingless Victory' was only twenty-seven feet long and eighteen feet in width, and was built on the Acropolis to commemorate the victory of Cimon on the Eurymedon. The Thesēum was built on a height north of the Areopagus, to receive the bones of Theseus, the national hero of Attica. It



is said to be one of the best preserved of all the ancient monuments of Athens. It is not the size of the building that impresses the spectator, for it is only one hundred and four feet long by forty-five feet wide. Its absolute symmetry is the admiration of all. The Painted Porch ran along one side of the *Agora* or market place, was a long colonnade formed by columns on one side and a wall on the other, on which were painted the masterpieces of Greek art.

The crowning glory of Athens was the Acropolis. Before the time of the Persian wars it was occupied by private dwellings ;

¹ Νική ἄπτερος. ² ποικίλη στοά.

after that period it was chosen as a fitting site for the temples of the guardian heroes and gods of Athens. The finest productions of Athenian genius in architecture, sculpture and painting were here exhibited. The only approach to the Acropolis was on the west side from the *agora* by means of a magnificent flight of stone steps. At the head of these stood the *Propylaea*, or entrance to the Acropolis, consisting of two porticoes, one facing the city and the other the Acropolis, each portico consisting of six pillars, four and a half feet in diameter and twenty-nine feet high. The whole *Propylaea* had a length of one hundred and sixty-eight feet and a width of seventy. The architect was Mnesicles, and the cost upwards of two million of dollars. The temple of 'Wingless Victory' was to the right of the *Propylæa*.

After passing the *Propylaea*, the chief building was the *Parthēnōn*, the temple of the 'Virgin Athena.' It was built during the administration of Pericles by Ictinus and Callicrates, under the superintendence of Pheidias. It, like the *Propylaea*, was of Pentelic marble. The Parthenon was two hundred and twenty-eight feet in length, one hundred and one feet in width, and sixty-six feet high. It was surrounded by a portico, supported by forty-six columns, and the whole building was adorned by sculptures executed under the supervision of Pheidias. The chief wonder of the Parthenon was the colossal figure of Athena, forty feet in height, executed by the master hand of Pheidias. The statue was a combination of ivory and gold. Another statue of Athena¹ adorned the Acropolis. It was about seventy feet high and towered high in air above the roofs of the Parthenon. It was the first object seen by the sailor approaching Athens. The only other object on the Acropolis was the *Erechtheum*, the temple of *Erechtheus*. It was considered with special reverence by the Athenians, as the hero was connected with the early traditions of Athens, and was regarded as one of the finest models of the *Ionic* order of architecture as the Parthenon was a model of the *Doric*.

¹ Ἀθηνῆν πρόμαχος, 'Athena, the defender.'

HISTORY OF ROME.

HISTORY OF ROME.

CHAPTER I.

GEOGRAPHY OF ITALY.

As we have said before, three important peninsulas are found in Southern Europe. On the extreme east of the Mediterranean, we find Greece; on the west, the Iberian peninsula, while the central peninsula is Italy, a long tongue of land with the Apennines running down the centre. *Peninsulas of Southern Europe.*

The term *Italia* applied in later times to designate the country which we call by the name *Italy*, had different significations in different periods of Roman history. Before the time of Pyrrhus, king of Epirus (275 B.C.), the term meant the country south of a line drawn from Metapontum, on the Sinus Tarentinus (*Gulf of Tarentum*) to Paestum or Posidonia, on the Mediterranean. From that time till the days of Augustus (B.C. 27), *Italia Propria* (*Italy Proper*) included all the country south of the Rubicon, on the east, and the Macra, on the west, to the Fretum Siculum (*Straits of Messina*). To the north of *Italy Proper* and extending to the Alps lay the district of Gallia Cisalpina, or *Gaul, this side of the Alps*, to distinguish it from Gallia Transalpina or *Gaul, across the Alps*, now called *France*. It was not till 27 B.C. that *Italia* was used by the Romans to designate the whole country south of the Alps. In using the term *Italy* in the subsequent history, we shall mean the country south of the Rubicon and the Macra, unless mention is made to the contrary. *Boundaries of Italy.*

Italy, in its widest signification, extends from $37^{\circ} 50'$ to $46^{\circ} 40'$ north latitude, and from $6^{\circ} 35'$ to $18^{\circ} 35'$ east longitude. The extreme length from the Alps to the Straits of Messina is seven hundred miles, and the width varies from three hundred and *Extent of Italy.*

fifty miles at the north to an average of one hundred miles at the south. The total area is 92,640 square miles.¹

Mountains. The mountain system of Italy is less complex than that of Greece. On the north and northwest, separating Italy from Gallia Transalpina (*France*), Helvetia and Raetia (*Switzerland*), are the Alps.² This range had different names in different places, *Maritime, Cottian, Graian, Pennine, Raetian, Tridentine*, west and north of Gallia Cisalpina, and the *Carnic and Julian Alps*, north of Venetia.

(1) Alps.

(2) Apennines. The Apennines are a continuation of the Maritime Alps. They begin a little west of Genūa (*Genoa*), and after skirting the Sinus Ligusticus (*Gulf of Genoa*), they form the southern boundary of the valley of the Pādus (*Po*). From latitude 44° to 42° they run nearly parallel to the coast, leaving a district about forty miles in width between them and the Adriatic, while the distance between them and the Mediterranean within these same parallels is nearly twice that extent. At nearly 41° they branch into two ranges, one running south to the promontory of Leucopetra (*Capo dell' Armi*) and the other to the southeast, terminating in the promontory of Iapygium (*Leuca*). The Apennines are not so high as the Alps, generally ranging from 3000 to 7000 feet high, while several peaks of the Alps reach twice the latter height. Of single mountains the chief are Mt. Gargānus on the Adriatic and Mt. Vesuvius near the bay of Naples.

Rivers. The rivers of Italy may be divided into three groups : those in the great plain of Northern Italy between the Alps and the Apennines ; those on the west of the Apennines flowing into the Mediterranean, and those on the east of the Apennines flowing into the Adriatic.

(1) In Northern Italy. The largest river of Italy is the Padus (*Po*), which rises in Mt. Vesūlus (*Viso*) and after a course of four hundred and fifty miles, flowing nearly due east, it falls by several mouths

¹ This is the area of Continental Italy. If we include the islands the area is 110,658 sq. miles.

² From Keltic *Alp* or *Alb*, 'a height': cp. Albion, Albania.

into the Adriatic. Its chief tributaries on the north are the Ticīnus (*Ticino*) draining lake Verbānus (*Maggiore*), the Addua (*Adda*) draining lake Lariūs (*Como*), and the Mincius (*Mincio*) draining lake Benācus (*Garda*). On the south, the chief affluent of the Padus is the Trebia (*Trebbia*). In Venetia are the Athēsis (*Adige*), Meduācus (*Brenta*), Plavis (*Piave*), and the Arsia (*Arsa*), the eastern boundary of Italy on the side of Illyricum, all emptying into the Adriatic.

On the west of the Apennines, beginning at the north, we find the Macra (*Magra*), a small river between Liguria and Etruria; the Arnus (*Arno*) rising in the Apennines and flowing nearly due west; the Umbro (*Ombrone*); the Tiber with its affluents the Clanis (*Chiusi*) in Etruria, the Nar (*Nera*) dividing Umbria and Sabini, the Anio (*Teverone*), separating Sabini and Latium: the Liris (*Garigliano*) with its sources near lake Fuci-nus and emptying into the sea near the boundary between Latium and Campania; the Volturnus (*Volturno*) with its source in Samnium and flowing through Campania.

The chief rivers south of the Padus flowing into the Adriatic are the Rubicon (*Pisatello*), the boundary between Gallia Cisalpina and Umbria; the Metaurus (*Metara*) in Umbria, the Aternus (*Pescara*) in Samnium and the Aufidus (*Ofanto*) in Apulia.

The most important lakes of Italy lie in the districts of Gallia Cisalpina, Etruria, Samnium and Campania. But the character of the lakes in the district first mentioned differs from that in the other districts. While the lakes of Gallia Cisalpina are fed by mountain streams and have their waters drained by rivers, the lakes in Etruria and Campania have often no visible outlet or inlet, and are supposed to be the *craters* of extinct volcanoes.

In Gallia Cisalpina, the chief lakes are Verbānus at the foot of the Pennine Alps, the largest lake of Italy, about forty miles in length and eight in width; Lariūs further to the east, and Benācus still further to the east on the boundary of Venetia. The first is connected with the Padus by the Ticīnus; the second, also with the Padus by the Addua, and the third likewise, with the Padus by the Mincius.

(2) *In Etruria.* In Etruria the largest lake is Trasimēnus (*Perugia*), surrounded on all sides by mountains. Besides this, we find Volsiniensis (*Bolsena*) and Sabatīnus (*Brocciano*).

(3) *In Samnium.* In Samnium is lake Fucinus (*Celano*) about thirty miles in circumference without any visible outlet, and in Campania, (4) *In Campania.* near Cumae, lacus Avernus (*Averno*).

Promontories.

The chief promontories of Italy are on the west and south. On the Adriatic the only one is Mount Gargānus (*Gargano*). On the west coast, near the middle of the Etrurian coast, opposite the island of Ilva (*Elba*), was Populonium (*Campania*); on the coast of Latium near Circeii was Mons Circaeus (*Circello*); also on the coast of Latium near Formiae was Caiēta (*Gata*); on the coast of Campania at the northern end of the bay of Naples was Misenum (*Miseno*) while at the southern extremity of the same bay was promontorium Minervae or Surrentinum (*Minerva*); on the coast of Lucania was Palinūrum or Palinurus (*Palinuro*). On the south of Rhegium are Leucopetra (*Capo dell' Armi*) and Herculis promontorium (*Spartarento*); Lacinium (*Capo delle Colonne*) east of Brutium. Off the coast of Apulia is Iapygium promontorium.

Minerals.

Iron is found in Gallia Cisalpina, near Comum, and in the islands of Ilva and Sardinia. In various parts zinc, copper, lead, and silver abound. Marble is plentiful especially in Northern Etruria.

Productions

Italy was regarded by the ancient Romans as abounding in everything needed for the support of man and beast. Grain, hemp, wool were produced in great abundance, and everywhere the raising of oxen, horses, sheep and goats was carried on extensively. The wines of the Falernian district, of Alba, and of Surrentum were famous; while the honey of Tarentum, the olives of Venafrum, and the figs of Tusculum were often extolled by the Roman poets.

Climate.

The climate of Italy varies from the cold of the Alpine districts on the north to the warm and sunny air of the south, or from the extreme rigor of the highlands of the Apennines to the genial temperature of the districts along the coast. In the north the

climate is temperate and healthy, though severe in winter ; in the central districts it is more genial, while in the south it is almost tropical. The singular clearness of the air and the varied scenery of mountain and plain set off the landscape with brilliant effect. The chief drawbacks are the cold piercing winds from the mountains or the pestilential hot blasts from the south, and the malaria that prevails at certain seasons of the year, especially in Latium. It is generally supposed that the winter in ancient times was severer than at present.

In regard to the character of her coast line, Italy is very *Coast line.* different from Greece. The coast line of Italy measures about two thousand miles, or not so much as that of Greece, though Italy is about four and a half times larger than Greece. On the east there are few harbours, the land along the coast being low, except where Mount Gargānus juts out into the Adriatic. On the west and south the coast is more broken by indentations. Along the Sinus Ligusticus (*Gulf of Genoa*), from the point where the Apennines break off from the maritime Alps to the mouth of the Arnus, the coast is lofty and precipitous. From the mouth of the Arnus to the head of the bay of Naples, the coast is low and swampy without any good harbour. From the bay of Naples to Tarentum the coast is rugged and rocky. The people on the eastern side of Italy did not readily take to navigation, and had little intercourse with the Greeks of the opposite coast ; but on the west and south the Italians had more communication with the neighbouring nations.

While we find in Greece a homogeneous race, though composed of different tribes possessing different characteristics, we meet with no such unity of origin in the different peoples that inhabited the Italian peninsula. From the Alps to the Sicilian straits, we find at least five distinct races, differing from each other in religion, language, political institutions, and in capabilities for self-government. *The races of Italy.*

In the valley of the Padus were the Gauls ; on the narrow strip of land between the Apennines and the Gulf of Genoa were the Ligurians ; on the west of the Apennines in the plain of Etruria, the Etruscans ; in the centre of Italy, the Oscan,

Umbro-Latin, and Sabellian tribes, while on the south, in the district of Magna Graecia, were the Greeks and Pelasgians.

(1) *The Gauls.*

The Gauls were a Keltic race, of the same stock as the Welsh, the Erse or Kelts of Ireland, and the Highlanders of Scotland. The Alps on the side of France and Switzerland are easier of ascent than on the side of Italy. Migrations of the Gauls probably came from the north and settled in the valley of the Padus from which they expelled the Etruscans, about the sixth century B.C. When the Romans became acquainted with them they were in a primitive state of civilization. They are described as a tall, blue-eyed, fair-haired race, who were nomadic in their habits, pasturing their herds and flocks, and paying little heed to agriculture. They dwelt in open villages or collections of primitive huts without fortifications. They were divided into clans, each governed by a chief, and never got beyond this form of government. According to Mommsen, they have shaken all states, but founded none. Though individually a match for the Romans in physical strength, personal courage and daring, they had not those qualities which enabled them to endure a campaign, or make any permanent use of their conquests. According to Cato, the Elder, they cared for little else than for war and wit. The influence of the chief depended on his fame as a warrior, or on his skill as an orator in rousing his unruly clansmen to battle, and on his power in keeping them under proper control. They lived by plundering each other or their common enemies. They excelled, however, in horsemanship, were active warriors, but better fitted for aggressive than for defensive warfare, loved poetry and speech-making. They could win a battle, but not a campaign.

(2) *The Ligurians.*

Who the Ligurians were is still a matter of conjecture. They certainly were neither Kelts nor Latins. From time immemorial they have occupied the narrow strip of land between the Apennines and the sea, from Nicaea to Luca. Some have supposed them to be a pre-Aryan race akin to the Basques, on the Bay of Biscay.

(3) *The Etruscans.*

Who the Etruscans were is still a greater mystery. Some have supposed them to be of Pelasgic origin; others say they came from Lydia, in Asia Minor; while others say they reached

Italy through the Raetian Alps. They called themselves *Rasenna*. While their alphabet resembles the Greek and Roman, still the language of this people has no affinity to that of any other Aryan race with which we are acquainted, and still baffles all efforts to decipher it. Their religion was a gloomy polytheism. They are supposed to have settled in Italy as early as the eleventh century B.C., and to have occupied the valley of the Padus, from which they were expelled by the Gauls. In early times they had an extensive fleet and developed, in conjunction with the Carthaginians, a considerable trade. They are said to have been well skilled in the working of iron and brass, and the numerous extant vases show great skill in the art of pottery. They had a league of twelve cities at the head of which was *Volsinii*, and thus must, at an early period, have developed the idea of political union.

The centre of Italy was occupied by *three* distinct nations, ^{(4) *Nations of Central Italy.*} more or less akin to each other. The Oscans or Opicans occupied the districts from the borders of Latium and Campania to the Adriatic, and included the *Aequi*, *Hernici*, and *Volsci* in Latium. The Umbro-Latins were found in the northern part of Central Italy, chiefly in Umbria and Latium. The Sabellian nation comprised a number of tribes in Central and Southern Italy—the *Sabini*, *Samnites*, *Peligni*, *Marsi*, *Apuli*, *Brutii*, *Picentes*.

The southern portion of Italy was originally peopled by the Pelasgians, and subsequently by the Greeks. Of these latter ^{(5) *The Greek.*} little need be said. We have already alluded to them in the History of Greece.

The Roman empire at the time of its greatest splendour extended its sway over all the countries on the Mediterranean, over the tracts as far north as the Danube, to St. George's Channel and the Frith of Forth, and as far east as Persia. In this vast empire were many peoples differing widely in customs, civilization, science, art, literature and religion. What was valuable in the institutions and arts of these different nations it was the mission of the Romans to assimilate and to hand down to posterity. When Rome fell under her barbarian conquerors, it was the treasure of ancient learning saved by Rome that ^{*The causes of Rome's greatness.*}

guided the footsteps of the modern nations of Europe to new forms of civilized life. The language of Rome still survives in a modified form in the languages of Portugal, Spain, France and Italy. The Latin was in former days the language of diplomacy, of law, of government, and is still the language of the ritual of the Roman Catholic Church. It was not, however, so much in the sphere of literature that the Romans excelled, for in this respect they were far distanced by the Greeks. In civil law and in the art of government, however, they were the teachers of modern nations, for all the civil law of modern states is based on that of Rome. The greatness of Rome was not due so much to the bravery of her soldiers, or to the ability of her legislators, as to the respect she usually evinced for established right and order. Though changes were made from time to time according to the needs of the growing republic, the Romans were not revolutionists, but closely resembled the English in making the constitution an adaptation to the wants of the state, in which everything new was merely a development of what was old.

Disadvantages of Rome.

The humble origin of Rome is in striking contrast to its greatness under the Imperial Caesars. When we consider the causes of its predominating power we find that this was not due to any advantage Rome possessed in excellency of soil, salubrity of climate, or superiority of race. The soil of Latium is comparatively sterile; the climate, especially at certain seasons of the year, unhealthy; and the Latins could not boast any preponderating excellence in race over the other peoples of Central Italy. Again, it was not due to the fact that Rome possessed a succession of distinguished men, for when such men as Marius, Sulla and Caesar appeared on the scene the best days of Republican Rome were at an end. While other nations have risen through the commanding genius of an individual as Frederick the Great or Count Cavour, Rome on the other hand could make no such boast.

Advantages of geographical position.

The advantages that gave Rome preponderance over the other towns of Latium were due to her geographical situation. While neighbouring towns, as Praeneste, possessed a stronger position

than any single hill of Rome, we find nowhere in Italy a group of hills so close to each other with the advantages of position that Rome possessed. The proximity of these hills fostered political union among the people, and tended to bind the inhabitants into one political community. With Rome as a centre the neighbouring tribes were gradually amalgamated into one body politic by peaceful union or by conquest, until she had acquired dominion over the whole peninsula. Another advantage was the sterility of the soil. The early wars of Rome were aggressive, undertaken rather for the purposes of aggrandisement than for self defence. The unhealthy climate, especially at certain seasons of the year, may also have been a protection against foreign foes, while its distance from the sea, and the unnavigable character of the Tiber for war galleys saved it from the attack of the Etruscan corsairs that scoured the Mediterranean. Finally, her position in the centre of the Peninsula of Italy, on the borderland of Etruria and the nations of Central Italy, enabled her to 'divide and conquer' her enemies on the north and the south. When once Rome gained a supremacy in Latium over the tribes of Central Italy, she became the recognized head of the Italian states, and the acknowledged defender of their liberty against the Etruscans, Gauls and Carthaginians.

CHAPTER II.

LEGENDARY AND REGAL ROME.

For the first four centuries the history of Rome is mainly legendary, though some of the legends have undoubtedly some foundation.

*Legend of
Aeneas the
Trojan.*

The Romans were fond of tracing their descent, especially in the days of Augustus, from the ancient kings of Troy. According to the legend, when Troy was taken and burned by the Greeks, Aenēas with his father, Anchises, and his son Ascanius (also called Iulus, from whom the Julian line of the Caesars traced their descent) with a band of followers escaped from the burning city. After in vain seeking a home in Thrace and Sicily, Aeneas, under the guidance of heaven, at last reached the Italian shore, near Laurentum, a few miles south of the mouth of the river Tiber. Here he found a people ruled over by King Latinus. The king mustered his followers and attempted to repel the invaders, but was worsted in the field and came to terms with the new-comers. To Aeneas he gave his daughter Lavinia in marriage, and land on which to found a city, which Aeneas called Lavinium in honour of his wife. But Lavinia had been previously betrothed to Turnus, king of the Rutūli, of Ardea. Turnus collected his followers and attacked the strangers but was slain by the hand of Aeneas. Three years after this the Trojan hero disappeared amid the waters of the river Numicius, and was afterwards worshipped under the name of Jupiter Indiges, or ‘god of the country.’

*Ascanius
transfers his
seat of
empire to
Alba Longa.*

Aeneas was succeeded by his son Ascanius (or Iulus) who transferred the seat of empire to Alba Longa or ‘the long white city.’ A line of kings for three hundred years reigned at Alba Longa, till the time of Procas. He left two sons, Numitor and Amulius. The younger brother, Amulius, dispossessed the elder, Numitor, of power, slew his son and made his daughter, Rea Silvia, a Vestal Virgin, which meant that she was

devoted to the services of Vesta, and was compelled to live and die unwedded. But the virgin had by Mars twin sons, Romulus and Remus, and in consequence of having broken her vows was doomed to be buried alive—a punishment which was carried out. The twins were ordered to be thrown into the river Tiber. It so happened that the river at that time had overflowed its banks, and formed shallow pools. The basket in which they were laid floated to the foot of the Palatine hill near the cave of the god Lupercus and was caught in the branches of a fig tree. When the waters subsided the twins were left on dry land. A wolf attracted by their cry came out of the cave and suckled them. Here they were found by a shepherd, Faustulus, who took them home to his wife, and she brought them up as her own children and gave them the names Romulus and Remus. It chanced one day that the herdsmen of Amulius, who fed their flocks on the Palatine, had a dispute with the herdsmen of Numitor, who fed theirs on the Aventine. Remus was taken prisoner and was brought before Amulius to answer the charge of having plundered the lands of his grandfather Numitor. Then Faustulus told Romulus the story of his origin, of the wicked designs of Amulius and of his miraculous escape. Romulus raised a band, forced his way into the town of Alba Longa, set free his brother Remus and put his grandfather, Numitor, on the throne.

*Legend of
Romulus
and Remus.*

The twins were not content to remain at Alba Longa, but longed to found a city near the spot where they had been miraculously preserved. But the new city had to have a site and a name. Romulus wished to build the city on the Palatine; Remus, on the Aventine. To end the dispute they agreed to leave the matter to the will of heaven as expressed by augury. Each took up his position on his chosen hill and watched for omens. Remus was the first to observe the flight of birds, for six vultures appeared on his hill, but at the moment of the announcement of this, twelve appeared to Romulus. It was now a difficult matter to decide the question, for though Remus was the first to see a sign of birds, double the number had been sighted by Romulus. The Palatine was, however, selected as the

*Rome
founded,
21st April,
753 B.C.*

central hill of the city, which was called Rome after the name of Romulus, who at once marked out the boundaries of the new city by drawing a furrow around the Palatine Hill. According to tradition Rome was founded on the 21st April, 753 B.C., a day celebrated by the Romans as the festival of Pales, the goddess of shepherds.

*Romulus,
753-716 B.C.*

When Romulus had marked out the boundaries of the new city, he built a wall and dug a trench around it. But Remus in derision leaped over the wall and the trench to show how easily the city could be taken. Then Romulus in anger slew his brother saying, 'Thus perish every one who may attempt to cross these walls.'

*The asylum
of Romulus.*

Afterwards Romulus opened an *asylum* or place of refuge for all who had been compelled to flee from their enemies or through fear of the law in their own states. Soon all kinds of criminals flocked to the asylum from the surrounding nations and all were welcomed and made citizens of Rome.

*Rape of the
Sabine
virgins.*

But the citizens of Rome lacked wives, and the neighbouring tribes were unwilling that their daughters should mingle with the reckless outlaws of Romulus. He sent messengers to them asking that his people should be admitted into a league with them so as to give his citizens the right of intermarriage, but his proposals were rejected. Then Romulus determined to accomplish by foul, what he could not obtain by fair means. So he sent a proclamation saying that he was going to hold games in honour of the god *Consus*. When the people were assembled from the neighbouring Sabine districts, and were intently watching the games, a number of Roman youths rushed in and carried off the Sabine women. At this the parents of the women were angry, and hurried away from Rome uttering curses on the faithless city that had so deceitfully done them wrong. They collected an army and put Titus Tatius their king in command. When they reached the Capitoline Hill they laid siege to it. Now the hill was in charge of Tarpeius, who had a daughter Tarpeia. When the Sabines were unable to take the Capitoline Hill, they carried out their object by means of Tarpeia, who promised to open the gates of the garrison if they

would give her what they wore on their left arms, meaning by this their gold bracelets. But after she had opened the gates, the Sabines threw on her their shields, which killed her by their weight.

Now when the Romans occupied the Palatine, and the Sabines the Capitoline Hill, frequent frays took place between the two people, in which victory was not always on the side of the Romans. On one occasion the Romans were being driven in flight when Romulus raised his hands to heaven and vowed a temple to Jupiter Stator, or 'Jupiter Stayer of the Flight,' if he would help the Romans in their need. Then, as the story goes, the Romans wheeled and drove back the Sabines. When the battle was at the turning point, the Sabine women rushed in between the two lines and begged on the one hand their husbands and on the other their fathers and brothers to cease their unseemly warfare. Thus some of the neighbouring Sabines and Romans were united into one people, and Romulus and Titus Tatius reigned jointly as kings. As the Sabines came from Cures, the united people ever after took the name of 'the Roman people and the Quirites.' A short time after the union of the two peoples Titus Tatius was killed and Romulus became sole ruler over the united people.

To Romulus were ascribed the foundation of the ancient political institutions and the organization of the citizens. The people were divided into nobles or patricians (*patres*) and clients or dependents (*clientes*). The patricians alone formed the sovereign people; they alone had political rights. All the patricians were equal among themselves, and each father of a family governed his own household—his wife, children and slaves—over whom he had the power of life and death. Several families united together and formed houses with sanctuaries, laws and customs in common. The clients had no civil or political rights, but were dependents of the patricians, who for loyal service protected the rights of the clients. Hence the patricians were often called *patroni* or 'protectors.'

Again, Romulus divided the patricians into three tribes—

*Tribes of
Romulus.*

Ramnes or the Romans of Romulus, the Tities or Sabines of Titus Tatius, and the Luceres or Etruscans of Caeles, an Etruscan nobleman who aided Romulus in the war with the Sabines. Each tribe was divided into *ten curiae*, and each *curia* into ten *gentes*. The thirty *curiae* formed the *comitia curiata*, the supreme assembly of the patricians. This assembly elected a king, made laws affecting the patricians and decided, under the authority of the king, cases affecting the life of a Roman citizen.

Senatus.

From the patricians, again, Romulus chose a number of elders which he called the *Senatus* or council of elders. There were originally *one hundred*, one from each *gens* of the *Ramnes*. When the Sabines came into the body politic another hundred were added. The Luceres were not yet represented so that the senate on the death of Romulus numbered two hundred.

Army.

From each of the three tribes Romulus chose one thousand infantry and one hundred cavalry. Thus the legion (*legio*¹) consisted in his days of three thousand infantry and three hundred horse.

*Death of
Romulus.*

Romulus, after settling the primitive constitution of Rome and regulating the army, governed wisely for many years. He extended the power of Rome beyond the city by capturing Fidenae, an Etruscan town. At length, during a festival on the field of Mars, there arose a terrific thunderstorm, and when the storm had cleared away Romulus had disappeared and was nowhere to be found. The people mourned for him. At length he appeared as a god to Julius Proculus and ordered him to tell the people to worship him as *Quirinus* and practice valour and virtue by which they would acquire dominion over all the nations of the world. Then the Romans erected an altar to him as the god Quirinus, the national hero and guardian for ever.

Interreges.

After the death of Romulus there was an *interregnum* for a year. During this time the senators held the royal power in rotation as *interreges* or *between-kings*. The reason for this was that the Romans and the Sabines were at variance as to the choice of a king. At last an agreement was made that the next

¹From *lego*, 'I choose.'

king should be a Sabine, but that he should be elected by the Romans.

The choice of the senate fell upon Numa Pompilius, a Sabine. *Numa Pompilius, 716-673 B.C.*
 As Romulus was the founder of the political and military system, so Numa was the author of the religious institutions. According to the legend he was instructed in all things by Egeria, a Muse. Under her direction he surprised the gods Picus and Faunus and kept them in confinement till they taught him a secret spell by which he learned the will of heaven. Jupiter appeared in the form of lightning and promised him a public sign of his favour. The next day there fell from heaven the sacred shield (*ancile*) of Mars Gradivus, the father of Romulus. To prevent this being stolen Numa ordered eleven others exactly like the original shield to be made, and appointed twelve *Salii* or priests of Mars to guard the sacred shields and to preside over public thanksgivings. To Numa was attributed the building of the temple of Janus, the gates of which were open in time of war and closed in peace, but so often were the Romans at war that the temple always remained open from his days till the time of the emperor Augustus, except during a brief period after the First Punic War. He appointed four pontiffs, with the *Pontifex Maximus* at the head, to preside over all matters connected with the worship of the gods. These acted as a sort of ecclesiastical council, and the office was held by the most distinguished men at Rome. To the worship of Jupiter, Mars, and Quirinus he appointed special priests. He also appointed augurs (*augures*) to consult the will of the gods, and chose four vestal virgins who kept alive the sacred fire brought from Alba Longa. He also taught the ceremonies appropriate for funerals, for expiating prodigies, and, especially, he reformed the calendar by adding January and February to the original ten months of Romulus. He encouraged agriculture and taught the people to have fixed possessions of land by requiring each man to mark out the boundaries of his land by landmarks (*termini*), which it was a sacrilege to remove and which were under the guardianship of the god Terminus. He also organized trade-guilds and generally encouraged the people in the arts of peace. *Religious institutions of Numa.*

*Tullus
Hostilius,
673-641 B.C.*

Another *interregnum* followed on the death of Numa Pompilius, after which the Romans chose Tullus Hostilius as their king. His reign was as warlike as that of Numa had been peaceful. The two chief events in his reign were the establishment of the Latins of Alba Longa in Rome and the appointment of two judges (*quaestores parricidii*) to try all matters of life and death in place of the king. These two events arose out of the legends which follow.

*The fight of
the Horatii
and Curiatii*

The wars of Tullus Hostilius were directed chiefly against the Albans, or people of Alba Longa. It broke out in the following manner. The lands of the Romans and Albans lay contiguous to each other. Predatory incursions, as was natural among rude peoples, often took place. When it was impossible to settle the difficulties amicably, the two nations had recourse to war. When the two armies of Rome and Alba lay encamped opposite each other, the leader of the Albans proposed that the quarrel between the two states should be decided by a single combat between the Albans and Romans. Now, it chanced that there were three brothers, the Horatii, in the Roman army, born at one birth, and likewise three, the Curiatii, in the Alban. These were sons of twin sisters and equal in age and strength. Therefore they were selected to decide the dispute between the two nations. The leaders with solemn rites of sacrifice had agreed that whichever side should be victorious should rule over the other. Then the fight began, each of the Romans and Albans who viewed the combat knowing well that the supremacy of either people depended on the result of the combat. At the first onset two of the Horatii fell, and the three Curiatii were wounded. Then the surviving Horatius took to flight while the three Curiatii pursued him at unequal distances. Suddenly turning round, the remaining Horatius attacked in succession the three Curiatii and slew them one after the other. Then the Romans welcomed Horatius with joy as a conqueror, collected the spoils of the Curiatii and carried them before him in triumph to Rome.

*Horatius
kills his
sister.*

But their joy was damped by a sad event which cast a gloom over the people of Rome. When the procession was nearing the city, the sister of Horatius went out to meet it. She had

been betrothed to one of the Curiatii who had been slain. When she saw the bloody coat of her lover which she had embroidered with her own hands, she sobbed aloud before the army and cursed her brother. In a rage Horatius drew his sword and stabbed his sister to the heart because she had wept over a fallen enemy.

The people and the senate, though they all felt grateful to Horatius in freeing them from the domination of the Albans, were shocked at this unnatural deed. The senate ordered him to be tried by two judges appointed by the king, found him guilty and ordered him to be hanged. But Horatius appealed to the people¹, who, out of compassion, wished to save the man who by his own hand had secured their liberty. The aged father of Horatius entreated for his son, and said that his daughter had been justly slain, and that he himself would have slain her, as he had the right to do, for according to the Roman law the father of a family had the power of life and death over his children. To atone for the crime, however, Horatius had to do public penance, for he was condemned to pass under the yoke, and offer up expiatory sacrifices to the spirit of his murdered sister. The Albans then became subjects of King Tullus, and were compelled to aid him in his wars.

But engrossed with many wars and successes Tullus Hostilius had neglected the worship of the gods, disregarded the laws of Numa, and had become proud and haughty. A plague, attributed by the Romans to the displeasure of the gods, smote the people. The king himself fell ill with a lingering disease. After the manner of Numa, he tried to find out the will of the gods. But Jupiter smote him with lightning and destroyed his house.

Again an *interregnum* followed, after which Ancus Marcius, a Sabine noble, son of a daughter of King Numa Pompilius, was chosen king. His first care was to cause the laws of his grandfather to be written on a white tablet² and set up in the *Forum* or market place, so that all could read them. Following

¹ Provocatio 'an appeal' to the people on a question affecting the life of a citizen. ²Album, 'a white tablet.'

*Death of
Tullus
Hostilius.*

*Ancus
Marcius,
640-616 B.C.*

in the footsteps of Numa, Ancus loved peace and all peaceful arts, but he was not always able to avoid war. Still even in war, he showed his regard for law and order by creating a college of priests called *Fetiales*, whose duty was to demand in a regular form from the aggressive state reparation for injuries, and when reparation was refused, to declare war by hurling a spear into the land of the enemy.

*War with
the Latins.*

His chief war was against the Latins who had made raids into the Roman lands. He defeated them and took that part of Latium that lies south of Rome to the sea. The most of the inhabitants of this district were brought to Rome and settled on the Aventine. They were not, however, on a political equality with the Romans, as the Sabines and the Albans were, but afterwards formed part of the *Plebs* or common people of Rome. Ancus is said to have constructed the first bridge¹ across the Tiber, fortified the hill Janiculus on the right bank of the river, erected a prison for criminals², planted a colony, Ostia, at the mouth of the Tiber, which long continued to be the chief port of Rome. Ancus died peacefully like Numa, after a reign of twenty-four years.

¹ pons sublicius, or *wooden bridge*. ² Afterwards called Tullianum robur.

CHAPTER III.

REGAL ROME—*Continued.*

The fifth king of Rome was by birth an Etruscan and by descent a Greek. He took the name of Tarquinius, from his native city ^{Tarquin, the Elder, 616-578 B.C.} Tarquinii, and soon by his wealth and ability gained the favour of Ancus Marcius, who made him guardian of his children. In this way he contrived to get the sovereignty into his hands. It is probable that before his day the Etruscans had conquered Rome, and that his reign marks the beginning of such a conquest.

The chief wars in the reign of Tarquin, the Elder, were with the Latins, the Sabines and the Etruscans. He captured many of the towns of Latium, defeated the Sabines and subdued the whole of Etruria. But it was not so much for his wars that Tarquin was noted, as for the rise of the plebeian order, though the foundation of it was said to have taken place in the days of Ancus Marcius, when the Latins were incorporated with the Romans and Sabines. ^{Rise of the plebeians.} Tarquin chose one hundred members for the senate from the *Luceres*, who were said to have been Etruscans, so that the number of the senate was now three hundred. He was not content with giving them this representation in the senate, but he sought to raise them to a status of equality in another way with the members of the old tribes. To trace the rise of the changes that he introduced it will be necessary to remember that in the days of Romulus the people were divided into *patricii* and *clientes* or patrons and dependents. The former alone composed the body politic, the latter had no political status. The patricians were divided into associations called *gentes* or clans, the members of which were called *gentiles*, bearing the same name, which generally ended in *-ius*. ^{Gentes.} For example, each Roman generally had three names: the *praenomen* or christian name marking the individual, the *nomen* marking the *gens*, and the *cognomen* marking the family of the *gens*. Thus

*Roman
names.*

*Who were
the plebs?*

Lucius Cornelius Scipio was a person of the Scipio family of the Cornelian *gens* having the name of Lucius. In course of time, a class would naturally arise which could be regarded neither as patrons nor clients. They differed from the former in having no political standing, and from the latter in being personally free. This class might arise either from an intermarriage between a patron and a client, the children of whom would be neither patricians nor clients; or again, a patron might die, leaving a number of clients without a patron; and lastly the additions from the neighbouring tribes swelled this class to such an extent that they became a power in the state. Tarquin determined to double the number of citizens by raising a number of plebeian families to patrician rank, but in this he was opposed by the old nobility. To each of the old tribes he added plebeian *gentes*, so that we find old and new Ramnes¹, old and new Tities, old and new Luceres. Thus the chief families of the plebeians were incorporated with the *patres*, and voted in the *comitia curiata*, but the great body of them still remained without any political standing.

*Public
works.*

The reign of this king was especially noted for the great works by which he improved the city. He built the temple of Jupiter on the Capitoline Hill, which was till a late period of the empire one of the most prominent of the great buildings of Rome. The *cloacae* or great sewers of the lower city remain to this day, still admirable for their workmanship, with not a stone displaced. He laid out the circus Maximus, and instituted the great or Roman games.

*Servius
Tullius,
578-534 B.C.*

The reign of Servius Tullius, who was probably the son of a slave belonging to the household of the last king, is the most noted during the regal period. Like Numa and Ancus he loved peace, and the only war he waged was with the Etruscans, whom he compelled to acknowledge the supremacy of Rome. With the Latins he made a treaty to live in peace and friendship for ever. As a sign of this union, by which Rome became practically the leading city of the league, the Romans and the Latins built a temple to Diana on the Aventine Mount,

¹ *primi et secundi Ramnes.*

where they held a yearly festival, at which sacrifices were offered for Rome and for the whole of Latium.

But it was not for his wars that Servius Tullius was famous. He was noted for classifying the people according to a property qualification, and according to local tribes. *Divisions of the people.*

The Romans did not vote individually but corporately. Hence the Roman suffrage was not a recognized majority of individuals but a majority of corporations, *i.e.*, of *curiæ*, *centuriæ*, or *tribes*. Each citizen concurred in whatever the majority of his corporate assembly decided on any question. For instance, when the number of the tribes was thirty-five, the votes of the eighteen would outweigh the votes of the seventeen, though numerically the individuals in the seventeen might be far greater in number than in the eighteen. *Roman mode of voting.*

Originally the Romans were divided into three tribes, Ramnes, Tities and Luceres ; each member of these tribes was a patrician. The ruling body was, therefore, an aristocracy of birth, for the *clientes* had no share in the government. Each of these tribes was divided into ten *curiæ* and each *curia*, into ten *gentes*. An assembly called for the purpose of voting was called *comitia*, and the *comitia curiata* meant the patrician assembly of the *curiæ* of the original tribes. This assembly during the regal period met to confer the *imperium* on the king and to decide questions of war and peace, but after the expulsion of the king it merely had the right to confer the *imperium* on the consuls and praetors, and was gradually superseded by the *comitia centuriata*. *Comitia Curjata.*

The *comitia centuriata* was an assembly in which the people, both patricians and plebeians, were summoned by divisions of classes or *centuriæ*, according to property qualification, as they were arrayed on the field of battle and as they voted in the assembly of citizens. For this purpose the people were divided into *equites* or cavalry, consisting of eighteen centuries, and five classes of *pedites* or infantry. The first class consisted of all citizens who had property worth 100,000 *asses*¹ and upwards, and was composed of forty centuries of older men (*seniores*) or

¹ A Roman *as* was originally a Roman pound of copper, or nearly $\frac{3}{4}$ of an English pound.

men from forty-five to sixty years of age, and forty centuries of younger men (*iuniores*) or young men from eighteen to forty-five years old, the former being employed in the defence of the city and the latter for active duty in the field. The second, third and fourth classes he divided into twenty centuries each, ten of older men and ten of younger men. The fifth class he made stronger and gave it thirty centuries, fifteen of older men and fifteen of younger men. All whose property fell below 11,000 *asses* of copper he classed together as *proletarii*. Besides these there were two centuries of carpenters and smiths (*fabri tignarii et aerarii*) for engineering purposes and two of trumpeters and horn-blowers. The total number of centuries was 193. The table¹ given below will make this division plain.

The assessment of property (*census*) was made solely with regard to land and no account was taken of slaves, cattle, money or furniture. The object of this *census* was twofold; first to

1

CLASSIFICATION OF SERVIUS TULLIUS.

CLASSES.	CENSUS.	CENTURIES.	ARMS.		
			DEFENSIVE.	OFFENSIVE	
First	Equites All having 100,000 asses and upwards Fabri or Wrights	18, of Knights 40 of seniores and 40 of iuniores 2 of Fabri	100	Helmet, shield, greaves and cuirass	Sword and spear
Second	All having 75,000 asses and upwards	10 seniores and 10 iuniores	20	Helmet, shield and greaves	Sword and spear
Third	All having 50,000 asses and upwards	10 seniores and 10 iuniores	20	Helmet and shield	Sword and spear
Fourth	All having 25,000 asses and upwards Cornicines or Trumpeters	10 seniores and 10 iuniores 2 centuries of cornicines	22	Helmet	Spear and javelin
Fifth	All having 11,000 asses and upwards Proletarii	15 seniores and 15 iuniores 1 century	31	None	Slings, bows, etc.

raise the *tribūtum* or tax for military purposes (which will be explained afterwards), and secondly for political purposes. It will be easily seen that such an arrangement as this gave the whole power of the state into the hands of the wealthy, who though necessarily fewer in number yet controlled 100 out of the total 193 centuries. This was, however, just, for the wealthy paid the bulk of the taxes. Again, the number of the centuries of *seniores* was the same as that of the *inniores*, although the membership of the former was smaller than that of the latter.

Such was the Servian constitution of the *comitia centuriata*, which though altered according to the needs of the times never was wholly abolished so long as Rome retained her freedom.


To Servius also is ascribed the custom of assembling the people in tribes for the purpose of levying the war tax (*tributum*). *Comitia Tributa.* These assemblies after developed into the *comitia tributa* and were mainly composed of *plebeians*. Rome had been already extending her conquests in Latium and Etruria. Servius divided the people into four city and sixteen country tribes. Afterwards the number of the tribes was increased to thirty-five and this number remained down to the latest times of the Roman empire.

To Servius Tullius is ascribed also the building of a strong wall from the Viminal to the Esquiline, and adding the Esquiline to the other hills of the town, so that the boundaries of the city would now include the seven hills. *Servius builds a wall.* The boundaries of the city were afterwards increased in the days of Aurelian and Probus (270-282 A.D.).

Servius had two daughters, the elder Tullia (*Tullia maior*) and the younger Tullia (*Tullia minor*¹) married to the sons of Tarquin the Elder, Lucius and Aruns. The character of the two daughters was directly opposite. Of the two sons of Tarquin, Aruns was noted for goodness of heart and gentleness of disposition, while Lucius was the very reverse. Now the wicked daughter was married to the good natured Aruns, and the gentle daughter to the ambitious Lucius. The ambitious wife of Aruns, enraged at the long life of her father and fearing that

¹ Women had no *cognomen* and rarely a *praenomen*. They were called by the *nomen* or name of their *gens*, and *prima*, *secunda*, *tertia*, or *maior*, *minor*.

his elder brother would dispossess him of the kingdom, resolved to murder her husband and father. Soon she instilled into the head of Lucius the fiendish plan of getting rid of his wife. After the gentle Tullia and the quiet Aruns had both been killed, the guilty pair straightway married. Tarquin then formed a conspiracy among the patricians who were angry at the reforms of



Servius. Arrayed in purple robes, Lucius appeared in the *forum*, seated himself in the royal chair in the senate, and bade the people obey him as king. When Servius heard this he hastened to the senate house, but was seized by Tarquin and flung down the stone steps. Hastening home, the aged king was overtaken by the servants of Lucius and killed. When the

wicked Tullia heard of this she went to the senate house to greet her husband as king. The transports of joy that she exhibited disgusted even Lucius, who ordered her home. As she was on her way she ordered her charioteer to drive over the corpse of her father whose blood spattered the wheels of her chariot. From that day the street bore the name of the 'wicked street.'

*Death of
Servius.*

Lucius Tarquinius, surnamed *Superbus*, or *Proud*, had gained his power by violence, and by the same unconstitutional means had to maintain it. One of his first acts was to abolish the rights that the Plebeians had gained by the laws of Servius. After the manner of the Greek tyrants, he surrounded himself with a body guard. He oppressed both rich and poor. The rich who opposed his rule, or whose wealth excited his avarice, on false accusations he punished with exile or death, while the poor were compelled to work on magnificent public buildings at miserable wages. He increased, however, the power of Rome by alliances and by conquest. To commemorate the union with Latium he established the festival of the Latin games, which were solemnized every year on the Alban hill at the temple of Jupiter Latiaris.

*Tarquin the
Proud, 534-
510 B.C.*

*Forms an
alliance
with the
Latins.*

After being strengthened by the alliance with Latium, Tarquin began war against the Volscians, who lived in the south of Latium. With the spoils of their chief town, Suessa Pometia, he completed the great temple of Jupiter on the Capitoline hill which his father had begun. This he dedicated to the trinity of the Etruscan and Latin religions—Jupiter, Juno, Minerva.

When at the height of his power, one day, a Sibyl, or prophetess, from Cumae, came to him with nine books of divine prophecies which she offered for sale. As she demanded an exorbitant price, the king laughed at her, whereupon she went away and burned three of the books. Returning with the remaining six, she demanded the same price, but the king looked upon her as mad and still refused to buy the books. Again she went away and burned other three. A third time she came with the last three and demanded the same price. By this time the king began to reflect seriously and to think that the woman was sent by the gods and he purchased the books. These books,

*Legend of
the Sibylline
books.*

written in Greek, were supposed to contain prophesies of the destiny of Rome. They were deposited in the vault of the temple on the Capitol and were consulted in time of danger, or dearth or pestilence.

*Legend of
the outrage
of Lucretia.*

In the last year of the reign of Tarquin, the Romans were engaged in besieging Ardea, a town of the Rutulians. One evening when the king's sons and their cousin, Tarquinius Collatinus, who lived at Collatia, were supping together, a dispute arose as to the excellence and thriftiness of their wives. They agreed to return home and see which of the ladies deserved the highest praise. Mounting their horses they soon reached Rome. Here they found the daughters-in-law of the king holding a feast, but at Collatia they found Lucretia, the wife of Collatinus spinning with her handmaids, though it was late in the night. Lucretia, therefore, was judged worthy of the highest praise. But Sextus came away filled with unholy desires. One evening he went back alone to Collatia, where he was hospitably entertained by Lucretia, as a kinsman of her husband. In the silence of the night, he went to the chamber of Lucretia and insulted her. After she refused to yield to him, he declared he would kill her and place a murdered slave by her side and tell her husband that he had found her in adultery. Then Lucretia yielded and in the morning Sextus rode to Ardea. Lucretia sent for her father and her husband, who came accompanied by L. Junius Brutus, nephew of the king, and Publius Valerius Poplicola. They found Lucretia clothed in mourning and plunged in the deepest sorrow. She told them of the deed of Sextus, and made them swear to avenge her dishonour. When she had ended her words she drew a knife and stabbed herself to the heart. Brutus addressed the assembled people around the body of Lucretia in the marketplace of Collatia, and exhorted them to expel the tyrant. The army at Ardea renounced its allegiance to the king, who fled with his two sons Titus and Aruns to Caere in Etruria. Thus Tarquin, the Proud, was expelled from Rome.

*Expulsion
of the
Tarquins,
509 B.C.*

CHAPTER IV.

FROM THE EXPULSION OF THE KINGS TO THE BATTLE OF LAKE REGILLUS.

When the Tarquins were expelled, the people in the assembly determined to abolish the kingly power forever. In place of a ^{Abolition of kingly power.} king they chose annually two men who at first had the name of *praetors* or 'leaders,' but afterwards of *consuls* or 'deliberators.' The charge of the state treasury was assigned to two *quaestors*, while the priestly functions of the king were performed by a king of sacrifices (*rex sacrorum*) appointed by the chief pontiff (*pontifex maximus*). The two consuls were elected by the *comitia centuriata*, and confirmed by the *comitia curiata*, which alone had the right of conferring the *imperium*¹ or highest executive authority on all magistrates. The laws and ^{First consuls.} ordinances of the state still remained intact. The first two consuls were Lucius Junius Brutus and Lucius Tarquinius Collatinus. The exiled king, however, still had a large number of followers in Rome, especially among the young patricians. He sent messengers to Rome to ask the Romans to restore to him his private property. The people and the senate were inclined to accede to this request, which was looked upon as just, but they soon discovered that the envoys of the king were hatching a plot to restore the royal family. The conspiracy was detected and the guilty plotters were seized and cast into prison. Among the conspirators were the two sons of the consul Brutus. With true Roman spirit the consul showed no mercy to his guilty children. Ordering the lictors to scourge and behead them, he exhibited to the people that a Roman's love of country was even greater than his parental affection. The people were now more incensed against the Tarquins than ever, and the senate gave orders that

¹ *Imperium* meant the supreme executive authority, civil, military, judicial, and was possessed by the consuls and praetors, dictator and master of the horse. Within the city it was limited by the right of appeal (*provocatio*) from the consuls, but not from the dictator, to the *comitia centuriata*; abroad it was wielded by the general in the field and the provincial governor, and was unlimited

*Exile of
Tarquinius
Collatinus.*

the goods of the exiled family should be divided among the people and that the land belonging to them (*Campus Martius*) should become the property of the state. Not merely were the immediate followers of the king banished, but the senate and people decreed that all of the name of Tarquin should be banished forever. Thereupon Tarquinius Collatinus, the consul, though a friend to the people and an enemy to the king, was exiled because he was of the lineage and bore the name of the Tarquins. He, therefore, laid down his office, and went into exile and Publius Valerius was chosen consul in his stead.

*First
attempt to
restore the
Tarquins.*

Tarquin, since cunning and fraud had failed, had recourse to arms. He sought aid from the Etruscans of Tarquinii and Veii, who readily granted it. In the battle that ensued, it happened that Aruns, the son of the king, who was in the front of the Etruscan line espied the consul Brutus, who was at the head of the Roman van. The exiled Tarquin desired to take vengeance on the man who had driven his family into exile, and spurring on his horse, made an attack on the consul. Brutus did not shrink from the combat, and both, pierced by each other's spears, fell from their horses. Both sides claimed a victory when night closed on either army. The Etruscans, however, fled, and the surviving consul Valerius carried the body of the dead Brutus to Rome. The Roman matrons mourned him for a year because he had avenged the wrongs of Lucretia. This was the first attempt to restore the family of the Tarquins.

*Valerius
Poplicola.*

By the death of Brutus, Valerius was left without a colleague. He began to build a house on the hill, Velia, which looked down upon the *forum* and soon suspicions spread among the people that he was aiming at kingly power. Not only did Valerius pull his house down, but he ordered the lictors to lower their *fascēs* or rods of office before the people as an acknowledgment of the supremacy of the power of the people. He also brought forward a law enacting that any citizen that had been condemned by a magistrate had a right of appeal to the people. This privilege, however, had been recognized as a right of a Roman citizen, for it will be remembered that the surviving Horatius who murdered his sister appealed from the decision of the two judges to the people. In consequence of his defence of popular rights, Valerius

obtained the name of Publicola or 'people's friend.' The assembly of the centuries was summoned to elect a successor to Brutus.

In the second year of the Republic a second attempt was made to restore the exiled Tarquins. The banished king managed to gain over Lars Porsenna, a powerful Etruscan of Clusium, at that time the chief city of the Etruscan league. Without opposition the Etruscan army marched as far as the hill, Janiculum, on the right bank of the Tiber. The Romans in alarm fled across the river by the wooden bridge (*pons sublicius*) and the city would have been taken had it not been the good fortune of the Roman state to have had on that memorable day a defender in the person of Horatius Cocles. With two other valiant Romans, Horatius undertook the defence of the entrance of the bridge connecting the Janiculan Hill and the Capitol, but gave instructions to his countrymen to cut down the bridge in the rear. When only a few timbers remained, the companions of Horatius started back, leaving him alone to bear the brunt of the battle. Horatius stood till the cracks of the falling timbers and the shouts of his countrymen told him that the bridge was tottering. Uttering a prayer to the river god, Tiber, he plunged into the stream and swam unhurt to the Roman side of the river amid the arrows of the enemy and the cheers of his countrymen.

Rome was now besieged by Lars Porsenna, and was hard pressed by famine. A young Roman, Mucius, determined to deliver his country by killing the king of the Etruscans. He went to the Etruscan camp, but, not knowing the king, slew instead the royal secretary, who sat near the king and was paying out money to the soldiers. At once seized by the guards, Mucius was threatened with torture. To show how little he regarded pain, he thrust his right hand into the flame of the fire burning on an altar, and without flinching kept it there till it was completely charred. Amazed at the courage of the youth, Porsenna bade him depart, and Mucius, to show his gratitude to the Etruscan king, revealed to him the fact that three hundred noble youths had sworn to take the life of the king and that he was the first to whom the lot had fallen. From this circumstance

Second attempt to restore the Tarquins, 508 B.C.

Legend of Mucius Scaevola.

Mucius received the name of Scaevōla or 'left-handed.' Porsenna, through fear of being assassinated, made peace with the Romans.

*Third
attempt to
restore the
Tarquins.*

When Tarquin found that he could expect no further aid from Porsenna to enable him to regain his lost power, he went to live with his son-in-law, Octavius Mamilius, chief of Tusculum, then the chief of the thirty towns of the Latin league. Dreading the combined power of the Latin towns, which had made Octavius their leader, and afraid that the jealous feeling of the two consuls would bring disaster to the campaign, the Romans had recourse to the appointment of a single magistrate, called a *dictator*. This magistrate had supreme power, both in and out of the city. From his decisions there was no appeal. He, however, could not hold power longer than six months. As he had no colleague to interfere with him, and no accusation to dread after his term of office had expired, he was free to act according to his own judgment, for all other magistrates, even the consuls, ceased to have any power when once a dictator was named. He appointed a *Master of the Horse* who commanded the cavalry. Then Titus Lartius was chosen as dictator and Spurius Cassius as master of the horse. But the

*First dicta-
tor, 499 B.C.*

Latins did not declare war for two years. Again the consuls named a dictator, Aulus Postumius, and he named Titus Aebutius master of the horse. A fierce battle was fought between the Romans and the Latins at Lake Regillus in which the Romans were nearly worsted. Almost all the chiefs on either side lay dead or wounded. When the Romans were on the point of giving way, the dictator offered a prayer to the heavenly twins, Castor and Pollux, vowing to them a temple if they would aid the Romans. At once there appeared on his right two horsemen, taller and fairer than the sons of men, on white chargers. At the head of the Roman horse they led the charge against the enemy. The Romans when they saw that they were the sacred twins took courage and defeated the Latins. Peace was now made with the Latin towns on the condition that they would give no harbour to the Tarquins. The aged king went into exile to Cumae, on the bay of Naples, where he died.

*Battle of
Lake
Regillus,
497 B.C.*

CHAPTER V.

FROM THE BATTLE OF LAKE REGILLUS, 498 B.C., TO THE
DECENVIRATE, 451 B.C.

For the next two hundred years Rome was engaged in struggles between the Patricians and Plebeians. From the death of Tarquin to the passage of the Ogulnian law (300 B.C.) when the priestly offices were opened to the Patricians and Plebeians alike, there was a constant strife between the two orders of the people. This struggle, though maintained with a steady determination by both parties, was yet marked by a noble self-control and, generally, by that regard for law and order that characterized the early Romans, for seldom do we find till the later period of Roman history that personal ambition dominated public interests. Though the strife between the two orders was continued during so long a period, we find, however, that the patricians and plebeians alike were always willing to unite their forces against a common foe. Instead of weakening the Romans the struggle developed in them that strong, manly character which enabled them to hurl the invader so often from their gates and which made Rome eventually the mistress of the ancient world.

The condition of the plebeians at Rome during the period after the exile of the kings resembled very much the state of the lower classes of Attica before the days of Solon. Most of the plebeians were small land owners, living in villages outside of Rome, and exposed to constant forays from their neighbours, with the loss of crops and cattle and homes that such forays naturally entailed. Again, the infantry of the army was mainly composed of yeomen who were compelled to quit their farms whenever the summer's campaign began, and to leave them to the care of their wives and children. The whole public land (*ager publicus*) which was obtained by conquest or confiscation, was in the hands of the patricians, who sub-let it

to the plebeians and paid a mere nominal quit-rent to the state for its use. Lastly, the lower classes were practically excluded from all offices, for though they were incorporated with the patricians by Servius Tullius, yet the wealthy centuries so outnumbered the others that the decision of everything depended on the patricians.

*Condition
of the
Patricians.*

The patricians, on the other hand, dwelt chiefly within the city. If land they had, it was usually tilled by their clients and slaves, and generally consisted of extensive pastures on which they fed their flocks and herds, which could be easily removed to a place of security in case of an invasion, and thus their lands were not so much at the mercy of a marauding enemy as the farms of the plebeians with their standing crops. The patricians had also the advantage of profiting by the wealth which their clients acquired by practising trades or crafts, which were exclusively in the hands of the latter. The offices of state were entirely in their hands and under their direction.

*What was
Roman
citizenship?*

We thus see that there were two distinct classes of citizens possessing certain rights and burdens in common, but differing in other respects. In later times full Roman citizenship¹ consisted of two classes of rights: (1) public; the right of voting², the right of holding office³, the right of appeal⁴ from the decision of a magistrate; (2) private; the right of trading⁵, the right of contracting a religious marriage⁶. Of these rights the plebeians during this period had the right of voting, though, as we have said, their votes went for little; the right of an appeal, and the right of trading. They had not the right of holding office, or the right of contracting a religious marriage. A patrician had the full rights.

*Law of
Debt.*

Though it was hard for the men who bore the brunt of the battles in defence of their native land to be deprived of some of the rights of citizenship, it was far harder for these same men to be reduced to the position of debtor and slave. The Roman law of debt was very severe and proceeded on the principle that anything pledged as security for debt passed completely into the

¹ *civitas*. ² *ius suffragii*. ³ *ius honorum*. ⁴ *ius provocationis*. ⁵ *ius commercii*. ⁶ *ius conubii*.

power of the mortgagee. The loss of property in the border wars that were now constantly waged, compelled the plebeians to borrow money from the patricians. When the property of the borrower was not sufficient to pay off the loan, the person of the debtor passed completely into the hands of the creditor, who was authorized by law to cast him into prison, and after a certain time to sell him as a slave. The position of the plebeians, who were thus neither slaves nor free, was peculiarly hard, and the discontent arising from this state of affairs naturally became formidable. The strife that arose was of a two-fold nature: between the rich and poor, and between rulers and subjects.

It was not to be expected that the plebeians would tamely submit to such treatment, especially since, as we have said before, the very land they were tilling and were purchasing from the patricians had been won by their valour and by their gratuitous service. Besides, the taxes (*tributum*) required to carry on the continual wars were doubtless heavy.

At length the plebeians, after a campaign against the Volscians, instead of returning to Rome, encamped at *Mons Sacer*,
Secession of the Plebeians, 494 B.C.
 a hill beyond the Anio, about two miles from Rome. There they determined to found a new town and leave Rome to the patricians and their clients. The patricians became alarmed when they saw the flower of the Roman infantry withdrawn from the city. In their extremity they sent the aged Menenius Agrippa, who had great influence with the plebeians, to induce them to return to Rome. He is said to have succeeded by relating to the seceding plebeians the well-known fable of the Belly and the Members.

The negotiations ended in a compromise. The plebeians were to have all debts cancelled, all debtors in bondage were to be restored to their freedom, and to secure in future the protection of their rights, the plebeians were to have the right of annually appointing, at the assembly of the tribes held in the forum, two magistrates called *tribunes of the people*. The jurisdiction of
Tribunes of the people.
 these officers was exercised within the city and for one mile from its walls. Consequently it could be exercised against a

consul while acting in the city, or when holding a levy or election in the Campus Martius, but not when he was abroad in the field. Their persons were declared sacred and inviolate, which meant that any person obstructing them in the discharge of their duty or offering them violence would be accursed in the eyes of the law. They were never to leave the city during their term of office; and their houses were open night and day to all who needed their aid.

Power of the Tribunes. The power of the tribunes was purely negative; they could stay proceedings. Their *veto* or right of intercession stopped any legal or administrative proceedings directed against the plebeians by a magistrate, but this power gradually extended to other public business. In after times, when they had, however, the right of addressing and summoning the people, they could initiate legislation. It is doubtful whether at first they were elected by the *comitia centuriata*, *comitia tributa* or *comitia curiata*, but after 471 B.C. they were elected by the *comitia tributa*, which was composed mainly of plebeians. Their numbers were at first two, then five, and afterwards ten.


Plebeian Aediles. By the secession to Mons Sacer, the plebeians obtained also the privilege of electing two *aediles*. These were both police commissioners and commissioners of public works, and their duties consisted in preserving order in the streets, and of looking after roads and buildings.

Agrarian bill of Spurius Cassius, B.C. 486. The power that the plebeians had suddenly acquired seemed likely to be increased by the espousal of their cause by a patrician of high rank, Spurius Cassius. He had already formed a league comprising the Romans, Latins and Hernicans, and in his third consulship he brought forward an agrarian bill by which the public land was to be divided among the plebeians. As we have before mentioned, the crown lands belonged to the state and was rented to the patricians at a mere nominal rate, who sub-rented it to the plebeians. Often large tracts were held by the patricians on which they kept their extensive herds and flocks. This land Cassius proposed to divide among the needy plebeians. In spite of the opposition of the patricians, the bill was passed but was never carried into effect. In the following year Cassius

was charged with aiming at kingly power, scourged and beheaded and his house was razed to the ground.

No sooner had these concessions been made than Rome was engaged in a strife which lasted for nearly a hundred years, with her neighbours—the Latins on the south, the Aequians on

Wars of Romans with their neighbours.



the east, and the Etrurians on the north. Of the shadowy details of these wars we have little real information. It is, however, certain that the Romans were hard pressed and lost a considerable number of towns they had previously acquired. There are three important legends connected with this period

which we shall notice ; that of Coriolānus, of the Fabian *gens*, and of Cincinnatus.

*Legend of
Coriolanus,
B.C. 488.*

Caius Marcius was born of a high patrician family. His mother, Volumnia, was a typical Roman matron of the old school—noble and generous, proud and stern, implacable towards an enemy, and unforgiving of the faults of a friend. It was her greatest joy to hear of the warlike deeds of her son, for he had won a civic crown of oak at the battle of Lake Regillus, for saving the life of a Roman citizen, and had gained the name of Coriolanus for recapturing the city of Corioli from the Volscians.

The Romans had been greatly distressed for want of corn, and a great dearth arose in consequence of their lands being devastated by war. In their extremity, Gelon, the Greek tyrant of Syracuse, had sent some corn ships to relieve their distress. Some were for giving it to the poor ; others were for selling it at a low price ; while Coriolanus, enraged at the concessions granted to the plebeians and angry at the thought that they were protected by the new officers, advised the senate not to relieve the people till they had given up their tribunes. His insolent language aroused the plebeians to such a pitch of fury that they would have torn him in pieces, but the tribunes advised them to offer no violence. They, however, summoned him to appear before them and to stand his trial before the assembly of the tribes. Then Coriolanus breathing threatenings and vengeance against his ungrateful countrymen turned his steps to Antium, which was then the capital of the Volscians, and made an offer to their king to lead them against the thankless Romans. The proposal was at once accepted. Coriolanus led the Volscians against Rome, ravaging and destroying the lands of the plebeians, but leaving those of the patricians unmolested. This naturally fanned the flame of jealousy between the two orders, and the consuls found it impossible to raise an army to meet the Volscians. Coriolanus had now advanced to within five miles of the city. In despair and fear numerous suppliants thronged to the temple, praying the gods for aid against the ever-victorious general. At length

a deputation of five leading patricians was sent to treat with him. Respectfully, but sternly, he told them that he was general of the Volscians, and the only terms to which he would agree, would be that they should restore to the Volscians all the lands taken in war and admit the Volscians to a league with Rome on an equality with the Latins. The Roman senate refused to treat on these conditions. Another deputation was sent, more imposing than the former. The pontiffs, flamens and augurs all arrayed in their priestly vestments besought him by all the reverence he had for the gods of his native land to spare Rome. Still he relaxed in no respect his former demands. When nothing seemed able to save Rome, Valeria, the sister of Valerius Poplicola, advised that she, with Volumnia, the mother of Coriolanus, and his wife Virgilia leading her two sons, and a number of other patrician matrons should go and try to soften the inexorable heart of Coriolanus. Unable to withstand the stern rebuke of a mother whom he had feared and respected from his childhood, he burst into tears and said, 'O my mother, thou hast saved Rome, but lost thy son.' So he turned his steps away from Rome and went to dwell among the Volscians.

Of the patrician families that were unrelenting in their opposition to the agrarian bill of Spurius Cassius, none were so determined as the Fabii, who for several successive years engrossed the consulship to themselves. Of this family, Kaeso Fabius had been one of the instruments in gaining the condemnation of Spurius Cassius. In his third consulship, however, he showed an altered spirit, and probably because he had seen the injustice of his course, he came forward as the champion of the bill he had so strongly opposed. The patricians rejected his measure, and the whole Fabian *gens* resolved to leave Rome, to the number of three hundred and six fighting men, with their wives and children, and to carry on war against the Etruscan city of Veii, about twelve miles from the city, and one of the most determined rivals of Rome. They took up their camp on the river Cremëra, and for two years carried on war against the city. After the people of Veii had in vain attempted to dislodge them they were led into an ambuscade and all slain.

*Legend of
the Fabii,
477 B.C.*

None survived but one young Fabius who had been left at Rome while the rest of the *gens* went to camp on the river Creméra. He was the father of the Fabii who were afterwards so famous in the history of Rome.

*Legend of
Cincinnatus
458 B.C.*

A peace had been concluded with the Aequians but was soon broken by their invasion of Roman territory. The Aequian army occupied Mount Algidus, from which they ravaged the Roman lands on every side. When an embassy was sent to them from Rome demanding satisfaction and compensation, the commander of the Aequians laughed at the ambassadors. Without any further delay the consul Minucius led his army against the foe, but was defeated and his army hemmed in on all sides by the Aequians. The senate met and appointed L. Quinctius Cincinnatus, a patrician, as dictator, who had long served his country in peace and war as consul and senator. He was found living on a small farm which he tilled with his own hands. He accepted the dictatorship, and next morning he appeared in the forum. He ordered all the law courts to be closed till danger was averted from his native land, and also summoned all the men of military age to meet him in the *Campus Martius* in the evening, with food for five days and twelve stakes apiece. Before sunset he had started for Mount Algidus to relieve the besieged army of Minucius.

When he drew near the enemy he ordered his soldiers to pile up their baggage in a heap, and at once he began to surround the camp of the Volscians. He then dug a trench, threw up a mound and drove the stakes into the earth on the top of the mound. The Romans raised a war cry which was recognized by the soldiers of the army of Minucius. On every side the Aequians were attacked, and seeing no hope of escape surrendered, and sued for mercy. The conquered Aequians were made to pass under the yoke formed by two spears fastened upright in the ground and a third fastened to these above. Thus Cincinnatus defeated the Aequians and within sixteen days after he received the dictatorship resigned his office, crowned with the gratitude and honour of his fellow citizens because he had saved Rome from destruction.

CHAPTER VI.

THE DECEMVIRATE.

We have already seen that Spurius Cassius proposed an agrarian bill, by which it was enacted that the land taken by the Romans in war, instead of remaining as crown lands leased out to the patricians at fixed rentals, should be divided up and pass into the absolute possession of the landless Romans and Latins. This bill, though passed, was not carried out. Another important bill passed at this time was proposed by Publilius Volero that the tribunes should be elected by the comitia tributa. It was only then that the plebeians really gained an advantage by the compromise granted at Mons Sacer. Though patricians were included in the comitia tributa, their numbers were few, for they would mostly be confined to the four city tribes, while the sixteen country tribes would be mostly plebeian. As the Romans always decided by a cumulative vote, there would thus be four votes on the side of the patricians to sixteen on the side of the plebeians. The concession granted thus by the Publilian Law (*Lex Publilia*) was that the plebeians had the right to elect magistrates who would guard their rights and who were outside of patrician influence, and that the plebeians in their own assembly could pass resolutions (*plebiscita*) which were now binding on the members of their own order. The exclusive administration, however, of the legal and judicial systems at Rome was still in the hands of the patricians, and there was as yet no written code to limit their power or govern their decisions. Accordingly, a tribune, C. Terentilius Arsa, proposed that a commission of three men (*triumviri*) should be appointed to draw up laws to check in future the arbitrary power of the patrician magistrates. For several successive years the struggle for plebeian rights was maintained. The same tribunes were appointed and scenes of violence and lawlessness were of frequent occurrence. The patricians had recourse even to assassination to thwart the success of the

First Agrarian Bill,
486 B.C.

Tribunes elected at Comitia Tributa,
471 B.C.

Bill of Terentilius Arsa,
proposed
462 B.C.

plebeian measures. It appeared that Rome from internal strife would be torn in pieces, and that she had lost the characteristic regard she had for law and order. Happily, there were among those of both sides men of liberal views who counselled moderation, for they clearly saw that the only hope of Rome was in unity, surrounded, as she was, on all hands by numerous enemies. At length the bill of Terentilius passed, and three commissioners at once set out for Greece to study the laws of Athens and of the other Greek states so that these might be the groundwork of the new code. In the autumn of 452 B.C. the triumvirs returned and ten men (*decemviri*) were appointed who were entrusted with all the functions of government. During their term of office, all other magistracies, even the tribunate, were suspended. They formed an executive and also a legislative council. They conducted the government, administered justice and commanded the armies in the field. They were empowered to draw up a code of laws, so that impartial justice might be meted out to patricians and plebeians alike, and that the power of the chief officers might be clearly defined. The decemvirs entered office in the beginning of 451 B.C. All were patricians, and at the head of them were Appius Claudius and Titus Genucius, who had been elected consuls for the year. During the first year of their office they discharged their duties faithfully and dispensed justice impartially. As was the case with the *interreges* or between-kings, they administered the government day by day in succession. At the end of the year they drew up the Laws of the Ten Tables, which received the approbation of the people. They then abdicated office, and were succeeded by another set of decemvirs, of whom Appius Claudius alone had held office the previous year. The composition of the second set of decemvirs, unlike the first, was of about equal numbers of plebeians and patricians. The decemvirs justified their appointment by producing two additional tables of laws. Appius Claudius had taken care that his colleagues should be men who would be his ready tools to carry out his tyrannical schemes. Instead of having twelve lictors in all, each of the decemvirs was attended by twelve, so that one hundred and twenty lictors were in the city. Appius now became a thorough despot. All freedom of speech and

*Law of
Terentilius
passed,
452 B.C.*

*First Decem-
virate, 451
B.C.*

*Laws of the
Ten Tables.*

*Laws of the
Twelve
Tables.*

action was suppressed ; his plebeian colleagues, overawed by his influence, acquiesced in his policy, or at least did not oppose his tyrannical acts ; the senate was seldom called together ; many of the leading men were put to death or banished, and in fact every vestige of the liberties for which the plebeians had striven and which the patricians had conceded seemed altogether obliterated.

*Second
Decemvirate
elected, 450
B.C.*

At the end of the year, the decemvirs, contrary to the practice of the Romans, did not lay down office, and in this they violated a fundamental principle of the Roman law, which required an officer to resign his magistracy at the expiration of his term of office. They did not even hold the semblance of an election, but continued in power as though they had been elected. From the universal discontent of all orders with their illegal conduct, it was evident that even a trifling occasion would cause the people to rise and break the fetters that were enslaving the state with absolute tyranny.

*The Decem-
virs illegally
continue in
office, 449 B.C.*

Such an occasion was not long wanting. The Sabines and the Aequians made an attack against the Roman territories. In the army sent against the Aequians was a centurion, Virginius by name. He had a daughter named Virginia, just ripening into womanhood and betrothed to L. Icilius, a plebeian leader. The beauty of Virginia had attracted the notice of Appius Claudius himself, who determined to get her into his possession. To carry out his plan, he ordered one of his clients to lay hold of Virginia as the latter was going to her school in the forum and to claim her as his slave. The matter was then brought before the decemvir Appius Claudius himself, who gave his decision that the maiden should be handed over to the claimant, who would have to produce her in case the alleged father should dispute the claim. This was a decision clearly in opposition to a law sanctioned by the decemvir himself, which provided that any person being in freedom should remain free till it was proved that such a person was a slave. Against the legality of this judgment Icilius, her betrothed, and Numitorius, her uncle, strongly argued, and Appius Claudius fearing a tumult agreed to leave the maiden in their hands on condition of their giving bail for her appearance in court next morning, and then, if her father did not appear,

*Legend of
Virginia.*

the decemvir said that he would give her up to her claimant. At once two friends set out for the Aequian camp, which they reached the same evening. Early next morning the unhappy centurion and his daughter appeared in the forum with rent garments. Numerous friends attended Virginius. Appius probably fearing a disturbance ordered the lictors to disperse the mob, thus leaving Virginius and his daughter alone before the tribunal. In the face of his own law, the lustful Claudius gave his decision that Virginia should be given up till she should be proved free. Seeing it was impossible to obtain justice, Virginius asked permission of Claudius to allow him to ask the maiden whether she was his daughter or no. Under the pretence of asking her this question, he drew her aside and snatching a knife from one of the butchers' stalls, he plunged it in her breast exclaiming: 'In this way only can I keep thee free.' Then turning to Appius he said: 'On thee, Appius, and on thy head be this blood.'

When his comrades heard the tale they at once abandoned their generals and marched to Rome, and were soon joined by the Sabine army, to which Icilius and Numitorius had related the sad news. They were joined by the plebeians, who decided a second time to return to Mons Sacer, where they extorted from the patricians the second great charter of plebeian rights. The decemvirs were compelled to resign by the patricians, who sent two of their number, Valerius and Horatius, to negotiate with the disaffected plebeians. The demands of the plebeians were:

*Demands of
the Plebe-
ians.*

(1) That the tribuneship should be restored, and that the comitia tributa should be recognized.

(2) That the right of appeal against the supreme magistrate should be secured.

(3) That full indemnity be granted to the movers and promoters of the last secession.

(4) That the decemvirs should be burnt alive.

All these demands were not granted, for the senate agreed that the fourth was unworthy of a free people and was in fact an act of tyranny as bad as any that had disgraced the rule of the decemvirs. The first three demands were,

however, confirmed. The plebeians now elected for the first time ten tribunes, instead of five as formerly, and the number ten remained the number of the tribunes down to the latest times. Of these the chief were Virginius, Icilius, and Numitorius. But the state was without any supreme magistrate. The *comitia centuriata* met and elected Valerius and Horatius, who were properly speaking the first consuls. This term, consuls, was used afterwards to designate the chief officers of the Republic, for previous to the year 366 B.C. these officers had the name of praetors. When the new consuls were installed in office, they at once redeemed the pledges given to the plebeians on Mons Sacer, and brought forward the celebrated Valerio-Horatian Laws. By these laws it was enacted

Valerio-
Horatian
Laws, 449
B.C.

(1) That every citizen should have the right of appeal to the people against the decision of the supreme magistrate. This right was a renewal of the old law of Valerius Poplicola in the first year of the Republic, and had been sanctioned by the ten tables of the decemvirs. A third time it was confirmed, B.C. 300, by M. Valerius, the consul.

(2) That the decisions of the plebeians (*plebiscita*) in their assembly (*comitia tributa*) should be as binding over all citizens, patricians and plebeians alike, as the laws that were passed at the *comitia centuriata*. Before this the *plebiscita* had only the force of laws over the plebeians.

(3) That the persons of the tribunes, aediles, and other plebeian magistrates should be sacred, and whoever injured them should be sold as a slave.

When these laws were passed Virginius, now a tribune, impeached Appius Claudius, who, scorning condemnation, took his own life. The other decemvirs were allowed to go into exile and their property was confiscated to the state. The twelve tables, of which only a few fragments remain, were regarded by the Romans as the foundation of their whole judicial system. Perhaps all they did was to fix in a definite written form the existing law, and not to leave the decision of many cases to the arbitrary caprice of magistrates. We shall see, however, in the next chapter that the law forbidding all marriage between the patricians and plebeians was repealed.

CHAPTER VII.

FROM THE DECEMVIRATE TO THE CAPTURE OF ROME BY THE GAULS (449-390 B.C.).

From the time of the decemvirate to the period when the Licinian Rogations became law (367 B.C.) constant struggles were going on between the two orders, the patricians and the plebeians. *Lex Canuleia, 445 B.C.* The first attempt to raise the social standing of the plebeians was made by Caius Canuleius, who brought forward a bill to remove the disability imposed by the eleventh law of the twelve tables, by which it was forbidden to a plebeian and a patrician to contract a legal marriage. Of course, this proposal was bitterly opposed by the patricians, who saw clearly that the ultimate object of the bill was to destroy the patricians as a caste and to break down finally all barriers between the two orders. It was not till the plebeians seceded and occupied the Janiculum that the proposal was granted. The success of the tribune emboldened his colleagues, who began to speak of bringing forward a measure which should throw the consulship open to the plebeians as well as to patricians. This, however, was averted by the patricians agreeing that the supreme power of the state should be entrusted to new officers bearing the name of *Military Tribunes with Consular Power*, who could be elected from both the patricians and plebeians at the *comitia curiata*. Their number varied from three to six. They continued to be appointed, with occasional intervals of consuls, from 444 to 367 B.C., when the Licinian Rogations, by which one of the consuls had to be a plebeian, became law. This apparently important concession of granting military tribunes to the plebeians was practically nullified by dividing up the duties of the consuls between the censors and the quaestors. It is even doubtful whether any plebeians held the office of military tribune with consular power till the year 400 B.C.

Censors first appointed, 443 B.C. The censors were appointed to relieve the consuls of part of their duties. They were always two in number and elected

at the *comitia centuriata* every five years, at first from the patricians but after 351 B.C. from the plebeians also. Though elected every five years (*lustrum*), they held power for only eighteen months and then abdicated. Their chief duties were, to assess the property of each citizen and to make a regular classification of citizens according to centuries, tribes and classes, to prepare a list of persons recommended to seats in the senate, to allot the contracts for public works, and generally to investigate the private life of any citizen.

The period immediately following the election of censors was marked by dearth and poverty in Rome. To relieve the wants of the poor a new officer called 'Master of the Market'¹ was appointed. He had the superintendency of the supply of corn. *Spurius Maelius*, 440-439 B.C. The first who held office, L. Minucius, a patrician, seems to have been an indolent and inefficient man. The plebeians were in great need and he made little exertion to relieve their wants. Accordingly Spurius Maelius, a rich patrician knight with a liberality rarely found among men of his class, purchased a quantity of corn which he distributed among the plebeians at a low rate. He became in consequence of his generosity exceedingly popular; so popular, in fact, that he excited the jealousy of the patricians who charged him with aiming at kingly power. The nobility determined to crush Spurius Maelius, and, to carry out their plan, a dictator, the aged L. Quinctius Cincinnatus was appointed, who was well known for his hostility to the plebeians. The dictator named C. Servilius Ahala, master of the horse. During the night following his appointment, the dictator manned the Capitol with troops and barricaded with soldiers all the entrances to the city. Next morning he took his seat in the forum and sent Ahala to summon Spurius Maelius. The latter refused to appear, for he was well aware that there was little hope of the success of an appeal to the *comitia centuriata* from the decision of the dictator. While Maelius was taking refuge in a band of citizens Ahala struck him dead. The dictator gave his decision that the act was justifiable. The house of Maelius was levelled to the ground. There seems to have been no outbreak on the part of the

¹ *præfectus annonæ*.

plebeians after this act of outrage, though the tribunes of the people did not hesitate to stigmatize the act in the severest terms.

The Quaestorship opened to the plebeians, 421 B.C.

We have already mentioned that the quaestors were officers under the kings. These quaestors, properly called *quaestores parricidii*, 'trackers out of murder', were judges on questions involving a matter of life and death, and must be distinguished from the *quaestores classici*, 'paymasters of the classes', or simply *quaestores*, who were now appointed. The duty of the latter was to act as paymasters to the *classes* into which Servius Tullius divided the people. Originally two, then four were appointed, and of the four two might be plebeians. Subsequently their number was increased with the addition of provinces to the Roman Empire, for every province had a quaestor attached to the staff of the provincial governor. As the quaestor at the expiration of his term of office was eligible to a seat in the senate, we can see that plebeians thus gained admission to that body.

War with Veii, 406-396 B.C.

The towns that withstood the advance of the Roman arms most stubbornly were Veii, in Etruria, and Fidēnae, a town in Latium, both only a few miles from Rome. But Fidenae was taken in 426 B.C., and at the same time a truce was made with the Veientes for twenty years. At the expiration of this truce the Romans accused the Veientes with making inroads on their settlements and declared war. At first the campaign was carried on languidly, for the Romans had on their hands also a war with the Volscians. When, however, the Volscian war was brought to a close, 403 B.C., the united forces of the Romans turned their arms against Veii. Still the war continued without any success on either side. The length of the war was not, however, an unmitigated evil to the Romans, for it developed the professional soldier. Then the Roman spent his winter, for the first time, in the camp instead of returning to his farm or business. As the war lasted ten years the custom of paying the soldiers was introduced. In the fifth year of the war the senate met and appointed M. Furius Camillus dictator, a man who stands out pre-eminent among the heroes of the early republic.

M. Furius Camillus, Dictator.

After a siege of ten years the city was taken, and the inhabitants either slain or sold into slavery. Camillus celebrated his victory in a manner hitherto unprecedented. He ascended the Capitol in a chariot drawn, like the chariot of the sun, by four white horses, and old men predicted that the vengeance of heaven would yet visit Camillus for his pride. *Veii taken.*

As Veii was a more beautiful city than Rome, many of the Romans wished to remove thither and make Veii the capital of the state. But from this project they were dissuaded by Camillus. The lands, however, of the conquered city were distributed among the plebeians, each of whom received seven *jugera*¹, with an additional allowance for his children. The next step was to punish the allies of Veii. *Lands of Veii divided among the Plebeians.* Capena was taken and destroyed; and Falerii, which had also aided Veii in the war, fell an easy prey to the Romans. *Capena and Falerii taken.*

Camillus soon lost his popularity with his fickle countrymen. It is said that flushed with victory he had vowed one tenth of the spoil to the Delphian Apollo without consulting the people, and when he wished them to deliver up the spoil wherewith to pay the vow, they regarded his act as tyrannical and arrogant. It is also said that he appropriated to his own use the bronze gates of the captured city. Though his tribesmen were willing to pay the fine that would have been imposed on him, Camillus took refuge in flight to Ardea, a city of the Volsci. *Exile of Camillus.* Soon, however, his countrymen were glad to recall him, for 'the Gaul was at the gates' of Rome.

The invasion of the Gauls took place with all the suddenness that one would expect from that impetuous race. Headed by the Senonian Gauls, the whole of the clans of Northern Italy laid siege to Clusium, then the chief city of the Etruscan league. The people of Clusium in alarm sent envoys to Rome to ask the aid of the Romans. The senate saw clearly that if Clusium were taken, Rome itself would be in danger. *The Gauls attack Clusium.* All that the Romans did, however, was to send three Fabii as ambassadors to Clusium, who were instructed to warn the Gauls not to meddle with the affairs of Clusium, for

¹A *jugera* was 80 yds. by 40 yds., or 3200 sq. yds.: about $\frac{3}{4}$ of acre.

that city was an ally of Rome. But little heed was paid to such a warning. It so happened that while the Fabii were at Clusium a battle took place, and forgetting their peaceful character as ambassadors, they fought on the side of the Etruscans against the Gauls. Angry at this violation of the law of nations, the Gauls demanded to be led straight against the Romans. The chiefs, however, dissuaded their impetuous clansmen from this course and persuaded the Gauls to send a deputation to Rome to demand the surrender of the Fabii. The senate immediately replied that so important a matter should be left to the people. The assembly of the Romans answered the demand of the Gauls by electing the three Fabii as military tribunes. At once Brennus broke up his camp at Clusium and marched for Rome. His route was along the Clanis which flows into the Tiber. After reaching the latter river they crossed near the town of Volsinii and marched down the left bank till they arrived at the Allia, a small river that flows from the Alban hill into the Tiber nearly opposite the mouth of the Crēmēra. The Romans drew up their line with the Tiber on their left, the Alban hills on their right and the Allia in their front. A furious onset of the Gauls turned the right wing of the Romans, most of whom were slain by the javelin of the enemy while attempting to swim across the Tiber. Of the survivors, some were cut down, and others fled to Rome. The Romans never forgot that disaster. For all time the day was marked with a black letter and was unpropitious for any undertaking. The dread inspired by this defeat made Gaul a name to be feared till the days of Julius Caesar who finally completed its conquest. Such was the loss in the army of the Romans that the men left were not sufficient to man the walls of the city of Rome. It was therefore decided that they should retreat to the Capitol with all the provisions at hand, and that the priests and the vestal virgins should take refuge at Caere. The aged senators, men who had grown old in the service of the state, unable to save their native land, resolved to sacrifice themselves for it. As the Gauls approached, they ordered their ivory chairs to be set in the forum before the temple of the gods, and then they took their seats, each clad in his *toga praetexta*, to await the coming of the barbarians.

*Defeat of
the Romans
at the Allia,
18th July,
390 B.C.*

At the head of his barbarian horde, Brennus entered the city by the Colline gate. To the great surprise of the Gauls, their march was unchecked and the streets were deserted. When they reached the forum they saw the venerable senators sitting like so many guardian gods of their native land. In silent wonder the strangers gazed on the aged senators. At length one of the Gauls, more impudent than the rest, ventured to stroke the beard of Papirius. The luckless barbarian was at once struck on the head with the ivory sceptre, and this was a sign for a general massacre of the Romans. Fire and slaughter reigned supreme for days. The only place not given up was the Capitol, which was still defended by a few heroic souls. For seven months the Roman garrison there was the centre of attack. The Gauls, fortunately for the Romans, had invaded Italy at a time when fever was prevalent, and their number was gradually thinned out by disease. While the Capitol was being besieged a number of Romans had collected at Veii and had resolved to ask the senate to appoint Camillus dictator. But to get Camillus appointed, it would be necessary to consult the senate, which was blockaded in the Capitol. A daring youth offered to be the bearer of the proposal. He reached the Capitol in safety, obtained the sanction of the fathers to the appointment of Camillus, and returned to Veii. His success, however, was well nigh destruction to Rome. Next day some of the Gauls observing the tracks of his steps attempted on the following night to reach the summit. The top had been reached by the foremost of the Gauls, when some geese, sacred to Juno, which the Romans had with religious veneration refrained from eating, even when hard pressed by famine, aroused M. Manlius, the defender of the Capitol, from sleep. Manlius hurled down the Gaul who had clambered up, and gave the alarm to his comrades. The Capitol was saved and M. Manlius, the saviour of the Capitol, was regarded in subsequent history as one of the greatest of Roman heroes.

Gauls enter Rome.

Camillus recalled from exile.

Capitol saved by Manlius.

Both Romans and Gauls were suffering from famine, and no doubt both sides were eager to make a compromise. At length it was agreed that the barbarians should quit the Roman territory on paying one thousand pounds of gold. This sum was procured from the treasures of the temple and the ornaments of Roman

Withdrawal of the Gauls.

matrons. When the gold was being paid out to Brennus, and when the Roman commissioners were complaining of the false weights used by the Gauls, the haughty barbarian threw his sword into the scale with the words, 'Woe to the conquered'. At this moment Camillus appeared in the forum, declared that the agreement was null and void, because it had been made without the dictator's sanction, drove the Gauls from the forum and out of Rome. Next day a battle was fought outside the gates of Rome, on the road to Gabii, when the Gauls were defeated and their leader, Brennus, fell under the sword of Camillus, who shouted in the ear of the expiring Gaul the haughty words he had used towards the Romans, 'Woe to the conquered.' Some historians relate that the departure of the Gauls was due to the fact that the Veneti attacked their settlements in Northern Italy. In whatever way the Gauls departed one thing is certain; Rome was reduced to ashes. The people were in despair and loudly asked to be led to Veii, a city with fine streets, magnificent buildings and level site. Camillus, however, dissuaded them and within a year the people saw Rome rise from its ashes. By the invasion, Rome was stripped of nearly all her allies. The league that she had formed with the Latins and Hernicans was dissolved, and her only salvation was that the other nations of Italy had been so weakened by the Gallic invasion that they were unable to assert any supremacy in the affairs of Rome.

Second invasion of the Gauls, 361 B.C.

Two other attempts were made by the Gauls, and these attacks are marked by two of the latest legends in Roman history. It is said that when the Gauls were encamped on the Anio, a gigantic Gaul stepped forward and insultingly challenged the Romans. In the Roman army was Titus Manlius, who obtained permission of the general to accept the challenge sent by the Gaul. He slew the giant and stripped from the neck of his foe the twisted chain (*torques*) which the Gallic chiefs were accustomed to wear. Hence he obtained the name of Torquātus.

Third invasion of the Gauls, 349 B.C.

It is also said that the Gauls had stationed their permanent camp on the Alban hills, and L. Furius Camillus, nephew of the great Camillus, was in command of the Romans. A gigantic Gaul,

as in the first case, had challenged any champion of the Roman army. Among the Romans was M. Valerius, who was a mere stripling compared to the monstrous Gaul. At the beginning of the conflict a crow alighted on the crest of the Roman's helmet, and at every onset the Gaul made, the bird flew in his face striking at him with his beak and flapping wings. Valerius slew the Gaul and thus obtained the surname of Corvus or the '*Raven*'.

CHAPTER VIII.

FROM THE GALLIC INVASION TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE PUBLILIAN LAWS, 389-339 B.C.

During the period succeeding the invasion of the Gauls, great poverty and suffering, with the attendant popular discontent existed. The city was in ruins, the small farms of the Roman yeomanry were ravaged, their homes were destroyed, and dearth prevailed everywhere. The first impulse of the Romans was to leave the blackened ruins of their city and take up their abode at Veii, but from this they were, as we have seen, dissuaded by Camillus. In their haste, however, to rebuild their city, the streets were laid out irregularly and consequently were crooked and narrow, and what was worse for sanitary reasons they often crossed the lines of the great sewers, so that the drainage was defective. It was not till after the great fire in the days of the Emperor Nero that Rome was built with any regularity.

*M. Manlius,
the patron of
the Ple-
beians, 385
B.C.*

The first precaution taken was to relieve the immediate distress that prevailed everywhere. One of the most obnoxious laws at Rome, as we have seen, was the law of debtor and creditor. Four years after the withdrawal of the Gauls, the brave defender of the Capitol, M. Manlius, came forward as the patron of the poor. Not only did he from his private means relieve many a plebeian who would have been sold into slavery for his debt, but he accused some of the patricians and senators of keeping possession of the money that had been raised to pay off the Gauls. He became the hero of the hour. In alarm the senate met and named Aulus Cornelius Cossus dictator. Manlius was summoned to make good his charges, and when he failed to do so to the satisfaction of the dictator he was cast into prison. A storm of popular indignation arose and Manlius, who claimed the right to be tried before the *comitia centuriata* was released. In spite of the fact that he had been the generous friend of the people and the saviour of the Capitol, and that he showed numerous badges given for his bravery in the field, the ungrateful

Roman patricians found him guilty and caused him to be thrown from the Tarpeian rock. A bill was passed enacting that his house should be destroyed and no one belonging to it hereafter should bear his *praenomen* of Marcus. *Death of
Manlius.*

The senate, now that it had got rid of this social reformer, began to be more conciliatory. His death, however, was only a check to the popular cause. The difference that existed between the two orders was fast disappearing, for many of the plebeian families were becoming wealthy and influential, while many of the patricians were lapsing into poverty and obscurity. The plebeians had already been admitted to the senate, to the offices of quaestor and aedile, and to that of military tribune, by virtue of which they could command the armies in the field. The only important offices they were now debarred from were those of consul and censor, and in case of these the objection was purely fictitious, for the patricians urged that no person could hold these offices save persons of pure patrician blood, since pure patricians alone could take the auspices. These *auspices* were supposed to furnish the revealed will of heaven to man. Every man could consult the augurs or gods for his own guidance in any action, but the magistrates alone could employ augurs to take public auspices on behalf of the people. The augur on such an occasion took up his position on some consecrated spot of ground, with his augural staff (*lituus*) marked out the heaven into four quarters, and watched for the flight of birds sent from Jove. He then according to the birds observed, and to the quarter in which they were seen, decided whether the signs were favourable or unfavourable. *Auspices.*

The bills that finally brought about a union of the two orders were the celebrated Licinian Rogations proposed by Caius Licinius Stolo and Lucius Sextius, tribunes of the people. These bills had for their object primarily the immediate diminution of the burden of debt with which the plebeians were oppressed; secondly, a fair division of the *ager publicus*, and lastly, the admission of the plebeians to the consulship. The provisions of the bills were *The Licinian Rogations, 376-367 B.C.*

(1) That on all debts on which interest had been paid, the sum

of the interest paid should be deducted from the principal, and the remainder paid in three successive annual instalments.

(2) That no citizen should have more than five hundred *jugera* of public land, nor should feed upon the public pastures more than one hundred head of oxen and five hundred of sheep, under penalty of a heavy fine.

(3) That henceforth, not military tribunes, but consuls should be elected, and that one of the two consuls *must* be a plebeian.

These laws were not passed till after a struggle of ten years. All kinds of opposition were offered by the patricians, who even instigated some of the tribunes to *veto* the proposals of their colleagues. But the two defenders of the rights of the plebs turned the engine of the veto now against the patricians. When the time of the elections at the *comitia centuriata* arrived, they exercised their power of veto by preventing any consuls, military tribunes, censors, or quaestors from being elected, and thus the only magistrates during these years in the state were the tribunes of the plebs and the aediles, who were elected at the *comitia tributa*. At the end of these five years, instead of relaxing their demands, they added another, that the care of the Sibylline Books, instead of being given to two men (*duumviri*) appointed by the patricians, should be given to ten men (*decemviri*), half of whom must be plebeians. For five years more the struggle lasted but the two tribunes adhered to their policy, and in the year 367 B.C. the Licinian Rogations became law, and Lucius Sextius became the first plebeian consul. One final effort was made to thwart the will of the plebeians. By the constitution of Rome, the *imperium* was conferred by the *comitia curiata* a patrician assembly of the *curiae* of Romulus. The *imperium* could thus be refused to the consul. The patricians elected Camillus, the defender of patrician rights, as dictator. But the aged veteran saw clearly that the only honourable thing to do was to accede wisely to the onward march of plebeian rights. A compromise was effected, and the *imperium* was granted to Lucius Sextius, but the judicial duties of the consul were separated from the office and given to a magistrate called the *praetor*. When Camillus had effected the union of the

*Decemviri
appointed.*

*First Plebe-
ian Consul.*

two orders he vowed a temple to Concord, but he died before he could dedicate it.

When the plebeians gained the consulship, it was easily seen that they soon would be successful in obtaining the right to hold the other offices. The first plebeian dictator was C. Marcius Rutilius, in 356 B.C., who was also the first plebeian censor, in 357 B.C. The first plebeian praetor was chosen in 336 B.C., and finally the Ogulnian Law (*Lex Ogulnia*) was passed in 300 B.C., by which the pontiffs were increased from four to eight, and the augurs from four to nine, and the provision was made that four of the pontiffs and five of the augurs should be taken from the plebeians. Another important reform was passed by the dictator, Q. Publilius Philo, which still further curtailed the privileges of the patricians. The provisions of these laws were

(1) That all resolutions of the plebeians (*plebescita*) passed at the *comitia tributa* should have the same force as laws passed at the *comitia centuriata*. *Offices opened to the Plebeians.*
Publilian Laws, 339 B.C.

(2) That when a law was brought before the *comitia centuriata* the senate should give its formal confirmation to the law before the voting began, not after.

(3) That one of the censors must be a plebeian.

The first was really a confirmation of the Valerio-Horatian Law, passed after the expulsion of the decemvirs, which had probably never been carried out.

CHAPTER IX.

FROM THE LICINIAN ROGATIONS TILL THE END OF THE THIRD SAMNITE WAR, 367-290 B.C.

From the time when the two orders were united by allowing the plebeians to become eligible for the consulship, till the final conquest of Italy, nearly a century elapsed. During the whole of this period the history of Rome is occupied with three important wars directed against the Samnites, the Latins and Pyrrhus, king of Epirus.

*First Sam-
nite War,
343-341 B.C.*

The Samnites belonged to the great Sabellian family of nations which occupied the highlands of Central Italy between Campania and Lucania. Like most mountaineers they were a pastoral people, and moved about from place to place wherever they could find most convenient pasturage for their flocks and herds. In consequence of their predatory habits, and also from a scarcity of pasture in their mountain fastnesses, they overran the plains that bordered on their own district, and soon spread themselves over Campania and Lucania where they drove out the Oscan and Pelasgian settlers. Soon, however, a quarrel arose between the Campanian Samnites and those of the interior, in which the Romans took sides with the Campanian Samnites, for these had offered to hand over to the Romans the city of Capua on the condition that the Romans would aid them in their wars with the Samnites of the highlands. This offer was too tempting to be resisted, for Capua was perhaps the wealthiest of all the Italian cities of that time, and the lands of Campania were the most fertile and the scenery the most beautiful of Italy. Two armies were despatched by the Romans, and a battle was fought at Mount Gaurus, near Cumae, at the head of the bay of Naples, where the Samnites were defeated with great loss. Two other defeats followed at Suessula and Saticula. During the winter that followed, the Romans occupied the lands of Campania. The prosecution of the war was delayed for two reasons. The soldiers wintering at

Capua, like those of Hannibal in after days, became discontented. They compared the rich and beautiful lands of Campania with the barren, dreary region that surrounded their native Rome, and they contrasted the luxurious and easy life of the Campanians with the spare and frugal mode of living practised at home. The poorer classes, too, in the city, still oppressed with debt, left Rome and joined the mutineers. Besides this, the Romans were aware that the Latins were on the eve of a revolt, and wished to husband their strength for a struggle which they saw must come sooner, or later, and which meant the life or death of the Roman state. A treaty of peace and alliance was made with the Samnites, so that the latter aided the Romans in the Latin war.

The Latins had already formed a league with the Romans in 356 B.C., and had aided them against the Etruscans and finally against the Samnites. The growing power of Rome had, however, excited their alarm. The Roman senate, too, saw clearly that, had the war with the Samnites continued, the Latins would have claimed an equality of command with the Romans. The conclusion of the treaty of alliance between Rome and the Samnites made it plain to the Latins that they must either be subject allies of Rome, or assert their independence in arms, or unite together and form one state. Accordingly a number of commissioners from Latium were sent to the Roman senate to consider the terms of union between Rome and Latium. They proposed that (1) henceforth Rome and Latium should form one state; (2) one of the two consuls should be a Latin; (3) the senate should be increased to six hundred, of whom three hundred should be Latins. It is also likely, though this is not expressly stated, that the demand was made that the Latin territory was to be divided like the Roman into tribes which would have equal votes with those of Rome at the *comitia tributa*.

These requests were rejected by the senate, and war was declared. Both Latins and Romans knew well that the great struggle was one on which the supremacy of Italy depended. Luckily for Rome she had for consuls in this war Titus Manlius Torquatus and Publius Decius Mus, consummate warriors and

The Latin War, 340-338 B.C.

Proposals of the Latin envoys.

Rejection of the proposals.

patriotic citizens, to lead her armies. These at once transferred the seat of war to the territory of Campania, where they could avail themselves of the aid of the neighbouring Samnites. When the two armies took up their position at the foot of Mount Vesuvius, the contest looked like a civil war. The soldiers of both armies spoke the same language; they had fought side by side under common generals; in arms, discipline and tactics they were the same; and many of them were well known to each other. Under these circumstances the Roman generals thought it expedient to break off all communication between the two armies. It was, accordingly, strictly forbidden for any Roman to engage in single combat with a Latin on the pain of death. The son of the consul Manlius, however, stung by the taunts of a Latin champion, accepted a challenge, slew his adversary and carried the spoils to his father. But the stern consul, like Brutus of old, would not pardon his son, and ordered him to be beheaded by the consul in presence of the army.

Roman victory at Mt. Vesuvius, 340 B.C.

As the two armies were lying opposite each other, on the night before the battle, each of the two consuls was disturbed by an ominous dream, for both were warned by a vision that on one side a leader and on the other an army would perish. Each of the consuls agreed that he whose division should first give way should devote himself to the gods of the lower world. Decius commanded the left and Manlius the right. When the left broke, Decius rushed into the thickest of the fight and was slain. Then victory came to the Romans, for more than three-fourths of the Latin army lay dead on the field.

By the victory of Vesuvius, the Romans gained not only Campania but also Latium. The war continued two years longer, but the Latin league was completely broken up. All general assemblies of the Latin nation were prohibited, the towns in Latium were governed by Roman soldiers, and they were prevented from forming again any union. The cities were kept isolated from each other, since the citizens of one city were forbidden to intermarry or make a legal contract with those of another, and the greater portion of the territory was incorporated with the republic.

During the interval between the Latin War and the Second Samnite War, the Romans were gradually completing their conquest of Campania. The immediate cause of the Second Samnite War was as follows: Parthēnōpē was an old Greek colony situated at the northern extremity of the bay of Naples. It was also called Palaeopolis or 'old town,' to distinguish it from Neapōlis or 'new town' further south. These towns were free and independent, though the neighbouring lands were in the hands of the Samnites. The senate alleged that certain piracies had been committed upon the Roman subjects of Campania and demanded satisfaction from Palaeopolis. But the city, trusting to the support of the Samnites and also secretly instigated by the Tarentines, refused to give any redress, and the senate declared war. Under the command of Publius Philo, the Romans marched to besiege Palaeopolis, and as the consul did not succeed in taking the city when the year of his office had expired, he was continued in command under the title of *proconsul*. Soon after the beginning of the year, Palaeopolis was treacherously delivered by two Greek traitors. The senate charged the Samnites with violating the peace and war was declared.

*Causes of the
Second Sam-
nite War.*

*The Second
Samnite
War, 326-
304 B.C.*

The Second or Great Samnite War lasted for twenty-two years. The Romans had now to fight not merely with the Samnites, but with the Tarentines and Lucanians, who had leagued themselves with the Samnites. Owing to the gravity of the situation they had appointed Lucius Papirius Cursor as dictator, and he named Quintus Fabius Maximus as master of the horse. When the dictator was recalled to Rome through some flaw in the auspices, he left the army in charge of the master of the horse, with strict injunctions not to hazard an engagement with the enemy till his return. Fabius, however, disobeyed the order and defeated the Samnites with great loss. Stung with resentment at this disobedience of his orders, Papirius ordered Fabius to be seized and put to death, but the soldiers rose in defence of the master of the horse, and an unwilling pardon was wrung from the dictator. A short truce followed, after which hostilities were renewed with greater activity than ever. The Samnites were led by C. Pontius, an able general, who inflicted on the Romans one of the most memorable defeats in history.

*A truce, 323
B.C.*

*Defeat of
the Romans
at the Cau-
dine Forks.*

The consuls considered that the capture of Luceria, the chief town of Apulia, was the key of the campaign, and determined to march thither as quickly as possible. The shortest route to this town was to strike the road at Caudium and march to Beneventum, where the road to Luceria branched off. Their route lay through a valley called the Caudine Forks, a narrow defile in the form of two wedges with the points facing each other and separated by a narrow plain. When the Romans attempted to enter the second defile they found the entrance impassable, being barricaded by fortifications and trunks of trees. They then retraced their steps but found the first defile occupied by the enemy. They now saw that they were entrapped, and surrendered. Pontius promised to dismiss them in safety on condition that they would agree to restore on equal terms the alliance between the Samnites and the Romans, and give up all the places they had conquered during the war. Though the consul and the superior officers agreed to this, and the whole Roman army was dismissed on this understanding, the senate refused to ratify the terms, and voted that the consuls and superior officers should be delivered up to the Samnites as hostages. These were conducted to Caudium by the priest (*fetialis*) and when they appeared before the tribunal of C. Pontius, Caius Postumius, the consul, struck the priest with his foot, saying that he was now a Samnite citizen and that the Romans could renew a justifiable war, since the sacred envoy of Rome had been insulted by a Samnite. Pontius, however, refused to accept the persons so offered, and sent them back to Rome, but retained the six hundred hostages left in the hands of the Samnites.

*Defeat of
the Romans
at Lautulae,
315 B.C.,
and of the
Samnites at
Cinna, 314
B.C.*

The Samnites seem to have gained little by this victory. Though the Romans were again defeated at Lautulae, this loss was retrieved by the victory at Cinna which is considered the turning point of the campaign. To Q. Fabius Maximus was due the victory, and to him really belong the honours of this war. Rome was now threatened by another danger, for the Etruscans and Umbrians united their forces to help the Samnites. But Fabius marched boldly into the heart of Etruria and defeated the Etruscans at the battle of Lake Vadimo, and the

*Etruscans
defeated, 309
B.C.*

Umbrians at Mevania. The Samnites were also defeated in several battles, and after the capture of Bovianun, one of their chief towns, they were compelled to sue for peace and acknowledge the supremacy of Rome. *Umbrians, 307 B.C. Peace concluded, 304 B.C.*

Soon after the conclusion of the Second Samnite War, the Aequians and Hernicans rose against Rome, but were reduced to submission in a single campaign. They were admitted to the Roman alliance on the same terms as the Latins. The lands of these were formed into two new tribes. Shortly afterwards the Marsi, Peligni, Marrucini and other nations of Central Italy also were received into alliance. While Rome was gradually reducing the nations of Central Italy, a new danger appeared on the North, for the Etruscans, Umbrians and Senonian Gauls—the same who had defeated the Romans at the river Allia—had combined against her. Taking advantage of this confederacy, the Samnites renewed the war and joined the forces of the confederates in Umbria. Then the great battle of Sentinum was fought in which the forces of the Romans gained a signal victory. After this the Romans completed the conquest of Samnium. This conquest was, however, sullied by the barbarous treatment offered to their generous enemy, C. Pontius. After being compelled to follow the triumphal car of the Roman general, he was beheaded in the prison beneath the Capitol. The war dragged out its slow length for three years longer when peace was concluded, which left the Romans practically masters of Italy from the Rubicon to the straits of Messina. *Third Samnite War, 295-290 B.C. Battle of Sentinum, 295 B.C. Death of Pontius, 293 B.C.*

CHAPTER X.

FROM THE THIRD SAMNITE WAR TO THE SUBJUGATION OF ITALY
(290-266 B.C.).

*Successive
conquests of
Rome.*

Rome had now little to fear from foes in Italy. The Latin league had been broken up by the defeat at Mount Vesuvius, the Samnites never recovered the reverse at Bovianum, and the Gauls, Etruscans and Umbrians had been crushed with disastrous loss at Lake Vadimo, and especially by the battle at Sentinum.

*Magna
Graecia.*

The only people who were still unsubdued were the Greeks of *Magna Graecia*. Several causes, however, rendered these people less formidable than either the Gauls, Etruscans, Latins or Samnites, for the same causes which prevented the Greek communities from uniting in a common object in the days of Greek freedom still operated among the cities of *Magna Graecia*. In the first place, mutual jealousy was an insuperable barrier to any concerted action, and in the second place, most of the cities were now in a state of decay, due partly to the loss of the spirit of freedom and partly to the increase of wealth and luxury, and lastly, the different cities were ruled by irresponsible tyrants whose interest it was to keep the cities isolated. The old aristocracy had been everywhere supplanted by a turbulent democracy, and this had been succeeded by tyrants whose object was to retain in their own hands the power they had gained by force or fraud.

Tarentum.

We have already alluded to Tarentum in the history of Greece as one of the colonies of Lacedaemon. It was situated on the eastern horn of a fine harbour. The city was built in the form of a triangle, with one side washed by the open sea, the other by the waters of the bay, while the third was connected with the land. The inhabitants were wealthy, and had lost the old Spartan love for independence and war. They had called in at various times several soldiers of fortune to aid them against the neighbouring tribes and cities, and now we find

them calling to their assistance the dashing and adventurous king of Epirus. The state of affairs throughout all the Greek cities of Italy and Sicily shows the worst fruits of Greek democracy. The people were indolent and luxurious, spent their days in the gymnasia, dreamed over political or philosophical theories which they never followed, or filled up their time in attending feasts or banquets. They were thus a poor match for the legions of Rome, composed of the hardy yeomanry of Italy whose life had been spent in the wars with the Italian nations.

No doubt the people of Tarentum viewed with alarm the progress of Roman conquest. The immediate cause of the war was not, however, a quarrel with Tarentum, but a quarrel between the Lucanians and the people of Thurii. This town had declared war against the Lucanians and had been besieged when the inhabitants called in the aid of the Romans. Not only did the consul C. Fabricius defeat the Lucanians and their allies and relieve Thurii, but he placed a garrison in the town. A fleet of ten ships were sent by the Romans to reconnoitre the sea coast and it appeared in the harbour of Tarentum. At once a fleet of the Tarentines was despatched against it and gained an easy victory. The Tarentine soldiers then marched to Thurii, took it, and compelled the authorities to dismiss the Roman garrison.

The senate sent at once an embassy to the Tarentines to formally complain of this violation of the rights of nations and to demand satisfaction, but the chief envoy was wantonly insulted by the Tarentines. War could no longer be put off. The Tarentines sent an embassy inviting the help of Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, who gladly accepted the offer.

Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, was thirty-eight years of age when he was invited to Italy to champion the rights of the Greek cities against Rome. He had been brought up amid the stormy times that followed the death of Alexander the Great. Driven twice from the throne, at the age of twenty-two he returned to Epirus, and transferred his seat of government from Passaron to Ambracia. Here he spent seven years in regulating his kingdom and in training his army. The invitation of the Taren-

*Invitation
to Pyrrhus,
200 B.C.*

tines filled his romantic mind with visionary dreams of rivalling the successes of his relative, Alexander the Great. The conquest of Italy, Sicily, and Africa would be a match for Alexander's conquest of Persia. Accordingly he crossed into Italy with a force of twenty thousand foot, three thousand horse, two thousand archers, five hundred slingers and twenty elephants. He had, however, sent in advance his general Milo with a detachment of three thousand men. As soon as he arrived he made the Tarentines feel that they had, instead of an ally, a severe master. He closed at once the gymnasia, the theatre, and the public promenades, diminished the number of festivals, and drafted all the citizens of military age into service. The giddy and licentious Greeks no doubt resented this interference with their acknowledged privileges, and few, except the Tarentines, flocked to his standard.

First campaign, 280 B.C. Defeat of the Romans at Heraclea.

In the first campaign, the consul Valerius Laevinus met Pyrrhus at Heraclēa, on the river Siris. This was the first occasion in which the Macedonian phalanx had been brought face to face with the Roman legion. The tactics of each were wholly different. In the Macedonian phalanx each man stood close to his comrade, so that his body was covered with his right man's shield. They were drawn up sixteen men deep, armed with long pikes. The Romans were drawn up in three lines so arranged that each was free to advance without being in the way of the other. When the first line discharged their javelins they retired and the second line advanced, and so with the third. Thus the Macedonian phalanx was suited for level ground, such as existed at Heraclea. No doubt, too, the elephants contributed to the defeat of the Romans, who were terrified at the sight of these unusual and ungainly animals. The victory was gained by Pyrrhus, but the loss he sustained was considerable, for all his best officers and troops fell in battle. As Pyrrhus viewed the field of battle he is said to have remarked, 'Another such victory and I shall be ruined.' Again, he was so impressed with the valour of the Romans and the sight of the dead bodies with their wounds all in front, that he exclaimed, 'Had I been king of the Romans I should have conquered the world'. The effect of the defeat of Heraclea was disastrous to the Romans,

for Pyrrhus gained great accession to his ranks from the Lucanians and Samnites. The Romans retreated to Capua, which Pyrrhus attempted to take, but failed. He then made his way through the lands of the conquered Volsci, Hernici and Aequi, to Etruria, intending to gain the discontented inhabitants to his side, and attack Rome from the north. He advanced to within twenty-four miles of Rome and sent his minister, Cineas, famed for his persuasive eloquence, to propose terms of peace to the Roman senate. The terms that the minister laid before the senate were those of a conqueror. All the Greek cities were to be set free, the cities taken from the Lucanians, Samnites and Bruttians were to be restored by the Romans, and in return for these Pyrrhus was to give back all the Roman prisoners without a ransom. According to one account these terms were indignantly rejected, according to another, many of the senators were wavering and inclined to treat for peace on these terms till the aged Appius Claudius, now old and blind, delivered an impassioned speech which caused the hesitating senators to reject indignantly the propoals of Cineas. The answer was sent that if Pyrrhus desired peace he must quit Italy; if he stayed the Romans would continue the war, though Pyrrhus should defeat a thousand such as Laevinus.

In the second campaign Pyrrhus gained another victory at Asculum. This victory was as devoid of results as the previous one at Heraclea. Though the loss on the side of the Romans was nearly double that on the side of Pyrrhus, Rome could replace her losses with greater ease than the king of Epirus.

Unwilling to hazard another campaign with the Romans in Italy, Pyrrhus listened to an invitation of the Sicilian Greeks to aid them against the encroachments of the Carthaginians. For the space of two hundred years there had been going on a constant struggle between the Greeks and Carthaginians for supremacy in that island. As we have mentioned, the Greek cities had been torn by dissensions among themselves, and had been ruled by one military adventurer after another. The people of Syracuse now invited Pyrrhus, who gladly accepted the invitation. His object was probably threefold: to restore order in Sicily by putting down tyrants, to drive out the Mamer-

Terms proposed by Pyrrhus.

Second campaign, 279 B.C. Defeat of the Romans at Asculum.

Pyrrhus goes to Sicily.

tines, and to keep in check the encroachments of the Carthaginians. But the latter concluded a defensive alliance with the Romans during the same year. Pyrrhus left Milo in command at Tarentum, and late in the summer started for Syracuse. On his arrival he found a complicated state of affairs. The people of that city were divided in their allegiance between two leaders, and a Carthaginian fleet occupied the harbour. After effecting a reconciliation between the two parties at Syracuse, he succeeded in driving the Carthaginians to the western end of the island, where they retained possession of their only fortress, Lilybaeum, and also in checking the power of the Mamertines. It may be said generally that his Sicilian expedition failed, for he left the island in the same position as he found it. This is still further confirmed by the memorable words he uttered on his departure, 'What a fighting ground for Rome and Carthage am I leaving'. After spending two years in Sicily he returned to Italy.

During the period that Pyrrhus was in Sicily, the Romans were engaged in successful expeditions against the Samnites and Lucanians, who had given assistance to Pyrrhus.

*Returns to
Italy, 276
B.C.*

On his return to Italy, the aspect of affairs had changed. The Samnites and Lucanians, taught by the success of the Roman arms, were unwilling to join the standard of Pyrrhus. The Romans, too, showed less desire to enlist against a king who had so far been successful. In both armies there was a lack of spirit. The Roman army was led by an able general, Curius Dentatus, who saw that the far-famed Macedonian phalanx, which Pyrrhus had employed in all his battles, was unsuited for uneven or rough ground. Advancing to Malventum (afterwards, Beneventum), he purposely picked out uneven ground and completely defeated the enemy. Pyrrhus escaped with a few horse to Tarentum, from which he crossed over to Epirus. This restless monarch could not refrain from war after his defeat, but fell two years later at the siege of Argos by a tile thrown by a woman's hand. By the victory of Malventum the Romans were freed from all fear of any internal enemies. All had now been subdued, and Roman colonies were placed in the conquered districts. Tarentum and Rhegium received Roman garrisons, and their surrender marks the conquest of Italy by the Romans.

*Defeat of
Pyrrhus at
Malventum,
275 B.C.*

*Death of
Pyrrhus,
272 B.C.*

CHAPTER XI.

HOW ROME GOVERNED AND WAS GOVERNED.

We have traced in the preceding pages the conquests by which Rome gradually obtained the sovereignty of Italy. What she thus acquired by conquest, it was her mission now to consolidate into one nation, united to the central authority by various kinds of alliances.

Though Rome was nominally a republic, she had few of the characteristics of modern republics. In the first place, the people of Italy were by no means 'free and equal,' and in the second place, the government of Rome proceeded on the principle that the Roman citizens, composed of the urban and suburban tribes, in the assemblies of the *comitia centuriata* and *comitia tributa*, which met in the city itself, should form the sovereign people. The management of a campaign, of an election, or of any important business of state could not be properly conducted unless first the auspices had been taken within the sacred precincts inside the walls of the city. It may be that the Romans aimed at the gradual enfranchisement of the conquered races of Italy until all should reach a condition of equality, but such equality was not reached till the passage of the Julian law. The laws of the Romans did provide, however, for the gradual acquisition of political rights by the conquered people, but such acquisition could only be obtained after a period of probation and dependence, during which the allies had an opportunity to show that they were worthy of the franchise. The inhabitants of Italy may be divided into three distinct classes: Roman citizens, Latins, and allies.

The Roman citizens consisted of those that dwelt at Rome, and in the suburban tribes, who had votes at the *comitia centuriata* and the *comitia tributa*. The district occupied by the tribes above mentioned may be said to include the country bounded by the Ciminian wood, near the city of Veii, in Etruria, and as far

Differences between the Government of Rome and Modern Republics.

Passage of the Julian Law, 90 B.C.

Roman Citizens.

south as the Liris, the boundary between Latium and Campania. Even in this district, and throughout Italy, were several towns (*municipia*) to which the Roman franchise was not given. Such municipalities were bound to Rome by treaty or alliance, varying in specific terms, but based on a general principle with respect to burdens and privileges. Such towns agreed to furnish, pay and equip certain contingents for the Roman armies, while the rations were furnished by Rome itself. They were exempt from all other taxes to Rome, and were free to elect their own magistrates¹. We have mentioned before what the full Roman franchise meant². Only citizens born of free parents, who were either citizens of Rome itself or citizens of the suburban tribes, or citizens in colonies whose inhabitants did not suffer any disability by belonging to such a colony, or who were slaves manumitted by their masters, or who for some other reason obtained the right of citizenship, had the right to vote in the assembly. They alone had the exclusive right of government. They alone made and enacted laws, decided important cases in court, declared war and made treaties, and in fact, exercised the sovereign functions of the government. All Roman citizens, seventeen years of age, were enrolled in the books of the censor, which specified the tribe, class and century to which each belonged. Wherever such a citizen lived, he could exercise his franchise only at Rome. He paid little or no taxes, for the state lands (*ager publicus*) and the tribute from the conquered districts sufficed for the ordinary expenses of the government.

*Roman
Colonies*

A Roman colony was properly a military occupation. It usually consisted of three hundred men of military experience, who went forth with their families to occupy conquered cities, often of no great importance except as military posts. At this time the chief military colonies were on the seaboard of Latium. The Roman colonists formed a patrician caste, while the condition of the old inhabitants was on a level with that of the plebeians

¹ The *præfecturae* did not, however, have this option. They were governed by a *præfectus* sent out from the city. In other respects *municipia* and *præfecturae* were the same.

² p. 332.

at Rome. The members of the colony retained their Roman citizenship and might repair at any time to Rome to exercise the franchise in the popular assemblies. A Roman colony was, in fact, Rome in miniature, and had its petty senators (*decuriones*) with its chief magistrates (*duoviri*, *quattuorviri*), who represented the consuls and praetors of Rome. The people among whom such a colony was planted might either retain their own constitution or be governed by a magistrate sent out from Rome. They were not Roman citizens except as being residents of a Roman colony, but irregular marriages with the Roman colonists often destroyed the line of distinction that separated the Romans from the native population.

The Latins (*Latini*, *nomen Latinum*), had no vote at Rome, and could hold no office there. They were, therefore, Roman subjects. A Roman who joined a Latin colony ceased to be a citizen of Rome. Whether there was any difference in the internal administration of a Roman or of a Latin colony is doubtful. Perhaps the Latins had the right to trade but not the right to intermarry¹. They certainly had not the right to vote or hold office. A Latin could, however, obtain the Roman franchise on the following conditions: if he had become a resident of Rome after having held a magistracy in his native town and having left a representative of his family in that town. *Latin Colonies.*

The third class of people—the allies—formed the rest of the peninsula with the exception of slaves, who were not at this time numerous. Each of the cities of the allies had a specific treaty with Rome which limited its rights and defined its duties. *Allies.* The position of the allied cities varied from nominal independence to complete subjection.

As we have already seen, Rome was at first governed by a king assisted by a senate or council of elders (*senatus*), summoned at his will, and consulted on all matters on which he chose to ask their advice, though he was not bound to follow the advice so given. But in 509 B.C. the kings were expelled and afterwards two consuls were elected annually. They summoned the people to the *comitia* either to elect magis- *Powers of the Consuls.*

¹p. 332.

trates, pass laws or try offenders. In the early days of the Republic they alone nominated¹, summoned and consulted the senate, and like the kings of old could take its advice or not as they chose; they controlled the exchequer; were supreme judges in all important legal cases, but could delegate their powers to the *comitia*. They could compel all citizens to obey their edicts, could enforce their appearance when summoned, could arrest them, throw them into prison, bind them, impose fines on them, flog them or even put them to death. They enrolled the citizens for war, enforced discipline, led the army in battle, selected the tribunes of the soldiers, and as commanders in the field were unlimited in their power (*imperium*). The power they legally had was, however, never fully exercised except in times of war and civil tumult.

*Checks on
the Consular
power.
(1) Dual
office.*

The powers of the consul could be checked in various ways. There were two consuls instead of one, so that the one acted as a check on the other. Each of the consuls was supreme and could prohibit the acts of the other, but not render them invalid when done. In the city they discharged the administrative functions a month in turn, the consul for the time being preceded by lictors and fasces, and the other going without the lictors, or following them without the fasces.

*(2) Annual
tenure.*

Again, the office was held only for one year. While in office the consuls could not be impeached, but after their term of office had expired they could be brought to account for illegal or oppressive acts committed during their consulship. They could not escape the consequences of such acts by re-election, for this seldom happened, though extraordinary emergencies justified it, and besides after 341 B.C. such re-election was illegal till ten years after a previous consulship.

(3) Laws.

The consulship, further, was held in check by law. All citizens had the right to appeal to the people even in cases of corporal punishment and fines, as well as in cases involving life and death. As these appeals were a source of annoyance to the consuls, these threw the responsibility of the trials on the people at the *comitia*.

¹ After 350 B.C. the censors had this duty, p. 371.

The tribunes of the people were elected after the secession (4) *Tribunes* of the plebeians to Mons Sacer. Their numbers varied from two to ten. As these were always plebeians, and as their chief duty was to afford protection to the plebeians against an infringement of the rights gained by the secession, we find the tribuneship the safeguard of plebeian rights. By this single word, *veto*, *I forbid*, they could stay proceedings in any matter in which they chose to interfere. They hindered the collection of tribute, enlisting of soldiers, election of magistrates; they put their veto on decrees of the senate, and by the sacred nature of this office it was a crime to interfere with them in the exercise of their prerogative. By postponing the day of trial, they could prevent a consul trying a case, and thus they could indefinitely put off the execution of the sentence. The only check on their power was to get one or more of their number to veto the proceedings of the rest, but those who did so were liable to be brought up for trial before the people by their colleagues.

In some respects the powers of the senate were a check on the (5) *Senate*. consular authority. The senate of Rome differed altogether from the modern parliament in three important particulars: the mode of election, the term of office held by its members, and in its legislative powers.

The senate was at first chosen by the kings, afterwards by (a) *Mode of election to the Senate*, the consuls, and after the year 350 B.C. by the censors. Every five years these latter officers revised the rolls of senators, striking off those who had died during this period, or whose lives had been reprehensible, or who had been guilty of any flagrant crime. They usually filled up the vacancies by appointing the ex-magistrates¹ first, and if any vacancies remained, by then selecting private citizens. Thus few persons entered the senate but those who had previously received the favour of the people, and since all the offices were open to the plebeians, a large number of the latter body would be found on its lists. At first no property qualification seems to have been necessary, but after-

¹Especially those who had held a curule magistracy (*curulis magistratus*) as consul, censor, praetor, curule aedile, dictator, or master of the horse.

wards in the early days of the empire this was fixed¹. The number of senators from the time of the kings to the days of Sulla was nominally three hundred.

(b) *term of
office of the
Senate,*

The office was for life, unless a person holding the position had by his behaviour rendered himself unworthy of that rank, in which case his name was struck off the roll. The senate of Rome was thus a standing council of men experienced in public business, that did not vary quickly, and was always capable of a steady, continuous policy. It was not liable to the fluctuations that usually belong to modern parliaments, as the great majority of the men who composed it had served continuously for many years.

(c) *powers of
the Senate.*

It was, however, a mere consultative body, free to give its advice, when asked, on all questions to the magistrates, who might adopt or reject the advice so given. Its recommendations could not be enforced, but, as it embodied the expression of the national will, its recommendations were not lightly regarded. It had, however, control of the treasury, and, therefore, it had practically superintendence of the great public works. Again, as Rome gradually acquired sovereignty over Italy, the senate issued commissions to try all cases of felony and treason in the Italian cities, and thus the administrative functions of the government fell under its jurisdiction. By its disputes between allied towns, the requests of ambassadors of foreign states, and questions of war and peace were decided.

6' *Dictator.* But the power of the senate was especially conspicuous in civil dissensions or dangerous emergencies within the city itself. It could invest the consuls with the power of the solemn decree (*decretum ultimum*), 'that the consuls should see that the republic should receive no harm.' This decree gave the consuls absolute power to quell any insurrection, to punish or put to death without a trial any citizen whom they pleased; to raise forces and carry on war without the order of the people. By the senate, also, a consul could be compelled to name a *dictator*. This office was no doubt a relict of the kingly power, and, like the office of king, it was irresponsible. It was only resorted to

¹ 400,000 sesterces, or about \$8,000.

when the needs of the republic required an untrammelled executive, in some dangerous emergency, as in a foreign war, in civil strife, or for holding an election when the consul could not be present. Such a dictator had all the ensigns (*insignia*) of royalty, twenty-four lictors with the axes and fasces. He had also the right to name his master of the horse. His term of office was limited to six months, and was often held for a much shorter period than this, till the object for which he had been appointed had been accomplished.

The power of the consuls was limited in another way, for the duties they originally had were divided among other magistrates. We thus find the quaestors, censors and praetors usurping functions that once belonged to the consuls. (7) *Duties of Consul divided among other officers.*

Under the kings were officers called *quaestores parricidii*, 'track-ers out of murder,' who tried capital cases, and whose duties soon were merged in other offices. After the establishment of the republic, 'quaestors of the treasury' (*quaestores aerarii*) were appointed, whose duty it was to have charge of the treasury. In the days of Pyrrhus they were eight in number: two stayed at home (*quaestores urbani*), two accompanied the generals in the field as paymasters of the forces (*quaestores militares*), while four more (*quaestores classici*) were added to enrol the crews of the fleet and to manage the finances of Italy. They paid out moneys on the order of the consuls or senate, and paid into the treasury taxes, fines, and money received from the spoils of war. (a) *Quaestores*
appointed 447 B.C.

The censorship was instituted in 443 B.C., when the consulship was divided between the consuls and the military tribunes with consular power. These censors were elected for five years, but really held their office for eighteen months and then abdicated. Their chief duties were to assess the property of each citizen and to draw up registers of tribes, classes and centuries, to prepare lists of the senate, and to manage the finances of the republic. They also gave out contracts for the construction and repair of public works and for the farming of taxes. It will thus appear that the censorship was an office of great power, and was regarded in some respects as the most responsible position of the state. At one time only those that had been consuls could (b) *Censors.*

be elected to it. By a law passed in 265 B.C. no person could be twice censor.

(c) *Praetors.* The praetorship was detached from the consulship in 366 B.C. Before this time *praetor* had been the usual name for the consul. After the admission of the plebs to the consulship, the praetor was the judge of Rome. He regulated the legal procedure and expounded the law. Though he did not often actually try a case himself, he sent cases to juries nominated by him with instructions on the law applicable to the case. At first there was only one praetor (*praetor urbanus*) but after the end of the First Punic War a new praetor (*praetor peregrinus*) was added. The first had charge of all cases between citizens and the second between aliens or between a citizen and an alien.

(d) *Aediles.* The aediles were of two kinds, plebeians and curule. The former were the assistants of the tribunes and guardians of the *plebiscita*. The curule aediles, first elected 366 B.C., were police commissioners, superintendents of public games, and of supplies of provisions. After this date there is little distinction between the duties of the two sets. They had charge of the repairs of buildings or streets, and the regulation of markets and of games.

Religion. The superintendence in matters of religion was in the hands of the pontiffs. The chief pontiff (*pontifex maximus*) had under him a King of Sacrifices (*rex sacrorum*) and fifteen priests

Pontiffs. (*flamines*), devoted to the service of the principal deities worshipped at Rome. He selected the vestal virgins, attended religious marriages, kept the calendar and announced on the first of each month when the festivals were falling due. He held office for life. After 300 B.C. the office of pontiff was open to both orders.

Lex Ogulnia
300 B.C.

Augurs. The college of augurs were the hereditary guardians of the auspices. As we have said before, nothing of any importance could be begun without consulting the gods, and their will was supposed to be revealed to man through the augurs.

The Roman Government a system of checks.

Thus the government of Rome was based on the principle of checks and of gradually delegating to different officers a share in the central authority. According to Polybius, it possessed the excellencies of the principles of monarchy, oligarchy and

democracy. Of this whole government the fatal fault was that the central authority had not sufficient power to compel the carrying out of any definite line of policy. The consul, or for that matter any chief officer, could be checked by the augur; the policy of any tribune could be vetoed by another tribune; a quaestor, censor or aedile could be obstructed in carrying out his policy by a consul; while an election of the officers of the state could be annulled, or the acts of the senate rendered powerless by the tribunes of the plebeians.

In early days all citizens were liable for military service at such times as they would be required. Each one had to furnish his own arms and serve without pay. For this reason, service was confined to men who had some property. The rich served as cavalry, and the rest as infantry. We are told that at the siege of Veii, on account of the length of the campaign, pay was first given to the soldiers, and from this the nucleus of a standing army was formed. The subject towns furnished the bulk of the soldiers of the Roman army. *The Army.*

The army was enrolled in brigades (*legiones*). The number of men in each brigade differed at different times. About the middle of the third century B.C. it was composed of three thousand heavy-armed infantry, three hundred cavalry, and one thousand two hundred light-armed infantry. The allies were probably equal in the number of the heavy-armed infantry and three times greater in the number of the cavalry. Thus a legion would be about ten thousand men. The regular number of legions raised for a campaign was two for each consul, but the number would vary according to the needs of the times. These were levied at the beginning of the year. On a fixed day all the free men between seventeen and forty-six, who had not served their regular term¹, were bound to appear and answer the muster roll. When the list of names of the tribes was called, usually enough of volunteers offered their services to make it unnecessary to compel men to enlist. The first thing to do was to appoint military tribunes, six for each legion. These were nominated by the consuls and elected by the tribes. After the

¹The infantry served twenty years; the cavalry, ten.

levy had been made by the consuls, the *sacramentum* or military oath was administered to the men, one repeating the formula and the others making the sign of assent. The men were divided according to their age, wealth and service into *hastati*, *principes* and *triarii*. This arrangement is said to have been due to Camillus who brought it into practice at the siege of Veii, 406 B.C. Formerly the Romans drew up their army in a solid body like the Macedonians (*phalanx*). The first line was composed of young men, the second of men in the vigour of life, and the third men were the veterans. Each line contained ten *manipuli*, arranged in the following fashion :—

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Each *manipulus* of each of the three lines contained two *centuriae*, each commanded by a *centurio*, but each *manipulus* of the *triarii* had half the number of men the first two lines had. Thus we have :

<i>Hastati</i> :	10 manipuli of 120 men each = 20 centuries = 1200 men.
<i>Principes</i> :	10 manipuli of 120 men each = 20 centuries = 1200 men.
<i>Triarii</i> :	10 manipuli of 60 men each = 20 centuries = 600 men.
	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; margin: 0;"> </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; margin: 0;"> 30 manipuli. 60 centuries. 3000 men. </div>

To each legion was also added a number of light-armed troops (*velites*, *rorarii*, *accensi*), and a squadron of cavalry three hundred in number divided into ten divisions (*turmae*). The *principes* and *hastati* were armed with the pike (*pilum*); the *triarii* with the spear (*hasta*). As the *triarii* were originally armed with the *pilum*, the two first ranks were called *antepilani*. It is doubtful how the *velites* were arranged. This would no doubt depend on circumstances.

*Roman
roads.*

‘All roads lead to Rome’ was a common saying in olden days. No sooner had Rome made a conquest than she developed the country by making a military road. At the beginning of the fourth century B.C. Rome began to build one of the most important roads that connected the city with the most distant parts of her empire. The Appian Way (*Via*

Appia) was begun by Appius Claudius B.C. 313, and at first connected Rome with Capua, then it was extended to Brundisium. It was called the Queen of Roads (*regina viarum*) and is yet entire in many places. Like most roads built by the Romans, the lowest stratum is of stone and mortar, then gravel, while the top is paved with blocks of flint.

CHAPTER XII.

CARTHAGE.

Roman history and enterprise have been to this time confined to Italy. But it was inevitable that the extension of Roman authority beyond the confines of the Italian peninsula should sooner or later be attempted. Each increase of territory brought Rome into contact with new tribes and nations. Some of these were able to offer little opposition to the progress of her arms, whilst others stoutly, and for a time successfully, withstood the onward march of her victorious legions. No single power maintained the struggle so long, or with such prospects of success as Carthage. In fact, it was long doubtful whether the nations around the Mediterranean were to recognize the sway of Rome with her western civilization, or that of Carthage as the exponent of the energy, thrift, and spirit of adventure of the Semitic races.

*Phoenician
maritime
enterprise.*

So important was the part Carthage played in the drama of the world's history, that something more than a brief mention of her power, resources, civilization, and institutions is necessary. A colony of Tyre, she exhibited all the commercial enterprise and maritime daring for which that ancient Phoenician city was renowned. For the Phoenicians were the explorers, traders and colonists of the Mediterranean long before Greek maritime enterprise began to make itself felt. Nor were the merchant vessels of Tyre and Sidon restricted by the bounds of the Mediterranean, for we find that their daring navigators passed through the Straits of Gibraltar (then called the Pillars of Hercules) into the Atlantic, rounded the Cape of Good Hope, opened up a trade with the Scilly islands, and even visited the shores of the Baltic. The riches of all known lands were brought back to these cities on the coast of Syria. Phoenician artizans were equally skilful and famous. It was from Tyre that Solomon obtained the men and the material necessary to build his famous temple. Phoenicia supplied the architects that built

the famous bridge of boats across the Hellespont when Xerxes sought to invade Greece. Phoenician ships were the main strength of the Persian navy. In brief, much of the maritime skill and enterprise, of the commercial activity, of the successful trade and colonization the nations around the Mediterranean exhibited before the sixth century, belonged to this marvellous race, whose sole possessions at first consisted of two or three cities and a narrow strip of fertile land on the coast of Syria. Tyre and Sidon did not seek for territorial expansion, but were content with their trade and commerce, and the wealth which these brought them. This was not the case, however, with one of their colonies, founded on the north coast of Africa, in the eighth or ninth century before the Christian era. Carthage, as this colony was called by the Romans, was situated on a peninsula projecting eastward from the Gulf of Tunis, the best harbour on the coast of Africa. Her situation was admirably adapted for purposes of trade and commerce, and in process of time the colony not only surpassed in wealth, power and population her elder sister Utica (on the same coast), but also the mother cities Tyre and Sidon. How great her population was in her palmy days we have no means of estimating exactly. The city and suburbs, we know, covered an area of twenty-three miles in circumference, and just before the Third Punic War, when her prosperity had been greatly diminished, the population was estimated at 700,000. Unfortunately the people of Carthage have left us no literary works by national historians, orators, or poets; and beyond the story told by the ruins of her magnificent temples, aqueducts, and reservoirs, and by a few Phoenician tablets which have been deciphered, we are dependent almost wholly upon the testimony furnished by the annalists of her deadly enemy, Rome.

*Situation of
Carthage.*

*Size and
population
of Carthage.*

At first Carthage was merely a Phoenician trading post. She was for a time content to pay ground-rent to the African Berbers, who owned the soil on which the town was built. As time passed the little factory developed into a great commercial city, whose ships controlled the trade of the western part of the Mediterranean. Every island, every point of advantage, was eagerly watched and, if possible, seized in

*Growth of
Carthage.*

the interests of her growing trade. Sardinia, the Aegatian, Liparean, and Balearic Islands ; Elba, Malta, and to some extent Corsica, passed under her control. Settlements, too, were made in Spain for the purpose of developing valuable silver mines. In Africa her growing power led her to refuse further payment of ground-rent to the natives whose soil she occupied. Step by step she began to extend her domain around the walls of the city, and from being the humble tenant she became the imperious and exacting mistress. The native tribes were either driven back or forced to pay a heavy tribute to the intruder. All the neighbouring Phœnician towns and cities, with the exception of Utica, were forced to recognize the supremacy of this new Queen of the Mediterranean, and had to pull down their walls and furnish money and men when called upon by Carthage.

*Liby-
Phœnicians* A new and mixed race sprang up as the result of marriages between the Phœnicians and the natives, a race which stood midway, as regards social and political privileges, between the Carthaginian citizens and the subject natives. This class, never fully trusted or trusting, had much to do with Carthaginian conquest and colonization.

Sicily. Between Carthage and Italy was the beautiful and fertile island of Sicily, an object of desire to all the ambitious and covetous states around the Mediterranean. As has already been pointed out (see Greek History), the coasts of Sicily were extensively colonized by the Greeks. When Xerxes sought to conquer Greece he feared that assistance would be sent from Sicily to the mother land. Aware that the Carthaginians looked with longing eyes upon the Greek possessions in Sicily, he induced them to send an army of 300,000 men, under Hamilcar, against Syracuse. The expedition was a failure, as Hamilcar was defeated at Himera with a loss of half his army on the same day that the battle of Salamis occurred.

*Battle of
Himera,
480 B.C.*

*Constitution
of Carthage.* It is usual to designate the form of government at Carthage a republic. Yet neither in the modern sense nor in the Greek and Roman sense was Carthage a republic. Aristotle has praised it as containing a happy admixture of the aristocratic, oligarchic, and

democratic elements. Tyre was ruled by kings, and the example and tradition doubtless led to the establishment at Carthage of two supreme magistrates, called Suffètes by the Romans. The Greeks compared these dignitaries with the two Spartan kings, whilst the Romans saw a resemblance between them and their own consuls. Under the kings was a council of Ancients, consisting of twenty-eight members, over which the suffetes presided. Here again we see a strong resemblance to the Spartan Gerousia, of which the kings were members. This council possessed great power, so long as it and the suffetes agreed on any line of action. It could declare war, appoint generals and establish colonies. In the event of a disagreement between the council and the suffetes, the question in dispute was referred to the citizens. This was the early constitution of Carthage ; but it was greatly changed by the time of the Punic wars. Through some influences not clearly understood, the power of the suffetes became reduced almost to a shadow, and the council or senate allowed their functions to be usurped by an oligarchy known as *Judges*, or 'The Hundred'. The people were seldom asked to express an opinion, and that only during a time of great public excitement. Although the 'Hundred' did not as a rule hold the offices of the state themselves, they controlled the appointment of magistrates and generals, and no dignitary was so high as not to be subject to their supervision and censure. Carthaginian generals were made to feel that they fought with a halter round their necks ; and woe to the unfortunate leader who failed in the enterprise on which he was sent. Happy was he if he escaped death by crucifixion.

The social life of the Carthaginians is not well known to us for the reasons already assigned. Public baths and public messes were in existence ; but special baths were set apart for the senate, and the Carthaginian nobles were accustomed to fare too sumptuously to join in the repasts of the common people. In fact, luxurious living was carried to the extreme limit by the wealthy land-owners and merchant princes of Carthage. Costly robes dyed in purple ; dining-tables of the priceless citron-wood ; gold and silver plate in abundance ; statues, paintings, and other works of art taken from the Greek cities

*Social life
of Carthage.*

of Sicily, told plainly of the wealth and love of luxury that prevailed among the higher classes of this great commercial city.

*Wealth and
agriculture.*

The wealth of Carthage was, no doubt, due mainly to her commerce and trade. Yet we find that commerce and trade were not the occupations of her highest citizens. These preferred the life of the country gentleman, and dwelt on their estates, from which they drew immense revenues. Farming and mining were carried on with great skill and success, the soil and the mines being worked by large gangs of slaves. Carthaginian agricultural skill must have reached a high degree of excellence, for at a later time the Romans paid them the compliment of translating into Latin an important work on agriculture by one of their authors.

Religion.

Turning now to the religious features of the Punic civilization, we find much that is laudable, but more that is debasing and horrible. The religion of the Carthaginians was the religion of the Canaanites, with its worship of the malevolent deity Baal-Moloch. This god demanded human sacrifices; sacrifices, too, of the best, and the dearest. He was seldom worshipped, except when some great disaster or equally great success called forth a burst of cruel fanaticism from the frenzied people. Tanith, or Astarte, was a female deity, representing sometimes wedded love, war, the chase, and husbandry; but at other times she was the goddess of lust, and demanded the foulest immorality from her worshippers. One god there was whose worship demanded neither sacrifice nor immorality. This was Melcarth, the god of Tyre. Although magnificent temples were built in his honour at Tyre and Thasos, there was no image of this deity. In Carthage, it is said, he had not even a temple, the whole city being his abode.

*Proper
Names.*

The strong and deep religious feeling at Carthage is shown by their proper names. Hamilcar is one whom Melcarth protects; Hannibal is the grace of Baal; while names such as Hasdrubal, Bomilcar and Adherbal proclaim the close relationship between the deities and the favoured sons of men.

Literature.

Of Carthaginian literature we know little, as the libraries of Carthage after its capture were given to the African chiefs, the friends and allies of Rome. Some valuable works on agriculture

were rescued from the general destruction and carried to Rome, where they were translated into Latin.

But agriculture, politics, commerce, and literature (such as *Military spirit.* they possessed) did not exhaust the energies of the Carthaginian nobility. In the profession of arms some of them found a career adapted to their tastes. The main strength and ornament of the Carthaginian armies consisted at one time of a 'Sacred Band' of two thousand five hundred citizens of high rank who fought in costly armour, and kept a record of their campaigns by the number of rings they wore.

The Carthaginian army was not like that of the Romans, made *The Army* up largely of citizens. On the contrary, it was composed mainly of mercenaries, Libyans, Gauls, Spaniards, slingers from the Balearic Isles, Greeks, Ligurians, Volscians and Campanians are all mentioned as being found in its ranks. Its characteristic feature, however, was its Numidian cavalry, which constituted its main strength and won its greatest successes. This was a *Numidian Cavalry.* body of men gathered from the roving tribes of the north coast of Africa, and which, mounted on the famous barbs of that region, displayed a skill in horsemanship and a daring in battle that made it the most formidable cavalry of the ancient world. When properly led and properly treated these hardy and half-clad horsemen proved invincible whenever brought face to face on even terms with the foe. But the system of waging war with mercenaries was one that eventually proved fatal to Carthaginian power. Often in the hour of need the mercenary soldiery was found wanting; and this was especially true when cruel treatment and bad pay inspired dangerous mutinies.

From this brief sketch it will be seen wherein lay the chief *Strength and Weakness of Carthage.* strength of Carthage, and wherein her weakness. Trade, commerce and agriculture made her marvellously wealthy. Maritime skill gave her the control of the Mediterranean. But her harsh and cruel treatment of her African subjects left her surrounded by a population which, if not actually hostile, had little inclination to take up arms in her behalf when the enemy came to her gates. Another source of weakness was the employment of a mercenary instead of a citizen soldiery. To these two causes we may attribute her ultimate downfall.

CHAPTER XIII.

FIRST PUNIC¹ WAR (264-241 B.C.).

Sicily.

Separated from Southern Italy by the Straits of Messina lies the island of Sicily, for many years the battle ground of the Greeks and the Carthaginians. The outcome of this conflict had been to give Carthage the control of the western half of the island, while the power of Syracuse, the head of the Greek colonies, was limited to the south-eastern part. This was the condition of affairs when Agathocles, tyrant of Syracuse, died, leaving behind him a body of mercenary troops, natives of Campania. On their way homeward these hired ruffians, known as Mamertines², seized the city of Messāna, slew the male portion of the population, and then divided the women and children among themselves. This outrage was followed by a course of plundering and harrying the surrounding country. The young king of Syracuse, Hiero, and the Carthaginians both took steps to put an end to these lawless proceedings. The Mamertines were besieged in Messana by Hiero, and recognizing the hopelessness of holding out against their enemies began to look around for allies. A difference of opinion arose among them as to the proper course to pursue. One party wished to call in the Carthaginians to keep out the Syracusans, while the other preferred to ask the Romans for aid against both Carthaginians and Syracusans. This division of opinion led to both Romans and Carthaginians being appealed to. The Carthaginians succeeded in getting possession of the citadel of Messana, and a Carthaginian fleet rode at anchor in its harbour.

*Mamertines
at Messana,
289 B.C.*

*Action of
the Roman
people.*


The appeal of the Mamertines to the Roman senate placed that body in a perplexing position. A very short time before this the Romans had treated with the greatest severity a band of lawless marauders who had seized Rhegium as the Mamer-

¹ From *Poeni* or *Puni*, a name given to the Phoenicians, and supposed to be derived from the Greek *φοίνιξ*, 'a palm leaf.'

² From *Mamers* or *Mars*, 'god of war.'

General Map of GREEK & PHENICIAN Settlements

GREEK
PHENICIAN



tines had seized Messana. To listen, then, to the appeal of the Mamertines was to give sanction to a course of conduct which they had just punished with the most extreme penalties. On the other hand, the appeal of the Mamertines was an appeal of Italians against Greeks and Carthaginians, and such an appeal could not well be passed over. The truth was, the Roman people, rulers and ruled, were eager for war and conquest, and such an opportunity to get a foothold in so fertile and wealthy an island as Sicily was not to be lost. The senate resolved to shirk its responsibility and referred the question to the people assembled in their comitia for a decision. The consuls, Appius Claudius Caudex and M. Fulvius Flaccus were ambitious men and easily persuaded the Roman people to cast their votes in favour of war. It was resolved to send aid to the Mamertines, and the first step was taken in commencing a struggle which did not terminate until after the lapse of more than a century, and which determined whether Rome was to remain content with Italy as her domain, or whether she was to embark on a career of foreign war and conquest.

The invasion of Sicily having been determined upon, the command of the army was given to the consul Appius Claudius. *Romans invade Sicily, 264 B.C.* How to cross the Straits of Messina was the next matter to be taken into consideration. Rome had few ships, and Carthage controlled the sea. But C. Claudius, the consul's legate, succeeded in reaching Sicily, and inviting Hanno, the Carthaginian admiral, to a conference, had him seized. The prisoner was allowed his life and liberty only on condition of surrendering the citadel of Messana. Although Romans occupied the citadel, the city was still besieged by the Carthaginians on the north and by Hiero on the south. Appius Claudius now managed to *First campaign.* cross the Straits with twenty thousand men. How he accomplished his task in the teeth of a Carthaginian fleet holding possession of the Straits is not explained. The consul soon raised the siege of Messana and then proceeded to attack Syracuse, but the malaria from the marshes made it necessary for the Roman army to retreat towards the north of the island.

The first campaign had accomplished much. The Mamertines

*Second
campaign.*

had been succoured, the Carthaginians had been driven back to the north-west of the island, and the Syracusans to the south-east. There was no reason now for the further prosecution of war, save the lust of conquest. But nothing short of the complete expulsion of the Carthaginians from Sicily would satisfy the Roman senate and people. The war was resumed, and the Roman army in Sicily increased to thirty-five thousand men. Fifty towns, it is said, fell easily into their hands, and Hiero at last concluded it was his wisest policy to secure Rome for an ally and friend. Peace was made between Syracuse and Rome, and henceforth during a long reign we find Hiero the faithful and trusted ally of the latter.

*The Cartha-
ginians
besieged at
Agrigentum*

Meanwhile the Carthaginians had been actively engaged in making preparations for the maintenance of their possessions. Troops were gathered from Africa, Liguria, Spain and Gaul, and supplies were thrown into the city of Agrigentum, where Hannibal, the son of Gisco, prepared to stand a siege. The Romans, undaunted by the smallness of their army, moved to the attack. For several months little was accomplished, and famine and pestilence were doing their work in both armies. At last a Carthaginian force sent to the relief of Hannibal was defeated and the Carthaginian general abandoned all hope of a successful defence of Agrigentum. He managed by a clever ruse to escape with his army through the Roman lines and left the city to its fate. The inhabitants at once surrendered; nevertheless, the city was given up to plunder and twenty-five thousand of its citizens were sold into slavery.

*Agrigentum
surrenders.*

The capture of Agrigentum left a few towns only in the western part of the island in the hands of the Carthaginians. To drive them entirely out of Sicily was now the Roman policy. But it was a policy that demanded a Roman navy for its accomplishment; for the Carthaginians had at last begun to put forth their strength on the sea. Their fleets sailing along the coasts of Sicily and Italy kept the cities and towns on the shore in a state of constant alarm and distress. Roman arms might hold the interior of Sicily, but so long as the Carthaginians controlled the seas the coast towns were at their mercy. If Roman rule was to be something more than a name on the island,

a Roman navy would have to be equipped which could dispute the supremacy of the seas with the Carthaginians. But Rome was not and never had been a maritime power. She had few war ships, and of the larger size, the quinquereme, she had none at all. Still further, the Romans were not sailors, so that if ships were forthcoming it would be found a difficult matter to man them. Nevertheless all these difficulties were overcome in a time marvellously short. A stranded Carthaginian quinquereme furnished a model for Roman shipbuilders, and a fleet of one hundred vessels was built, it is said, in sixty days. While the ships were being constructed men were set to work to practice the art of rowing in time, on tiers of stages erected on the sands of the shore.

Rome needs a navy.

A fleet built.

The fleet thus hastily prepared and imperfectly manned, set sail B.C. 261 under the command of the consul Duilius. The Carthaginian fleet was at Mylae, a peninsula on the north-east coast of Sicily, and thither Duilius directed his course. The Carthaginian fleet consisted of one hundred and thirty vessels, well-built and well-manned. Duilius, with his ungainly fleet of one hundred ships and his unskilled sailors, knew he had little chance of victory unless by some artifice he could change the naval conflict into what was equivalent to a land battle. To that end he had equipped each of his vessels with a strong grappling hook fastened to a mast on the fore part of the ship. When a vessel of the enemy approached near enough it was at once seized by one of these hooks, and the two vessels were held so close together by the iron bond that the Roman soldiers could swarm on board the enemy's deck and there and then decide the issue. Partly through the over-confidence and carelessness of the Carthaginians, and partly through the successful practice of this new device, Duilius won a decisive victory, his opponents losing fifty ships.

Battle of Mylae, 260 B.C.

Rome had won her first naval battle and her joy was correspondingly great. Duilius, although a plebeian, was the hero of the hour. A pillar was erected to his honour in the forum and called the Columna Rostrata, on account of it being adorned with the brazen beaks of the captured Carthaginian vessels.

Columna Rostrata.

The battle of Mylae was not allowed to go unimproved by the Romans. Sardinia and Corsica were attacked with some success, and the Roman army moved on to Egesta, in the western part of Sicily. But Hamilcar, the Carthaginian commander at Panormus, proved so active and capable that the Romans, after losing four thousand men near Himera, were compelled to retire from before Panormus. The situation now was such as to call forth the greatest efforts of both nations. Rome endeavoured to raise a navy strong enough to enable her to send troops into Africa and there dictate terms to her enemy; while Carthage sought to wipe out the disgrace of the defeat at Mylae by winning a victory which would fully restore her supremacy on the sea.

*Battle of
Ecnömus,
256 B.C.*

The result of these efforts on both sides was that the Romans set sail from Messana (256 B.C.) with a fleet of three hundred and thirty ships; while the Carthaginians collected a still larger fleet of three hundred and fifty ships in the harbour of Lilybaeum. It has been estimated that the men on board both squadrons numbered three hundred thousand. Perhaps no such hosts ever before or since met in naval combat. The Romans were under the command of M. Atilius Regulus and L. Manlius; the Carthaginian admirals were Hanno and Hamilcar. The two fleets met off Ecnömus, on the southern coast of Sicily, and a fierce engagement ensued in which the Carthaginians were defeated and forced to retreat towards the coast of Africa. This disaster brought the war to the very doors of Carthage, for Rome resolved to send a strong force into Africa, and there compel Carthage to accept such terms of peace as she should propose.

*Invasion of
Africa.*

Taking only sufficient time to re-victual and repair their vessels, the Roman commanders, Regulus and Manlius, turned their fleet towards the Hermaeum promontory on the north-eastern horn of the Bay of Carthage. Coasting along the African shore, the Roman army landed at Clypea. Carthage had been warned of the coming invasion, but she was almost wholly unprepared for resisting any prompt and energetic attack. Her best armies were in Sicily, and her fleet had been

recently defeated. Under these circumstances, had Regulus acted promptly and moved forward at once against Carthage, the great city might have fallen then and there. But the Roman soldiers, entranced by the wealth of the district around Carthage, spent valuable time in plundering the inhabitants, and in filling their ships with slaves. Outside of Carthage, little opposition was offered to the Romans by the people of the surrounding towns and villages. One place after another surrendered on the approach of the Roman army, for the Libyans and Numidians were both disaffected towards their hard Carthaginian taskmasters. Manlius and his army were now recalled to Rome, taking with them thousands of slave prisoners, and Regulus was left behind with a force of fifteen thousand men to bring the war to a successful conclusion. For a time all went well, and Carthage was even reduced to ask for terms of peace. But the demands of Regulus were so exorbitant and humiliating that the Carthaginians determined upon resisting to the utmost. The city was already threatened with famine, when Xanthippus, a Spartan soldier of fortune, arrived on the scene with a few recruits. He at once saw that the cause of the Carthaginian weakness was their lack of discipline and their incapacity to make proper use of their fine cavalry and their elephants. He was entrusted by the Carthaginian rulers with the task of reorganization, and by his own confidence and strict discipline restored the confidence of the desponding Carthaginian citizens and soldiers. Choosing a favourable time and place for an engagement, he drew the arrogant and boastful Regulus into a battle, out of which the Romans escaped with but two thousand men. Regulus and six hundred of his men were taken prisoners, the small remnant of the Roman army that escaped taking refuge at Clypea. The Numidian cavalry and the elephants, under the judicious handling of Xanthippus, accomplished all that the keen military observation of the Spartan expected. Nothing of African soil now remained in Roman hands save Clypea, and the small Roman army there was soon closely besieged. With desperate courage it kept the enemy at bay until a Roman fleet came to its relief. A naval battle followed in which the Romans were successful, and the

*Xanthippus
arrives at
Carthage.*

*Regulus de-
feated and
taken pris-
oner, 255
B.C.*

*Roman fleet
wrecked.*

remnant of the Roman army at Clypea was put on board the fleet and sailed for Rome. The unfortunate soldiers, however, were not destined to see their native Italy. The fleet, a large one of three hundred and forty ships, had reached the southern coast of Sicily, and was rounding Pachynus, when a terrific storm, common enough at that season of the year, burst upon the doomed ships. What with foundering in the open sea, and breaking upon the sharp rocks on that shore, only eighty vessels escaped. The disaster was wholly due to the rashness and folly of the Roman admirals, who refused to be guided by the warnings and counsels of the pilots.

*Panormus
captured,
254 B.C.*

Carthage now assumed the aggressive, and sent a general with an army and a fleet to Sicily. He took with him one hundred and forty elephants, and made Lilybaeum his objective point. Landed safely he began the work of ravaging the open country. But Rome, ever undismayed, immediately began the building of another fleet, and within three months had two hundred and twenty ships ready to set sail. Strange to say the Romans were in some respects more successful in their hour of disaster than in their days of prosperity. For the Roman consuls, gathering together the few vessels that had escaped the storm and the wreck, sailed for Panormus, and captured with ease that strong fortress.

*Second Ro-
man fleet
wrecked.*

But it seemed as if the winds and the waves still battled for Carthage. The Roman fleet once more made for the African coast, and falling into the Syrtis, the ships ran aground. The ships got off the banks only by throwing overboard a valuable cargo, and then made haste for Panormus. Crossing from Panormus to Italy another storm caught them, off Cape Palinurus, and strewed the shores for miles with wreckage and the dead bodies of the unlucky Roman sailors. The last disaster proved too much for the Roman senate, and for two years no new fleet was equipped. The war was carried on for that time with the land forces, and Carthage was once more Queen of the Sea.

Events in Sicily for a time brought little solace or satisfaction to the Romans. Hasdrubal, who had been sent with a large

force into Sicily, and his elephants were dreaded, for the story of the havoc wrought by these animals against the army of Regulus in Africa had been widely spread abroad. The Romans were afraid to venture into the level ground, and clung to the hills where the elephants were powerless. Caecilius Metellus was in command of the Roman army at Panormus, while Hasdrubal operated from Selinus. Emboldened by the timidity of the Romans, the Carthaginians carried off the rich harvests of the country under the very eyes of the Roman army. At last the opportunity came for Metellus to strike a blow. Luring the Carthaginians and their elephants to the very walls of Panormus, he inflicted a serious defeat on them, and succeeded in capturing the latter, which were sent to Rome to grace the triumph of Metellus, and afterwards were slaughtered in the circus.

*Elephants
captured.*

About this time, it is supposed, Regulus, along with an embassy, came to Rome from Carthage, under parole, to negotiate a peace between the two nations. The embassy was unsuccessful and Regulus returned to captivity, in which he died. The Roman orators and poets have treated the world to many beautiful and tragic stories about Regulus and his self-sacrificing patriotism; all intended to paint the Roman character in the brightest, and the Carthaginian in the blackest of colours. But these tales of Carthaginian cruelty to Regulus, after his return to captivity, served a good purpose in excusing the infamous treatment meted out to two Carthaginian prisoners by the wife of Regulus.

*Story of
Regulus.*

Carthage, after the Roman victory at Panormus, still retained three fortresses, Lilybaeum, Eryx and Drepanum, all in the north-western part of the island. Of these Lilybaeum was much the strongest, and if it could be captured it was thought the war in Sicily would speedily come to an end. The siege was a long one, and its story is relieved from tedium by the appearance on the scene of a great military genius in the person of Hamilcar Barca, the head of the famous family known as the Barcine. To capture Lilybaeum was now the main object in view with the Romans. This stronghold possessed a fine har-

*Siege of
Lilybaeum
begins.
250 B.C.*

*Hamilcar
Barca.*

bour, which, however, was difficult to enter, owing to the high winds that prevail off its headland, and to the sunken rocks and sandbars lying near its shores. The Romans were not to be deterred by the strength of the place, and they sent five legions and two hundred ships to carry on the siege by land and sea. Little success for many years attended their efforts. The Carthaginians managed to keep the garrison supplied with provisions in spite of the watchfulness of the Roman fleet. Matters went still worse for the Romans in 249 B.C., when P. Claudius took the command of the army and the fleet. Rash, over-confident, and grossly incompetent, he made an attack on Drepanum, and was defeated with great loss to his fleet by Adherbal, the Carthaginian general and admiral. This victory raised for a time the siege of Lilybaeum, although the Romans still lingered in its vicinity. Once more the Romans trusted themselves to the uncertain fortunes of the sea. A great fleet of vessels laden with food for the army at Lilybaeum, and accompanied by one hundred and twenty ships of war, was sent from Rome. The expedition reached Syracuse in safety ; but subsequently, after rounding Pachynus, was overtaken by a storm and utterly wrecked. This last disaster led the Roman senate to drop for several years all ideas of sending forth another fleet to be made the prey of the relentless waves. The war now lingered. The consul Julius seized Mt. Eryx, a strong mountain fort between Drepanum and Panormus, and made it a thorn in the side of the garrison at Drepanum. On the other hand, Hamilcar, with a handful of mercenary troops, seized Mount Ercte, an almost inaccessible fortress, in sight of the Roman camp at Panormus. From this eyrie Hamilcar kept watch on the doings of the Roman army at Panormus, and supported his own little army by successful raids on the country round about. He also kept up a system of continuous raids and attacks on the Italian coasts, harassing and injuring the Romans in every way possible to so small an army and fleet as were at his disposal. For Carthage, with great short-sightedness, was doing little or nothing during these years of Roman exhaustion to support her great general, and bring the war to a close. Rome, too, was so greatly weakened by her many losses at sea, that she ceased

*Battle of
Drepanum,
249 B.C.*

*Third Ro-
man fleet,
wrecked
249 B.C.*

for a time to put forth any great effort. At last Hamilcar abandoned his stronghold at Mount Ercte and seized Mount Eryx. Rome, too, awoke to the necessity of making a supreme effort; but so impoverished was the state that its citizens had to come to the rescue, and out of their own private resources furnish a fleet to bring the war to a close. Two hundred ships were built, and the consul Lutatius Catulus was put in command. Again a Roman fleet rode at anchor in the harbours of Lilybaeum and Drepanum, and Carthage suddenly realized the peril of her armies in Sicily. An expedition was fitted out to relieve Hamilcar, who was in danger of being cut off from all supplies. But the Carthaginian fleet was got ready in too great haste to be well equipped, and meeting the Roman squadron off the Aegatian Isles was easily defeated, with the loss of many vessels. The hour had come for Carthage to acknowledge defeat, abandon Sicily, and obtain the best terms possible. Partly through the fear of Hamilcar's genius, and partly through exhaustion, the terms Rome offered were reasonable enough. Carthage abandoned Sicily, restored all prisoners she had taken, and agreed to pay in ten years two thousand three hundred talents.

*Roman fleet
built at ex-
pense of
citizens.*

*Battle of
Aegatian
Isles, 241
B.C.*

*Punic War
ends, 241
B.C.*

CHAPTER XIV.

EVENTS BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND PUNIC WARS.

*Revolt of the
Carthagen-
ian mercen-
aries, 421-
238 B.C.*

The close of the war was a welcome relief to the Romans ; but to the Carthaginians it brought a desperate conflict with their mercenary troops. Hamilcar, when peace with Rome was secured, had handed over the command of his men to one Gisco, who was entrusted with the task of taking them to Africa, and of informing the Carthaginian government that the pay of the troops was heavily in arrears. No attention was given to the just demands of the soldiers, and, in consequence, a mutiny of a serious character broke out. For a time Carthage was brought to the verge of ruin, and was saved only through the desperate exertions of Hamilcar. At length the mutiny was suppressed, and the rebels were almost exterminated by the victorious Carthaginians.

*Sardinia
and Corsica
acquired.*

The distress of Carthage gave Rome an opportunity to seize Sardinia and Corsica, and when Carthage protested against such a wanton and unjust invasion of her rights, Rome pretended to take offence, and demanded and received an additional tribute of one thousand two hundred talents. Rome now possessed three islands lying near the shores of Italy. These new possessions, in one sense, belonged to Italy, and it was quite in harmony with the natural growth of her empire that Rome should extend her territory so as to include Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica.

*Cisalpine
Gaul.*

Twenty-three years of peace between Rome and Carthage now followed, during which time the former was extending her conquests in the north of Italy, between the Apennines and the Alps. The Gauls of this region were stirred into action by a law passed at Rome, giving lands in Northern Italy to Roman citizens. This was interpreted to mean that the Romans had resolved upon appropriating all the land belonging to the Gallic tribes, and the latter rose in arms to defend their rights.

A great army of Gauls seventy thousand strong crossed into Etruria, and created something like consternation at Rome. Two consular armies advanced from the north and the south against the invaders. The Gauls were hemmed in, and after 225-222 B.C. a desperate defence were almost cut to pieces. Another great battle, three years later, completed the conquest of the valley of the Po, and Roman colonies, Placentia and Cremōna, were established in the Gallic territory. A military road, the *Via Flaminia*, was carried across the Apennines to Ariminum, which was made the centre of the Roman administration of the conquered territory. The Gauls were treated as subjects, and not as allies, and for a long time were very restless under the Roman yoke.

The Romans were also during this time making their influence felt to the east of the Adriatic. Illyrian pirates were troubling the trade of the Greek cities, such as Corcyra and Epidamnus, and Rome proceeded to chastise the marauders, greatly to the joy of the Greeks, who hailed the Romans as friends and allies. This friendly interference in the affairs of the East was to lead, very soon, to the most momentous consequences.

Meanwhile Carthage, under the advice and leadership of Hamilcar, had turned to Spain as a field where she could more than make good her losses in Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica. Spain held at that time much the same relation to Carthage that Mexico and Peru subsequently bore to Spain. It was a land of apparently inexhaustible mineral wealth, and required only the mining skill and industry of the Carthaginians to develop its great resources. Carthage had already established trading-posts along the southern shores of Spain, and the Spaniards were disposed to view with satisfaction the advent of a people who could develop their mines and give employment to their people. Of Carthaginian rule they had as yet no experience, and fortunately for Carthage the rule of Hamilcar and his immediate successors, Hasdrubal and Hannibal was so just, politic and humane as to win the loyalty and affection of the native tribes of Spain.

Hamilcar, with the permission of the Carthaginian senate, led an army into Spain, where he hoped to build up an empire

*Hannibal's
oath.*

the resources of which in men and material would enable him once more to renew the struggle with his enemy, Rome, and to win from his hated foe a long-cherished revenge. He was accompanied by his son-in-law Hasdrubal, and by his son Hannibal, a lad then nine years of age. Before starting on his mission he took Hannibal to the altar of the god Melcarth and on it had him solemnly swear eternal enmity to Rome. How well Hannibal kept his oath, time and the story of the Second Punic War will tell.

*Death of
Hamilcar.*

Of Hamilcar's deeds in Spain we have but a meagre historical record. Landing on the southern coast, he and his successors gradually extended the rule of Carthage until her supremacy was recognized from the south to the rivers Tagus and Ebro. The mines were worked to such advantage that Carthage and the Spanish tribes alike profited. A flourishing city, Carthago Nova, or New Carthage, was established on the south-east coast, as the capital of this new empire. The Spaniards were won over by the conciliatory rule of Hamilcar, and Carthage herself was kept in good humour by the wealth sent to fill her coffers. For nine years Hamilcar continued his unwearied efforts to so strengthen himself in Spain that when the time came to strike a blow at Rome, he might be able to reverse the disasters of the First Punic War, and take a fitting revenge at the gates of Rome itself. But Hamilcar was cut off in battle, dying sword in hand, and his far-sighted policy was left to be carried out by his son-in-law Hasdrubal and his son Hannibal. At this time Hannibal was in his nineteenth year, and was considered too young to command the army.

*Hasdrubal,
229-221 B.C.*

Hence Hamilcar was succeeded by Hasdrubal, who continued Hamilcar's policy of extending the rule of Carthage in Spain. Soon all Spain from the south to the Ebro, with one exception, was in the hands of Carthage. This exception was the city of Saguntum on the east coast, and lying somewhat south of the Ebro. Saguntum claimed to be a Greek city, a colony of Zacynthus, and was in alliance with Rome. During the steady and rapid advances of Carthage in Spain, Rome had been kept busy by her wars with the Gauls, but she had stipu-

lated that Carthage should not extend her conquests beyond the Ebro, and, of course, required that Saguntum should not be molested. These stipulations were observed during the time of Hasdrubal, but when he was assassinated in the eighth year of his command, and Hannibal was unanimously chosen to fill his place, the long-planned projects of the new leader and his father seemed ripe for execution. Saguntum, hitherto unmolested, was too important a town to be left in the heart of Carthaginian territory as an ally and friend of Rome. Preparations were begun for its siege, and the unhappy Saguntines *Saguntum besieged.* appealed to Rome for help. Rome demanded of Hannibal that her ally, Saguntum, should be exempted from attack, and Hannibal referred the Roman ambassadors to Carthage, meanwhile continuing his preparations for the siege. During the delay involved while Rome was making her demands on Carthage, Saguntum fell into the hands of Hannibal. Its citizens finding that further resistance was impossible, built a great fire and flung their valuables along with themselves into the devouring flame. *Saguntum taken, 219 B.C.* The attack and capture of Saguntum, it was well known to Hannibal, involved war with Rome. Aware that the peace party at Carthage might listen to Roman demands and consent to terms of peace, Hannibal sent home to Carthage from Spain sufficient gold to win over the majority of the Carthaginians to the side of war. Hence when Q. Fabius, the Roman ambassador, appeared before the Carthaginian Senate, and holding up his toga, exclaimed dramatically, 'I carry here peace and war; choose ye which ye will have'; the answer was, 'Give us whichever you please.' 'War, then,' said Fabius. The decision was greeted with applause, and with a light heart Carthage entered upon what is in many respects the greatest war in ancient times. *War declared, 219 B.C.*

CHAPTER XV.

SECOND PUNIC WAR (218-201, B.C.).

*Hannibal's
plans.*

When war was declared between Rome and Carthage, Hannibal resolved to invade Italy, instead of waiting for the Romans to attack him in Africa or Spain. It was a bold resolve, but one well justified by its brilliant results. With Hannibal to resolve was to act, and he at once began his preparations. He garrisoned Spain with fifteen thousand Libyans, and Libya with Spaniards. He left the command of the troops in Spain to his brother Hasdrubal, and he opened up successful negotiations with the Gallic chiefs of Transalpine and Cisalpine Gaul. It was his policy to enlist the support of the recently conquered Gauls in Northern Italy in the war which he proposed to wage at the gates of Rome itself. He also hoped to secure the aid of the nations of Central Italy, many of which had been very recently forced to recognize Roman supremacy. For some reason, not very well known, Hannibal determined to invade Italy by a land journey through Spain and Southern Gaul, and thence across the Alps into the plains of Cisalpine Gaul. Starting from New Carthage with ninety thousand infantry, twelve thousand cavalry, and thirty-seven elephants, he crossed the Ebro and defeated some Spanish tribes in alliance with Rome. He left Hanno with ten thousand foot and one thousand horse to hold the newly conquered district, and also sent back ten thousand men who could not be fully trusted. With a greatly reduced army he crossed the Pyrenees, and marched to the Rhone without meeting any opposition.

*Hannibal
sets out
from Spain.*

Meanwhile the Roman consul, Publius Scipio, was on his way to Spain. When he reached Massilia he was surprised to find that Hannibal was on the march towards Italy, and well on his way through Southern Gaul. Finding himself too late to intercept Hannibal's passage of the Rhone, Scipio made haste to return to Italy. He sent his brother on to Spain, while he

himself took steps to meet Hannibal in Cisalpine Gaul with a large army. The other consul, Sempronius, was at Sicily with a view to the invasion of Africa, when he was summoned back to Italy to assist in defending it against Hannibal.

Hannibal found that the Gauls were prepared to dispute his passage of the Rhone, but by a clever stratagem he succeeded in getting his men, horses and elephants across the river with little loss. Marching north for some distance he prepared to enter on the most difficult and dangerous portion of his enterprise, the crossing of the Alps. It is not known with any certainty through which of the passes of the Alps Hannibal entered Italy. Opinion is divided between the Little St. Bernard and the more southerly one at Mount Cenis. But, whichever route was taken, it was one involving terrible risk for all concerned. Hostile natives rolled down masses of rock on the little army. Horses and men lost their footing and rolled down steep precipices, or fell into concealed crevasses and perished. The summit of the pass was at length reached, and from it the promised land, the plains of Northern Italy, could be seen. But the descent was found to be more perilous than the ascent, and was accompanied with great loss of men and beasts. At last the journey was accomplished in fifteen days, and Hannibal, with the remnant of an army, so worn as to look like shadows, emerged into the valley of the Po. Twenty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry were all that were left after this terrible journey. One half of Hannibal's army had perished in the undertaking.

*Hannibal
crosses the
Alps.*

It, apparently, did not take long for Hannibal's little army to recruit, for we find it shortly after entering Italy chastising some hostile tribes, capturing the city of Turin, and compelling some of the natives to join the Carthaginian army against the Romans.

Hannibal now advanced towards the Po, but an excursion against the Taurini gave Scipio, who was waiting with a large army in Cisalpine Gaul to intercept Hannibal, time to cross that river and build a bridge over the Ticinus, a stream which issuing from Lake Verbanus flows southward into the Po. Near this

*Battle of
Ticinus,
218 B.C.*

stream the hostile armies met in an engagement which resulted in the defeat of the Roman cavalry and light infantry by the Carthaginian cavalry. Scipio himself was wounded severely, and rescued, it is said, through the gallantry of his son, Scipio, the future conqueror of Hannibal at Zama.

Scipio now retreated across the Po, followed by Hannibal, who pitched his camp near Placentia, under the walls of which Scipio had taken refuge. Meanwhile the Gallic tribes of Cisalpine Gaul were sending in offers of alliance with Hannibal, and this so dismayed Scipio that he determined to retreat to some higher ground on a spur of the Apennines. Putting the river Trebia between himself and Hannibal, he pitched his camp and waited for the arrival of his colleague Sempronius. The union of the two Roman armies was effected and brought their strength up to forty thousand men. With such an army Sempronius thought success could not be doubtful, and he was eager to engage in battle.

*Battle of
the Trebia,
218 B.C.*

It was midwinter, and the waters of the Trebia which flowed between the opposing forces were deep, and cold as ice. Near the river, and on the same side as Hannibal's army, was a water-course, overgrown with bulrushes and brambles, and with banks so steep and high as to furnish complete concealment for cavalry. Into this natural ambush Hannibal placed his brother Mago with two thousand foot and horse. At dawn of day, Hannibal sent his cavalry across the river to make a pretended attack and retreat, so as to draw the Roman soldiery into a pursuit. Falling back, the Carthaginian cavalry re-crossed the Trebia, followed by the Roman cavalry and foot in hot pursuit. This was what Hannibal anticipated, and for which he made his careful preparations. The Roman soldiers had taken no breakfast, and were otherwise imperfectly prepared to stand the chilling effects of the icy waters, the cold winds and the falling sleet. On the other hand, Hannibal had ordered his men to take their breakfasts by their fires, to oil their bodies, and to stay in their tents until they were needed. The Romans reached the Carthaginian side of the river cold and benumbed, and found themselves at once engaged in battle with the enemy's skirmishers.

The light-armed troops soon fell back, and then the Romans were brought face to face with the dreaded Carthaginian cavalry and the main body of Hannibal's infantry. The battle was not long doubtful. The Romans fought bravely, but when Mago issuing from his ambuscade fell on their rear, they sought in vain to re-cross the river. A body of ten thousand Romans with the courage of despair broke through the ranks of their enemies, and made their way to Placentia. The remainder of the army was almost completely destroyed by the cavalry and the elephants of the Carthaginians.

The effect of this battle was to bring the Gauls more fully into line with the Carthaginians. In vain did the Roman commander send word home that he had won a partial victory. The truth could not be concealed, and with their wonted indomitable courage the Roman senate proceeded to hold the elections and gather reinforcements from far and near. Winter gave the Romans time to make preparations, for Hannibal could not cross the Apennines till spring arrived. Two Roman armies were sent to guard the two usual routes from the north into Central Italy. Cn. Servilius was stationed at Ariminum on the Adriatic, while the consul Flaminius (the builder of the great military road known as the Flaminian way) took up his position at Arretium in Etruria. But Hannibal chose his own route across the Apennines. He entered Etruria on the western coast, and in spite of the flooded condition of the country between Luca and Faesulæ, due to the melting snows on the hills in the springtime, he reached Faesulæ, having suffered the loss of many of his Gallic troops in this trying march. Hannibal himself, it is said, lost an eye from ophthalmia. At Faesulæ he found high ground on which to pitch his camp. He also found himself between the Roman consular armies, Servilius being still at Ariminum, and Flaminius at Arretium. Hannibal now began the devastation of the plains of Etruria, and marching past the camp of Flaminius took the road towards Rome. This action forced Flaminius to follow closely in Hannibal's footsteps. When the latter reached Trasimēnus he found the road led through two narrow passes, between which lies a plain of a circular shape. Concealing his men on the slopes of the

*Hannibal
crosses the
Apennines.*

*Battle of
Lake
Trasimenus
217 B.C.*

hills surrounding this plain, and near the entrance and exit of this natural amphitheatre, he waited patiently for the approach of the unsuspecting Roman army of thirty thousand men. It was early morning when the fated victims entered this 'valley of death'. The mists hung heavily over the plain, effectually concealing the Carthaginian soldiers. When the rear of the Roman army had passed into the valley the signal for the slaughter was given. No time was allowed for forming into order of battle. The Romans were simply cut to pieces where they stood, with the exception of six thousand men who fought their way, sword in hand, through the narrow exit to a rising ground, where they halted, waiting in dread suspense the issue of the invisible struggle in the valley behind them. The mists arose at the end of three hours to reveal fifteen thousand Roman corpses lying on the ground, or floating on the waters of Lake Trasimenus. Flaminius himself was slain by a Gaul who recognized him as the man who ravaged the territory of the Insubres. The six thousand men who temporarily escaped were forced to surrender the next day, and four thousand cavalry sent by Servilius to the aid of Flaminius also fell into the hands of Hannibal.

*Defensive
prepara-
tions at
Rome.*

No attempt was made at Rome to conceal the nature of the disaster at Lake Trasimenus. The praetor calmly announced, 'We have been defeated in a great battle,' and the senate forthwith went to work to devise plans for the defence of the city. A dictator was appointed in this hour of peril, the choice falling upon Quintus Fabius Maximus, a slow-moving, but prudent and wise patrician general. The first step taken by the dictator was to appease the angry gods with vows and offerings; the next to repair the walls of the city. Bridges over the rivers were broken down, and the country through which Hannibal would likely march on his way to Rome was desolated.

But Hannibal, who had no love for sieges and was as yet unsupported by any portion of the Italian peoples, did not think it wise to venture an attack upon a city capable of making so strong a defence as Rome. He hoped to arouse among the recently conquered Italian nations a desire for the restoration of their independence. Supported by the Italian peoples he could crush the common enemy without running any serious risk, and

Rome girt about by a ring of foes would be forced to surrender. He, therefore, turned aside from Rome, and with his small army traversed Umbria, crossed the Apennines again, and entered Picenum. From this district Hannibal sent his first messenger to Carthage with news of his doings since he had left Spain. The tidings of his victories encouraged the Carthaginian people to send reinforcements to Hasdrubal in Spain and to Hannibal in Italy.

Hannibal enters Picenum.

Picenum was admirably adapted as a resting-place for Hannibal's weary troops and worn-out horses. Both men and horses soon rallied under the generous diet furnished by this rich district; and Hannibal employed his spare time in accustoming his Libyan and, perhaps, Spanish soldiers to fight in Roman armour, of which he possessed an abundant supply after his recent victory at Lake Trasimenus. Once thoroughly rested, Hannibal resumed his march through the territories of the Marrucini, Frentani, Marsi, and Peligni, eventually pitching his camp near Arpi in Apulia.

Hannibal's movements.

In the meantime Fabius, the new Roman commander, had levied four new legions and started out in pursuit of Hannibal. His policy was to avoid a general engagement with the dreaded Carthaginian, but to follow him from place to place, never far away, and yet never so close as to be drawn into a battle in which he was almost certain to be worsted. This policy, the wisest that could be adopted, earned for Fabius the surname of Cunctator, or 'Lingerer'. It was a policy which irritated both Hannibal and the Romans, and required for its successful carrying out great firmness and self-control. In vain Hannibal sought, by ravaging the richest districts, and by the frequent shifting of his camp, to draw the prudent Fabius into a decisive conflict. Fabius kept to the hills to avoid the Numidian cavalry, and seized such opportunities as came to him to cut off the stragglers of Hannibal's army.

The Fabian policy.

The policy of Fabius was equally irritating to the Roman army and people. Minucius, the master of the horse, was one of the foremost in finding fault; but the dictator was proof against all murmurings and complaints. At last, Hannibal, wearied of a policy which brought no decisive results, determ-

Hannibal in Campania. ined to march into Campania. He passed through Samnium, ravaged Beneventum, took Telesia by assault, and entered the beautiful and fertile plains of Campania. The usual work of destruction began in the hope that Fabius would come to the rescue of the fairest portion of Central Italy. Fabius did, indeed, follow after Hannibal; but neither the discontent at Rome, nor the loud complaints of his own army, could induce him to give battle to the Carthaginians. Instead he sought to prevent Hannibal from returning to Apulia to spend the winter, and to that end placed four thousand men at the head of the pass through which Hannibal must march on his retreat. But Hannibal was equal to the emergency. Taking two thousand of the strongest oxen (part of his booty captured in Campania), he tied faggots of dry brushwood to their horns, and when night fell, set the faggots on fire. Terror-stricken and maddened with pain, the infuriated animals were driven up the hills to the great alarm and excitement of the Romans, who thought Hannibal and his army were escaping in that direction. The pass was left unguarded, and during the confusion Hannibal marched his men safely through without encountering any opposition. The easy escape of Hannibal brought upon Fabius the charge of aiding and abetting his foe, a charge to which Hannibal sought to give a semblance of truth by sparing the private property of Fabius, while destroying that of all others in its vicinity.

Hannibal's stratagem.

Nevertheless, Fabius continued his policy of apparent inaction. But Minucius, his master of the horse, was of a different mind, and taking advantage of the temporary absence of Fabius at Rome, he made an attack on Hannibal's foragers and won a slight success. This was hailed as a proof of the wisdom of the generalship of Minucius, and he was forthwith appointed the equal in command with Fabius. To prevent the disaster almost certain to arise out of a divided command, Fabius and Minucius agreed that each should continue in full control of two legions. Hannibal, aware of the impetuosity of the temper of Minucius, drew him into an engagement in which he would have suffered severely had not Fabius come to his rescue. It was now evident that the policy of the 'Lingerer'

Minucius entrapped.

was the right one, and Minucius resigned his command to take his old position of master of the horse.

But the six months' term of office of Fabius was drawing to a close, and he had accomplished, apparently, very little, although in reality he had done much. He had kept Hannibal from the gates of Rome, and had trained the raw levies of the Romans to overcome the dread of Hannibal and his army. Hannibal, too, had been taught the lesson that the Italian cities were not disposed to espouse his cause and throw off the mild yoke of Rome.

The winter of 217-216 B.C. was a time of considerable activity upon the part of the Romans. Legates were sent to Liguria to ensure their fidelity, and reinforcements were despatched to Spain. Arrears of tribute were collected in Illyria and Philip of Macedon was called to account for harbouring one of Rome's enemies. Elections for the consulship were held, *Consuls chosen.* which resulted in L. Aemilius Paullus, a patrician who had distinguished himself in the Illyrian war, and P. Terentius Varro, a plebeian, being chosen. Varro has been described by patrician annalists as another Cleon; but he had already held *Varro.* high office, and even after the great disaster with which his name is connected, was chosen to lead Roman armies.

The Romans in the meantime had been encouraged by several small successes in different quarters, and the new consuls were sent forth with instructions to fight Hannibal, and by a decisive blow bring the war in Italy to a close. Fabius ceased to be dictator and returned to Rome; but the consuls of the previous year were continued in the field to co-operate with Paullus and Varro. Great efforts were put forth to send out a Roman army which would overwhelm Hannibal. Eight legions of five *Great Roman preparations.* thousand foot and three hundred horse each, with allies equal in number, took the field, so that Hannibal soon found himself called upon to face an army of over eighty thousand men, with a force scarcely half that number.

Meanwhile Hannibal's army was beginning to feel the want of supplies, and he fell back from Gerconium to seize Cannae, a small town on the right bank of the Aufidus, about eight miles

*Cannae
seized.*

from its mouth, which contained a Roman magazine. Cannae was taken by surprise, and this action spurred the Romans on to attack Hannibal before he could inflict further injuries on them. Hannibal, too, was desirous of a battle, as he could not well retreat or ravage the country for supplies with such a large army threatening his movements. According to the Roman version, Paullus was exceedingly anxious to avoid a conflict in the open plain where the Carthaginian cavalry could operate with good effect. But Varro, who commanded alternate days with Paullus, knew that Rome was expecting a battle and a victory, and therefore felt compelled to bring matters to a speedy issue. Besides, the support of an army of over eighty thousand men in Apulia was a difficult task, as Hannibal stood between the Romans and the corn-fields (just ripening) of Southern Apulia. Both armies were forced to encamp near the Aufidus to obtain the necessary supply of water. The Romans established a camp on each side of the river, an example that was followed by Hannibal. A few days were spent by the hostile armies in manœuvring before battle was actually joined. When Varro was in command the Romans moved forward towards their enemies, but Paullus preferred a policy of delay. Varro, however, placed the Romans in such a position that a conflict was inevitable. On the last day of his command he drew his men up in order of battle, with his right and left wings resting on the north bank of the Aufidus, which at this point forms a loop.

*Battle of
Cannae,
216 B.C.*

The Carthaginians crossed the river and took up a position between the Romans and the river, also resting their wings on the Aufidus. The narrow front, forming the chord of a circle, made it necessary to draw up the Romans in deep columns. Thus their great numbers availed them very little. The Carthaginians faced the north, so that the rising sun, and the hot dust-bearing winds from the south-east were in their favour. The Romans placed their cavalry, all picked men, and two thousand four hundred strong, on their right, where they faced the main body of Carthaginian cavalry under Hasdrubal. On the left wing were the cavalry of the Roman allies, against whom was

lated the Numidian horse, under Maherbal. The Romans brought about seventy thousand foot and eight thousand horse into the field; the Carthaginians thirty thousand foot and ten thousand horse. Hannibal advanced with his army drawn up so as to form a convex front, the Gauls and Spaniards in the foreground, and the heavy well-armed African infantry on the flanks and rear. Battle was begun by the slingers and light-armed men. Soon the heavy cavalry were engaged on the right of the Roman position, and after a short but desperate conflict the Romans were routed with great slaughter. Hasdrubal followed up his success by riding around the rear of the Roman army, and falling upon the cavalry of the allies, who had been kept busy by the agile Numidians. The whole of the Roman cavalry was thus early in the day defeated with heavy loss. Meanwhile the infantry had begun a life and death struggle. The Gauls and Spaniards of Hannibal's army were easily borne back by the solid mass of the Roman columns, which pressed forward like a wedge right into the midst of the Carthaginian army, only to be attacked fiercely on both flanks by the Africans, who wheeled in from the left and right. The Romans were at the same time attacked on the rear by Hasdrubal, and in the front by the Gauls and Spaniards, who had returned to the slaughter. What followed was mere butchery. The unfortunate Romans were so closely packed together that effective resistance was impossible. Quarter was neither asked nor given. The helpless victims fell under the relentless blows of the Carthaginians, who never ceased the work of destruction until the whole Roman army was nearly annihilated. Fifty thousand men were slain, and twenty thousand taken prisoners in the pursuit and from those left to guard the Roman camps. Aemilius Paullus was slain, but Varro escaped with seventy horsemen to Venusia. Servilius, the proconsul, Minucius, the master of the horse, both quaestors, twenty-one military tribunes, sixty senators, and a multitude of knights were among the killed. Hannibal lost but five thousand five hundred infantry, and two hundred cavalry. It is said that as a convincing proof of his great victory Hannibal sent home to Carthage three bushels of gold rings taken from the fingers of the Roman knights slain in battle. In the glow of victory Maherbal

Roman loss.

wished to push on with his cavalry to Rome, and seize the city before the consternation produced by their terrible defeat had subsided among the Roman people. But Hannibal refused, greatly to the chagrin of his impetuous cavalry leader.

Panic at Rome.

The news was not long in reaching Rome. At first it was thought the entire army had been destroyed, and the Romans were in hourly expectation of hearing the advancing hoof-beats of Hannibal's cavalry. Multitudes sought to escape from the doomed city, but by the advice of Fabius the gates were closed. The senate remained calm and collected, and began to put the city into a condition of defence. Slaves and even criminals were armed, and the gods were by human sacrifices implored to be merciful. Then more hopeful tidings reached the mourning city. Varro had escaped, and was endeavouring to collect at Canusium the scattered fugitives of the recent grand army. Hannibal, too, was not on the march towards Rome. These things gave the Romans fresh courage, although tidings of loss and defeat soon followed from Sicily and Cisalpine Gaul.

Why Hannibal refused to march against Rome.

Why did Hannibal refuse to take advantage of Roman consternation to march at once against Rome and capture the city? Great historians and generals have alike condemned him for losing the best opportunity of his brilliant military career. Rome, it has been said, could have been easily captured during the few days that followed Cannae. But Hannibal evidently thought otherwise. He had no fondness for sieges; he lacked siege engines; Rome had strong walls, and was defended by the malaria of her surrounding marshes. His victories were due to his matchless cavalry, which of course was utterly useless for siege operations. Besides, Hannibal now believed that Southern Italy, at least, would revolt against Rome, and he hoped that at the head of a general rising of the Italian allies he would soon be able to encompass Rome so closely that her surrender would be only a matter of time. Such are the reasons that have been assigned for Hannibal's refusal to besiege Rome at this the most critical period in her history.

Peace refused by Rome.

Hannibal not only refused to proceed at once to Rome, but he even offered to negotiate terms of peace with his sworn

enemy. But the Romans, as in the days of Pyrrhus, refused to consider any negotiations so long as the Carthaginian army held a foot of Italian soil. Instead of coming to terms with Hannibal, Rome proceeded to raise fourteen legions to replace the army she had lost at Cannae. Varro was thanked by the senate because he had not 'despaired of the Republic'. M. Claudius Marcellus, the best remaining Roman general, was put in command, and for several years held this position as either consul or proconsul. Hannibal, however, reaped some fruit from his great success. Southern Italy now joined him, and Capua, the second city in Italy in population, opened its gates to him on condition of not having to contribute any soldiers to Hannibal's army. In this pleasure-loving and luxurious city the Carthaginians spent the winter following Cannae, and some historians contend that the effect upon the toil-worn soldiers was to demoralize them and render them less fit for future campaigns. This, however, is uncertain as Hannibal's little army ever proved more than a match in the field for their enemies.

In the year following Cannae fresh difficulties arose before the Roman people. Their old and faithful ally Hiero, king of Syracuse, died and left his throne to his weak and unworthy grandson Hieronymus, who deserted Rome and entered into an alliance with Carthage. Hannibal also entered into an agreement with Philip V., king of Macedon, by which Philip was to attack Rome from the East. Sardinia also revolted but the insurrection was speedily suppressed. In spite of these favourable events Hannibal found himself unable to make much headway in Campania. Naples, Cumae, Nola, and other cities were attacked but without effect. Nevertheless, the Romans under Fabius, Marcellus and Gracchus never dared to meet Hannibal's small army in the open field. The old tactics of Fabius were resumed, and Hannibal getting little assistance from Carthage fell back into Magna Graecia, where he captured the Greek city Tarentum.

New armies raised.

Syracuse and Macedon join Carthage.

Tarentum captured, 213 B.C.

The revolt of Syracuse was followed by a general movement in Sicily in favour of the Carthaginians. To quell the insurrection

*Siege of
Syracuse,
214-212 B.C.*

and restore Roman influence in the island, Marcellus, the 'Sword of Rome', was sent to Sicily with a powerful force. After a siege which, through the skill and engineering genius of the great mathematician Archimēdes, lasted altogether three years, Syracuse fell by treachery into the hands of Marcellus, and Archimēdes was slain, while engaged in study, by a common Roman soldier. So fell the great city which had resisted successfully in its time the assaults of both Athenian and Carthaginian armies. Its choicest works of art were carried off to Rome to adorn that grasping city, and the savage soldiers of Marcellus were allowed to plunder at their will.

*War in
Spain.*

Let us now turn our attention to Spain, which Hannibal had left under the control and care of his younger brother Hasdrubal. It will be remembered that Publius Scipio was on his way to Spain with a large force, and had reached Massilia when he learned that Hannibal was on the rapid march through Gaul towards Italy. He at once returned to Rome, but sent the greater part of his army on to Spain, under the command of his brother Cneius. But Publius was defeated at the Ticinus and at the Trebia, after which he was despatched to Spain with a naval and land force of considerable strength. Joining his brother Cneius, the two Scipios soon acquired control of all the country north of the Ebro, partly by victories in the field, and partly by the tact and address with which they treated the Spanish tribes. In the year of the battle of Cannae, Hasdrubal was defeated in a great battle near a town called Ibēra, just as he was about to start for Italy to aid his brother Hannibal. Step by step the Scipios were winning over to the Roman allegiance the Spanish people, and Carthage was being threatened with the loss of her Spanish empire, when the Scipios allowed their forces to be divided. In this condition they were attacked by Hasdrubal and Mago (recently sent from Carthage), their armies defeated, and they themselves slain. All that the Romans had won seemed now to have been lost. But Publius Scipio had a son, P. Cornelius Scipio, who had already greatly distinguished himself at the Ticinus and at Cannae. This young man, only

*Scipios
slain, 211
B.C.*

*P. Cornelius
Scipio takes
the com-
mand in
Spain.*

twenty-four years of age at the time of his father's death, now took the command of the disheartened Roman troops in Spain as proconsul. Under the wise leadership of the younger Scipio, the Roman cause in Spain rapidly gained strength. This was due as much to Scipio's treatment of the natives as to his victories over the Carthaginians in the field. Of Scipio many marvellous and interesting tales are told. That he was the one great Roman general produced by the Punic wars is universally admitted. His character, too, seems to have been one seldom found among the Roman people. Kind, generous, true to his word, loving literature and the fine arts, he was an unusual product of a race that seems to have been lamentably deficient in all the humane instincts that soften the hardships of war.

Meanwhile the tide of fortune in Italy was beginning to turn against Hannibal. Without adequate support from Carthage, he was unable to make headway against the great armies Rome placed in the field. Capua was now besieged by the Romans, and Hannibal in vain sought to relieve the city. As a last resort he marched rapidly against Rome itself with the hope of inducing the Roman army at Capua to raise the siege and follow him. The ruse failed, for Rome had defenders enough within her walls, and though Hannibal rode up to the Colline gate itself, he was compelled to withdraw without accomplishing anything. At length Capua fell into the hands of the Romans, and the great ease-loving, luxurious city was made to suffer a severe penalty. Her leading citizens were executed, she was deprived of political rights, and placed under the control of two Roman praefects. Thousands were sold into slavery or dispersed among the Latin colonies.

*Capua
besieged.*

*Capua taken
211 B.C.*

The fall of Capua could not have other than a bad effect upon the allegiance of Hannibal's Italian allies. In vain he strove by some brilliant achievement to restore their confidence in his ultimate success. He failed to capture Rhegium, and to drive out the Roman garrison in the citadel of Tarentum. The assistance he expected to receive from Philip of Macedon never came, for the Romans had found employment for Philip at home by stirring up the Aetolians against him. Marcellus

*Tarentum
captured,
209 B.C.*

*Marcellus
slain.*

*Hasdrubal
leaves Spain
to enter
Italy.*

also, flushed with his Sicilian victories, returned to Italy to help in the struggle against Hannibal. Nevertheless, though Samnium and Lucania submitted in 209 B.C. to Roman authority, and three Roman armies were in the field against his small force, Hannibal won two brilliant victories in Apulia and forced Marcellus to take refuge in Venusia. The two following years proved that the great Carthaginian was still invincible in the field. But Tarentum fell by treachery into the hands of the Romans, and a terrible revenge was taken on its inhabitants. Slavery or death was the fate of many thousands, and the valuable literary works of this great Greek city were carried off to Rome. The next year Hannibal, having moved northwards into Apulia, surprised and slew Marcellus, the 'Sword of Rome'. The loss of Marcellus was a serious matter to Rome ; but not so serious as the disaffection of twelve of the Latin colonies which on ground of exhaustion refused to furnish their mistress with any more men and money. The Romans listened to and respected the protest, knowing the danger of such disaffection spreading among the remaining eighteen Latin colonies. Still more serious was the news that reached them the same year. Hasdrubal, who had been waging for ten years a fierce struggle against the Scipios in Spain, had been able in spite of a defeat at Baecula at the hands of the younger Scipio, to pass into Gaul and begin his march into Italy, where he expected to join his illustrious brother. No greater danger could possibly threaten Rome than the junction of the armies of Hasdrubal and Hannibal. If Hannibal alone, and unaided from without Italy, could march and counter-march throughout the length and breadth of Italy, defeat the best Roman generals and imperil Rome herself, even when her allies remained true to her cause, what might not be expected when Hasdrubal, moving down from the north with a host of Gauls and Spaniards, joined his forces with those of Hannibal in the heart of Italy ?

Fortunately for Rome some months elapsed before Hasdrubal thought it wise to leave Gaul and attempt the passage of the Alps. C. Claudius Nero and M. Livius were the consuls of the year 207 B.C. The former was sent against Hannibal in Apulia, while the latter was despatched to Cisalpine Gaul to

check the advance of Hasdrubal. Hasdrubal found no difficulty in crossing the Alps and entering the plains of Northern Italy. *Hannibal enters Cisalpine Gaul.* His men were in good condition after the passage of the Alps ; but instead of proceeding at once southward he lingered to besiege Placentia. When he started to march the Romans retreated before him until they reached the south side of the river Metaurus, in North-Eastern Italy. From Sena Hasdrubal sent messengers to Hannibal with instructions to meet him at Narnia, about thirty miles from Rome. But Hannibal, who was moving rapidly backwards and forwards between Bruttium and Apulia, was not found by the messengers of Hasdrubal, and they unfortunately fell into the hands of the Romans. The message was read by Claudius Nero, who at once formed the bold resolution of marching northwards with a portion of his troops to join Livius, and by uniting their forces crush Hasdrubal before Hannibal was aware of his presence in Italy. *Bold march of Claudius Nero.* Nero took with him six thousand foot and one thousand horse, and aided by the inhabitants of Central Italy made a rapid march over the two hundred miles that lay between the two Roman armies. Entering at night the camp of Livius so that Hasdrubal might not be aware of his presence, he distributed his travel-worn troops among the tents already occupied. The following morning Hasdrubal detected the presence of a new army, and fearing his brother had been defeated, began a retreat northwards. He was, however, treacherously guided towards a portion of the Metaurus where there was no ford, and the Romans coming up he was compelled to draw up his men in order of battle, with a rapid river in his rear. The day was a disastrous one to the Carthaginians. They were defeated with great slaughter, and Hasdrubal was among the slain. Taking the head of Hasdrubal along with him, Nero at once returned to Apulia and rejoined the portion of his army he had left behind, before Hannibal was even aware of his absence. With true Roman brutality Nero caused the head of Hasdrubal to be flung within the camp of Hannibal, and this was the first intimation that Hannibal had of his brother's arrival in Italy. *Battle of the Metaurus, B.C. 205.*

The battle of the Metaurus practically determined the issue of the Second Punic War. The defeat of Hasdrubal left the Cartha-

Gadestaken, ginians powerless in both Spain and Italy. Scipio in the former country was able to drive back gradually the Carthaginians until nothing was left in their possession except Gades. This the first and last stronghold of Carthage in Spain was abandoned 205 B.C. by Mago, the brother of Hannibal. Mago then crossed over to the Balearic Isles, and subsequently landed on the shores of Liguria, in the hope of making a diversion favourable to Hannibal.

Scipio at Rome.

When Scipio returned to Rome at the close of the year 206 B.C., he was the hero of the hour. Although only thirty years of age, he was elected consul, but the senate refused him a triumph. He at once began to urge on the senate the policy of transferring the war to Africa. To this the senate demurred, remembering the fate of Regulus. Hannibal, it was not forgotten, was still at large in Italy, and Scipio was advised to crush him before undertaking to carry on a war at the doors of Carthage. But Scipio had the popular ear, and to save its dignity the senate gave Scipio Sicily as his province, with permission to cross over to Africa if he thought it advisable. Two legions were assigned him, the rest of his army were volunteers who eagerly sought to enlist under his command. The Etrurians found him ships; the Sicilians, horses and provisions. Early in 204 B.C. Scipio crossed over from Sicily to Africa, with a force which has been estimated as low as twelve thousand men, and as high as thirty-six thousand. The army was not a large one, but it was soon increased by additions from the African tribes adjoining Carthage. Why the Carthaginians did not prevent Scipio from landing is not at all clear, as they still held the command of the seas. Landing at the 'Fair Promontory,' Scipio sought the alliance of two Numidian chieftains, Masinissa, of the Massylians, a tribe to the west of Carthage, and Syphax, of the Massaesylians, a larger tribe, inhabiting the district of modern Algeria. Syphax remained true to the Carthaginian alliance, and drove Masinissa out of his kingdom, who took refuge in the camp of the Romans.

Scipio invades Africa, 204 B.C.

The last part of the story of the Second Punic War is vague and unsatisfactory. Many of the events as given us by the Roman historians are extremely improbable. Carthage, we are told, made no opposition to the Romans landing on their shores, nor were the Carthaginian land forces in a shape to offer a strong

resistance to a disciplined army. Hasdrubal, the son of Gisco, was their best general. The villages and towns around Carthage were still unwall'd as in the days of Regulus, and the inhabitants fled to Carthage as the invaders advanced. But Scipio, instead of advancing against Carthage itself, undertook the siege of Utica, in which he failed. The year 204 B.C. thus ended without any definite success.

The following year the Romans made great efforts, and put in the field twenty legions. Scipio was continued in command in Africa. The camp of the Carthaginians under Hasdrubal, and that of the Numidians under Syphax, were close to the winter quarters of Scipio. The huts of the Carthaginians were made of dry wood, those of the Numidians of reeds thatched with straw. Scipio, by pretending to negotiate terms of peace, managed through his agents to get an accurate idea of the camps of his enemies. He then caused them to be set on fire, and while the panic lasted, succeeded in slaughtering, it is said, forty thousand of the Africans. Hasdrubal escaped to Carthage, and Syphax to his own capital, Cirta. Followed closely by Masinissa, Syphax was taken prisoner, and his kingdom given to his rival.

Discouraged by their misfortunes, the peace party at Carthage sought to bring the war to a close; but the terms agreed to by Scipio were rejected by the Roman Senate. It was then resolved to recall Hannibal and Mago from Italy. The former, confined to the southern point of the peninsula, had been holding at bay the Roman armies, which in spite of their numbers were afraid to meet him in the open field. Mago had taken Genoa, and during his two years in Italy had striven to build up a cause among the Ligurians and Gauls. In a battle fought in the territory of the Insubres he had been defeated and seriously wounded. Making his way to the coast he found an order to return to Carthage awaiting him. He immediately set sail, but died before his ship touched the shores of his native land.

With a heavy heart Hannibal left the land where he had spent fifteen years in desperate conflict, and had won so many victories. 'He left,' says Livy, 'the country of his enemies with more regret than many an exile has left his own.' Landing at

*Romans
burn the
Carthagin-
ian Camp.*

*Death of
Mago.*

*Hannibal
leaves Italy.*

Leptis (the lesser), he made his way slowly towards the city that he had not seen since he was nine years of age. His very presence on African soil roused the drooping spirits of his countrymen, who now once more became eager for war. Gradually advancing into Numidia he won some victories over Masinissa, but was overtaken near Zama by Scipio, who had moved forwards from Tunis.

*Battle of
Zama, 202
B.C.*

For the first and last time Hannibal and Scipio met at the head of their respective armies. The battle that followed was to settle for all time which power was to rule the Mediterranean Sea and its adjacent countries. In fact it was to decide once for all the future history of the world. The battle field is supposed to have been somewhat westward of Zama, and the struggle to have taken place in October. Hannibal's army consisted of Ligurians, Gauls, Moors, Carthaginians and their African allies, besides his veterans from Southern Italy. In addition to a body of cavalry, he had eighty elephants drawn up in front of his lines. Scipio, like Hannibal, drew his men up in three lines; but he made a departure from the Roman usage in the disposition of his ranks or files. Instead of arranging his men chequer-wise on the field, he placed the men of the second and third ranks immediately in the rear of those of the first, thus leaving broad lanes through the army. This arrangement was a happy thought, for when the elephants attacked they were driven by the lances of the Roman soldiers into these lanes, through which they rushed harmlessly to the rear. Some, however, were turned aside to the flank of the army, and there they threw the Carthaginian cavalry into confusion. Outnumbered and confused, Hannibal's cavalry, the strong arm of his force, was defeated; and then the Roman cavalry, led by Laelius and Masinissa, attacked Hannibal's veterans and Spaniards in the rear. With obstinate courage these well-tried soldiers held their ground until they were cut to pieces. Twenty thousand of Hannibal's army were slain and twenty thousand more were taken prisoners. Hannibal escaped to Carthage, and recognizing the impossibility of continuing the war with success counselled peace. Scipio was not averse to treating, for Carthage

was a strong city, and if the war were further prolonged, the glory of its capture might fall to his successor in the consulship.

The terms offered by Scipio, and accepted by the Carthaginians, were ratified by the Roman Senate. Carthage kept her African territory intact, and was allowed to make her own laws. She had to surrender all her prisoners of war without ransom, and give up all her ships of war except ten. She was to pay ten thousand talents in fifty years, and was to recognize Masinissa as king of Numidia. Most serious of all, Carthage was not to make war in Africa without the consent of Rome, nor abroad at all. All her possessions outside of Africa had to be given up. This left Carthage dependent upon Rome so far as her foreign relations were concerned, and at the mercy of her vindictive neighbour Masinissa, who was now enrolled as the friend and ally of Rome.

*Terms of
peace, 201
B.C.*

CHAPTER XVI.

ROMAN CONQUESTS IN THE EAST.

With Carthage humiliated and bound to her chariot wheels, Rome had no rival west of Italy to fear. Spain, Sardinia, and Sicily, were under the immediate government of the imperial city, and of these Spain alone gave any trouble. All of Sicily was now placed under the rule of a Roman praetor, and Spain was divided into two provinces, to which were sent two praetors elected for that purpose. But while Sicily made no opposition to Roman rule, Spain gave almost unceasing trouble for many years. The praetors had to be supported by large armies, and sometimes the consuls themselves had to go to Spain to quell the insurrections created by Roman cruelty and treachery. The consul Cato (195 B.C.), and Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, by their just rule and wise concessions, did much to restore order and quiet, and Spain gave no further trouble until 149 B.C.

Trouble in Spain.

Carthage, after the Second Punic War, was for several years under the guidance of Hannibal, whose influence was used to restore good government in the city. Under his honest and careful administration of her finances she was soon in a position to meet the heavy indemnity placed upon her by Rome. But these signs of her reviving power were not welcome to Rome, who demanded that Hannibal, her most dreaded antagonist, should be given into her hands. Hannibal, however, escaped to Asia, and found for a time a refuge with Antiochus the Great, king of Syria. Here we must leave him for the present.

Hannibal goes into exile.

In Italy the Second Punic War was followed by many important results. The Gauls were made to pay for the aid they had given Hannibal by having their territories wrested from them, and Roman colonies established in their midst. Aquileia, in the north-east, and Luna, in the north-west, were established to hold in check the Alpine tribes and the Ligurians, respectively. In Southern Italy the Bruttians, who had been true to

Results of the Second Punic War in Italy.

Hannibal, had most of their territory confiscated. The Lucanians and Apulians were treated somewhat better, but they also suffered severely at the hands of Roman speculators and land-grabbers. Etruria, too, showed a marked decline in prosperity, decreasing in wealth, population and energy.

Turning now to the East, we find Rome extending her empire so as to include Greece and Asia Minor. Her inter-*Rome in the East.*
course with Egypt had begun in 273 B.C., when an alliance was formed with this one of the three great powers into which Alexander's empire had been divided. Later on, as has already been noted, Rome chastised the Illyrian pirates. No further action was taken for several years, until Philip, the ambitious king of Macedon, entered into an alliance with Hannibal, in 214 B.C. This, of course, led to a war with Macedon, which might have proved fatal to Rome, had she not been able to form against Philip a coalition of Greek states sufficiently strong to keep Philip employed in Greece. In 205 B.C. Rome and Macedon came to terms, which left matters where *First Macedonian War, 213-205 B.C.* they were when the war broke out.

The Romans, however, cherished a strong feeling of resentment against Philip for his share in the Hannibalian struggle, and bided their time to take a fitting revenge. Before the Second Punic War was wholly ended Philip had joined Antiochus, king of Syria, in a plot to rob the young king of Egypt of his possessions in the eastern Mediterranean. Philip was to seize Egypt's possessions in the Aegean and on the coast of Asia Minor, while Antiochus was to appropriate Coelo-Syria. The latter portion of this plan was carried out, but Rome interfered on behalf of Egypt against Macedon. War was declared against Philip in 200 B.C. on the pretext that he was invading the territory of Athens, Rome's ally. Roman legions were landed in Epirus, and Philip soon found that in a disunited Greece, torn with factions and petty jealousies, he could find little support. He met the Roman army at Cynoscephalae, under the command of T. Quinctius Flaminius, and in spite of high courage and good generalship, suffered a disastrous defeat. The Macedonian phalanx was no match for the Roman legion. The Achæan *Second Macedonian War, 200 B.C.*
Battle of Cynoscephalae, 197 B.C.

*Terms of
Peace.*

league now joined Rome and captured Corinth. Philip's troops were also defeated in Caria, and he found himself compelled to accept the terms of peace. Roman commissioners were authorized to give. Philip was left in possession of his own dominions, but he was stripped of all he had acquired in Greece, Thrace and Asia Minor. He was also forbidden to wage war without the consent of Rome.

*Grecian
freedom
proclaimed
by Rome.*

Rome now went through the solemn farce of proclaiming the freedom of Greece at the Isthmian games. Two years after (194 B.C.), Flaminius withdrew his troops from Chalcis and Corinth, to the great joy of the light-headed Greeks, who failed to perceive that while rid of Macedon they had assumed the yoke of a more despotic ruler, Rome.

*Antiochus
the Great
crosses into
Greece, 192
B.C.*

Greece was left nominally free; but such arrangements were made of its territory as rendered order and good government, among a people so embittered by petty feuds, out of the question. In the meantime, Antiochus III., of Syria, wrongly named the Great, had conquered Coelo-Syria, only to find at the close of his campaign that his ally, Philip of Macedon, had been crushed at Cynoscephalae. As he could do Philip no good, he concluded he would seize his Egyptian possessions in Asia Minor and Thrace. Asia Minor was overrun rapidly and then he crossed into Thrace. In 192 B.C., at the solicitation of the Aetolians, he crossed the Aegean, encouraged to do so by the withdrawal of the Roman troops from Greece. By this time Hannibal had reached his camp, and had Antiochus acted on the advice of the great general, a different story would probably have to be told. Hannibal urged Antiochus to join his forces with those of Philip of Macedon, and push the war with vigor while the Romans were unprepared. But Antiochus was a pleasure-loving, irresolute, and altogether frivolous king. He would not listen to the advice of Hannibal, and he wasted valuable time at Chalcis in pleasure, and in attacking small Thessalian towns. Further, he brought with him into Greece a force too small to be of any real service. The Romans, it seems, rather dreaded a conflict with the great eastern king, and sought by negotiations to avoid a war. These proving unavailing, a strong Roman force under Glabrio landed in Greece in 191 B.C., and

meeting Antiochus at Thermopylae, scattered his army with little trouble. Antiochus fled across the Aegean to Ephesus, leaving the Aetolians to their fate. The Romans resolved to follow him into Asia Minor to protect their allies there. In 190 B.C. L. Scipio, the consul, and brother of Scipio Africanus, led a Roman army into Asia Minor. With a force of less than forty thousand men the Roman general defeated, at Magnesia, near Mount Sipylus in Lydia, a great host of Asiatics under Antiochus. It was the story of Greece and Persia over again.

Battle of Thermopylae, 191 B.C.

Battle of Magnesia, 190 B.C.

Terms of peace were now agreed upon. Rome sought to make secure her influence in Asia Minor, and to that end fixed upon the Halys river and Taurus range of mountains as the boundary eastwards between Rome's allies and the kingdom of Antiochus. The Syrian king was forbidden to cross this boundary; nor was he to send ships further west than Cape Sarpēdon in Cilicia. Bithynia and Paphlagonia lay near this frontier, and these states were allies of Rome. Pergamus and Rhodes were strengthened so as to not only reward their loyalty, but to secure their steady support against the Thracians in the north and the Syrians in the south. The Greek cities along the coast of Asia Minor, save such as were placed under Pergamus, were declared the independent allies of Rome.

Peace made with Antiochus.

So far Rome's operations in the East had resulted in establishing protectorates; for direct annexation had been avoided. But the incessant feuds among the Greeks rendered it necessary that some action should be taken if anarchy was not to be allowed to prevail. Philip of Macedon had loyally supported Rome in her war with Antiochus; yet he found that the sole result of his assistance was to have insult and injury inflicted upon him. His position, however, was such as to call for prudence. He could not afford to rush into a war with Rome without making careful preparations. For ten years (189-179 B.C.) he husbanded and developed the resources of Macedon, patiently biding his time to assert his independence. His death in 179 B.C. left his son Perseus to continue his policy. Friendly relations were established with the Illyrians and Thracians, while matrimonial alliances brought him into close

Death of Philip of Macedon, 179 B.C.

contact with the kings of Syria and Bithynia. The memories of the greatness of Greece in the days of Alexander, the Great, were revived with some effect. Rome, however, was kept informed of the intrigues of Perseus, and when a suitable time arrived war was declared against him. The unfortunate Mace-

Third Macedonian War

Battle of Pydna, 168 B.C.

donian king found that all his plans for securing the support of the Greeks, Syrians and Bithynians were unavailing. Some little help was given by the Thracians and Illyrians ; but a great victory won by Aemilius Paullus at Pydna brought the Third Macedonian War to an end. Perseus was carried a prisoner to Rome, where he died, and the Macedonian monarchy was extinguished. For a time Macedon was not organized into a Roman province, although some features of the Roman provincial system were introduced. The people had to pay taxes, were disarmed, and isolated from each other, but a Roman governor was not sent to maintain order. Four small republics were established, without the right of inter-marrying or of engaging in trade with each other. No central authority was provided to keep in control the jarring factions, and harmonize the conflicting interests of these petty states. Finally in 149 B.C. a pretender, Andriscus, who claimed to be the son of Perseus, came forward and endeavoured to revive the Macedonian monarchy. He was easily defeated in 146 B.C., and Macedon was made a definite Roman province with a Roman governor in authority.

Macedon becomes a Roman Province, 146 B.C.

Greece, it will be remembered, had been placed under a Roman protectorate in 189 B.C., and no outward change occurred until after the battle of Pydna in 167 B.C. But the sympathy shown by the Greeks with Perseus gave Rome a convenient excuse for further interference. All Greeks suspected of sympathy with Perseus were removed to Italy. The Achaeans, the most power-

Greek hostages sent to Rome.

ful of the Greek communities, were compelled to send one thousand hostages to Rome. This band was made up of their most distinguished men, and included among others, Polybius, the historian of the Punic Wars. No further action was taken until the Achaeans endeavoured to compel Sparta to submit to their League. Rome then interposed, war followed, and the Achaeans were compelled to submit to such terms as Rome

dictated. A 'commission of ten,' under L. Mummius, was entrusted with the task of settling the affairs of Greece. *End of Grecian freedom.* Corinth was burnt to the ground; Thebes, Chalcis and all other fortified towns that had fought for Greek freedom had their walls razed. Once more the Roman system of maintaining control over conquered peoples was brought into play. The right of trading with each other was taken away from the different communities, and all the features of Roman provincial rule established, except the appointment of a Roman governor. Instead of a governor for each district, the Macedonian prefect was entrusted with a general supervision of Greek affairs.

East of the Aegean, the same policy of fostering strife and anarchy was carried on by Rome. When Pergamus and Rhodes, Rome's most faithful allies, showed signs of prosperity, they were humiliated, checked, and reduced to a condition of helpless dependency on their arbitrary mistress. Rome's influence and control were extended to the borders of Armenia, and to the Upper Euphrates, by forming alliances with Pontus and Cappadocia. Syria had to accept a king at Rome's dictation, and Egypt formally acknowledged her supremacy in 168 B.C.

CHAPTER XVII.

THIRD PUNIC WAR (149-146 B.C.).

The year of the destruction of Corinth (146 B.C.) was also the year of the destruction of Rome's hated rival, Carthage. It has already been related that Hannibal had been forced by the petty malignity of Rome to find a refuge with Antiöchus of Syria. After that monarch had been compelled to accept terms of peace at the hands of his conqueror, Hannibal was through Roman influence forced to leave the Syrian dominions, for one of the terms exacted from Antiöchus by the Romans was that Hannibal should be placed in their hands. Rather than submit to this fate, Hannibal fled to Crete, whence he returned to Asia, and after some wanderings found a resting-place at the court of Prusias, king of Bithynia. But Roman malice followed him to this remote corner of Asia Minor. Prusias was forbidden to harbour the illustrious guest, and Hannibal determined to escape further persecution by taking poison, which, it is said, he always carried with him in a hollow ring. At Libyssa, in the year 183 B.C., the tragedy of a marvellous career closed, and the greatest of warriors found a grave among strangers. His great rival, Scipio Africanus, was but little more fortunate in the treatment he received from his fellow-citizens. After Zama he entered the domain of Roman politics, but his somewhat overbearing and haughty conduct, added to his contemptuous disregard of constitutional forms and rules, soon made him many enemies. He was finally compelled to abandon the political field to more popular men, and he retired to Liternum, where he spent the few remaining years of his life in literary pursuit. He died the same year as Hannibal.

*Death of
Hannibal,
183 B.C.*

*Death of
Scipio
Africanus,
183 B.C.*

When Rome by the peace of Zama compelled Carthage to undertake no war without Rome's consent, she well understood that she had the means at her disposal of almost constantly humiliating and irritating her defeated, yet still dreaded rival.

The chief instrument in this policy of irritation, annoyance and humiliation was Rome's ally and friend, Masinissa, king of *Masinissa and Carthage*. Numidia and possessor of the forfeited lands of Syphax. To Masinissa it was a delight to carry on a system of encroachment on the Carthaginian territory in Africa. In so doing he was well aware that he had the cordial support of Rome, who, when appealed to by Carthage for protection, invariably refused to interfere with Masinissa, no matter how wanton his provocations. Emboldened by the security of his position, Masinissa began to encroach on Euphoria, the richest portion of Carthaginian territory and her undoubted possession for over three hundred years. The remonstrances of Carthage to the Roman senate failed to produce any satisfactory results, and Masinissa went still further in his policy of encroachment. At last, her patience exhausted by continuous insult and injury, Carthage took up arms against her malignant tormentor. The longed-for opportunity to make an end of Carthage had now arrived, and the preliminary steps were taken at Rome. Prior to this, however, the Roman people had been led to believe that Rome's greatness and safety would never be secure until Carthage was destroyed. Among those who wielded a great influence at Rome in the interval between the Second and Third Punic Wars was a remarkable man, a survival of the type of the early Roman citizen. This was Cato the Elder, whose hatred of luxury and modern manners was only equalled by his burning desire to blot out of the map of the world the great commercial city of the Mediterranean. Among the commissions sent to Africa to enquire into the complaints of Carthage was one in which Cato had a prominent place. He was greatly surprised and dismayed at the strength, population and resources of the supposed thoroughly weakened Phœnician city. He took note of the fertility of the surrounding country, with its magnificent fruits and cereals. Returning to Rome with specimens of its figs, he showed them to the Roman senate, and told them these grew at a distance of only three days' sail from Rome. From this time forth the refrain of every speech that Cato made in the senate, no matter what the subject might be, was, *Carthago delenda est* *Carthage must be destroyed.* ('Carthage must be destroyed'). A 'constant dropping of

water hollows a stone,' and the constant repetition of these memorable words produced at length its effect at Rome. It became the policy of Rome to seize the first favourable opportunity to make war on Carthage and utterly destroy her.

*Perfidious
conduct of
the Romans.*

Rome was as perfidious as she was resolute. The Carthaginians made every effort to turn aside the wrath of their enemy, and at the demand of Rome sent three hundred of their noblest citizens to Lilybaeum as hostages. War, however, was not declared against the doomed city, until eighty thousand men were on their way to Africa. In the meantime Utica had surrendered to Rome, and this enabled the Roman expedition to land at a point not more than ten miles from Carthage, without meeting any opposition. Once on African soil the Roman consuls made known the full demands of their senate. But prior to doing this the Carthaginians were told to give up all their arms and engines of war, on the ground that Carthage now being under the protection of Rome, no longer needed to defend herself. With this demand the Carthaginians complied, leaving their city apparently defenceless. Then came the final and most crushing terms. The Carthaginians were to abandon their city, which was to be destroyed, and were to be allowed to build another city, not less than ten miles from the sea-coast. The terms were received at Carthage with a terrible outburst of grief and indignation. In spite of the surrender of their arms and military engines; in spite of the fact that by remaining loyal to their treaty they were without vessels of war, they resolved on defending their city to the utmost extremity. The gates were closed, the walls were strengthened, and the city was turned into one great workshop for the manufacture of engines of war. Women gave their long hair to make ropes for the catapults; lead was torn from the roofs and iron from the walls. The Romans, little thinking of what the energy of despair was accomplishing, waited for some time to see the city surrendered. When they approached its walls they found the gates closed, and the Carthaginians ready to receive their attack. In vain did the besiegers seek to force an entrance through the strong walls that girt Carthage landward and seaward. The Romans were beaten back at all points. The year 149 B.C.

*Roman
demands.*

*Siege of
Carthage
begins,
149 B.C.*

came to its close, and Carthage was still untaken. More than once the consuls were in great danger, and were rescued, it is said, by the skill and daring of P. Cornelius Scipio, the son of Aemilius Paullus, the conqueror of Macedonia. Scipio had been adopted into the family of Scipio Africanus, and was now serving in the Roman army in the capacity of a military tribune.

The year 148 B.C. brought new commanders from Rome to the siege, but the results were equally unsatisfactory: Carthage still held out. At length Scipio, in spite of his youth, was appointed consul and the siege was begun in earnest. Step by step the Carthaginians were cut off from their friends without until they were left with nothing but what the walls of their fortifications contained. The only means Carthage now possessed of obtaining food supplies was through her blockade runners, which sped in and out of the narrow entrance to her harbours. Scipio endeavoured to block the mouth of these harbours by building a mole of great stones across it. But while Scipio was doing this the Carthaginians were silently making their way to the sea by excavating another channel, and when Scipio fondly thought he had closed the harbours' mouths, he was surprised to see a fleet of Carthaginian vessels sailing out, apparently through the dry land, into the open sea. Another winter passed, and the desperate garrison still held the city against all the furious assaults of the Romans. The hour was, however, close at hand when successful resistance was no longer possible. The Romans forced their way into the harbours, and thence into the market place. The Byrsa or citadel was still defended, and the Romans pushed on through the narrow streets with their high-walled houses to the final assault. But before reaching the citadel they were forced to engage in a desperate struggle with the citizens, who turned their houses into castles from which they flung down on the heads of the Roman soldiers missiles of all available kinds. The houses had to be stormed, and for six days the work of massacre went on. At length opposition was at end, and the quiet of death reigned. The city was fired, and those who had sought concealment from the Roman sword were burned, or met their fate in the falling buildings. The citadel in which the remnant of the Carthaginian population had taken

*Carthage
taken and
destroyed,
146 B.C.*

refuge was now attacked. At the pitiable pleading of the unfortunate people fifty thousand men, women and children were allowed to go forth unharmed. There still remained a small garrison of nine hundred men, deserters from the Roman army, and for these there was no mercy. The Carthaginian general, Hasdrubal, basely begged for his life, and in contempt it was granted him. But his wife, who with the garrison had taken refuge in the temple of Aesculapius, the highest point of the citadel, came out upon its roof, and before the eyes of the Romans slew her two sons. The temple was fired, and the patriotic mother flung herself, along with the dead bodies of her children, into the flames and there perished. So died one worthy of the race that produced a Hamilcar and a Hannibal.

The city was plundered of its ornaments to grace the triumph of Scipio, henceforth to be known as Africanus the Younger. Overjoyed at the destruction of her most dangerous rival, yet still revengeful, the senate ordered that what was left of the city should be levelled to the ground. A plough was driven over its site, and Scipio pronounced a solemn curse on any one who should ever attempt to rebuild it. So ended the history of the greatest of the great commercial cities of ancient times, after a brilliant career of over seven hundred years.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE ROMAN STATE AND PEOPLE AT THE CLOSE OF THE PUNIC WARS.

Rome came out of her victorious wars in the West and East with serious changes in her polity and morals. Outwardly there seemed to be little change in her constitution ; but a gradual widening of the gap between its theory and practice had gone steadily on. The senate, which in the early period of the republic was subordinate to the magistrates and the people, was now really the sovereign power in the state. This had been brought about by the necessities of the war, which demanded a stronger executive than could be furnished by the assembly of the people, or by magistrates elected frequently. Thus it came to pass that while a magistrate could propose any measure to the people for their sanction, the senate acquired the power of withholding from them all proposals except those that had first received its approval. This gave the senate the right to initiate legislation. The decrees of the senate, also, gradually acquired the force of law, and through them the extension of the command of a magistrate took place. The senate, too, settled terms of peace, and gave hearings to foreign ambassadors. The formation of alliances, the raising of troops, the annexation of provinces with their government, the control of supplies, all came to be exercised by this almost sovereign body. Its ranks were still filled by the magistrate, but his choice was limited to those who had held any curule¹ magistracy, had been tribunes of the plebeians, aediles or quaestors, and to those who had won renown in war. Such a system of selection filled the senate with an official class, magistrates and ex-magistrates.

The senate.

The growth of the power of the senate was closely related to the changes that had taken place in the power of the consuls. The right of appeal had taken away their power of inflicting capital punishment within the city ; and the appointment of tri-

Consuls.

See p. 371.

bunes by the plebeians had subjected their authority to frequent checks. Then, again, the appointment of censors, who were clothed with some of the powers of the consuls, lessened the importance of the office of the latter. Later on the tribunes obtained the power to initiate legislation in the assembly of the tribes, and to this was added, still later, the authority to convene and consult the senate. Another cause of the lessened authority and prestige of the magistrates was the rapid increase in their number, made necessary by the sudden expansion of the Roman empire. In 346 B.C. a city praetor (*praetor urbanus*) was appointed, to whom was entrusted jurisdiction over the civil affairs of the citizens. In 246 B.C. another praetor was elected to take charge of cases in which aliens were concerned. Then came Rome's conquests outside of Italy. Sicily, Spain and Sardinia required four praetors for the administration of their affairs, thus making the total number of magistrates invested with the *imperium*¹, eight, whereas at first there had been only two. So many magistrates, each permitted to exercise all the powers of the *imperium*, necessarily led to some confusion and a conflict of authority. The system would have been unworkable had not certain rules of precedence been established which gave a priority to the two original praetors, who were now known as 'consuls', the remaining six bearing the name of 'praetors'. The rule was also established that the praetor 'who prohibits is stronger than he who commands'. Nevertheless, some central authority was required to maintain harmony, and this authority was found in the senate.

In the early days of the republic the 'nobility' was not to be distinguished from the patrician order; but this was now entirely changed. The nobility of the period which we are considering was no longer wholly patrician. In fact the majority of the 'nobiles' were of plebeian birth. The term 'nobiles' was by custom applied to those families one or more of whose members had held a curule magistracy², and in consequence were privileged to put in their halls and exhibit at their funeral processions the masks (*imagines*) of their ancestors. Such an ances-

See p. 327. ² See p. 371.

tor was said to 'found a family'. Numerous 'families' were 'founded' in this way during the first three quarters of a century of this period, such as the Caecilii, Metelli, the Flamini and the Calpurnii. But this new nobility soon became more exclusive and aristocratic than the old patricians, and sought to confine all the important offices of the state to their families. A sort of Family Compact was organized to keep exclusive possession of these recently won honours and offices, and their efforts were generally successful. This 'nobility' threw its whole influence into the scale of the senate, whose interests were bound up with theirs.

It was during this period that Rome laid the foundations of her provincial system of government, which soon necessitated a new class of officials known as 'proconsuls'. The new dependencies of Rome outside of Italy were not governed, as a rule, in the same way as her colonies and allies in Italy. The chief points of difference were, that while her allies in Italy were not disarmed, taxed, or placed under a resident Roman magistrate, the 'provinces' were subject to all these restrictions. In fact, it was the grouping of a number of communities under a resident Roman magistrate which constituted the formation of a province. The principles on which a province was to be governed were settled by the senate; and its organization was entrusted to a commission chosen from the members of that body. The rights and duties of the province, as well as of its governor, were both laid down in a provincial constitution which the governor was expected to observe. These constitutions were not harsh, and had they been faithfully observed by the Roman governors the provinces would have had little cause for complaint. Existing political divisions were generally respected in grouping communities into a province, and a large measure of local self-government was permitted. The practice that Rome had adopted in her early conquests of denying inter-marriage and interstate commerce was now abandoned. Perhaps the chief source of oppressive government was the way the taxes were collected. The governor had too much latitude in determining the amount of the taxes, as well as in the method of their collection. It was the rule that existing local systems

The Provincial System.

of taxation should not be disturbed, and that the amount of tribute to be paid to Rome should be raised as the local authorities might determine. It is said that the amounts imposed were not usually excessive, and grievances in this respect were largely due to the dishonesty and extortion of almost irresponsible Roman officials. For Rome seldom benefited by the extortion and fraud of her provincial officials.

*Defects of
the system.*

Unfortunately the Roman governor was in the exercise of his powers almost entirely free from any efficient control. Living abroad, he had no colleague to hold him in check. There was no appeal from his decisions, no tribunician veto in the interests of the oppressed provincials. The supplies which Rome voted him, and the taxes his subjects paid were alike at his absolute control. He could tax the provincials to meet his honest or dishonest needs without fear of opposition. The body of officials who accompanied him to his province were entirely under his control; even the quaestor, generally a young man, was expected to submit implicitly to his will. The governors were also very frequently inexperienced men, who knew little or nothing of the provinces they were called upon to administer. The short term of their office, usually one year, made them often extremely anxious to 'make hay while the sun shone'.

Lex Calpurnia, 149 B.C.

The frequent abuses of authority by the Roman officials in the provinces led to the establishment of a special court at Rome to try cases of magisterial extortion. But the remedy was a very imperfect one. The court was held at Rome, and this alone made it difficult for a provincial to obtain redress. It was composed of senators; that is, of a class whose members had been, or hoped to be, governors of provinces. Their sympathies were, therefore, generally on the side of the accused. And, as no proceedings could be taken until the governor's term of office expired, the relief usually came too late to be of any service to the sufferer.

The Proconsulate.

The practical irresponsibility of the governors of provinces was a source of constant trouble and confusion at Rome itself, bringing discredit upon Roman authority, and weakening that of her magistrates at home. These results were aggravated by

the custom, that towards the end of this period began to prevail, of sending *proconsules*, or substitutes for the consuls, to the provinces as governors. After 146 B.C. praetors were never sent abroad to rule, and the consuls only in the time of war. To send a pro-magistrate required at first a vote of the people; but during the Second Punic War, when pro-magistrates were frequently employed, their authority rested solely on a decree of the senate. The people were thus left without any direct control over their conduct, and the proconsul or proprætor soon became independent of the consul or prætor he was supposed to represent. The privileges and power of the proconsul abroad greatly exceeded that of the consul at home, and hence the consulate itself became in time to be valued as a mere stepping-stone to the inferior office, the proconsulate.

If the acquisition of territory outside of Italy led to important *Roman life*. political changes at Rome, much more did the same cause affect the social life of the people. The great wealth of Africa, Spain, Greece and Asia Minor now began to pour into Rome through the agency of her victorious generals and soldiers. Rome, too, became possessed of valuable public lands by her conquest of Carthage, Spain, and Macedonia. The tributes from the provinces together with the revenues from her mines and public lands, rendered it unnecessary to further tax the Roman people, or levy the *tributum* from her allies in Italy. The great revenue thus placed at the disposal of the state was, however, but an insignificant part of the wealth that was brought to Rome by her victorious legions. The plunder of conquered cities and peoples was a feature of every successful campaign. The rapacity of the Romans knew no bounds. Gold and silver, ornaments of the precious metals, statues and bronzes from Greek cities, anything and everything portable and valuable were brought to Italy to maintain and adorn the costly villas of the Roman generals. Nor did the Romans depend upon the time of war to reap a golden harvest. Peace brought to the conquered provincial no freedom from extortion. The Roman money-lenders, grain-brokers, speculators and contractors (*publicani*) who collected the custom duties and developed the state mines, were like a swarm of locusts that destroyed every green thing. Some of

this ill-gotten wealth found its way among the lower classes of the Roman people, in the shape of a free distribution of wheat and money, and in the furnishing of magnificent shows for their pleasure. A sudden and alarming passion for luxury in every form took hold of all classes. Roman ladies became so extravagant in their expenditure on jewellery, dresses and carriages that a law was made to restrain their excesses. Cato, the censor, could find time between his denunciations of Carthage, to declaim against the luxury and greed that prevailed on all sides. But Cato in spite of the strenuous resistance he offered, could make no impresson on his fellow-citizens, and the law against female extravagance was soon repealed. Slaves, too, were imported in great numbers from the provinces and the slave marts of Delos, and it soon became the correct thing for every well-equipped Roman household and Roman estate to have a full complement of competent slaves. The numerous foreign wars, the importation of slaves to till the land, the large quantities of grain sent from abroad into Italy, made farming no longer profitable, and that sturdy class of small farmers to which so many of the greatest men at Rome belonged, began to disappear. Serving abroad in the army, or exploiting a province as a money-lender, contractor or speculator were much easier ways to acquire wealth than the patient tilling of the soil. The nobles came back from the provinces with their enormous fortunes, to build magnificent villas which they furnished with every luxury. Surrounded by a host of slaves and attendants, they lived the lives of princes ; not of plain Roman citizens. Below this class another was developing, composed of the *publicani* and men of business, whose wealth was also acquired in the provinces, or from contracts with the state. Subsequently this class was known as the 'Equestrian Order'. A still lower order, composed of the artisans and dealers, farmers and peasants who had left the rural districts for the city, and the freed slaves, was beginning to make its malign influence felt. Possessed of the franchise, their votes were easily secured by the bribes of ambitious politicians. The new wealth of Roman citizens was freely used in this direction, and that system of political corruption and demoralization which ended in the ruin of the Roman republic, gained a sure footing.

Lastly, we must notice an effect caused by Rome's close relations with the East. The conquest of Greece and Asia Minor brought the Romans under the direct influence of the Greek learning and civilization. It is true that in Magna Græcia Rome first came into contact with the Greek civilization. But it was not until after the Second Punic War that a close and constant intercourse began between the Greeks and Romans. This intercourse aroused at Rome a deep and strong admiration for the Greek language, art and philosophy. This admiration, was at first almost wholly healthy, and the influence which Greece exercised upon Rome was of a beneficial character. Many of the best minds of Greece were employed in the Roman service ; of such was that of Polybius, the historian. The best intellects at Rome were attracted by Greek literature, and devoted much time to its study. Roman literature itself had really no existence until called into being by the stimulus of Greek models. Soon it came to pass that no man was deemed properly educated unless he had mastered the Greek language and literature. Greek rhetoricians taught the Romans the art of oratory, and the precepts of Greek philosophy were on the lips, if not in the brains, of budding statesmen.

But the introduction of such a tide of new ideas could not fail to affect the old manners and customs of the Roman people. The old Roman discipline and austerity of life began to be relaxed, and from this relaxation most serious consequences followed. That strong sense of duty, which made the Roman submit to so many sacrifices for his city, was weakened, and to 'live as one likes' became the principle of action of only too many. Men became eager in their desire for honours and dignities, whether earned or not. A fondness for titles and vulgar display marked the growing deterioration of the Roman character. The women at Rome were no longer content to live a quiet domestic life, but claimed and practised an unlimited freedom in their lives and manners. These changes did not take place without an attempt being made by the conservative element to stem the tide. Cato, as censor, exercised his authority rigorously. He endeavoured to prevent the introduction of the

*The New
Learning
and Cus-
toms.*

Greek language, and to that end the Greek teachers, among whom was Carneades, were expelled from Rome. He wrote works on agriculture for the Roman youth, hoping in that way to turn their attention to more profitable, if not to more interesting studies. But it was all in vain. The tide had set in too strongly to be turned back by any human power, and Cato himself in his old age was compelled to begin the study of Greek, to keep in touch with the learning of his times.

CHAPTER XIX.

INSURRECTIONS IN SPAIN AND SICILY.

In no province were the evil effects of Roman misrule more keenly felt than in Spain. The Carthaginians had extended their sway over the south-eastern half of the peninsula, but the Romans advanced beyond the Carthaginian boundaries both westwards and northwards. The successors of Scipio Africanus in Spain were, with few exceptions, faithless, cruel and exacting. Heavy taxes, together with the plunder of their gold and silver mines, drove the Spaniards time after time to desperate efforts to recover their liberties and property. Mention has been made of an attempt to quiet the Spaniards in 179 B.C., when a treaty was signed that exempted them from all obligations to Rome, save the non-fortification of their cities. To Sempronius Gracchus is due this peace-restoring measure. *Misrule in Spain.*

After this treaty there was a period of quiet, which was broken by a rising of the Lusitanian shepherds, under the leadership of Viriathus, one of their number. Viriathus was more than a shepherd and guerilla chief; he was a leader who could command armies and defeat the Roman legions. Roman treachery in the form of a cowardly massacre of the Lusitanians led to a formidable revolt, in which Viriathus soon distinguished himself by nearly destroying a Roman army, and by forcing the proconsul Servilianus to recognize the Lusitanians as the allies of Rome. Caepio, the successor of Servilianus, with true Roman faithlessness broke this treaty, and despairing of conquering the gallant Lusitanian in fair fight, bribed some of his friends to assassinate him in his tent, 140 B.C. Deprived of their leader, the Lusitanians were soon compelled to submit to their perfidious conquerors. *Viriathus.*

In the meantime the Celtiberians, a hardy race living in Castile, had taken up arms. Their strongest city was Numantia, on the river Douro. Situated on a steep crag, and defended on

three sides by thick woods, it made a prolonged resistance to the Roman armies. One Roman general after another was forced to admit failure, and Mancinus was so completely surrounded by Numantians that he had to beg for the lives of his men. In his army was a young quaestor, Tiberius Gracchus, the son of the Gracchus previously mentioned. Distrusting the Roman commander the Numantians would accept no terms not signed by the son of the old friend of the Spaniards. The Roman senate refused to be bound by the terms of their general and the war was renewed. Scipio Africanus the younger, the destroyer of Carthage, was eventually chosen to command the Roman army besieging Numantia. Beginning with a rigorous discipline in his army, he soon drew the lines around Numantia so closely that the brave garrison found it impossible to get supplies or relief from without their walls. Famine now came in to do its work. After suffering all manner of torture from hunger, the brave Numantians were compelled to surrender their stronghold, and the Celtiberian rising came to an end. All Spain was now practically under Roman supremacy, for her arms had in the meantime been carried to the Bay of Biscay itself

*Numantia
surrenders,
133 B.C.*

*Condition of
Roman
slaves.*

Roman slavery was of the most horrible kind. Sicily and Southern and Central Italy were full of gaunt, half-starved and half-clad beings who during the day tilled the soil under cruel task-masters, or herded the cattle and sheep of their owners. Purposely ill-fed and clad, they were encouraged to rob the unfortunate travellers who passed by their way. The day brought them nothing but hard toil and harder blows; the night found them lodged in a great gloomy jail partly underground and dimly lighted through a few narrow and barred loop holes. The slightest opposition to their cruel treatment brought with it the severest punishment, not excepting death by torture. It is not then a matter of surprise that in sheer despair attempts should be made to throw off such an unbearable yoke, and that Roman slave-owners lived in hourly danger of a servile insurrection.

The first great outbreak occurred at Enna in Sicily, and was brought about by the brutality of a slave-owner and his wife.

The slaves took as their leader Eunus, a Syrian-Greek, who by some juggling made it to appear that he could spout fire from his mouth. He led a body of slaves against Euna, and slew all the men except the armourers, who were set to work to forge arms. Eunus was now chosen king, and took the title of Antiochus. He was joined by one Cleon with five thousand slaves, and soon had an army of ten thousand. The Roman forces sent against them were defeated, and the insurrection spread with such rapidity that it is estimated that two hundred thousand slaves were soon in arms, and nearly the whole island was in their hands. But Rome put forth her strength, and the insurrection was crushed. Calpurnius Piso took Messana, butchering and crucifying the slaves by the thousand. Rupilius captured their two strongholds, Tauromenium and Enna, through the treachery of some of their inmates. All the prisoners at Tauromenium were tortured, and then hurled from the rocks. Cleon died of wounds received in battle, and Eunus perished in prison of a loathsome disease. Twenty thousand slaves were crucified by Rupilius alone; so with an inhumanity even greater than that which provoked the insurrection, the fires of revolt were stamped out.

*Servile war
in Sicily.*

133 B.C.
132 B.C.

The kings of Pergamus were the steady and servile henchmen of Rome. By their obsequiousness they managed for a time to hold their possessions under Roman auspices. At length Attalus III. came to the throne, a man whose cruelty had led him to murder his friends, and whose folly or insanity induced him to leave his kingdom and his treasures to the Roman state. Attalus died in 133 B.C., and his throne was at once claimed by Aristonîcus, the son of a previous king. Rome, on the strength of the will of Attalus, made war upon Aristonîcus, and after suffering some defeats subdued him, and took him to Rome where he was strangled in prison. The kingdom of Pergamus was then brought to an end. Part of it, Phrygia, was given to Mithridates V., king of Pontus; part was joined to Macedonia; but the greater portion of what remained was erected into the province of Asia, thus forming the nucleus of what was intended to be an extensive Roman possession in the East,

Pergamus.

CHAPTER XX.

THE GRACCHI.

*Social and
Political
Condition
of Rome.*

In a previous chapter the growth of the power of the senate at the expense of the magistracy and the assembly was briefly outlined. The time had now arrived when a vigorous effort was to be made to recover for the people the rights which had been held so long in abeyance, and to check the growing pauperism of the many, brought about by the accumulation of enormous fortunes in the hands of the few. The senate and the nobles, or optimates, were in a close league to maintain and increase their power and wealth, and to monopolize all the high offices of the state, as well as the greater portion of the public domain. At the other end of the political and social scale was the great mass of the people of Rome, dependent upon the bounty and largesses of the wealthy, and ready to vote or engage in a faction fight at the bidding of their masters. Rome was full of 'broken men,' cast adrift at the end of her wars, and of those who had abandoned their small farms to lead an idle and restless life in the great metropolis. The very existence of such an element was a danger to the state, and when coupled with a generally low moral tone among the ruling classes, who were always ready to buy political support by the lavish distribution of ill-gotten wealth, the danger became a menace. Slavery was rapidly displacing free labour in the cultivation of the soil, and foreign produce freely imported was making farming in Italy unprofitable. The small farmer or yeoman was becoming a person of the past, to the serious injury of the state which had fought its greatest battles and won its most brilliant victories with armies composed of yeomen.

The growing pauperism at Rome and the rapid disappearance of the small farmer class, together with the spread of a most cruel and degrading form of slavery, did not pass unnoticed by patriotic Romans. Yet no one seems to have made any serious





attempt to introduce a remedy until Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus came to the front as a champion of the poor. Tiberius Gracchus was the son of that Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus *Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus.* who had won honourable distinction by framing a just treaty with the Spaniards in 179 B.C. His mother, Cornelia, was the daughter of the elder Scipio Africanus, and was one of the most remarkable women in history. Gracchus belonged to a distinguished aristocratic family, although his ancestry was plebeian. His friends were of the highest rank. He himself was married to a daughter of the house of Claudius, his sister Sempronia, to Africanus the Younger, and his brother Caius, to the daughter of Mucianus. The most gifted orators and most cultivated scholars of Rome were ranked among his intimates. Tiberius Gracchus, although a young man when he undertook to redress the economic evils of his time, had already made an honourable name for himself. He served under Scipio at Carthage with marked ability and courage, and subsequently, as already noted, saved a Roman army in Spain from destruction by negotiating a treaty with the successful Numantines.

The character of Tiberius Gracchus has been painted by historians in contradictory colours. He is described by some as a demagogue of the most dangerous type, while others see nothing in his career but the most self-sacrificing patriotism. Gifted and highly educated he undoubtedly was, and he had nothing to gain but everything to lose in engaging in a struggle with the senate and the optimates.

Unfortunately his legislation and his attempts at introducing reforms are not very well understood. At first he seems to *Policy of Gracchus.* have aimed at the reduction of the growing pauperism of the people, and at the spread of slave labour, which was rapidly displacing free labour on the farms and estates of Italy. What he proposed to do was nothing very novel. It consisted pretty much of the re-enactment of the Licinian Rogations which had become a dead letter in Roman law. The Licinian laws, as it will be remembered, had provided that no person should hold more than five hundred acres of the public lands, nor pasture more than one hundred cattle, or five hundred

sheep on the public domain. Gracchus saw that the only remedy for the existing pauperism was to take away from the rich Romans, Latins, and Italian allies, all public lands they unlawfully occupied, beyond five hundred acres. There was, however, a provision that each grown son of the occupier could hold an additional two hundred and fifty acres, the total amount to be retained by the family not to exceed one thousand acres. The land thus taken away from the rich land-owners and graziers was to be divided into lots of thirty acres, and distributed among the Roman, Latin and Italian poor. As, however, the poor might be forced or cajoled into the sale of their holdings, the land given them was not transferable. Further, to ensure the carrying out of his projects, a permanent board of three men was appointed to superintend the task of making the allotments.

*Gracchus
tribune,
133 B.C.*

Tiberius brought forward these proposals in his character of tribune. He very soon found that while his reforms made him popular with a certain class at Rome and in Italy, the senate and the wealthy occupiers of public land made common cause against the innovator. To many it seemed little short of confiscation and robbery that land which had been in the possession of a family for many years, perhaps for generations, should be wrested from it. No doubt some land had been acquired in good faith by purchase from a previous holder, and there were also many whose titles, if not absolutely good, were of such a nature as deserved recognition and respect. By all such Tiberius Gracchus would be looked upon as a robber and disturber of the peace.

*Gracchus
and
Octavius.*

The tribuneship gave Gracchus a strong position from which to attack the privileges of the wealthy and their friends of the senate. But the office was only for one year, at the end of which time its holder was expected to retire. What was to be done had therefore to be done quickly. But, unfortunately for Gracchus, his friend and colleague in the tribunate, Octavius, was opposed to his reforms, and threatened to place his *veto* on them to prevent their being read to the people for approval. In vain Tiberius besought Octavius to withdraw his veto and let the bill pass. Failing in that, Gracchus used his power to suspend

public business and stop payment of the public money. An appeal was made to the senate by Gracchus without avail. Rendered desperate by the obstacles placed in his way he called upon Octavius to resign, but this he refused to do. Gracchus then summoned the thirty-five tribes and asked them to vote Octavius out of office, which they did. As Octavius refused to retire after this hostile vote, Gracchus had him dragged away from the rostra by one of his freedmen.

The deposition of Octavius was looked upon as an undoubted violation of the constitution, and placed Gracchus in a false position. He succeeded in getting his measures passed, but the price he paid for success was too great. The senate was intensely hostile and used every device to frustrate the schemes of Gracchus. He, however, went on his way, and added to his reforms a proposal to divide the treasures of Attalus, king of Pergamus, among the new settlers in that district; for Attalus had bequeathed his kingdom and his treasures to Rome, doubtless at the instigation of the senate. This proposal, together with a suggestion that the settlement of Pergamus should be taken from the senate and given to the people, intensified the alarm and hostility of that body. Tiberius must have been aware of the danger in which he stood, but he does not seem to have faltered. Vast schemes were floating in his brain, which required another term of office for their realization, and he put himself forward again as a candidate for the tribuneship in defiance of law and custom. The president of the tribunes, after two tribes had voted for Gracchus, refused to let the voting proceed, and the election was adjourned until the next day. Tiberius put on mourning and committed his son to the protection of the people, thus appealing to their fears and their affections at the same time. The next day Gracchus went to the Capitol, where a riot instigated by the senate took place. P. Scipio Nasica, the deadly enemy of Gracchus, called upon the senators to follow him, and took up a position in the Capitol above the reformer. Armed with clubs and the legs of benches, a furious onslaught was made on the friends of Gracchus. Gracchus himself fell over the bodies of his friends, and while lying helpless was despatched by a blow from, it is said, one of his fellow-tribunes.

Feeling at Rome.

Tiberius Gracchus slain, 132 B.C.

Thus died Tiberius Gracchus in the prime of his manhood, being less than forty years of age. Three hundred of his followers perished in the riot, and the first attempt at arresting the downward career of Rome was smothered in blood.

Though Tiberius Gracchus had fallen, his schemes were not allowed to be wholly abandoned. The allotment of public land went on under the supervision of the commissioners, of whom one was Caius Gracchus, the brother of the slain tribune. The death of Tiberius Gracchus put his brother-in-law, Scipio, in the first place among Roman citizens. Scipio was somewhat of a political trimmer, and a question having arisen in which the interests of the Italian land-owners were at stake, Scipio, who was suspected of favouring the Italians, brought down on his head the wrath of the partisans of Tiberius. He was found dead in his bed, a wax tablet containing the heads of a speech he intended to make, lying beside his pillow.

*Death of
Scipio the
younger
Africanus.*

Projects of reform were still in the air, although the senate had crushed Tiberius Gracchus. Fulvius Flaccus brought forward a proposal to give the Italian allies the franchise, but it was rejected. Despairing of justice, Fregellae, a Latin colony of tried fidelity, revolted. The revolt was stamped out with unusual cruelty, and the town was destroyed. It was an incident which showed the growing discontent of the allies, and the fear of the ruling classes. It was followed soon after by the appearance of Caius Gracchus, the younger brother of Tiberius, as a candidate for the tribuneship. Caius was a more highly gifted man than his brother Tiberius. He was the most finished orator of his day, and possessed of wide and comprehensive views of public policy. He had served on the commission secured by his brother for the allotment of the public lands, and had been appointed quaestor in Sardinia. That he was a man to be feared is shown by the fact that the consul under whom he served had his command prolonged in Sardinia for the purpose of keeping Caius Gracchus abroad. He returned home in 124 B.C., and was met by a summons to appear before the censors, to be rebuked and expelled from the senate. He silenced his opponents by a vigorous defence, and showed that he had served more years in

*Caius
Sempronius
Gracchus,
123 B.C.*

the army and as quaestor than the law demanded. In 123 B.C. he was elected tribune by a large vote, and at once took up the cause for which his brother had died. His speeches were full of bitter complaints at the way his brother had been done to death. But he did not rest content with reproaches. He struck at the power of the senate, and sought to restore to the people and the magistrates the rights which during the Punic wars they had lost. The mercantile class was to be given the chief executive power, while the legislative power was to be placed under the control of the country voters. The assembly under his guidance placed restrictions upon the senate's power to assign provinces. The provinces which were to have magistrates were now to be chosen *after* the elections of the consuls instead of *before*, as formerly was the case. The taxation of the provinces of Asia was now regulated by the assembly, which also changed the conditions of military service. He won the support of the non-senatorial wealthy class, the equites, by placing the court for the trial of magistrates guilty of abuse of their powers when in the provinces, under its control. Tiberius Gracchus had relied too much on the support of the poorer classes in Rome and throughout Italy. Caius saw his brother's mistake and sought to enlist popular support of all kinds. The wealthy Latins and Italians had resented the agrarian schemes of Tiberius Gracchus, which gave them no share in the allotments, yet despoiled them of land they rightfully acquired. The Latins and Italians were now to share in the schemes of colonization which he set afoot in Italy and at Carthage. Further, the much coveted boon of the franchise was to be granted to them. The latter was a most important concession, but one which was bitterly opposed by nearly all classes at Rome. A more doubtful measure was his Lex Frumentaria, which fixed a nominal price for wheat bought by the Roman citizens; the difference between this price and the market price being made good by the public treasury. The demoralizing influence of such a law can well be imagined. To conciliate the host of contractors, money-lenders, and men of business, who exploited the provinces, he granted them the privilege of collecting the tithes in the provinces of Asia. He

*Policy of
Caius
Gracchus.*

is also said to have not only placed the equites in control of the new court for the trial of magistrates, but also to have put the administration of justice in civil processes in their hands. The senators themselves were made to feel that their condemnation or acquittal was dependent upon *indices* or jurors of the equites class.

*Hostility to
Caius Grac-
chus.*

Such in brief outline was what Caius Gracchus accomplished, or strove to accomplish. His career as a reformer and innovator was a short one. He aroused, in its most intense form, the hostility of the senate and its friends. Tiberius Gracchus had to overcome the opposition of his own colleague, and Caius found in his fellow-tribune, Livius Drusus, an antagonist still more dangerous and subtle than Octavius. The colonists Caius had established were expected to pay a small sum each year to the state as rent; but Drusus proposed that they should be free from all charges. This, of course, was a policy still more in favour of the poor man. Most of the colonies started by Caius Gracchus were unsuccessful, and the one established at Carthage did violence to the superstitious feelings of the Romans, who remembered the solemn curse pronounced against any one who should attempt to build again on its site. Caius also angered all classes of Romans by endeavouring to secure for the Latins and Italians the franchise, so that his great popularity began to wane. This was shown by the election of one Opimius, as consul, a man known to be hostile to Gracchus and his schemes. Caius was now out of the tribuneship, which he had held two years in succession, and his life was no longer sacred. To provoke him to commit some act of violence was now the policy of his enemies. Opimius, therefore, proposed, among other things, that the law authorizing the colonization of Carthage should be annulled. The day came for the voting on the measure, and Rome was thronged with excited partisans. A licitor passing through the Capitol insulted Caius Gracchus, and the fellow was stabbed by one of the friends of the reformer. Advantage at once was taken of the incident by the enemies of Gracchus. Opimius obtained a senatorial decree sanctioning his destruction as a public enemy. The senators and their friends and slaves were armed, and it was seen that

*Murder of
Caius Grac-
chus, 121
B.C.*

the life of Gracchus was in imminent peril. His home was watched that night by a band of faithful friends. The following day Gracchus went to the Aventine, unarmed, although his friend Flaccus had gone before him with a body of partisans bearing weapons. A conflict almost immediately took place between the two parties, and the followers of Gracchus were scattered. Flaccus was killed, and Gracchus made haste across the Sublician bridge to the Grove of the Furies. His retreat was covered by two heroic friends who played the part of Horatius Cocles over again. Gracchus was accompanied by a trusty slave, who on the command of his master slew him, and then took his own life. The head of Gracchus was severed from the body and carried to his enemies, who gave the soldier who brought it to them its weight in gold. His body was thrown into the Tiber, along with those of hundreds of his followers. Another martyr in the cause of degenerating Rome had fallen ; but her cup of iniquity was not yet full.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE JUGURTHINE WAR—THE CIMBRI AND TEUTONES.

*Outcome of
laws of
Caius
Gracchus.*

The death of Caius Gracchus brought agrarian reform to an end, and restored much of the power of the senate. Nevertheless, there were some things which that body could not, or dare not, reverse. In 119 B.C. the Lex Maria was passed by Caius Marius. It proposed to protect voters from the solicitation of candidates, thus making the ballot effective. The corn law of Caius Gracchus was not interfered with, and the equites remained for several years the jurors or *indices* of the courts. But the power and disposition of the senate were shown in the rapid sweeping away of the agrarian legislation of the Gracchi. The colonies established by Caius in Italy were annulled and broken up. Occupiers of state lands were given permission to sell, a privilege which soon put the public lands once more in the hands of the wealthy. A further distribution of public lands was forbidden by one of the tribunes; and finally a law was passed which allowed those holding public lands to do so without paying any rent to the state. This practically changed the public lands into private lands, and put an end forever to further attempts in the direction of colonization. Henceforth the increase of slave labour and slave discontent was rapid. Large farming grew apace, the population diminished, and wealth became more and more concentrated in the hands of a few favoured families. The high offices of state were held by the nobles, and were passed on from hand to hand within a charmed political circle. Misrule at home and dishonour abroad now characterized the history of the next twenty years, until a strong and rude hand was put forth to scourge the aristocracy.

Jugurtha.

How deep-seated and wide-spread corruption and bribery had become at Rome was fully illustrated by the war against Jugurtha. Jugurtha was the illegitimate son of a brother of Micipsa, the son and successor of Masinissa, king of Numidia.

Micipsa had left his kingdom to his two sons, Adherbal and Hiempsal, and his nephew Jugurtha. The latter was a brave but cruel and treacherous prince. He had served with distinction in the war against Numantia, and had won the hearts of his countrymen by his daring qualities and handsome martial figure. His association with the Roman officers and leaders had left him with an accurate and profound impression of Roman venality and greed. When, then, he found himself the sharer in his uncle's dominions he began to plot for the dethronement of his cousins, trusting to the power of gold to overcome any opposition the Romans might feel disposed to offer. He began operations by murdering Hiempsal, and then proceeded to expel Adherbal from his dominions. This unfortunate prince fled to Rome to get aid against his enemy; but the envoys and the gold of Jugurtha followed close behind. The effect of judicious bribery was at once seen. Ten commissioners were sent to Africa to arrange a division of the Numidian territory between the rival claimants. The commissioners were in their turn bribed, and they gave to Adherbal the eastern half of the kingdom, containing Cirta the capital. This section was mainly barren sands. What fell to Jugurtha were the fertile lands of the west. The commissioners had scarcely left Numidia when Jugurtha took up arms against Adherbal and besieged him in his capital. Commissioners were twice more sent out to Africa to interfere in Adherbal's behalf; but in each case they were bribed to do nothing. Cirta was captured, Adherbal was murdered, and the garrison containing some Italians was put to the sword. There was an outburst of indignation at Rome when the news reached the city, and Caius Memmius forced the unwilling senate to take action. Once more a batch of envoys was sent to Africa, and once more the gold of Jugurtha did its work among the ambassadors and generals sent against him. Hostilities ceased after Jugurtha made a formal submission, and the consul went home to attend the coming elections. Again Memmius came forward, and in burning words upbraided the Romans for their baseness. He so far prevailed that Jugurtha was ordered to come to Rome to defend himself. The crafty Numidian came in the guise of a suppliant and found

that his bribes were equally effective with the tribunes themselves, for a tribune, one Baebius, interposed his veto when Jugurtha was being cross-questioned by Memmius. But Jugurtha in his audacity went too far. Massiva, a grandson of Masinissa, was put forward at Rome as a claimant of the Numidian crown, only to be immediately assassinated by an emissary of Jugurtha. Even Roman venality had to give way before such an outrage. Jugurtha was ordered to leave Rome, which he did forthwith. Roman generals were sent against him, but with little or no result, the natural explanation being that they, too, were bribed. The war lingered on many years, and once the Roman army was forced to submit to the humiliation of passing under the yoke. At length, in 109 B.C., Q. Caecilius Metellus was appointed consul and sent out to Numidia. A proud, stern man, of the order of the nobility, although of plebeian origin, he possessed all the haughtiness of his class. Nevertheless he was resolved to restore discipline in the army and conduct the war with energy. Along with him went Caius Marius, a rude, unlettered man, who had already won high distinction in Spain and elsewhere. Jugurtha now sought terms of peace, but in vain. It became henceforth a life and death struggle with the Numidian king, and he fought gallantly for his kingdom. Defeated by Metellus and Marius in a great battle, he had resort to guerilla warfare. On the other hand, Metellus endeavoured to win over his intimate friends, and, if possible, to assassinate him. The war was still pushed with vigour by Metellus, and Jugurtha fled to his father-in-law Bocchus, king of Mauritania, who now espoused his cause. In the meantime Marius had gone to Rome to stand for the consulship, which he secured by the votes of the common people. The news of the triumph of his subordinate was gall and wormwood to Metellus, and he refused to prosecute further a war the glory of ending which would probably fall to his successor Marius.

*Metellus
appointed
Commander
109 B.C.*

*Marius
Consul,
107 B.C.*

Marius was compelled to fill the ranks of his army with the lowest orders at Rome, as the war promised neither glory nor profit to those engaged. The campaign was now resumed with ruthless energy. Towns were captured and plundered, the male

inhabitants slain, and the rest sold into slavery. In the army of Marius served a distinguished cavalry officer, Sulla, a man of *Sulla*. the patrician order, at once daring, unscrupulous, and dissolute. His career will be outlined later on ; in the meantime it is to be noted that much of the success of Marius was due to the brilliant exploits of Sulla and his cavalry. Several desperate engagements were fought, until at last Bocchus was won over by bribes to make peace with Rome. The coolness and daring of Sulla, who visited Bocchus at great personal risk, led to the surrender of Jugurtha into the hands of the Romans. He was taken to *Jugurtha captured, 105 B.C.* Rome, and led through the streets alongside the triumphal car of Marius. The greatness of his downfall it is said drove him insane. The triumphal celebration over, he was stripped of his clothing and thrust into an underground prison. There, after six days of torture, he was allowed to starve to death. His kingdom was divided between Bocchus and his half-brother Gauda.

The Jugurthine War, which ended in 105 B.C., came to its close none too soon for Rome's safety. For some years the northern frontier of Italy had been threatened by an irruption of the Cimbri and Teutōnes, a vast host that had moved southward and westward from the north and east of Europe in search for homes. Who the Cimbri were is not well known. Some think that they belonged to the same race as the Cymri, a people that lived in the western part of Britain, and spoke a language near akin to the Gaelic. Others, while admitting that Kelts were found among them, are of the opinion that they were a Teutonic race. They were a fair, tall, and blue-eyed race ; strong in body and brave in battle. They wore copper helmets, and fought with long swords and narrow shields. Sometimes they went on the field of battle with a chain running through the belts of those in the front rank. The Teutones were undeniably Teutonic tribes ; but how they happened to join their forces with those of the Cimbri is not known. It is generally supposed that both Cimbri and Teutones were driven westward and southward in search of homes, some great convulsion or movement of the peoples in the East and North of Europe having driven them forth, with their families and property. The

*The Cimbri
and
Teutones.*

*Defeat of
Maximus
and Caepio
at Arausio,
105 B.C.*

Cimbri appeared on the north-eastern frontier of Italy in the year 113 B.C., when they were attacked at Noreia by Carbo the consul. The Romans suffered a severe defeat, and Northern Italy was in great danger. But the Cimbri instead of invading Italy moved westwards, and in the year 109 B.C. they are found in Southern Gaul, inflicting a defeat on another Roman army. Still later, in 105 B.C., they met the Roman commanders Maximus and Caepio at Arausio (Orange) on the Rhone, and routed their army with terrible slaughter. Eighty thousand Romans are said to have been destroyed on this eventful day. Meanwhile, Marius was carrying on the war with Jugurtha, and Rome was awaiting anxiously his return.

*Marius pre-
pares to
meet the
invaders.*

The danger that threatened Italy was so great that Marius was re-elected consul for the second time, in defiance of law and custom. Fortunately for Rome the Cimbri did not invade Italy after their great victory, but turned instead to Spain, which they speedily over-ran. The Celtiberians made, however, so determined a resistance to the invaders that they were glad to return to Gaul, where they were joined by the Teutones. At length in 103 B.C. the invasion of Italy was resolved upon, and the barbarians divided their forces for that purpose. In the meantime Marius had returned to Rome, and had begun his preparations for meeting the dreaded northern hordes. He had to organize a new army out of the raw materials furnished him, and to that end spent two years in drilling his recruits. He then moved into Gaul and took up a strong position at the junction of the Isara and the Rhone, where he could guard the two roads leading into Italy. The Cimbri had in the meantime moved eastward around the northern frontier of Italy, with the intention of entering Italy by the north-eastern passes. The Teutones moved down the Rhone to reach the road on the sea-coast, and as they passed the Roman army jeered and taunted it. Marius followed them closely, avoiding an engagement and watching carefully against being taken by surprise. When the Teutones reached the wells of Aquae Sextiae (*Aix*), an engagement was brought on by the Romans seeking to obtain water. The battle was at first between the light-armed troops of the Romans and the Ambrones, a tribe that was accompanying the Teutones.

A day or two after a general engagement took place, the Teutones having come to the rescue of their friends. By a stratagem of the same kind as that employed by Hannibal at Trebia, the Teutones, when the battle was the hottest, were thrown into a panic by an attack on their rear from a body of Romans who had been placed in ambuscade. The struggle had lasted many hours, and the great heat of the noonday sun had told heavily on the northern hosts, when the sudden and unexpected assault of the men in ambush took place. The slaughter of the Teutones was something terrible, most of those escaping the Romans being slain by the Gauls.

*Battle of
Aquæ Sextiæ,
102
B.C.*

Meanwhile the Cimbri had gone eastward to enter Italy by the Tyrolese Alps, and Catulus, the colleague of Marius, was sent to the Adige to intercept the expected host. The next year, 101 B.C., the Cimbri began to descend the Alps, sliding down the glaciers on their long and narrow shields. They met the Romans at the Adige and easily pushed them aside. Catulus retreated to the Po, and took up a strong position, where he was joined by Marius in the summer of 101 B.C. Marvellous tales are told of the extent of the Cimbric encampment, and of the size of their army. They asked Marius for homes and lands, but met with no friendly response. A battle was now decided upon, and the great host of the Cimbri was drawn up in a square, the front ranks of which had a chain running through their belts to keep the line unbroken. In spite of their courage and deeds of reckless daring, the Cimbri were driven back on their waggons, which formed the walls of their encampment. The women of the Cimbri now took a part in the conflict and fought with the utmost desperation. It was of no avail, for Roman discipline once more proved invincible. The slaughter, like that at Aquæ Sextiæ, was very great, the unfortunate Cimbri being almost exterminated. The great cloud that had threatened to break upon the plains of Italy had now been dissipated, and to Marius was given the credit of the deliverance. He had been elected consul again in 104 B.C., and so great was the sense of the danger at Rome that he was elected annually to the consulship until the year 100 B.C.

*Battle of
Campi
Raudii, 101
B.C.*

*Servile
Insurrec-
tion in
Sicily, 103.
101 B.C.*

In the meantime Sicily was again the scene of an insurrection among the slave population. A Roman praetor had suspended the decree of the senate liberating some persons kept unlawfully in slavery, and the smouldering fires of revolt broke out into a fierce flame. The story of the rising is much the same as that of the First Servile War. A brief success of the slaves was followed by a bloody suppression of the revolt. A number of slaves were brought to Rome to fight in the arena for the pleasure of their brutal masters ; but the victims slew one another at the altars, the last surviving man falling on his sword.

CHAPTER XXII.

SOCIAL AND FOREIGN WARS.

Hitherto there has been said as to the early life and mental and moral characteristics of two men whose influence for evil was now to be felt for all time at Rome. Marius was of very *Marius*. humble birth, and had during his youth served as a day labourer. He was a native of Arpinum, his father being a client of one of the noble families of that district. Subsequently he served in a humble capacity in the army besieging Numantia, and by a faithful discharge of his duties won the respect and admiration of the younger Scipio Africanus. His abilities won for him promotion in the army; but it is doubtful if he would have been allowed to fill the higher offices of the army and state had he not been fortunate enough to marry Julia, the aunt of Caius Julius Caesar, a lady of wealth and high rank. This marriage opened up a career for the ambitious soldier, and henceforth we find him filling with acceptance such important offices as that of prætor and legate to Metellus in the war against Jugurtha. He was also the author of a bill which secured for the Roman people the free use of the ballot at elections; and became well-known as a pronounced opponent of the 'nobiles' or 'optimates', whose culture and refinement he heartily despised. For Marius in spite of his great ability as a soldier and general was a rude, unlettered man, who found his chief social pleasures in the company of the lower orders to which he properly belonged. Until the Jugurthine War little but good can be said of his conduct; but the insolence with which Metellus treated his request to be allowed to return to Rome to stand for the consulship aroused all the latent evil of his boorish nature. In spite of the opposition put in his way by Metellus he was elected consul by an overwhelming majority of the Roman people, the lower classes looking upon him as a champion of their order. His distinguished services in Africa and the

consequent reward in the shape of a re-election to the consulship have already been noted. But his cup of joy and satisfaction had two bitter ingredients. It was Metellus that got the title *Numidicus* for his share in the Jugurthine war, and it was Sulla who claimed and received the applause of the Roman world for his skilful and daring capture of Jugurtha. To Marius has been given the credit of the organization of the Roman army on an improved basis. The system of drawing up the army in three lines was abandoned, and new weapons were put in the soldiers' hands. All civil and social distinctions in the army were abolished, and voluntary enlistment took the place of the compulsory levy. This made the army no longer a body of citizens, but one of professional soldiers.

Sulla.

Sulla was in most respects the very antipodes of Marius, and was also many years his junior. Marius was of the lower classes; Sulla belonged to the patricians. Marius was uncultured and unlearned; Sulla was both cultured and learned. Both men were brilliant soldiers and great generals. Both men were capable of acts of great cruelty; but with Marius such acts were the result of strong passions and a rankling sense of injustice and wrong. On the other hand Sulla was cold-blooded, cynical, and deliberately cruel. Moreover, he was a most shameless debauchee, his vices being written unmistakably upon his pimpled and blotched countenance. Sulla although of the patrician class began life poor, and his rapid rise was due very largely to his wonderful ability as a cavalry officer, and later on, as a general of large armies. He served with Marius in Numidia, and was a veritable thorn in his side, undermining and lessening the influence of his superior officer. He was also with Marius in Gaul, against the Teutones and Cimbri, for Marius was aware of his ability, and the times were too perilous to allow private grudges to affect the efficiency of the army.

*Saturninus
and Glaucia*

The great victory over the Cimbri in 101 B.C. gave Marius his sixth consulship, besides a notable triumph through the streets of Rome. His good fortune had, however, turned his head, and from this time forth his career is marked by weakness and crime. Marius was no politician; but his popularity with the Roman people made him a useful tool in the hands of abler and more

unscrupulous men. Of these Apuleius Saturninus and Servilius Glaucia were the most prominent. Marius was consul; Saturninus, tribune; and Glaucia, praetor, so that the whole power of the state was in their hands. Saturninus is represented by most writers as a politician of the worst type, while a few have ventured to class him with the Gracchi. He secured the passage of an agrarian law which permitted the establishment of colonies in Transpadane Gaul, in which the Italians as well as the Romans should have a share. To Marius was to be given the power of conferring Roman citizenship on a limited number of Italians in these colonies. Both proposals were unpopular among the Roman people, and met with bitter opposition. To prevent the senate from attacking his agrarian law, Saturninus demanded that its members should swear to maintain it, within five days after its adoption by the tribes. Led by Marius, the members of the senate with one exception complied. That exception was Metellus Numidicus, who refused and, in consequence, was exiled. Then followed the consular elections, in which C. Memmius, an energetic and fearless opponent of Saturninus, bade fair to be a successful candidate. To prevent his election, Saturninus and Glaucia caused a riot, during which Memmius was murdered. The conspirators had now gone too far, and even Marius was aroused to take action. Saturninus and Glaucia fled to the Capitol with their friends, and prepared to stand a siege. Marius himself moved against them, and by cutting off their water supply soon reduced the rebels to submission. Many of them were shut up in the Curia Hostilia, while steps were being taken to bring them to trial. The authorities, however, preferred an easier way than a public trial to bring them to justice. The mob was incited to attack the Curia, whose roof was scaled, and from it the rebels were pelted to death with tiles torn from the building. After this, Marius seems to have retired for a time from political life.

Rome had now a brief breathing spell from faction fights. It was, however, only the calm before the storm. The evils at Rome were too deep-seated to be easily removed, although many efforts were made to eradicate them. The condition of the courts, which were now under the control of the equites, or monied

Drusus.

class, was a scandal to good government at home and abroad. Justice against the *publicani*, and other members of the monied classes, was found impossible of attainment by the provincials; while those Romans who sought to deal fairly and justly with the people of the provinces were liable to be condemned on the testimony of false witnesses. The Italians were clamouring for the franchise, a right which every fair-minded Roman recognized they should possess. This state of affairs brought to the front Livius Drusus, the son of the rival of Caius Gracchus, as the champion of reform in the courts, and of the Italian people. He proposed that three hundred equites should be added to the senate, and out of the new body (six hundred in number) the courts should be selected. He also introduced a colonization scheme, and proposed that cheap food should be given to the Roman masses. Drusus was an impetuous and easily irritated person, and little fitted to act as mediator between the Italians and Romans. Hence, although he had the zealous support of the Italians in his efforts to secure them the franchise, his rather injudicious advocacy brought him the determined hostility of the equites and the land-owners. It seems that many of the Italians had, in the confusion of the time, managed to vote and one of their number had actually been elected consul. It was now proposed that the electoral lists should be purged of all illegal voters, and this unwise step aroused the Italians to madness. When, then, Drusus brought forward his measure to give the Italians the franchise, the latter came to Rome in great numbers to over-awe the electors and assist Drusus. The bill by such means was carried, but only to be rejected by the senate on account of its illegal enactment. The Italians were now desperate, and a large number armed themselves to support Drusus and secure their rights. A conflict in the streets of Rome might have followed immediately had not Drusus been struck down in the lobby of his house by the dagger of an assassin. This greatly excited the Italians, and their excitement and indignation was not lessened when a court was established to discover the men who had negotiated with the Italians for giving them the franchise. Impeachments rapidly followed, and the already strained loyalty of the Italians gave place to a

desperate social war, in which the Italians sought to establish an independent republic with a capital at Corfinium in Peligni. *The Social War begins, 90 B.C.* The new capital was re-named *Italica*, and the constitution of the new republic was modelled closely upon that of the Romans.

The first act of violence occurred at Asculum in Picenum, when nearly all the resident Romans were massacred. *Romans massacred at Asculum.* The revolt then rapidly spread, and soon included the Picentines, Marsians, Pelignians, Samnites and Lucanians. The Apulians seem also to have taken up arms. Later on, the Umbrians and Etrurians revolted, but they as well as the Apulians did not belong to the new republic. The soul of the revolt was Samnium, which still cherished an implacable hatred of Rome. Had the allies been thoroughly united, and all the members as brave and resolute as the Samnites, Roman supremacy would then and there have come to an end. But the Latins, who confidently expected to be admitted very soon to the franchise, remained true to Rome. They were rewarded almost immediately with this long-delayed boon, and Rome was thus able to bring the great strength of the Latin colonies to bear upon the revolting allies. The war was carried on in three different districts; in the south, the middle, and the north, with Campania, Samnium, and Picenum as centres. *Events of Social War, 90-88 B.C.* At first the allies had the best of the struggle, and a Roman army was defeated by the Samnites. The turn of the tide was shown by the Romans under Cn. Pompeius Strabo winning a great victory over the Picentines. Nevertheless, the danger was great and the issue uncertain, and Rome resolved to weaken her enemies by offering the franchise to those who would lay down their arms. The strain of the war must have been very great, for we are told that three hundred thousand men perished. Necessity, then, seems to have compelled the Romans to concede the franchise. This offer served the desired end, for the northern tribes accepted the Roman terms and abandoned the alliance. New tribes were created for voting purposes, for the old tribes objected to have the new citizens enrolled among them. The war was now carried on by the Samnites alone, who seem to have resolved to perish rather than submit. It is true the Etruscans and

Umbrians rose in revolt during the second year of the war, but they soon made peace on condition of also obtaining the franchise.

First Mithridatic War.

Mithridates VI.

The war was still lingering against the Samnites when a serious danger arose in the East in the shape of a war with Mithridates VI., surnamed the Great, king of Pontus. The kingdom of Pontus, in the north-eastern part of Asia Minor, had been strengthened in the reign of Mithridates V. by the addition of Phrygia, a gift from Rome in consideration of the services rendered by that monarch in the war against Aristonicus of Pergamus. Besides Pontus and Phrygia, Mithridates V. practically ruled over Cappadocia and parts of Paphlagonia and Galatia. His son, at the time of his death, was but an infant, and his early life was one of extreme hardship and peril. As he grew to manhood he developed marvellous physical and mental strength, the stories of his accomplishments as an athlete and linguist being almost incredible. He early formed a strong dislike of Rome, which for no good reason had taken away from Pontus, Phrygia, the Roman gift to his father. As time passed he meditated projects of revenge, and prepared for the struggle that, sooner or later, must come. He extended his conquests around the Black Sea, and thereby acquired a vast territory and revenue. He then began to interfere in the affairs of Cappadocia, placing one of his own relatives on the throne. Rome interfered and Mithridates withdrew for a time; but not for long. Once more he began his intrigues against his neighbours, and once more Rome interfered and compelled him to withdraw. In the meantime the Social War had broken out, and Mithridates is said to have been in league with the Italians. But he made a great mistake in not beginning war until the struggle in Italy was well-nigh ended. It is another illustration of Rome's good fortune. The war in Asia was at last begun, not by Mithridates, but by Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, who was almost forced by greedy Roman provincials into hostilities. It matters little which party struck the first blow, for war could not well be delayed much longer. The Romans were not prepared for the struggle, as they were exhausted with the Italian war. They, however, put three armies in the field, mostly

Asiatics, and were thoroughly beaten by Mithridates. The *Romans* latter then over-ran Asia Minor, and everywhere the people ^{defeated,} *ss B.C.* hailed him as a deliverer from the Roman yoke. Confident that the war was ended, and that no further danger existed of Roman rule, the oppressed people arose and slew in one day seventy or eighty thousand Romans and Italians, who had ^{Massacre of} like so many blood-suckers been preying on them. Many of *Romans in* the Greeks welcomed Mithridates, as he was looked upon as *Asia.* one of themselves. Not content with mastering Asia Minor, Mithridates sent an army into Greece, where the Peloponnesians and Boeotians joined him. In fact, it seemed as if in a few months all Rome's conquests in the East had been lost to her through the energy of Mithridates.

The news from Greece and Asia aroused the Romans to the determination to prosecute the war against Mithridates with vigour. Sulla, who had been elected consul and who had greatly distinguished himself in the Social War, was given the command ^{Sulla} of the army for the East. But Marius, although now an old ^{appointed} man, eagerly sought the position. His fame had been on the ^{commander.} wane, and it greatly incensed him to find that he was being superseded by his rival Sulla. Marius was still the head of the party opposed to the aristocrats, and his friends rallied to secure him the coveted post. P. Sulpicius, a man of great ability, and an adherent of Marius, was the tribune at this time, and he ^{Sulpicius} brought before the tribes a bill that the command of the army ^{makes pro-} against Mithridates should be transferred to Marius; that the ^{posals.} new citizens should be distributed among the old tribes, thus giving them a strong control of the elections; that the freedmen should no longer be confined to the four city tribes; that any senator owing more than two thousand *denarii*¹ should lose his seat; and lastly, that those exiled on account of their supposed complicity in the Italian revolt should be recalled. These proposals created a feeling of intense hostility among the classes injuriously affected by them, and the consuls to prevent them from becoming law proclaimed the day of voting a public holiday. Sulpicius armed his followers and drove the consuls, of whom one was Sulla, out of the city. The laws were then carried by the

¹ A *denarius* was about 16 cents.

tribes, many of those voting being the new citizens. Sulla, who was thus ousted from his command against Mithridates, retired to Nola, where his legions were carrying on a siege against the Samnites. He called together his soldiers, told them of his treatment at Rome, and pointed out how much they were likely to lose in the event of the command going to Marius. The legions at once resolved to follow Sulla to Rome to restore his rights by force, if necessary. Taking the Appian road, six legions were soon on their way, much to the dismay of the senate, and also of Marius and his party. A defence of the city was found impossible, and Sulla entered almost unopposed. Marius and Sulpicius fled, the former making his way with some difficulty to Libya, in Africa, but Sulpicius was captured and put to death; otherwise Sulla acted with great moderation. So little disposed did he seem at this time to play the tyrant, that he allowed the consuls to be freely elected; and in consequence, Cn. Octavius, a partisan of Sulla, and L. Cornelius Cinna, one of Marius, were chosen by the people. Having restored order, Sulla went to Greece, leaving the siege of Nola to his friend Pompeius, who was also entrusted with the task of ending the Social War. No sooner, however, had Sulla left the shores of Italy than the civil strife broke out again, considerably to the relief of the Samnites. Cinna brought forward again the proposals of Sulpicius, but his colleague Octavius, collecting an armed force, attacked the new citizens who had gathered at Rome in large numbers to vote, and slew many of them. Like Sulla, Cinna took refuge with the legions still carrying on the siege of Nola. The senate illegally deposed him from the consulship, and Cinna replied by marching against Rome with the soldiers. The Italian communities sent him men and money, while to add strength to his cause the exiled Marius was recalled from Africa. Landing at Etruria, Marius was joined by many of his old veterans, and with six thousand men marched on Rome. Joining his forces with those of Cinna, he soon made his way into the city, and began a terrible massacre. Cinna was acknowledged as consul, and the sentence of outlawry on Marius was repealed. Marius now caused himself to be elected to his seventh consulship, an honour he had eagerly

*Sulla
marches
against
Rome.*

*Sulla
leaves for
Greece,
87 B.C.*

Cinna.

*Marius
returns.*

desired, and one that as yet had fallen to no Roman. For a few days he enjoyed his ill-won distinction, and then died (86 B.C.). *Death of Marius, 86 B.C.*

Cinna was now the chief man at Rome, and for three years, while Sulla was absent in Greece and Asia Minor, ruled with almost despotic power. No constitutional authority existed, for Cinna and his friends controlled everything. The new citizens were now enrolled in all the tribes, a measure of great importance. The Samnites were recognized as citizens, and became the staunch supporters of the party of Marius. Meanwhile Cinna was haunted by the dread of the return of Sulla. Valerius Flaccus, who succeeded Marius in the consulship, was sent to Asia to take the command against Mithridates, while Cinna himself began to collect an army in Italy to go against Sulla in Greece. But his soldiers mutinied and killed him, and the power in Italy fell into the hands of Papirius Carbo, nominally a consul, really a tyrant. *The rule of Cinna. Cinna killed*

While affairs at Rome were thus under the control of the partisans of Marius, Sulla was waging a vigorous war in Greece against the generals of Mithridates. Archelaus, the chief general, was defeated at Chaeronæa, where a great host of Asiatics was scattered with but little loss on the part of the Romans, and subsequently in a bloody battle at Orchomenus Sulla again encountered and defeated Archelaus. Prior to these battles the Peiræus and Athens were besieged, and a brave defence was made at the Peiræus by Archelaus. Athens, through famine, was compelled to surrender. A frightful slaughter ensued, but the walls and buildings of the city were not much injured. A different story has to be told of the fate of the Peiræus, which after its capture was almost wholly destroyed. Athens, however, was nearly depopulated, and stripped of its art treasures and libraries. Step by step the generals of Mithridates were driven out of Greece, and then Sulla carried the war into Asia. Valerius Flaccus had preceded him there, but he had scarcely landed on its shores when he was murdered by Fimbria, his quaestor or legate, who took over his command. It was now the policy of Sulla to make peace with Mithridates so that he might be free to attack Fimbria and *War in Greece and Asia. Chaeronea and Orchomenus Athens and the Peiræus taken.*

return to Italy. Mithridates finding himself between two armies proceeded first against Fimbria, but terms of peace being offered, he negotiated a treaty with Sulla, which brought the war to an end. He abandoned all his conquests, paid down two thousand talents, and surrendered seventy ships of war.

*End of First
Mithridatic
War, 85 B.C.*

Sulla now marched against Fimbria, and pressed him so hard that the unfortunate general in despair took his own life. His soldiers went over to Sulla, but as they were suspected of being friendly to the Marian cause they were left in Asia. Peace having been made with Mithridates, Sulla punished the Greeks of Asia Minor for their share in the revolt against and massacre of the Romans by placing upon them a fine so heavy as almost to crush them. The unfortunate people not being able to pay the large sums demanded were compelled to borrow from Roman usurers at exorbitant rates of interest.

*Sulla
returns to
Italy, 83
B.C.*

Sulla was at last free to return to Italy to avenge himself on his enemies, and to champion the cause of his friends, who had sent him during his years of absence many and urgent appeals for help. In the spring of 83 B.C. he landed at Brundisium with an army of forty thousand men. Had Sulla's enemies been united and under capable leadership he might easily have been crushed. But there were no great generals among his opponents, and little opposition was offered to his advance towards Rome. One consul was defeated at Capua, while the forces of the other joined Sulla at Teanum. He spent the winter in Campania, and then continued his march towards Rome. He encountered the consul Marius (the adopted son or nephew of the great Marius) at Praeneste, and defeated him, after which he entered Rome without opposition. Meanwhile the struggle had been going on in many quarters between the partisans of Sulla and Marius. Everywhere the cause of Sulla was triumphant, and the Marian leaders, Carbo and Norbanus, were compelled to flee from Italy. One antagonist still remained whose courage and constancy never failed. The Samnites and Lucanians, looking upon Sulla as an enemy to their cause, had taken up arms, and joined the Marian party. Praeneste, a strong city, was in their hands, its garrison being under

*Civil war in
Italy.*

the command of the younger Marius and a brother of Pontius Telesinus, a man worthy to be ranked with the great Pontius of the Second Samnite War. Pontius Telesinus endeavoured to relieve Praeneste, which was besieged by Sulla's army, but failing in this marched suddenly with a large army of Samnites and Lucanians against Rome itself. It was his intention to take Rome and destroy it, and he very nearly succeeded. Sulla, who had been warring in Etruria, hurried back to Rome and reached it just in time to meet the Samnite attack. A desperate struggle took place before the Colline gate, and for many hours the issue was in doubt. At last, as the day was closing, the Samnite ranks were broken, and Rome was saved from deadly peril. The slaughter of the Samnites was very great, and eight thousand were taken prisoners. Pontius was slain, and the younger Marius abandoning all hope, caused himself to be killed. Praeneste surrendered at discretion, and its garrison, with the exception of the Roman citizens, were shot down with javelins. The larger towns of Etruria were destroyed, and the struggle between the two factions was brought to a close in widespread ruin and a deluge of blood.

*Battle of
Romans and
Samnites at
the Colline
Gate.*

The true character of Sulla was now revealed when absolute power had passed into his hands. For the first time Rome was made to know the meaning of a *proscription*. A list of the enemies of Sulla and the enemies of his partisans was drawn up, and put in public places. Any one on this list might be slain with impunity, and on the head of each a price was set. The list contained the names of thousands of the noblest and wealthiest people at Rome. The hand of the father was raised against the life of his son, while the son often sought the life of his father to secure his possessions. Nothing more horrible can well be imagined than the suspicion and dread which this cruel proscription engendered. The equites as a class were the special objects of his wrath, and the confiscation of property went on hand-in-hand with the murder of its possessors. The prisoners taken from the Samnites, to the number of many thousands, were placed in the Temple of Bellona and there butchered within the hearing of the senate. In such a fashion did Sulla begin his reforms at Rome.

*The Sullan
proscrip-
tions and
confiscations*

*The Sullan
Reforms.*

To reward his soldiers, and secure their steady support, he assigned military colonies to twenty-three of his legions. These are the first real military colonies, for the land thus assigned was wrested from the inhabitants of some unfriendly town, and given to soldiers whose sole claim was their fidelity to Sulla. The new colonists were indifferent settlers, and served no purpose save that of propping up the despotic authority of their master. Wide tracts of land, confiscated, but never given out to settlers, were left uncultivated. Samnium and Etruria were almost desolated; and life and property over a great portion of Italy became insecure through the effects of brigandage.

Sulla compelled the senate to appoint him dictator for an indefinite time, with full power over the life and property of the people. Armed with this authority, and supported by his legions, he began to introduce important changes in the constitution. His idea was to restore the old power of the senate, and lessen and degrade that of the magistrates. His attempts at reform were attempts to put 'new wine in old bottles,' with the usual result. He found the senate much reduced in numbers, and he filled up the vacancies with low-born and servile creatures. The power of the tribunes was restricted by making it necessary to secure the consent of the senate before submitting any proposal to the people. He also restricted their power of interference to that of protecting individuals, and he prohibited a tribune from holding any subsequent magistracy. He took the control of the courts out of the hands of the equites, and restored it to the senate. No consul was to be eligible for re-election, and no man could be consul unless he had passed through the lower grades of office. The number of praetors was increased from six to eight, and the quaestors to twenty, both increases being necessary by the great expansion in Rome's foreign possessions. The pontifical and inaugural colleges were put under the control of the senatorial nobles, and the number of their members greatly enlarged. One important and useful reform was, however, due to Sulla. The power of the courts for the trial of cases of magisterial extortion had hitherto been confined to bribery and treason; but Sulla enlarged their jurisdiction so as to include the chief criminal offences, and in this way laid

the foundation of Roman criminal law. The children of those who had been proscribed were rendered ineligible to hold office, an act of gross injustice which remained long on the statute-book of Rome. He formed a body-guard of freedmen, who were known as the Cornelians, and these favourites could do much as they liked with the lives and property of the citizens.

Much to the surprise of the Roman world Sulla retained the dictatorship only two years, and then (80 B.C.) retired to private life at Puteoli. His life of self-indulgence was now to find a fitting close. A horrible disease, such as is said to have afflicted Herod, the king of the Jews, took hold of him, and he died a mass of corruption in the year 78 B.C. His funeral proved that although he had nominally resigned power, he still was held in fear in his retirement, and that his sway over the minds of his contemporaries was undiminished.

*Death of
Sulla,
78 B.C.*

Several minor events occurred abroad during Sulla's dictatorship. Of these the most important were successes won by Cn. Pompey, over the followers of Marius in Sicily and Africa. For these services Pompey, though a very young man, was granted a triumph by Sulla. Next in importance comes the so-called Second Mithridatic War. Mithridates had refused to surrender Cappadocia, as the treaty he made with Sulla had not been confirmed by the senate. Archeläus, who had deserted to the Romans, persuaded L. Murēna, the Roman commander in Asia, to attack Mithridates. He did so, and plundered a wealthy temple at Comāna; but Mithridates marched against him, and defeated him at Sinōpe. Sulla now interfered and brought the war to an end, leaving Mithridates in possession of part of Cappadocia, and free to continue his plans of further aggression.

*Second
Mithridatic
War,
83-82 B.C.*

CHAPTER XXIII.

FROM THE DEATH OF SULLA TO THE END OF THE THIRD MITHRIDATIC WAR.

*Aemilius
Lepidus and
Q. Catulus
consuls, 78
B.C.*

Scarcely had Sulla died when an attempt was made to overthrow the aristocratic constitution he had established. In the year after his death, M. Aemilius Lepidus and Q. Catulus were elected consuls. The former was a self-seeking, unscrupulous politician whose praetorship in Sicily had been notorious for extortion and tyranny; the latter is represented by Cicero as one of the ablest and most honest of the men of that time. Lepidus was not long in showing his opposition to the policy of Sulla. He proposed laws regulating the distribution of cheap corn, recalling from banishment those who had been banished by Sulla, and restoring the lands of Etruria to those that were dispossessed by the veterans that Sulla had settled there. Both consuls were despatched to check the disorder which had arisen in Etruria by some of the dispossessed trying to gain forcible possession of their estates. Instead of settling the disorder, however, the consuls turned their arms against each other. A battle was fought at the Mulvian Bridge, which spans the Tiber at Rome, and Lepidus was defeated. Soon after he took ship for Sardinia and died there.

*Death of
Lepidus, 77
B.C.*

*Rise of
Sertorius.*

The success thus gained by the optimates was, however, temporary, for a greater danger was threatening them in Spain. Marius had under him in the war against the Cimbri an officer, Q. Sertorius. In the stormy days of the Marian ascendancy Sertorius had kept himself aloof from the bloodthirsty acts of his party, and had already acquired a reputation for uprightness and honesty that subsequently marked his career. On the return of the victorious Sulla, he left Rome and went as propraetor to Spain, for he saw clearly that the Marian cause was for a while, at least, lost in Italy. By the mildness of his rule and the straightforwardness of his policy he made himself

popular with the Romans and the Spanish natives. Soon he acquired such an ascendancy over the minds of the Spaniards that he held out the hope of forming an independent state that would rival the power and defy the armies of Rome. He instructed the Spanish youth in Roman manners, equipped his soldiers with Roman arms, and trained his army in Roman warfare. Many of the old Marians flocked to his standard. Several armies were sent against him without success, and at length Pompey was despatched to put an end to the war. At first he was as unsuccessful as the others, and at the river Sucro he would have met with a most disastrous defeat, had it not been for the timely assistance of Metellus. At length dissensions broke out in the camp of Sertorius, and an officer of his, Perperna, assassinated him, and thus brought to a close a career that might have been fraught with serious consequences to the Roman state. Pompey defeated and slew Perperna, and the Marian party became for a time extinct, till its revival under C. Julius Caesar.

*Death of
Sertorius,
72 B.C.*

While these events were going on in Spain, Italy was being threatened by a Servile War. Among the cruel sports in which the Romans indulged, none were so popular or so famous as those of the amphitheatre. The gladiators who fought there were generally prisoners who had been taken in war and sold to persons who trained them in schools for the Roman games. Such a school was maintained at Capua, in which Gauls and Thracians were kept. Under the leadership of Spartacus, a Thracian, a body of gladiators had broken loose from the school, seized a quantity of arms, and established themselves at Mt. Vesuvius. Fugitive slaves, criminals, banditti, and all kinds of men of broken fortunes joined their ranks till they soon reached the number of forty thousand, or some say one hundred thousand men. Wandering about Italy, wherever they were most likely to get most plunder, they did not waste the whole of the southern part of the peninsula. The consular armies sent out against them were ignominiously defeated, no doubt owing to the want of skill on the part of the Roman commanders. The senate, in the absence of Lucullus and Pompey, selected as commander M. Crassus, who was better known for his vast wealth, from which he obtained the

*Servile War,
73-71 B.C.*

name of Dives (*the Rich*), than for any skill in the field or forum. Soon Crassus confined these outlaws to Rhegium in Southern Italy and inflicted on them a crushing defeat. Still the senate was impatient at the length of the war and summoned Pompey to Italy to aid Crassus. Soon after, Spartacus was defeated at Petelia, and the war was brought to a close. Pompey though merely a knight entered Rome a second time in triumph.

*Pompey and
Crassus con-
suls, 70 B.C.*

The next year was marked by the appointment of Pompey and Crassus as consuls, though Pompey was ineligible by law, since he was absent from Rome at the time of his election, was not of the legal age, and had not held any of the subordinate offices of state.¹ One of the first acts of Pompey was to restore the power of the censors, which had been in abeyance for sixteen years. Since the days of Sulla no revision of the senate rolls had taken place, and no enumeration of the citizens or valuation of their property had been recorded. The new censors at once struck off the names of sixty-four senators from the rolls. It could easily be seen that the senate was not now the master of the state, but the servant of an autocratic politician. Another important reform of Pompey's was the restoration of the tribunician power, which had been abrogated by the Sullan constitution. Again he appointed the *indices* of the superior courts, not from the senators as Sulla had done, but equally from the senators, knights, and tribunes of the treasury.² By instituting these reforms, Pompey had broken with the aristocracy, probably to ingratiate himself with the middle and lower classes.

*Reforms in
the Consti-
tution.*

*Third
Mithridatic
War, 73-64
B.C.*

While these stirring events were occurring in Italy, war had been renewed with Mithridates, king of Pontus. The peace that had been concluded at the end of the Second Mithridatic War was only a hollow truce. Mithridates saw well that to meet successfully the Roman soldiers in the field of battle he must instruct the barbarian troops of his kingdom in the tactics, and arm them with the weapons, of the Romans. In carrying

¹ The *Lex Annalis* fixed the age of candidates for public offices: a quaestorship was obtained at 31; an aedileship at 37; a praetorship at 41; a consulship at 43.

² The *tribuni aerarii* were officers who collected the war tax (*tributum*) in each tribe.

out his plans, he was aided by refugees of the Marian party who took refuge in his camp after the defeat of Fimbria by Sulla. The immediate cause of the war was the death of Nicomēdes III., king of Bithynia, who on his decease had left his kingdom to the Roman people and Bithynia was, therefore, declared a Roman province. But Mithridates asserted that the late king had left a legitimate son, and at once proceeded to back his claims by arms.

Already the king of Pontus had collected an army of one hundred and twenty thousand foot, sixteen thousand horse, and a large number of barbarian auxiliaries, disciplined and armed in the Roman manner. He had, besides, on the Euxine a fleet so large that the Romans had no hopes of meeting him successfully on the sea. When the Roman generals, L. Licinius Lucullus and Aurelius Cotta arrived in Asia, Mithridates had already overrun Bithynia and was laying siege to Chalcēdon, a city opposite Constantinople. The reverse that Cotta there met emboldened Mithridates to press on to Cyzicus. Mithridates, however, was unsuccessful here, for he was compelled to raise the siege and to retreat to his native Pontus. A second defeat near Cabīra compelled him to flee to Armenia and seek the protection and aid of his son-in-law Tigrānes. These were, however, reluctantly given, and had it not been for the haughty demands of Appius Claudius, whom Lucullus had sent to Tigranes to demand the surrender of Mithridates, the war might have been brought to an end there and then. Tigranes resented the arrogant and imperious conduct of the Roman envoy. Accordingly, Lucullus entered Armenia and defeated Tigranes at Tigranocerta before Mithridates could come to the aid of his son-in-law. In the following year the united forces of Mithridates and Tigranes were defeated at Artaxāta. But discontent arose in the Roman army, which prevented any further advance being made. Lucullus then turned aside to Mesopotamia and laid siege to the impregnable fortress of Nisībis, which he was obliged to abandon on account of a mutiny among the soldiers, who demanded that they should be led home. This mutiny was headed by Publius Clodius, so conspicuous in after days as the turbulent demagogue of the Roman forum. When the Roman commissioners arrived in Pontus to

*Siege of
Cyzicus,
73 B.C.*

*Tigranes
defeated at
Tigrano-
certa, 69 B.C.*

*Mithridates
and
Tigranes
defeated at
Artaxata,
68 B.C.*

*Defeat of
the Romans,
67 B.C.*

reduce it to a province, they found it still in the hands of the enemy. The political opponents of Lucullus at Rome found this a pretext to deprive him of the command. The defeat of Fabius and Triarius, two of the lieutenants of Lucullus, no doubt, too, increased the unpopularity of the Roman commander. M. Acilius Glabrio, one of the consuls of the year, was sent out, but he fared no better than Lucullus. He was no doubt hampered in his movements by Lucullus, who, though recalled, was very unwilling to be superseded in the command by an inferior officer. The army was, however, given over to Pompey, who had just brought to a successful termination the war against the pirates.

*Pompey
succeeds.*

*War against
the Pirates,
68 B.C.*

The prevalency of piracy in the Mediterranean was an old sore. From the east to the west the waters of this great inland sea, dotted as these waters are with numerous islands, had been the rendezvous, even in early times, of these daring marauders. At this time they were chiefly confined to the bays and strongholds of the Cilician coast, and from their haunts these corsairs had plied a profitable trade by preying on the shipping of three continents. The Civil and Social Wars in Italy had deprived many thousands, not only in Italy but throughout the Roman world, of the means of living, and had thus created a class of men characterized by their lawlessness, and greed of plunder. The forces of the pirates were no doubt largely composed of men of this class. While the armies of the republic were increasing or preserving the boundaries of the empire by land, the fleet of the state had been neglected, and thus piracy had arisen to an alarming extent. The wealthy cities on the coast were plundered, the carrying trade of the Romans was destroyed, murder and pillage were rampant on every shore, and even the Appian Way, and the harbour of Ostia had witnessed their assaults. In consequence of their naval power, all communication with the provinces was cut off or attended with the greatest danger, and thus the granaries of Rome—Sicily, Sardinia and Egypt—were closed to the inhabitants of Italy. As a result, Rome was threatened with a famine, and the price of provisions arose in consequence. In this emergency all parties were willing to bury their political strife and to invest with supreme command some one who would

remedy this intolerable state of affairs. Accordingly, the tribune Aulus Gabinus brought forward a bill by which some commander should be invested for three years with absolute authority, both by land and sea, over the whole Mediterranean and as far as fifty miles into the interior. Within this range lay all the important cities of the Roman world. No one was named in the bill, but all were fully aware that Pompey was meant. Though the nobles opposed the bill, and Caesar almost alone in the senate supported it, the proposal was carried in the assembly. Five hundred galleys, one hundred and twenty thousand soldiers were voted, and the treasury of the state was put at the service of Pompey. This vote, according to more than one historian, was the actual beginning of the empire. No sooner had Pompey been put in chief command than the aspect of affairs changed. Public credit was at once restored, the price of provisions fell, confidence in the security of life and property was re-established, and the financial stringency that had ensued in consequence of the commerce of Italy being paralyzed, ceased. Selecting experienced commanders, Pompey assigned squadrons to each of the divisions into which he divided the Mediterranean. In forty days he swept the whole of the western part of the Mediterranean and drove the pirates into the eastern end, where he completely defeated them and burned their ships in the harbour of Coracesium. Within three months the war was brought to a close.

The bill of Gabinus was succeeded by another proposed by Caius Manilius, who now brought forward a motion conferring on Pompey unlimited powers over the army and fleet of the East to prosecute the war against Mithridates. Again the nobles were alarmed at the extraordinary powers conferred on Pompey. The bill was supported by Julius Caesar, Crassus, and especially by Cicero, whose extant speech is little less than a panegyric on the military genius of Pompey. In the war against Mithridates, Pompey displayed the same energy that he had exhibited in the war against the pirates. At once the Roman general formed an alliance with the king of Parthia, and broke up the league between Tigranes and Mithridates. Pontus was blockaded by a Roman fleet. Hemmed in on every side, and destitute of allies,

*Gabinian
Bill, 67 B.C.*

*Manilian
Bill, 66 B.C.*

*Pompey
undertakes
the Mithri-
datic War.*

Mithridates fled before Pompey. At length he was surprised and defeated, and having no other place of refuge, he plunged into the heart of Colchis and made his way to the Cimmerian Chersonese or *Crimea*. Unable to obtain any satisfactory terms of peace from the Romans, Mithridates conceived the bold design of marching round the northern and western coasts of the Euxine, and forming an alliance with the wild Sarmatians and Getae, to attack Italy on the north; but in this he was doomed to disappointment. The rebellion of his son Pharnāces stung with chagrin the Pontic king, who took poison and died 63 B.C. His body was sent to Amisus, where it was given a princely burial by Lucullus. Before returning home, Pompey marched into Syria and reduced it to a Roman province. He also advanced against Palestine, at that time distracted by a quarrel between the high priests, Hyrcānus and Aristobūlus. The Roman general espoused the cause of the former, and the Jews, that of the latter. In the war that ensued, Jerusalem was taken by storm and Hyrcanus made high priest.

*Death of
Mithridates
63 B.C.*

*Pompey
settles the
affairs of
the East.*

It was now the policy of Pompey to settle the affairs of Asia by placing vassal kings of Rome over the territory he had conquered. He established Pharnāces, son of Mithridates, in the possession of the Bospōrus; to Deiotārus was given Galatia; and Cappadocia was restored to Ariobarzānes. He arrived in Italy in 62 B.C. at the head of his victorious legions to obtain from the senate a confirmation of his acts in Asia, for the regulation of the provinces was conducted on his part without any authority.

CHAPTER XXIV.

INTERNAL HISTORY OF ROME FROM THE CONSULSHIP OF POMPEY AND CRASSUS TO THE RETURN OF POMPEY FROM THE EAST (69-61 B.C.).

The internal history of Rome for the next twenty years is occupied by the struggles between the popular party and the optimates or nobles. These two classes had very different policies. The optimates wished to retain intact the existing constitution, the old forms and rites of the national creed in connection with its system of auspices, the rights of the senate in its administration of the courts of law, the exchequer, the army and the provinces. The popular party maintained, on the other hand, that the constitution must be changed to meet the altered condition of the times, that the old rites in connection with the taking of the auspices were meaningless and obsolete, that the power of the senate must bow to the popular will, that the constitution of the senatorial courts was notoriously corrupt, that the administration of the finances of the government, and especially of the provinces, was attended with flagrant peculations, and that the public lands of the Roman empire should no longer enrich the wealthy aristocracy merely, but should be divided among the common people for actual settlement.

After the deaths of Marius and Cinna, no prominent leader of the popular party appeared till the days of Julius Caesar. Even now he was preparing the way for his final triumph, for the inherent weakness of the optimates was their need of a strong leader. Pompey had shown too great independence of spirit to receive the hearty support of the conservative wing of that party. By his acts in abrogating the Sullan constitution, he had really broken with his own followers, and he made the breach still wider by assuming the unprecedented powers conferred on him by the Gabinian and Manilian bills. On both of these he had received the support of Crassus and Caesar, the former of whom he regarded with personal aversion and the latter with

jealousy. Of the other leaders, Catulus was too narrow and aristocratic ; M. Porcius Cato, too much of a Stoic—the ancient type of a Puritan,—and Lucullus, too fond of personal indulgence and too selfish, ever to take politics seriously except for purely personal ends. The weakness of the optimates brought to the front of the popular party such men as Caesar, Cicero and Catiline as the typical politicians of that period.

*C. Julius
Caesar.*

Caesar was born 100 B.C. By birth he was connected with the optimates, for he was descended from one of the oldest families of Rome. He was, however, related in two ways to the popular party. His aunt, Julia, was the widow of the great Marius, and his wife Cornelia was the daughter of Cinna. When Caesar was ordered by Sulla to divorce his wife, he showed his characteristic firmness by refusing to comply with the demand.

*Indicts Cn.
Dolabella,
77 B.C., and
C. Antonius
76 B.C.*

After a brief campaign in Asia Minor he returned to Rome, when he prosecuted Cn. Dolabella for extortion in his management of the province of Macedonia, and next year he indicted C. Antonius for his administration of Greece. In both of these causes his eloquence attracted attention. To prosecute his studies of oratory he went to the school of Molo, at Rhodes, but on his way was captured by pirates, and was held by them till a ransom of fifty talents had been collected for his release. On his return to Rome he became the recognized leader of the popular party.

*Elected
Quaestor,
68 B.C.*

In consequence of being elected quaestor he obtained a seat in the senate. In the same year he lost his aunt Julia, and his wife Cornelia. When he delivered their funeral orations, he seized the occasion of pronouncing a panegyric on the leaders of the popular party. As quaestor he went to Spain, where he obtained a reputation for fairness and moderation in settling the difficulties of the provincials. In the following years we find Caesar supporting the Gabinian, and afterwards the Manilian bill. In doing so he probably had two designs : first, to make the Romans more and more familiar with the notions of autocratic government ; and secondly, to secure a rupture between Pompey and the optimates. In the office of aedile, Caesar increased his popularity, as well as his debts, by the gladiatorial shows he gave to gratify the depraved tastes of the Roman populace. He also during his term of office showed his

*Caesar
Aedile,
63 B.C.*

devotion to the memory of Marius by causing the trophies of that great commander which had been destroyed by Sulla to be replaced.

Another leader of a very different type was M. Tullius Cicero, *Cicero*, the son of a Volscian knight, born at Arpinum 106 B.C., and, therefore, of the same age as Pompey. His first and only campaign was served in the Social War, 89 B.C. During the stormy times of the Sullan rule he gave himself up to the prosecution of those studies that were essential to his success as a lawyer and a politician. His career at the bar was brilliant and his advancement so rapid that Hortensius and Aurelius Cotta, his most formidable rivals, were soon compelled to acknowledge his superiority. Elected quaestor of Sicily, he endeared himself to the inhabitants of that island so that he was chosen as their patron at Rome, and subsequently undertook in their behalf *Cicero* the prosecution of Verres, who for three years (73-71 B.C.), as *Quaestor of Sicily,* praetor, had misruled and plundered the Sicilians. The prosecution of this cause would lead us to expect that Cicero would have cast his lot with the popular party, for Verres had the support of the optimates. In due time¹ Cicero became aedile and praetor. The support that he gave to the Gabinian and Manilian bills would also lead us to suppose that he was not in *Position of* harmony with the aristocratic party. The truth is that he was *Cicero.* in accord with neither faction. He was as much opposed to the conservative policy of the optimates as he was to the revolutionizing tendencies of the leading men of the popular party.

An important actor in the stirring events of the times was Lucius Sergius Catiline, a penniless aristocrat. He first appears as a partisan of Sulla, and during the sanguinary period *L. Sergius* of the revolution he killed with his own hand his brother-in-law *Catiline,* and tortured to death a kinsman of Cicero. He is said to have poisoned his first wife and his own son to make room for the rich, but profligate Aurelia Orestilla. Notwithstanding his *Praetor,* disgraceful character he became praetor, and afterwards pro- *68 B.C.;* praetor of Africa, and returned to Rome with the hope of *Propraetor,* obtaining the consulship. The two consuls elect, for the year *67 B.C.;* *returns to* *Rome 66 B.C.*

¹ See p. 470, foot note 1.

*First conspiracy,
Feby. 5th,
65 B.C.*

65 B.C., P. Autronius Pactus and P. Cornelius Sulla had been disqualified for bribery and the defeated consuls, L. Aurelius Cotta and L. Manlius Torquatus, took their seats. Filled with anger at missing the object of his ambition Catiline formed the design of murdering the consuls on the 1st of January. This plan was postponed till the 5th of February, and failed in consequence of his giving the signal too soon to his associates. Emboldened rather than disheartened by his defeat, he attached several senators and knights to his side and was again a candidate for the consulship for the year 63 B.C. Cicero and C. Antonius were, however, elected, though the fact that the latter had only a few votes over Catiline shows how powerful his influence was. Catiline now determined to carry out his conspiracy. He collected to his side a band of needy desperadoes whose bankruptcy could be averted only by a revolution. To these he promised offices and plunder without stint, an abolition of all debts, and in fact everything that revolutionists would covet. He pointed out that the time was ripe for such a revolution. His friends held power in Spain and Africa; no forces were in Italy to check their progress, for Pompey had not yet returned from the East; Gaul and Etruria were ready to rise, and above all C. Antonius, the consul, was on their side. Cicero found out the plans of Catiline by means of Fulvia, a mistress of Q. Curio, one of Catiline's most intimate friends. He convoked the senate, which at once passed the decree empowering the consuls to see that the republic should receive no harm. The murder of Cicero was averted by the precautions of the orator. When the unblushing conspirator took his seat, Cicero pronounced in strains of impassioned eloquence his first speech against Catiline. The conspirator who rose to reply, was greeted with epithets and shouts of indignation on every hand. Leaving the conduct of the campaign to his fellow traitors, he set out at the dead of night for the camp of Manlius at Faesulae. No sooner had he left Rome than Cicero gave expression to his joy in the second speech against Catiline. Though the traitor had departed, he had laid before the conspirators his plans. They were to fire the city at twelve places at once, and to carry on the work of plunder and murder. Cicero wished,

*First speech
against
Catiline,
Nov. 7th,
63 B.C.*

*Second
speech,
Nov. 8th.*

before disclosing the full guilt of Catiline, to have stronger evidence than the mere word of a mistress of a conspirator, and luckily such evidence was soon obtained. It so happened that there came to Rome at that time envoys of the Allobroges, from the province of Transalpine Gaul, to ask redress for some real or imaginary grievance. When they did not obtain their redress from the senate, Lentulus, a conspirator, thinking that he might turn the discontent of the Allobroges to good account, asked them to support the plans of Catiline. Without deciding definitely to co-operate, they thought it well to lay the whole scheme before the patron of their state, Q. Fabius Sanga, who in turn revealed the matter to Cicero. The envoys were instructed by Cicero to feign participation in the plot, and to obtain from the heads of the conspiracy letters and documents as a surety of the sincerity of their intentions. At once the conspirators fell into the trap, and on the night of the departure of the envoys, Cicero had the ambassadors of the Allobroges arrested with all the documents. Cicero placed the whole matter before the senate in his third speech. Again he summoned the senate to decide the fate of the conspirators. A long and important debate followed. At first all the speakers were for inflicting the punishment of death till it came to the turn of Julius Caesar, who was praetor elect. After he had pointed out fully that the penalty proposed was illegal and that its consequences would be very serious, he ended his speech with the recommendation that the property of the conspirators should be confiscated, and that they should be sent to the various municipia and there kept in perpetual custody. Cicero followed with the fourth speech against Catiline, in which he advocated the death penalty, and he was followed in the same strain by M. Porcius Cato, who decided the opinion of the senate. On the same night the conspirators were put to death in the Tullianum, a dungeon on the slope of the Capitoline.

*Dec. 3rd,
Third
Speech.*

*Dec. 5th,
Fourth
Speech.*

Meanwhile Catiline had levied two poorly equipped legions in Northern Etruria. He first attempted to cross the Apennines to Cisalpine Gaul, but found the passes blocked by Roman troops. Determined to sell his life as dearly as possible, he gave battle at Pistoria to the legions under Petreius, a lieutenant

*Battle of
Pistoria,
62 B.C.*

*Death of
Catiline.*

of the consul Antonius, and fought with all the courage of despair. His life was somewhat redeemed by his death, for he fell in the thickest of the fight, after giving undoubted proofs of valour.

*Cicero's un-
popularity.*

Cicero's popularity was unbounded. He was hailed as 'Father of his Country' both in the senate and the forum, and thanksgivings in his name were voted to the gods. His popularity was, however, short-lived, for the excessive vanity he displayed was disgusting to the people. The immediate cause of his downfall was, however, the direct violation of the constitution, which stated that no citizen could be put to death except by the sentence of the people in the comitia. The senate had assumed functions which it had no right to usurp, and for this violation of the constitution, Cicero, as presiding magistrate, was held directly responsible.

*Caesar pro-
praetor,
61 B.C.*

When Caesar resigned his praetorship, he obtained Spain for his province. He was at this time enormously in debt—wanting, as he himself said, two hundred and fifty million sesterces¹ to be worth nothing. He, however, was relieved by Crassus, who believed in his rising fortunes, and who had been attracted to his side by the coldness of the optimates. In Spain he so enriched himself as propraetor that he was enabled to pay off his outstanding debts, and to be free thereafter from financial embarrassment.

*Pompey's
return,
62 B.C.*

Pompey, meanwhile, had returned to Italy from the East at the head of his victorious legions. There were grave apprehensions at Rome as to his intentions, but these were quieted when he disbanded his army at Brundisium. With a few friends he set out for Rome, where he celebrated his triumph in the following year. The grandeur of the procession outstripped all previous ones in its magnificence. The tablets carried in the procession recounted the fact that he had taken one thousand strong fortresses, nine hundred towns, and eight hundred ships; that he had founded thirty-nine cities, and had raised the revenue from sixty-nine to eighty-five millions; and that he had brought twenty thousand talents to the public treasury. At his triumphal

*His
triumph.*

¹ A sesterce was worth about four cents.

car, three hundred and twenty-four captive princes walked. But in spite of this apparent popularity, the course of Pompey was not satisfactory to the leaders of the senate, M. Crassus and L. Lucullus, both his personal enemies. He had arranged, too, the affairs of Asia without any commission of the senate, and he now was asking that body to ratify his acts and assign the lands he had promised to his veterans. This, however, the senators refused to do, and by their stupidity they lost the favourable opportunity to win him over to their side, to check the dangerous and growing influence of Caesar. This short-sighted policy of the optimates naturally threw Pompey on the side of Caesar, and was eventually the cause of the downfall of the senatorial party.

*Refusal of
the senate to
ratify his
acts in Asia.*

CHAPTER XXV.

FROM THE RETURN OF POMPEY TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE SECOND CIVIL WAR (61-49 B.C.).

*Caesar's
return from
Spain,
60 B.C.*

Caesar returned in the summer of 60 B.C. from Spain. He had freed himself from all financial embarrassments, and had also displayed ability in military affairs by completely subduing the inhabitants of the Iberian peninsula. This was the first opportunity he had had to exhibit his qualities as a commander, a position in which he afterwards became famous. On his return he laid claim to a triumph, but he was willing to relinquish this empty honour for the still greater benefits that the consulship conferred. The Roman law required that a candidate for the consulship should present himself on three separate occasions in the forum, whereas any one claiming a triumph was not allowed to enter the city till the day of the triumphal procession.

*Caesar Consul,
59 B.C.*

Caesar was elected consul along with Bibulus, a colleague of aristocratic tendencies who was too weak to thwart his will. The chief care of Caesar now was to bring about a reconciliation between Crassus and Pompey, who were deadly personal enemies, and to use their co-operation in furthering his own plans. These three, Caesar, Pompey and Crassus, formed the First Triumvirate, as it is called. This was not a legally established commission, but was rather a tacit understanding formed by these three men to support each other in the unlimited control of the state. No sooner had Caesar obtained power than he brought forward an agrarian bill, by which the lands in Campania were divided among twenty thousand Roman citizens, the majority of whom were veterans of Pompey. Though opposed by the aristocracy, the bill was supported by Crassus and Pompey, and passed. Caesar next obtained from the people a ratification of the acts of Pompey in the East, and he further cemented the friendship between himself and Pompey by giving to the latter his only daughter Julia in marriage. He also gained over the equites by remitting to them one-third of the money they had agreed to pay

*First Tri-
umvirate,
59 B.C.*

for farming the lands in Asia. After thus gaining to his side the people, Pompey, and the equites, he next induced the tribune Vatinius to propose in the assembly a bill granting him the provinces of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum for five years. The province of Transalpine Gaul was afterwards added. Caesar, *Caesar obtains Gaul and Illyricum for five years, 58-54 B.C.* however, did not propose to sever himself from the politics of Rome, as Pompey had done when he went to the East. Taking up his quarters in the winter at Luca or Ravenna, he kept himself in touch with the politics of the capital and watched closely every movement of his opponents. He procured the consulship in 58 B.C. for L. Calpurnius Piso and Aulus Gabinius, ready tools of his own, while he used the profligate and unscrupulous Publius Clodius to procure the banishment of Cicero. It appears that Pompeia, the wife of Caesar, had, some five years before this, been celebrating the mysteries of *Bona Dea*, when Caesar held the office of pontifex maximus. At these mysteries all males were rigidly excluded. Clodius in female attire had found his way into the house and had been detected. The college of pontiffs decreed that Clodius was guilty of sacrilege, and Caesar evidently believing his wife an accomplice in this act of impiety caused her to be divorced. Clodius tried to prove an *alibi*, but Cicero swore that on the day of the celebration he had spoken to Clodius in the forum. In consequence of this Clodius, though acquitted of the charge, vowed vengeance on the orator. Being a patrician he got himself adopted into a plebeian family to enable him to be a candidate for the tribuneship of the plebs. One of his first acts, as tribune, was to introduce a bill by which any one who had put to death a Roman citizen without a proper trial should be banished. Though no one was named in the bill, it was very easy to see that Cicero was aimed at, for he had laid himself open to the charge in conducting the trial of the conspirators. Deserted by the triumvirs and abandoned by the consuls, Cicero retired to Greece. In his absence his estates were forfeited and his villas at Tusculum and Formiæ plundered and destroyed. The outburst of indignation against the orator soon brought a revulsion of feeling in his favour. The enmity of Clodius had overshot its mark and with the aid of the new consuls, Cornelius Lentulus and Q. Caecilius Metellus, and of the triumvirs, a decree was passed *Cicero banished, May 1st, 58 B.C.*

*Cicero's
return, Sept.
5th, 57 B.C.*

recalling Cicero from banishment. After an absence of sixteen months Cicero returned, and his return was a triumphal procession. The Appian Way from Brundisium to Rome was thronged with eager crowds, who testified by their enthusiasm their gratitude for the services he rendered the state in suppressing the conspiracy of Catiline.

Gaul.

Gallia Transalpina included all the country west of the Rhine, viz.: the whole of modern France and Belgium, and parts of Holland, Switzerland, and Germany. The south-western part was inhabited by the Aquitanians, a race akin to the modern Basques, and the eastern part by some German tribes who had crossed the Rhine. With these exceptions the inhabitants were of Keltic origin, consisting of about sixty tribes, who were always at war with each other or their common enemies. They do not seem to have ever risen above the tribal state. Just before the days of Caesar two factions existed in the country, the one headed by the Aedui, who were in league with Rome, and the other by the Arverni and the Sequani. The Aedui, proud of the alliance with Rome, had been lording it over the others, and as a counterbalance for the support of the Romans, the Arverni and the Sequani had invited the aid of the neighbouring Germans. The immediate cause of Caesar's departure was, however, the news that reached Rome that the Helvetii were setting out on an expedition as the Cimbri had done fifty years before. Occupying that part of Gaul north of the Lake of Geneva, and between Mount Jura and the Rhine, a district comparatively limited, unfertile and bleak, they determined to acquire the rich plains in the south-western part of Gaul. Accordingly, quitting their homes and burning their villages and towns, they had already passed through the territories of the Sequani and plundered those of the Aedui. Their presence was a standing menace to the Roman province in Southern Gaul. Now advancing upon Geneva, they intended to cross the Rhine by the bridge at that town and force their way through the province. Caesar left Rome a few days after Cicero had been exiled and within eight days arrived at Geneva with five legions. His sudden appearance compelled the Helvetii to take the route along the river *Saône*.

*First
Campaign,
58 B.C.*

Already he found that three-fourths of the enemy had crossed that river when he arrived at the Saône. Those who had not crossed were overtaken and defeated, and the rest were overtaken in a few days and cut to pieces at Bibracte (*Autun*), while the rest who escaped from the slaughter were compelled to return to their homes.

Not content to defend the Province against these invaders, Caesar now accepted the invitation of the Aedui to expel from the borders of Gaul the Germans under Ariovistus. This leader had made overtures to Caesar to divide Gaul between them, but this proposal was rejected by Caesar. The legions were alarmed at the prospect of a battle with men who were physically and numerically superior to the Romans. When the soldiers of the Roman army hesitated to engage, Caesar showed his characteristic coolness in the face of danger by declaring that 'if all deserted him, he would face every danger and engage the foe with the Tenth Legion alone.' The legionary soldiers rallied and a crushing defeat was inflicted on Ariovistus near the town of *Basle*. Only a few of the enemy escaped across the Rhine. By this battle the Romans extended their territory as far as the Treviri.

The second year was occupied with a war against the Belgae. *Second Campaign, 57 B.C.* A number of tribes between the Sequana (*Seine*) and the Rhine, alarmed at the encroachments of the Romans, had formed a league against Caesar. Only the Remi were favourable to him. After reducing the weaker tribes, Caesar marched against the Nervii, one of the most warlike tribes of Gaul, and fought a desperate battle, which was won only by his skill and personal daring. So signal was this victory gained over the Nervii at the river Sabis (*Sambre*), that out of sixty thousand fighting men only five hundred Nervii remained. A public thanksgiving of fifteen days, an unprecedented honour, was granted to Caesar. By this victory all Eastern Gaul from the Mediterranean to the English Channel was now in the hands of the Romans.

During the spring of 56 B.C. Caesar held his courts (*conventus*) *Events in the Spring of 56 B.C.* in Gallia Cisalpina. He saw clearly that his work in Gaul could not be completed at the expiration of the five years which would

end in December 54 B.C. He had no desire to have his policy reversed by the senate as Pompey's had been in the war against Mithridates, nor did he wish to run the risk of having his veterans unprovided for, and the laws he passed in his consulship repealed or, at least, ignored. Cicero, also, had assailed the acts of the triumvirs, and dissensions were arising constantly between Crassus and Pompey. With the optimates the influence of Pompey, who had never been a favourite, was gradually waning, and with the popular party it was being eclipsed by the brilliant career of Caesar in Gaul. At Luca, Caesar held a conference with Pompey and Crassus. The importance of this meeting may be judged from the fact that two hundred senators and one hundred and twenty lictors were in attendance. Caesar effected a patched-up reconciliation, and it was agreed that Pompey and Crassus should be consuls for the year 55 B.C., that Pompey should receive the command of the two Spains for five years at the end of 53 B.C., and Crassus the government of Syria for the same period, and that Caesar should obtain the government of Gaul for five years beginning with 53 B.C.; that at the end of his term in Gaul, Caesar should stand for the consulship for 48 B.C. without being compelled to appear personally at Rome. Caesar would thus lay down his imperium Dec. 31st, 49, and Pompey a year later. Pompey and Crassus were elected consuls, not without violent opposition.

*Conference
at Luca,
April 56 B.C.*

*Third
Campaign,
56 B.C.*

In his third campaign Caesar completed the conquest of Gaul. The chief incident in this year was the conquest of the Venēti, on the north-west of Gaul, a daring, sea-faring people, who suffered a crushing defeat in the Bay of Quiberon. He then turned his army against the Morini and Menapii, two tribes in the neighbourhood of Calais. Though Gaul was subjugated, still the spirit of the nation was not broken, and only lacked an opportunity to rise against its conquerors.

*Fourth
Campaign,
55 B.C.*

The news on the German frontier called out Caesar earlier than usual during the spring of this year. The Usipetes and Tencteri, two German tribes, had been driven out of their own territory by the Suevi, and had crossed the Rhine, intending to settle in Eastern Gaul. Caesar defeated them with great slaughter, after detaining the ambassadors who had come to sue for peace.

After this victory Caesar determined to cross the Rhine to strike terror into the hearts of the inhabitants. In ten days he built a bridge in the neighbourhood of Cologne, and remained about eighteen days on the eastern side of the river, when he returned to Gaul and broke down his bridge. His ambition was not satisfied with defeating the Germans. He resolved to cross the Channel and invade Britain. With two legions and eighty vessels he set out from Port Itius (probably *Wissant*, between Calais and Boulogne), and landed probably near Deal. Beyond obtaining the submission of a few British tribes on the southern part of the island, his conquest effected nothing, for the season was too far advanced to permit a regular campaign. A public thanksgiving of twenty days was decreed, not without opposition, for Cato proposed that Caesar should be given up to the Germans in consequence of his treacherous acts towards the ambassadors of the Usipètes and the Tencteri.

The expedition against Britain had flattered the vanity of the Romans. The island was said to abound with rich mines and the sea, with pearls, and to offer a rich field for Roman enterprise. Accordingly, he sailed again from Port Itius with five legions, and landed at the same place as he had done the previous year. The Britons had placed in supreme command of their forces Cassivellaunus, whose state was north of the Thames. Caesar advanced north, crossed the Thames, probably above London, defeated the Britons and advanced as far as St. Albans. After taking hostages and determining the amount of tribute Britain should pay yearly, Caesar returned to the continent.

Caesar's absence in Gaul had been attended with danger to the Roman cause, for a rebellion was maturing in Gaul. This Caesar helped to foster by arranging his legions at considerable distances from each other—a policy he was compelled to pursue in consequence of the scarcity of corn in Gaul. Accordingly, the Eburōnes, a Gallic tribe, attacked the camp of Sabinus and Cotta and cut to pieces their command. They next besieged Q. Cicero, the brother of the orator, who was stationed among the Nervii, and who was relieved by Caesar himself defeating the enemy.

The defeat of Cotta and Sabinus had inspired the natives of Gaul to make an effort to regain their independence. Caesar

*Fifth
Campaign,
54 B.C.*

*Sixth
Campaign,
53 B.C.*

strengthened his army by levying two new legions in Cisalpine Gaul, and receiving another from Pompey, who was now at Rome. He defeated in turn several tribes in North-eastern Gaul. As the chief of these tribes—the Treviri—had been aided by the Germans, Caesar determined to cross the Rhine again. After receiving the submission of the Ubii, he devastated the lands of the Suevi, and on his return to Gaul he laid waste the district occupied by the Eburones.

*Seventh
Campaign,
52 B.C.*

This year marked a general uprising in all Gaul. Even the Aedui, the former friends of the Romans, joined in the general revolt. At the head of the insurgents was Vercingetorix, the chief of the Arverni, and by far the best general Caesar had ever met in his Gallic campaign. Caesar's success in this, as in all other campaigns, was due to the unexampled rapidity of his movement. With incredible celerity he concentrated his forces and attacked the enemy before they were aware of his presence. After taking several towns, he attacked Vercingetorix, who had strongly fortified himself at Georgovia (near *Clermont*). But the Gauls had raised an immense army and besieged Caesar, who now found himself between the two armies. Defeating the besieging army, Caesar finally compelled the surrender of Alesia, after which the Aedui and Arverni submitted.

*Eighth
Campaign,
51 B.C.*

The last campaign was spent by Caesar in reducing several of the minor states, and in employing himself with the details of the pacification of Gaul. His policy now towards the Gauls was conciliatory, and after so many years of fighting, Caesar left the province of Gaul loyal to the Roman cause, and patiently submissive to the Roman yoke.

*Death of
Julia,
54 B.C.*

While these stirring events were going on in Gaul, other events equally stirring were taking place in other parts of the Roman world. The conference of Luca was only a hollow truce and soon it was evident that a rupture was imminent. The first break in the link that bound the triumvirate together was the death of Julia, the daughter of Caesar and wife of Pompey. Both husband and father were warmly attached to her. Another link was broken in the death of Crassus, who was slain in an expedition against the Parthians at Carrhae. By his

removal, the state was now at the mercy of Caesar and Pompey. *Death of Crassus, 53 B.C.* While Caesar, however, was actively reducing the province of Gaul and gaining fresh laurels with every conquest, Pompey instead of setting out to Spain remained inactive at the city resting on the honours he had gained in the Mithridatic War. The state of affairs in Rome itself showed clearly the need of an absolute ruler to put down the lawlessness that prevailed. During the years 54 B.C. and 53 B.C. bloody brawls had been of frequent occurrence between the two old foes Clodius and Milo and their hired gladiators. Finally Clodius was slain. *Death of Clodius, Jan. 20th, 52 B.C.* During the funeral of Clodius the senate house was burned, and in consequence of the constant riots of the two factions the senate met and appointed Pompey sole consul. Milo was tried and exiled to Massilia. Pompey now became a sturdy supporter of the aristocratic party. After the death of Julia he married Cornelia, daughter of Metellus Scipio, whom he made his colleague in the following August. He now brought forward an old law that no one could become a consul while absent from Rome. This would have compelled Caesar to resign his command at the end of 49 B.C. At the same time Pompey would, by virtue of the conference at Luca, still be at the head of his army, since his term of office did not expire till a year after the expiration of that of Caesar. Marcellus the consul also proposed that Caesar should give up his military power, now that all Gaul had been subdued. Cato, the uncompromising foe of Caesar, also declared that in case Caesar should appear at Rome, he would bring him to trial for his acts in Gaul. The quarrel was evidently begun by the senate, and not by Caesar. It would have been vain for Caesar to give up his command and retire into private life while Pompey was invested with the *imperium* and at the head of legions at Rome. The tribune Curio laid before the senate the proposal of Caesar, that the latter would disband his legions if Pompey would do the same. The proposal was made on January 1st, 49 B.C., when the new consuls L. Cornelius Lentulus and C. Claudius Marcellus took office. With difficulty Mark Antony, afterwards the triumvir, and Q. Cassius Longinus, at that time tribunes of the plebeians, obtained a

Pompey sole consul, Feb. 25th, 52 B.C.

Causes of the war between Caesar and Pompey.

hearing for the proposal of Caesar. At length after a stormy debate the motion was passed 'that Caesar should disband his soldiers on a certain day, and if he did not, he would be declared a public enemy'. This meant a declaration of war. Five days after the consuls were invested with dictatorial power and Pompey was appointed to carry on the war in case Caesar did not obey the mandate.

CHAPTER XXVI.

CAESAR MARCHES AGAINST POMPEY.

Caesar was at Ravenna when the news of the action of the senate reached him. He was not long in maturing his plans. Reviewing the only legion he had with him, he recounted to them his wrongs and asked them to follow his fortunes. At midnight he left Ravenna secretly and crossed the Rubicon, a *Caesar crosses the Rubicon,* small stream which divided his province from Italy Proper. To pass this river without the express order of the senate was equivalent to a declaration of war. At Ariminum he met the two tribunes, Q. Cassius and Mark Antony, who had fled from Rome when the senate refused to accept their *reto* to the bill passed by that body declaring Caesar an outlaw. Town after town fell before Caesar without striking a blow. His journey through Northern Italy was a triumphal procession, and by the beginning of February he had Umbria and Picenum at his feet. To all opponents he granted amnesty. In this respect the conduct of Caesar in carrying on the war against his fellow-citizens was in striking contrast to his policy in his Gallic campaigns. By the middle of February he was reinforced by two other legions from Gaul. The first opposition that Caesar encountered was at Corfinium in the Pelignian Apennines, which was held *takes Corfinium,* by Domitius Ahenobarbus. As soon as the news reached Corfinium that Pompey had withdrawn from Rome with the chiefs of the senatorial party, Domitius surrendered to Caesar, who after making a statement justifying his course generously dismissed all the prisoners unharmed. Most of the troops of Domitius took service under Caesar.

Pompey and the chiefs of the aristocracy on hearing the course *and follows Pompey to Brundisium.* of action of Caesar were thrown into consternation. Abruptly leaving Rome, in his haste Pompey even forgot to take with him the money in the treasury. He hastened along the Appian Way

¹Dates are given in the unreformed calendar; see page 498.

and reached Brundisium February 20th, where he remained till he was overtaken by Caesar. This town could not be taken by assault, and Pompey could take his leisure in embarking his troops. On the 28th of March he landed his rear guard on the coast of Epirus. Caesar had not sufficient ships to pursue Pompey, and he also saw clearly that if Pompey held possession of the corn-producing countries and continued to retain supremacy by sea, Italy could be starved into submission. Caesar, therefore, to check this possible movement, at once secured possession of Brundisium, Tarentum and other harbours, and sent Valerius to secure Sardinia and Curio to hold Sicily. With his troops, which now mustered six legions, he arrived at Rome in the end of March. On the motion of Mark Antony, the people gave Caesar full power to take what money he desired from the treasury. But the tribune Metellus refused to give up the keys, whereupon Caesar forced an entrance and secured abundant wealth to pay his legions. He now was master of Italy and Gaul, and his next object was to obtain Spain, which had been Pompey's province, and where a veteran army was ready to invade Italy. Caesar determined to set out for Spain and to spend the rest of the year in the reduction of that province. But he found that Massilia had declared for Pompey. Leaving Decimus Brutus with twelve ships and Caius Trebonius with a body of troops to take the town, he proceeded on his march and crossed the Pyrennees early in the summer. Hither Spain was held by Caius Afranius and M. Petreius, two officers of Pompey. Near Ilerda (*Lerida*) Caesar met the Pompeian army, but they surrendered without coming to any decisive engagement, and many of the soldiers took service under his standard. In Further Spain Varro surrendered at Corduba, and by the middle of September Spain was at the feet of Caesar. On his return the Massilians were ready to yield, and were treated by Caesar with the greatest clemency.

Caesar goes to Spain, June 22nd, 49 B.C.

Surrender of Pompeians in Spain, August 2nd, 49 B.C.

Caesar's first Dictatorship Dec. 2nd to Dec. 13th, 49 B.C.

During Caesar's absence in Spain, M. Aemilius Lepidus, prefect of the city, had named Caesar dictator. Though dictator for the first time only eleven days, during that brief period he passed several important laws. He presided at the

comitia and was elected consul for the following year. He also restored all exiles to the city, except Milo:

One of the most important of his acts was the enfranchisement of the inhabitants of Cisalpine Gaul. In this act, Caesar was following the policy of the democratic leaders who had given the Roman citizenship to the Italian allies. Caesar also had been for many years the governor of the province and the champion of its inhabitants, and almost the first act when he obtained supreme power was to procure for them the suffrage. By this act Gallia Cisalpina ceased to be a province and now became a part of Italy. Perhaps the most important of his reforms was his financial legislation. A serious commercial crisis had arisen in Rome during the long continued civil wars. Credit had fallen, and debts could not be collected. The unbounded extravagance of the young nobles had so involved them in debt that many of the class of Catiline saw no hope but in a revolution. Caesar himself was deeply involved in debt, and every one naturally expected that he would follow out the programme of Catiline and call for a cancellation of all debts. But those who held that view were destined to be disappointed. His moderate measure for the relief of debts enacted that the interest paid on the debts should be deducted from the principal and that property should be taken in liquidation of the debts at its valuation before the outbreak of the war.

While Caesar was secure in the possession of Italy, Gaul and Spain, his lieutenant was defeated in Illyria, and thus all east of the Adriatic was in the hands of the Pompeians. Curio also, who had been sent to Sicily, after securing that island to Caesar's side had crossed over to Africa. But the Pompeian governor of Africa, P. Attius Varus, had the support of Juba, king of Mauretania, and Curio was defeated and slain. Thus the Pompeian party had in addition to all east of the Adriatic, Africa on their side. Having thus secured Italy, Gaul and Spain, Caesar embarked at Brundisium. The first part of the campaign was far from promising to Caesar. He spent nearly six months in trying to capture Dyrrhachium, where Pompey had his stores, and in making the attempt nearly ruined his army. While Pompey had been waiting for the arrival of a reinforcement which his father-

Caesar's reforms.

Caesar embarks at Brundisium Jan. 4th, 48 B.C.

*Contrast of
the two
armies.*

in-law Metellus Scipio was bringing to his aid, Caesar had effected a junction with Domitius Calvinus on the upper Peneius. Pompey, who had now been joined by Metellus Scipio, pitched his camp on the plains of Thessaly about four miles from Caesar. Elated at the success of the manœuvre at Dyrrhachium and impatient of their enforced absence from the luxuries of the capital and their estates, the leaders in the army of Pompey were anxious to bring about a battle. The more sanguine spirits of the senatorial leaders were even now amusing themselves with quarrelling over the spoils which they expected to reap by a victory, and were urging their leader to give battle at once. The camp was filled with intrigues among the motley throng of Romans, Asiatics, Jews, Arabians, and Armenians, who were bent rather on pleasure and plunder than on war. The forces of Pompey numbered forty thousand infantry and seven thousand horse, while Caesar had only twenty-two thousand infantry and one thousand horse, with a few irregular battalions. Though Caesar had the smaller army, all his soldiers were veterans, loyally devoted to his cause, and with full confidence in his success. In his army there were no divided counsels, no intrigues, but only one resolve, to do the will of their commander.

*Battle of
Pharsalia,
Aug. 9th,
48 B.C.*

Both armies were protected on one flank by the little stream Enipeus, while the other flank extended to the open plains. Caesar drew up his army in three lines, of which the rearmost was to act as a reserve. Pompey, as we have seen, was far superior in cavalry. To compensate for the inferiority in this part of his army, Caesar picked out six veteran cohorts to skirmish between the files of horse. Domitius Calvinus commanded the left, Mark Antony, the centre, and Caesar, the right, with the tenth legion in reserve. Caesar's horse was driven back by Pompey's cavalry but the latter was repulsed by Caesar's reserves. A charge of infantry was ordered by Caesar but Pompey's men remained stationary. When Caesar observed this, he halted his soldiers to gain breath before they closed with the enemy, after which a desperate conflict ensued. The day was gained by Caesar's third line coming on the ground and soon the army of Pompey was in full retreat. Orders were

passed to spare the Romans, but to give no quarter to foreigners. The allies of Pompey were fearfully slaughtered in the rout, for Caesar followed up his advantage during that day and the following. He exhibited to his countrymen the same clemency that he had previously shown, and granted a general amnesty to all who had taken up arms against him, and among these was M. Junius Brutus, of whom we shall hear presently.

Pompey fled through the Vale of Tempe and boarded a merchantman. He first went to Lesbos where were his wife Cornelia and his young son Sextus. With them he went to Cyprus and finally to Egypt. At the time when Pompey arrived there, the kingdom was ruled by the boy-king Ptolemy Dionysus, who had expelled Cleopatra, his sister and wife. The ministers of Ptolemy did not wish to refuse Pompey a refuge, for the Roman general had been appointed as the young prince's ward on the death of the late king, Ptolemy XII. Not willing to receive him and yet not daring to openly refuse him, a council was held at which it was decided to assassinate him, and thus the Roman fugitive was murdered as he was being conveyed to the shore.

Pompey flees to Egypt.

Death of Pompey.

Perhaps the career of no one in the history of Rome is so dramatic as that of Pompey. Fortune smiled on all his early life. With unexampled success he defeated Sertorius in Spain, conquered Mithridates, crushed the pirates of the Mediterranean, and brought to a close the Servile War. The boundaries of the Roman empire had by his means been extended from the Pillars of Hercules to the Euphrates. But while he had undoubted genius for war, he had little political sagacity. He began by courting the popular party, but in this he was outbidden by Caesar. When he could have made himself powerful with the optimates there was distrust on both sides. He was a politician without a policy and attempted in his career to carry out two inconsistent things, the impossible task of gratifying his personal ambition and at the same time adhering to the constitution. Caesar on the other hand had a definite policy, which aimed, at least, to remedy the existing defects in the senatorial government of Rome. He had also boundless confidence in himself, and this confidence inspired his followers with devotion to his cause.

Career of Pompey.

The victory of Pompey would have meant a perpetuation of the evils of a system admittedly bad ; the victory of Caesar meant, at least, that an attempt would be made to remedy defects.

March 2nd,
47 B.C.

Caesar arrived at Alexandria to receive the signet ring of his great rival. He turned away from the ghastly spectacle of the dissevered head of Pompey and ordered it to be buried with fitting respect. New difficulties, however, occurred. Caesar took the side of Cleopatra in the quarrel that had arisen concerning the succession of the kingdom. The people of Alexandria, to whom Cleopatra was obnoxious, assaulted the palace and reduced Caesar to desperate straits, for as yet he had not an army sufficient to enforce his wishes. In the course of time, however, Caesar obtained ships from Lesbos ; the Egyptian fleet was burned, and unfortunately the great library of the museum with its four hundred thousand volumes was consumed. At last he was induced to allow Ptolemy to be restored and to negotiate a peace. On the arrival, however, of reinforcements from Syria, he defeated the Egyptian army and Ptolemy was drowned when attempting to escape. Cleopatra then reigned as queen of Egypt. Five months after his victory at the Nile, Caesar left Egypt and marched northward against Pharnāces, son of Mithridates, whom he defeated at Zela. His laconic despatch to the Roman senate announcing this victory—*veni, vidi, vici*—is well known. He gained over the disaffected Asiatics to his side by remitting a portion of the taxes due to the state treasury.

Zela fought
Aut. 2nd,
47 B.C.

Caesar returned to Rome to arrange for the consular elections of the following year, when he and M. Aemilius Lepidus were chosen. He was elected a second time also to the office of dictator, for disorders were coming to the front. The financial measures he had passed in his first dictatorship had not yet stayed the commercial crisis. Many of the Romans were still clamouring for a cancellation of accounts, but to these demands he paid little heed. Another trouble still more dangerous awaited him. A mutinous spirit had broken out in the army, and the ring-leader in this was the favourite Tenth Legion, but Caesar with promptitude quelled the insurrection and restored order.

The decisive battle of the Pompeian party was fought at Thapsus in Africa. Under Metellus Scipio, a commander of inferior ability, aided by Juba, of Mauritania, the Pompeians suffered a severe defeat. By this victory all northern Africa passed into the power of Caesar except Utica, which was held by Cato. The inhabitants of the town saw that resistance was hopeless, and Cato resolved rather to die than to submit to the despotic rule of a man whom he had always opposed. After retiring to his chamber, he spent the night in reading the *Phædo*, a dialogue of Plato on the immortality of the soul, and then stabbed himself. Though his wound was dressed and he would probably have recovered, he showed his characteristic determination by tearing the wound open and so perished.

Caesar was now the sole ruler of the Roman world. There was grave apprehension in Rome that he would imitate Sulla and Marius in proscribing all his enemies. These fears were, however, groundless. It was no part of Caesar's policy to show a disregard for the lives of his fellow-countrymen, however regardless he might be of the lives of foreign people. As soon as the word came of his victory at Thapsus, a public thanksgiving of forty days was proclaimed, the dictatorship was bestowed on him for ten years, and the censorship was conferred under the title of *præfectus morum* for three years. He then celebrated with great splendour his four triumphs—over Gaul, Egypt, Pontus and Numidia—purposely avoiding all reference to the civil wars. These triumphs were followed by gifts of corn and money to the soldiers and the people, and by all kinds of public entertainments.

His dictatorship was marked by many reforms. He tried to check by severe measures the extravagance that pervaded all classes of the people. Perhaps the most memorable, as well as the most lasting of his measures was the reform in the calendar. In this he was aided by the Greek mathematician Sosigènes of Alexandria. The Roman year had been a lunar year and was at this time ninety days in advance of the solar year. Intercalary months were added from time to time. During this year such a month had been added of twenty-three days. It was calculated that the year would be still sixty-

seven days in advance of the true time, so that the year 46 B.C. consisted of four hundred and forty-five¹ days. To prevent confusion the year was extended from three hundred and fifty-five to three hundred and sixty-five days, each month except February being lengthened to the number of days we now have, and a fourth day added to February every leap year. With the 1st of January, 45 B.C., the solar year and the civil year began. Caesar also increased the number of the senators to nine hundred, many being enfranchised citizens of Cisalpine Gaul.

*Munda,
17th March,
45 B.C.*

*Caesar
returns,
Oct. 45 B.C.*

*Honours
granted to
Caesar.*

In the year of his dictatorship he received the intelligence that an insurrection had broken out in Spain, where the sons of Pompey, Cneius and Sextus had collected an army. At the end of 46 B.C. he set out, and within seven days he arrived at Corduba. He defeated the enemy at Munda in one of the most desperate battles he had ever fought, a victory which was gained only by his personal bravery. Caesar was detained for some months in settling the affairs of Spain. In October he celebrated his triumph, although he had gained a victory over citizens. The senate at once began to shower honours on him. On all occasions he was allowed to wear a triumphal robe, he received the title Father of his Country (*pater patriæ*), statues of him were erected in the temples, his effigy was placed on coins, the month of Quintilis was to be styled afterwards Julius, and he was to be raised to the rank of a god. By his office, too, of Imperator for life he was the supreme ruler in the Roman world: he was consul for ten years, dictator and *præfectus morum* for life, his person was inviolate, senators and knights were to form his body-guard, and the senate took an oath to watch over his safety.

*His plans
when
dictator.*

It may be said to the credit of Caesar that he used his power mercifully. No proscriptions followed his assumption of abso-

¹ The addition of one day would be correct if the year were exactly 365 days 6 hours. But the solar year is 365 days 5 hours 48 minutes 46 seconds, so that the Julian year is 11 minutes 14 seconds shorter than the solar year. Caesar's astronomers knew of this but disregarded it. Accordingly in 1582 A.D. Pope Gregory found the year behind the true time by 13 days and shortened the year by 10 days, still leaving the year 3 days behind the true time. He also ordered that a nearer approximation might be reached to leave out the odd day in February three times in 400 years. England adopted this in 1752. Russia still keeps the old style, so that her time is 12 days behind the rest of Europe.

lute rule. His mind was bent rather on schemes for the benefit of the Roman world. To reward his friends he increased the number of the public officers. He proposed to codify the Roman laws, to establish public libraries, to enlarge the harbour of Ostia, drain the Pomptine marshes, and to cut a canal through the isthmus of Corinth. In the midst of the schemes he was also preparing for an expedition against the Parthians and the tribes on the Danube to protect the boundaries of the Roman empire. For the fifth time he was elected dictator and consul for the last year of his life, 44 B.C., with Antony as his colleague in the consulship and Lepidus as his master of the horse. He wished to perpetuate his power in his own family. Having no legitimate children he made his sister's grandson Octavius, afterwards the Emperor Augustus, his successor. He wished also to have the title as well as the power of king, and accordingly it was agreed that at the approaching *Lupercalia* (15th February) Mark Antony should offer Caesar a diadem in public. But the very name of king had since the days of the Tarquins been obnoxious to Roman ears, and the proposal was for the present dropped.

Meanwhile after the Spanish triumph a conspiracy had been formed. It was started probably by C. Cassius Longinus, a personal foe, and included upwards of sixty persons, many of whom had taken active part in the war against Caesar, but had been pardoned by him. Among the most prominent of the conspirators was M. Junius Brutus, who had fought against him at Pharsalia but was pardoned, and had since been raised to the praetorship. A descendant of the man who expelled the Tarquins, a son-in-law and nephew of Cato, Brutus inherited the traditional theories of the republicans, and no doubt sincerely believed that the death of Caesar would cure all the ills of Rome. It was arranged to assassinate Caesar on the Ides (15th) of March. Though rumours of a conspiracy were darkly hinted to Caesar he disregarded all warnings and went to the senate. According to custom, the senators rose to honour him, and when he took his seat the conspirators surrounded him to ostensibly support the petition of Tillius Cimber, one of their number, who was interceding with Caesar to recall his brother from banishment. When Caesar grew impatient at their importunity, Tillius seized

Death of Caesar, March 15th, 44 B.C. him by the cloak. This had been agreed as the signal. Caesar fell at the base of Pompey's statue pierced with twenty-three wounds.

Caesar's death was a loss, not to Rome, but to the civilized world. Had his master genius matured the plans he proposed to carry out, the whole of future history would have been changed. With his death were renewed those civil wars which brought disorder and carnage to the Roman world. Equally gifted as general, jurist, statesman, historian, mathematician and architect, his versatility of genius was remarkable. His successes in war were achieved after his fortieth year. According to Cicero he might have been a great orator. We have his commentaries to prove that he was a great historian. His true greatness is shown by the entire absence of vanity or self-conceit from his character. No doubt he was excessive in his careful attention to his person, and some have even stigmatized this as an evidence of his vanity. This arose rather from the studied art with which Caesar paid attention to everything that would enhance his reputation among the people. Power he loved above all things and to attain the end he had in view probably he was no worse or no better than the other Roman political leaders of his own day.

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE SECOND TRIUMVIRATE.

The murder of Caesar was viewed with conflicting feelings by the Roman people. At first there was a disposition to applaud the conspirators as men who had rescued Rome from the danger of having a king imposed upon them. Among those who took this view of the situation was Cicero, who did not hesitate to express openly his approval of the deed. But the conspirators were too merciful in their own interests. Had they gone further, as some suggested, and removed Mark Antony, Caesar's intimate friend, and the custodian of his papers and will, the revolution they sought to bring about might have been accomplished. But Antony was spared, and although he pretended at first to be desirous of maintaining amicable relations with Brutus and Cassius, it soon became evident that he was waiting for a suitable opportunity to make political capital out of his position as Caesar's executor.

At first it was decreed in the senate that an amnesty should be granted for all that had occurred, and Brutus and Cassius betook themselves to the Capitol to watch the trend of public opinion. Caesar's soldiers came into the city in great numbers, and the political atmosphere was full of suppressed excitement. The senate was found utterly unequal to the situation, for it began with the advocacy of measures tending to reconciliation, and ended with conferring divine honours on Caesar, and in acknowledging the validity of his ordinances. Caesar's will was ratified and ordered to be read to the public. It was found that an immense sum was to be distributed to his soldiers and to the Roman citizens individually. At once popular passion was roused to vindicate the memory of the dead benefactor. A public funeral was ordered for his remains, and the body placed in an open bier was brought into the forum. To Antony, as a near friend, fell the task of making the funeral oration. He

recounted Caesar's achievements, told of his love for the people and his generosity as shown by his will, and concluded by holding aloft a waxen image showing Caesar's wounds, and his blood-stained toga rent by the daggers of his assassins. The excitement of the populace was now at its highest pitch, and instead of taking the body to the Campus Martius, the crowd there and then built a funeral pile of benches and other available wood, and burnt it in the forum. Brutus, Cassius and the chief conspirators were now compelled to seek safety in flight. Brutus retired to Macedonia, a province previously allotted to him by Caesar; Cassius, to Syria, and Decimus Brutus to Cisalpine Gaul, where several legions were stationed.

The conspirators leave the city.

Caius Octavius.

Caesar had by his will adopted C. Octavius, the grandson of his sister, and made him his heir. Octavius was at that time a young man of eighteen, and, when his uncle's death occurred, was at Apollonia, in Illyricum, receiving a Greek education. The news of Caesar's murder, and his own good fortune in being appointed heir, caused him to return almost immediately to Rome to claim his inheritance. His appearance on the scene was not at all gratifying to Antony, Caesar's executor. For Antony was very unwilling to give up the estate placed in his hands and sought to intimidate the young heir. But Octavius had found a good friend and adviser in Agrippa, and he also secured the support of Cicero. Antony had to surrender the will and the property such as was left, for with characteristic extravagance and recklessness he had managed to make away with the greater share of Caesar's immense fortune. Bad blood was thus aroused between these two men, and so great was the tension that Cicero for a brief period left Rome for Athens.

Temporary power of Antony.

Antony now ruled for a time at Rome, and on the strength of supposed instructions found in Caesar's papers, he began to act in a most arbitrary manner, giving the franchise to favoured communities, filling the senate with his tools, and distributing the provinces to his friends. Lepidus was the governor of Gaul, a position to which he had been appointed just prior to Caesar's death. Antony now compelled the senate to give him Cisalpine Gaul, although Decimus Brutus had been previously sent there on the same authority. At the

end of the year Antony betook himself to Cisalpine Gaul where he attempted, without success, to win over from Brutus his legions. Failing in that, he laid siege to the army of Brutus in Mutina. The new consuls for the next year were Hirtius and Pansa, and they were assigned Gaul and Italy by the senate, with instructions to march against Antony and assist Decimus Brutus. Matters were still further complicated by the part now played by the young Octavius. Antony had in October recalled some legions from Macedonia to aid him in his war against Decimus Brutus, but no sooner had these troops landed in Italy than Octavius managed to entice away from Antony a whole legion. Raising another legion from Caesar's veterans in Campania, Octavius found himself at the head of a considerable army. He then induced the senate to give him consular power, and to send him with his army to Mutina, to aid the consuls and Decimus Brutus against Antony. The war in the north was brought to an end early in the year by a battle at Mutina, in which Antony was defeated, although both consuls lost their lives. Octavius now expected to be given the chief command of the army, but Cicero used his influence in the senate to have it conferred upon Decimus Brutus, an older and more experienced man. At once Octavius marched against Rome with eight legions, and compelled the senate to recognize his claim and appoint him consul, although he was only twenty years of age. To such a pass had constitutional government come at this time! A law was now passed authorizing criminal proceedings against all those who were implicated in the death of Caesar, and a price was set on the heads of Brutus and Cassius. Decimus Brutus, in consequence, fled to Aquileia, where he was murdered.

*The War at
Mutina,
43 B.C.*

*Octavius
Consul.*

In the meanwhile Antony, after his defeat at Mutina, had gone to Gaul, where Lepidus and Plancus were in command of the Roman legions. He was received by them kindly, and proclaimed *imperator* by their soldiers. This occurred in the early summer. In November he returned to Italy accompanied by Lepidus and Plancus with their army, and Octavius marched to Bononia (*Bologna*) to meet them. Instead, however, of settling their disputes by the sword, an agreement was reached to divide the government of the Roman empire among them-

The Second Triumvirate selves for five years. This combination is known as the 'Second Triumvirate,' and had a few precedents in its favour.

Italy was to be administered in common by the triumvirs; Lepidus was to be given as his provinces, Spain and Narbonese Gaul; Antony, Cisalpine, Lugdunensian and Belgic Gaul; Octavius, Africa, Sicily and Sardinia. As for the eastern provinces, Brutus and Cassius had them under their control.

Proscription list drawn up.

The first act of the triumvirs was to prepare a proscription list, on which were placed the names of a great number of the wealthiest and most eminent men at Rome. Antony sacrificed his uncle, Lepidus his brother, and Octavius, Cicero, the opponent of Antony. This proscription was worse than that of Sulla, for men were now hunted down and slain solely for the sake of their property. Cicero was at his villa when the list came out, and he made a half-hearted attempt to escape. He started out in a small vessel, leaving it to fate or fortune to determine whether he should find a refuge with Sextus Pompeius in Sicily, or with Brutus in the east. The wind was, however, contrary, and, to please his sailors (and perhaps himself) put in to shore at one of his estates near Formiæ, until the storm was over. Here he was betrayed by one of his own people, and a party under the leadership of a centurion, named Laenas, started in pursuit of him. Cicero had been placed in a litter by his friends and was being conveyed to the seashore by an unfrequented road when his pursuers overtook him. He refused to allow his slaves to fight in his behalf, but when overtaken stretched out his head to receive the fatal stroke at the hands of a man whom he had once befriended. His head and hands were cut off and carried to Rome, where Fulvia, Antony's wife, gratified her hatred by feasting her eyes on the dead features of her husband's enemy.

Murder of Cicero, 43 B.C.

Brutus and Cassius in the East.

While these things were transpiring in Italy, Brutus and Cassius were obtaining a complete control over the East. Brutus was the master of Macedonia, and his authority was acknowledged by the legions there. Cassius had gone to Syria, where his services against the Parthians were still remembered, and he found the whole country ready to accept his rule. Thus all the possessions of Rome east of the Adriatic were subject to the

two republican leaders. They had at their disposal a large body of troops, whose number was continually increased by refugees from the proscription of the triumvirs. They also were in possession of a large and efficient fleet, under the command of Mureus and Domitius Ahenobarbus, which with that of Sextus Pompeius in the West practically controlled the Mediterranean.

Nevertheless Antony and Octavius resolved to attack Brutus and Cassius, and with that object crossed over to Illyria with a large force. Marching into Macedonia they met with little opposition and speedily subdued all Greece. Brutus and Cassius now collected their forces in Asia, and crossing the Hellespont also moved into Macedonia. Near Philippi there is a narrow pass between the mountains and the sea, and this pass was occupied by the army of Antony and Octavius. Brutus and Cassius were guided around this pass, and took their position over against the enemy and near Philippi. Their fleet controlled the western seas, and had they held their ground, avoiding a battle until their fleet joined them, Antony and Octavius would have been compelled to retreat from want of provisions. But the army of Brutus and Cassius was eager to fight without waiting for reinforcements, and to this must be ascribed the disaster that followed. Brutus commanded the left wing (for there was no centre) of the army; Cassius, the right. Brutus was pitted against Octavius, whom he easily routed; but Cassius on the right was overborne by Antony. Cassius was not aware of the success of Brutus, and imagining all was lost, caused his slave to take his life. This was very depressing to Brutus, who held his ground for twenty days, and then, yielding to the desire of his troops for a decisive conflict, once more engaged the enemy. This time his men did not fight so well, and he was badly defeated. Despairing of success and of the future of the republic, he fell upon his sword and died in his thirty-seventh year. In the army of Brutus were many men of note who had escaped from the proscription, and of these many followed the example of their leader and took their own lives. The soldiers of Brutus generally accepted service under the banners of Antony and Octavius, while the greater portion of

War in the East against Brutus and Cassius.

Battle of Philippi, 42 B.C.

his fleet passed into the service of Sextus Pompeius, who controlled Sicily and the western seas with his piratical vessels.

*Antony
meets
Cleopatra.*

The triumvirs were now masters of the situation, and Octavius returned to Italy, leaving Antony in the East. The latter treated the people of Greece with humanity, but he exacted great sums of money from those of Asia Minor. While passing through this district he summoned Cleopatra of Egypt to meet him at Tarsus in Cilicia. She promptly responded, and sailed up the Cydnus in a galley decked with purple and gold. She invited Antony to a banquet, and so bewitched him with her beauty, wit, and other fascinations that henceforth he became her humble slave and passionate lover.

*War at
Perusia,
41-40 B.C.*

While it was now the task of Antony to collect money in the East to reward the victorious legions, it fell to Octavius to allot the lands in Italy promised to the veterans, and to crush the growing power of Sextus Pompeius. Such an arrangement was decidedly to the advantage of Octavius, who, secure in the possession of Italy and in full control of the central government, was able to pose before the Roman world as the champion of western civilization, while Antony was disgracing himself and his country by his orgies and extravagances in the East. Octavius found it no easy task to carry out his scheme of allotments of land to the veterans, for Antony's brother Lucius, aided and abetted by Fulvia, Antony's wife, came to the front as the defender of the rights of those that had been evicted, or were threatened with eviction, from their possessions. Matters became so serious that a civil war broke out, which ended in Lucius being blockaded in Perusia by the forces of Octavius. The siege lasted through the autumn and early winter, and ended in January, 40 B.C., with the surrender of Lucius.

*Piracy of
Sextus
Pompeius.*

Taking advantage of Antony's absence in the East, Octavius not only took possession of Spain and Numidia, which had been allotted him after Philippi, but seized Gaul which had fallen to the share of Antony. Lepidus was offered Africa in exchange for his right to share in the government of Italy. The next step was to make war upon Sextus Pompeius in Sicily, for the fleet of Sextus had become so powerful and aggressive in its interception of food supplies as to threaten Rome itself with

famine. Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa, the chief adviser and ablest general of Octavius, was entrusted with the heavy task of driving Sextus out of Sicily and crushing the power of the pirate.

But the war against Sextus was suspended by the news that Antony was at last on his way to Italy. He had been informed of the siege and capture of Perusia, and after spending the winter of 41-40 B.C. in Alexandria in the company of Cleopatra, had at last yielded to the entreaties of his friends to return to Italy and defend their interests. He met his wife Fulvia in Greece, and thence crossed over to Brundisium, which, being closed against him, he began to besiege. Another civil war was imminent, and Octavius was threatened with an alliance between Sextus Pompeius and Antony, which would have given them full control of the Mediterranean. Fortunately for all parties, Fulvia, the wife of Antony, died, and a peace was patched up at Brundisium between the rivals, which was cemented by the marriage of Antony to Octavia, the sister of Octavius, a noble woman, who proved a faithful wife and a peacemaker between him and her brother. The empire was once more divided, Octavius retaining Italy and the western provinces, while Antony obtained the whole of the East. Lepidus, who was considered of no weight, was left in possession of one province, Africa. Rome, too, found a temporary relief in a treaty with Sextus Pompeius, which stopped for a time his piratical practices, but left him for four years in possession of Sicily and Sardinia, and possibly Achaia. By this treaty the proscribed fugitives were allowed to return to Rome.

*Antony
returns to
Italy.*

*Treaty of
Brundu-
sium, 40 B.C.*

*Treaty of
Misenum,
39 B.C.*

In the East there was trouble with the Parthians, who had been induced by Labienus, a Roman fugitive, to invade Syria. For a time they were very successful, but were ultimately driven back by Ventidius. When Antony returned to the East he lived for a time with Octavia, and then sent her back to Rome, and resumed his old intimacy with Cleopatra. Amid his senseless pleasures he was seized with the ambition to invade Parthia, and avenge the defeat of Crassus. He was, however, drawn aside by the solicitations of the Armenian king into an invasion of Media, and there began the siege of the Median fortress

*Antony
makes war
against
Parthia.*

*Disastrous
result of the
war.*

Gazaca, or Phraata. He had left behind him on the frontiers of Media his baggage, and his battering engines, with two legions to protect them. But scarcely had Antony begun his siege when the news reached him that his two legions had been overpowered and cut to pieces by the Parthian king Phraates. The siege continued until the approach of winter, when Antony found himself compelled to retreat to Armenia. His army was followed closely by the Parthians, who inflicted upon it heavy losses. A fourth part of his force was killed and most of his baggage destroyed. Not content with resting in Armenia, Antony hurried southward to Alexandria to join Cleopatra. The campaign was fatal to Antony's reputation and power, although he had, in times of great peril, displayed his usual courage and skill as a general. Once, however, at the court of Alexandria, he forgot all about his failures and disgrace, and gave himself up to every manner of unseemly revels. In the hands of Cleopatra he was as wax, and this ambitious princess used her power over him to such effect that he gave her Coelo-Syria, Judaea and Cyprus as her kingdom, a proceeding that excited intense indignation at Rome.

*Influence of
Cleopatra.*

*Sextus Pompeius renews
his piracies.*

While Antony was thus disgracing himself in the East, Octavius was patiently and effectually strengthening himself in Italy. The peace with Sextus Pompeius did not last very long (four years), for the admiral of Sextus in 38 B.C. treacherously handed over his fleet and troops to Octavius, together with the island of Sardinia. The result was that Pompeius at once renewed the war, and speedily asserted his superiority on the sea. It became necessary now for Octavius to build another fleet, the former having been destroyed by Pompeius, aided by a storm. To Agrippa, recalled from Gaul and appointed consul, the task was entrusted. While preparations were going on, Antony paid a brief visit to Italy, appearing at Brundisium with a fleet of three hundred vessels. He found its harbour closed, and, full of indignation he landed at Tarentum. Once more, through the agency of Octavia, peace was made between the rivals, and an exchange of forces took place. Antony gave Octavius one hundred and twenty ships to aid in the war against Sextus, and he received in return twenty thousand troops for his wars in the East.

*Peace of
Tarentum,
37 B.C.*

The next year was occupied by a combined attack upon Sextus Pompeius in Sicily. Agrippa with a large squadron was to attack the island on the north, Antony's ships, on the east, and Lepidus, on the south. At first the concerted action failed, but ultimately a large force was landed, which co-operating with the fleet of Agrippa speedily reduced Pompey to extremities. The final blow was struck when Agrippa completely defeated Pompeius off the promontory of Naulōchos, near Mylae. Pompeius himself escaped with a few ships, but his land army surrendered, and the war in Sicily was at an end. Pompeius managed to reach Lesbos, with the intention of seeking the protection of Antony. He was, however, suspected of forming plans which would give him the control of Asia Minor, and was put to death by Antony's subordinates. It was a curious fate which made the son of the conqueror of the pirates the last great pirate chief of the Mediterranean.

War against Pompeius.

Battle of Naulochos, 36 B.C.

Death of Sextus Pompeius.

Sicily was now quiet, but a difficulty arose between Lepidus and Octavius. The former was in possession of Messāna, at the head of twenty-two legions, and thought the time was opportune for bringing his fellow-triumvir to account for the contempt with which he had been treated. His soldiers were, however, tampered with by Octavius, and readily renounced their allegiance in favour of his rival. He was deposed from the triumvirate and sent to Rome, where he enjoyed the nominal honour of *pontifex maximus*.

Lepidus deposed, 36 B.C.

The control of the whole Roman world was now divided between Octavius and Antony, and the struggle for final supremacy could not long be delayed. Octavius was wholly supreme in the west, and peace and prosperity were after so many years of strife beginning to return. Octavius was not disposed to play the part of a Sulla or a Marius, and the confidence his mild but firm rule aroused, placed the whole strength of the western world at his command. He was appointed on his return from Sicily tribune, an office which gave him great power. Aided by statesmen like Agrippa and Maecenas, a series of wise and useful reforms were carried out, which lessened taxation, repressed disorder, and improved the city. During the period between 36-32 B.C. he waged but one war,

Character of the rule of Octavius.

and that was in Pannonia, to secure a rectification of the Roman frontier. The capture of the Pannonian fortress, Siscia, on the Save, brought this border struggle to an end, 33 B.C.

*Power of
Cleopatra in
the East.*

Such was the condition of the western part of the empire when Antony returned from his Parthian war to enjoy himself at the court of Cleopatra. His mistress was now disposed to exert her influence to the utmost, and she obtained from Antony the title of 'Queen of Kings.' She and her sons were assigned the Roman provinces of Syria, Cilicia, Cyprus, Africa and the Cyrenaica, and her son Caesarion, by Caesar, was put forward as his heir in opposition to Octavius. The ambition of Cleopatra made the Romans recognize that Antony was no longer the ruler of the East, but a humble servant of a barbarian princess. Such a state of things could not be allowed to continue, and Octavius came forward as the champion of western civilization against the barbarism of the east. The feeling at Rome was intensified when it became known that Antony had made a will naming the sons of Cleopatra as his heirs, and that he had divorced his faithful and long-suffering wife Octavia. The senate, immediately, by a decree stripped Antony of his command, and declared war upon Cleopatra (32 B.C.).

*War
declared
against
Cleopatra,
32 B.C.*

When war was thus declared, Antony was in Greece with a large army, a numerous fleet and plenty of money. Had he acted with promptitude and invaded Italy the war might have had a different termination, but the fatal spell of Cleopatra's sorcery paralyzed his energies. He advanced that year no farther than Corcyra and left his fleet and army at Actium. Thus time was given Octavius to make his preparations. Agrippa was in 31 B.C. sent out with swift sailing fleet to harass Antony's garrisons on the Peloponnesian coast, and to intercept his supplies from Egypt and Asia. Octavius crossed over from Brundisium to the coast of Epirus, and succeeded in blockading the fleet of Antony in a land-locked gulf within the strait between the two promontories at Actium. The troops of Antony occupied the southern promontory, while near by his fleet was moored. Octavius seized the northern promontory, and his fleet closed the mouth of the strait. Under the circumstances Antony could have withdrawn his troops to the plains of

Thessaly, and there given battle with prospects of success. But Antony wasted his time in useless attempts on the position of the army of Octavius, thus giving Agrippa time to arrive on the scene. Antony's officers implored him to withdraw his army, but in vain. The infatuated general could not make up his mind to sacrifice his fleet by a retreat which was opposed by Cleopatra, and which might discourage his Asiatic allies. He finally resolved to force his way to the open sea through the blockading fleet of Agrippa and Octavius, and orders were given to that effect. The naval battle that followed was well contested until the Egyptian squadron, headed by Cleopatra's galley, hoisted sail and made for the open sea. Antony immediately followed his mistress, leaving his fleet to fight its own battle. The men of his squadron fought bravely until their ships were ignited by fire-balls from the fleet of Octavius. The flames spread rapidly, and the noble fleet of Antony at the close of the day was a complete wreck. Antony's troops, disheartened by the desertion of their leader, laid down their arms and accepted service in the army of Octavius.

*Battle of
Actium,
Sept. 2,
31 B.C.*

The battle of Actium ended the long struggle between the two rivals for power. The East as well as the West now passed under the control of Octavius, who used his power with clemency and consideration for the feelings of the Greeks. The different rulers in the East were left in their respective positions, although many of them had been appointed by Antony. But there was one person whose power was too great and influence too dangerous to be allowed to rule. Octavius determined that Cleopatra should be dethroned and taken to Rome to grace his triumphal procession. This artful queen, accompanied by Antony, had fled to Alexandria after the defeat at Actium and had made attempts to build another fleet and gain allies, but, finding all her attempts fruitless, she resolved upon ensnaring Octavius as she had previously entrapped Caesar and Antony. She opened negotiations with her conqueror, who accepted her gifts and amused himself by making her empty promises. In the spring of 30 B.C. the armies of Octavius moved towards Alexandria, and Antony made a feeble effort to check his progress. He challenged Octavius to single combat, but of course met with no response.

*Events
following
the battle
of Actium.*

*Death of
Antony,
30 B.C.*

*Death of
Cleopatra,
30 B.C.*

*Egypt
becomes a
Roman
province.*

Defeated and despairing, Antony heard that Cleopatra was dead, and immediately made an attempt on his own life. The wound was not at once fatal and he lingered for some time, slowly bleeding to death and attended by his mistress. Alexandria capitulated, and Octavius sought to secure Cleopatra to adorn his triumph, but that proud princess, fearing such a fate, shut herself up in her palace along with the dead body of Antony and refused to surrender. Although her life was promised her, she resolved to die, as Octavius refused to treat her as other than a slave. It is said she tried several kinds of poison, but the current story is that she put asps on her bosom or arms, and so took her own life. Octavius humanely and honourably caused Antony and Cleopatra to be buried together in the tomb of the Ptolemies. Their two sons were sent to Rome where they were cared for by Antony's wife, Octavia. Egypt became a province of the Roman empire, and Octavius had the head of Alexander the Great engraved upon his signet ring, thus indicating that the empire founded by the great Greek had passed into Roman hands.



THE ROMAN EMPIRE

AT THE DEATH OF AUGUSTUS

A.D. 14.

Senatorial Provinces marked (S)



CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE RULE OF AUGUSTUS.

Octavius, after his victory over Antony and Cleopatra, returned to Rome in the early part of the year 29 B.C. The temple of Janus, which had stood open for two hundred years, was now closed to indicate that Rome was at peace with all the world.

The history of the Roman republic ends with the battle of Actium, for while the forms of the constitution were partly maintained, the power had passed into the hands of an irresponsible ruler. The new master of the Roman empire was in many respects a remarkable man. Possessed of great personal beauty, even in old age, he joined to his physical attractions a profound knowledge of politics and men. His self-control was evident at a very early period in his public career, and all through the stormy times following the death of Caesar he played his part with an astuteness and craft which showed his accurate *Octavius.* knowledge of the Roman character and of the times in which he lived. As a general he was a failure, and he has even been accused of a lack of personal courage. From what has already been said it is seen that cruelty and falsehood stained his early career. His private life was that of a libertine. He was twice married, first to Scribonia, who bore him a daughter of unhappy fame, and secondly to Livia, the wife of Tiberius Claudius Nero. *Livia.* Livia was a woman of marvellous beauty and strength of character, and was the mother of two sons, Tiberius and Drusus, by Claudius, when she attracted the attention of Octavius, who forced her husband to give her up to him. Henceforth she wielded an ever-increasing influence over Octavius, until in his old age he became entirely under her control and was guided by her in his most important actions.

Whatever cruelties characterized the public actions of Octavius at the outset of his career were now abandoned in favour of a

policy of moderation and conciliation. He was everywhere recognized as the supreme ruler of the Roman empire, nevertheless he simulated the actions and adopted the manners of a simple Roman citizen. Welcomed at Rome by the senate and the people as the conqueror of Antony and the restorer of Roman authority in the East, the most servile adulation greeted him on all sides. He was offered the position of dictator, but

Octavius obtains the title 'Imperator' and surname 'Augustus.'

this he refused. He was given the title of *Imperator*, or supreme commander of the army, and two years after his return to Rome the senate conferred on him the unusual surname of *Augustus* (Venerable), the name by which he is best known to history.

Power of Augustus.

It was his policy to wield all the power of an absolute king and dictator under the guise of republican forms. Hence the letter of the old constitution was observed while the spirit was destroyed. The senate continued to meet and deliberate; consuls and other magistrates were elected annually; tribunes of the people were appointed, and, tribes met as of old in their legislative capacity. But Augustus was given something more than the power of the consuls, and sat with them in the discharge of their duties. So too he exercised the powers of the censors, and of the tribunes, in conjunction with these regularly chosen magistrates. The tribes met only to register his decrees and elect his nominees. The senate was his obedient tool, and in his presence and at his dictation did little else than carry out his wishes. In addition to all these powers he was given the sole command of the Roman armies, and the proconsular power out of Rome over the whole empire was in his hands. Thus he could control and direct at pleasure the movements of the Roman legions and govern the provinces by deputies or legates. His position as permanent censor enabled him to purge the senate of unworthy members, a power which he exercised judiciously in the interests of the dignity of that assembly. The tribuneship for life gave him power to annul the decrees of the senate and interfere with all the acts of the magistrates. It also gave him the power to summon the senate and the tribes, and to make motions, which as a matter of course carried, before these assemblies. Subsequently, after the death of Lepidus, he conferred upon himself the office of *pontifex maximus*, and this

gave him authority over the religious worship of the state. The treasury, too, was subject to his control by virtue of his offices of censor and tribune. Thus it will be seen that little was left for the praetors and consuls to do except to discharge the purely routine duties of administration. These extraordinary powers were first conferred upon Augustus for ten years, then for five, once more for five, and then three times for ten years each, but the last term of office was cut short by his death.

A marked feature of the administration of Augustus was his mode of governing the provinces. As *Imperator* or commander-in-chief of the whole army and possessor of the proconsular power out of Italy, he took into his charge the government of all those provinces in which troops were regularly stationed, and whose frontiers were subject to attack from foreign peoples. Such were the provinces of Spain (all but Baetica), Gallia Lugdunensis and Aquitania, Raetia and Vindelicia, Dalmatia, Pannonia, Moesia, Pontus, Cilicia, Syria and Egypt. The more central provinces and Italy (which was never a province) were left to the care of the senate, and to these belonged, among others, Asia, Africa, Macedon, parts of Gaul and Spain, Achaia and Cyprus. The revenues of the senatorial provinces went into the state treasury; those from the others into that of the Emperor. In the senatorial provinces the senate appointed the governors (*proconsules*) but in the non-senatorial provinces the power of Augustus was absolute. He appointed the governors (*legati Augusti*) and assigned them their duties. To him was always an appeal from his deputies and subordinates in these provinces, hence the privilege subsequently so highly prized of an appeal to Caesar. These provinces became, under the wise management of Augustus, models of good government, and contrasted most favourably with the condition of such parts of the empire as were left under the control of the senate. It was the policy of Augustus to choose the governors of the most important provinces from the men of highest rank and greatest merit, and to extend their terms of office to four, five, and even ten years. The other governorships at his disposal were given to men of less rank, such as the Equites, whose ambition was thus gratified in honourable and profitable employment. On

*Government
of the
Provinces.*

the other hand many of the old abuses in government remained in those provinces where the senate had power, and the governors of which had but a yearly tenure. Augustus, however, it is thought, exercised some control over the senate in their exercise of power in their provinces.

*Domestic
policy.*

Not content with reforming the administration of the government of the provinces, Augustus gave much attention to domestic affairs. The franchise had been much debased by the emancipation of slaves, and a check was put upon the practice. The city of Rome was without a police, and from the days of Sulla robbers and bandits frequented the streets to such an extent that life and property were seriously menaced. To Augustus credit must be given for the removal of this evil. He divided the city, suburbs included, into fourteen districts, over each of which he placed a magistrate, with full power to maintain order and protect life and property. Still further, he organized a body of men who were to be promptly on hand to crush a riot, or put out a fire, or, in fact, to deal with any civic disturbance. Over the city was placed a *praefectus urbi*, to whom was entrusted the whole civic administration. The happy choice of L. Piso, who held the post for twenty years, ensured for Rome a degree of good government such as she scarcely ever before experienced. Outside of Rome, throughout Italy, the same reforming energy was shown. The bounds of Italy were now extended northwards as far as the Alps, and the whole peninsula was divided into districts with probably some kind of local government.

The army.

Every Roman general who aimed at maintaining his position was compelled to consider the desires and wants of his soldiers. Hence, when Augustus returned home from the East, he proceeded to make provision for his victorious legions. Lands were assigned them in different localities, but instead of wresting these lands from their owners without compensation he paid for them out of the money which he brought home from Egypt and Asia. He also formed a body-guard of ten praetorian cohorts, who were expected to hold in check any popular movement hostile to the Emperor. Three of these cohorts were stationed at Rome, the remainder were scattered throughout Italy during

the reign of Augustus. The total number of this body, which subsequently proved so powerful and dangerous, was at this time about eight thousand. The army, too, was now largely recruited from the provinces—these levies being known as *auxilia*. Italy had suffered so much from civil strife that its population was greatly reduced, and it became increasingly difficult to fill up the ranks of the legions with Romans or Italians.

During the long reign of Augustus many minor wars were waged. Very soon after the battle of Actium a rising took place among the Astures and Cantabri in the north-west of Spain. Augustus himself in 27 B.C. went on this campaign, and carried on the war for three years. A temporary submission on the part of the Cantabri was followed by another revolt which was suppressed by Agrippa in 19 B.C.

Border struggles were also carried on about this time in Egypt and Arabia, and against the Ethiopians and Garamantes. The Parthians, in 20 B.C., to the great joy of the Romans, returned the standards which they had taken in the wars against Crassus and Antony.

To the north and east of Italy, in the Raetian and Graian Alps, were many large tribes, whose warlike disposition made them turbulent neighbours. Against these, war was waged in 25 B.C. and continued until they were reduced to subjection in 13 B.C. Disturbances, however, began elsewhere along the Roman frontier, in Gaul and Germany. Some of the German tribes crossed the Rhine and entered Gaul, and Augustus went (16 B.C.) with an army to check their inroads. At the end of three years he returned, leaving the command in the hands of his wife's son Drusus.

The war along the German frontier that now followed is of more than passing importance. It marks the first serious attempt made by Rome to extend her eastern frontier beyond the Rhine to the Elbe, and even to the Weser. Germany was then for the most part an uncultivated country, in which dense forests and numerous morasses existed. The German tribes lived a free, roving, unsettled life, and were remarkable for their love of freedom and the purity of their domestic life.

Their courage and hardihood would have made them dangerous foes, had they not been rendered comparatively powerless by their numerous divisions, and by their frequent quarrels with each other. Concerted and sustained action was with them, owing to their tribal system of government, an impossibility. The Roman commander, Drusus, now undertook to extend the Roman dominions from the Rhine to the Elbe. Starting from Mayence he led several successful expeditions against the German tribes, and secured his conquests by building a fortress at Aliso near the Lippe. He finally advanced as far as the Elbe, but he was compelled to return from want of provisions. On his way back he fell from his horse and died from the effects of the injuries received.

*Death of
Drusus,
B.C. 9.*

The death of Drusus made it necessary for his brother Tiberius to take the command of the army in Germany. Tiberius had been carrying on a successful campaign against Dalmatia and Pannonia, before he was transferred to this new field of operations. In his new command he displayed marked military ability, and for two years waged an aggressive and partly successful campaign against the German tribes. He then returned to Rome, and the war was continued by Domitius Ahenobarbus, who succeeded in extending the Roman conquests to the Elbe. Once more Tiberius assumed the command in A.D. 4, and in a series of successful battles subdued the land lying between the Rhine and the Weser, which was then made into a Roman province.

*War in Dal-
matia and
Pannonia.*

Trouble was now brewing among the Marcomanni, a powerful tribe in South-Eastern Germany, but Rome was prevented from engaging in a war in that quarter by a formidable rising taking place in Dalmatia and Pannonia. At first the Romans made little headway against the insurrection, and success was secured only at the loss of a great many lives and the desolation of a large area of territory.

The year (A.D. 9) that marked the suppression of the revolt to the east of the Adriatic, also witnessed a fearful disaster to Roman arms in the west of Germany. The new Roman province there established was gradually making its influence felt on the young Germans, and the Roman language and Roman military tactics were rapidly becoming popular among the more am-

bitious and enterprising of the higher classes. But Rome, unfortunately for her cause, placed in this German province as governor, Quintilius Varus, a man at once avaricious, haughty *Varus.* and insolent. His manners and actions excited an intense hatred of Rome and her rule among the Germans, and a fit instrument was soon forthcoming to take a coveted revenge. Among those who had served in the Roman armies and mastered their military tactics was a young Cheruscan chief, Armin or *Arminius or Hermann.* Hermann organized a wide-spread conspiracy against the Roman governor, and succeeded in enticing him with three legions and many auxiliaries into the heart of the Teutoburg forest in the pursuit of some rebels. Once there the Roman legions found themselves surrounded by a host of furious Teutons, and for three days they endeavoured to fight their way through the midst of their enemies. The effort was in vain, for the Roman soldiers were either slain or taken prisoners and made the slaves of the victors. *Defeat and death of Varus in the Teutoburg forest, A.D. 9.* Varus took his own life, the Roman standards were lost, and the whole country westward to the Rhine was freed from Roman control. Henceforth, during the remainder of this rule, the Romans were content to allow the Rhine to be their German frontier in Gaul.

It has been mentioned that the life of Augustus was none *Attempted social reforms.* too pure. Nevertheless recognizing the demoralizing influence of the growing aversion among the Roman men to wedlock, and their habit of living in concubinage with slaves, he passed laws in encouragement of marriage, and by a system of rewards and punishments sought to restore the domestic life of earlier times. But his legislation was all in vain. His own daughter Julia was among the most dissolute and depraved of women, although for many years her father was kept in ignor- *Julia.* ance of her vices. This Julia was a beautiful and clever woman. She was first married to Marcellus, the son of Octavia the sister of Augustus by Marcellus, her first husband. The younger *Marcellus.* Marcellus was marked out by Augustus as his successor, but to the great grief of all he died in early manhood. Julia was then given in marriage to Agrippa, the chosen friend of Augustus, a man old enough to be her father. Her life now became so

*Family
affairs.*

openly licentious that her conduct was a disgrace to her friends and to her husband. She bore Agrippa two sons, Caius and Lucius Caesar, and a daughter Agrippina. After Agrippa's death a third son was born and hence was called Agrippa Postumus. The two sons of Julia, Caius and Lucius, were adopted by Augustus as his heirs, much to the chagrin of Tiberius the son of Livia by her first husband. But the sons of Julia also died in their youth, and it was suspected that Livia had employed unlawful means to get rid of them. Augustus now wholly under the influence of Livia, adopted her son Tiberius as his successor.

*Tiberius
chosen
successor.**Religious
reforms.*

Among the other futile attempts of Augustus to bring back the old Roman manners and morals was his assiduous attention to the worship of the gods, particularly the old Roman deities, as opposed to the deities of foreign nations. Temples were restored at a great expense, and every encouragement given to religious worship; but the day had passed when educated Roman people had faith in their gods. In those days there were many gods, and very great men who had won fame and distinction were after their death worshipped. Thus a temple was erected to Caesar; and to Augustus himself, during his lifetime, shrines were erected in many places and households.

*Caesar-
worship.**Birth of
Christ.*

It was while Rome and the civilized world were thus sunk to the lowest plane of morals and religion that Jesus Christ was born in Bethlehem of Judaea. The received chronology is said to err, and thus the most important event in the world's history should be dated back four or five years.

Augustus lived to a good old age, in spite of a somewhat delicate constitution, for he took excellent care of himself. His last days were his saddest. His legions were destroyed in Germany; his daughter Julia, at last found out, was banished for her vices; and Livia his wife took such full control of him that he was not allowed to see his friends without her consent. He had been long faithfully served by Agrippa, who was slightly his senior, and who died some years before him. Another of his intimates was Maecenas, the ease-loving politician and patron of literary men, such as Horace and Vergil. But the great literary brilliance that marked this period will be

dealt with in the next chapter. Enfeebled in health, Augustus had retired to Nola when death overtook him. It is said his last words were to ask his friends if he had played his part well on life's stage, and if so to give him their plaudits on leaving it. This story, true or false, sums up fairly well the career of Augustus. He was but an actor all through the drama that clustered around his path, although it must be admitted he was one who played his part with consummate skill, and often to the great advantage of the empire.

CHAPTER XXIX.

ROMAN LITERATURE.

*Scanty
character
of Roman
Literature.*

For the first five centuries of their history the Romans had no written literature. No doubt there existed in the early days poetical compositions among them, as we find among other nations, but these compositions, orally transmitted, have all been lost, though we find traces of them in the pages of the Roman historians. Cicero tells us of the banquets in early times being enlivened by the songs of bards, who recounted the deeds of heroic men. Still we may be assured of this, that the minstrel never occupied in Italy the same position that he did in Greece, and consequently we find the Italian literature in early days scanty compared to rich literature in early Greek history. Various causes also contributed to the slow development of Roman literature. In the first place Italy faces the west, Spain, Gaul, Africa, which could teach her nothing; Greece, on the other hand, faces the east, the coasts along which spread the civilizations of the Tigris and the Nile. Again, Italy is a continental country; Greece, a maritime one. The Romans communicated with the rest of the world by land rather than by sea, except in the south where the Greek settlements were planted. This prevented the Romans from intermingling with the rest of the world, and by their isolation and their consequently conservative spirit they were little inclined to hold intercourse with their neighbours. Finally, the people of Italy lacked the imagination of the Greeks. They were too practical in their tendencies to become a literary nation in the highest sense of the word. Their natural bent led them to be a nation of statesmen, warriors, jurists, orators, but not of poets, for while they may claim originality in politics, law, war and oratory, their poetry is a faint reflection of the grander poetry of Greece. The influence of the literature of Greece on that of Rome is so marked in every department that it is doubtful

*Causes
of this.*

whether we should have any Roman literature at all if the early Romans had not had the models of Greece.

It is probable that the Etruscans were the earliest teachers of the Romans in the earliest days of their literature, for we are told by Livy that dramatic exhibitions were first introduced from Etruria on the occasion of a pestilence to appease the anger of the gods. These exhibitions were probably nothing more than pantomimic scenes to the music of a flute without song or dialogue.

Roman literature from the earliest times to the death of Augustus may be conveniently divided into two periods. The first period includes the time of its rise, growth and development, during which we find traces of oral and traditional compositions, the rude elements of the drama, the introduction of Greek literature, the rise of history and oratory, and the formation of a national taste. This period begins with the conclusion of the First Punic War and ends with the appearance of Cicero in political life. The second period begins with the appearance of Cicero in political life and ends with the death of Augustus. In it flourished the most brilliant of the Roman writers, and hence it is regarded as the golden age of Latin literature.

The name of M. Livius Andronicus stands as the first representative of Latin literature. He was, however, not a Roman, but a Greek slave of Tarentum, who afterwards became a naturalized Roman citizen, and was adopted by his master, M. Livius Salinator, whose name he took. Like many other Greeks, he became a tutor to the sons of his master. He wrote both tragedies and comedies, the plots of which were obtained chiefly from Greek writings, and translated the Odyssey into Saturnian verse¹. His works, though very inferior, retained a place in the curriculum of Roman schools till after the days of Horace.

¹ The Saturnian verse consisted of the following scheme :

o — | o — | o — | — || — o — | — o — | — o — |

Dabunt malum Metelli Naevio poetae.

Cf. the old nursery rhyme :

The queen was in the parlour, eating bread and honey.

Cn. Naevius
flourished
220 B.C.

Cn. Naevius was the first Roman who wrote poetry. He was a native of Campania and, like Livius, flourished at the end of the First Punic War, in which he served. Following the example set by Livius Andronicus, he borrowed most of the subjects of his dramas from the Greek, and especially from Euripides. He was an ardent plebeian and did not refrain from lampooning the chief families of Rome on the stage. This would show that his plays were of the nature of Greek comedy. For his unruly tongue he was first thrown into prison and finally exiled to Utica, where he died. During his later days he employed his time in writing his most famous work, an epic poem on the First Punic War, in which were introduced many of the incidents afterwards borrowed by Ennius and Vergil. He also wrote in the Saturnian verse.

Q. Ennius,
239-169 B.C.

Quintus Ennius may be justly regarded as the father of Roman literature. He was born at Rudiae, in Calabria, and was probably an Oscan by birth, though he was certainly a Greek by education. He adopted the Greek hexametre, after discarding the Saturnian measure, as the fixed form of metre of the Latin epic. In early youth he settled in Sardinia and from that island was brought to Rome by Cato. At the capital he maintained himself by teaching the youths of the Roman nobles and writing his epic poems in Eighteen Books, 'the Annals of Rome.'

Comedy.

T. Maccius
Plautus,
254-184 B.C.

The comedy of the Romans boasts of two writers, several of whose plays still remain to this day. T. Maccius Plautus was a native Italian, born at Sarsina, a village of Umbria. His father was a freedman. He seems to have led a careless, jovial life amid actors, taverns and people of the lower classes. His life was full of varied experiences. Of a speculative turn of mind he made money, but soon lost it and was compelled to enter the service of a baker who employed him in turning a hand mill. While at this drudgery he wrote three plays, the sale of which enabled him to begin his literary career. The comedies of Plautus, twenty in number, have been justly praised by critics in all ages for their free, outspoken sallies of wit on the foibles of human nature. His comedies still retain their popularity, from the fact that his plays have been imitated by several modern poets.

P. Terentius Afer appears to have been born at Carthage. In his youth he was the slave of a Roman nobleman, P. Terentius Lucanus, whose *nomen* he took, as was the custom, on obtaining his freedom. His first play, the *Andria*, he finished in the twenty-seventh year of his age, and at once he gained the acquaintance and patronage of Scipio Aemilianus and Laelius, who were then young men studying Greek under Pobybius. Six of his comedies still remain to us. Terence, though a foreigner, is noted for the purity, elegance and precision of his style. Though probably inferior to Plautus in genius, Terence shows greater consistency of plot and character, deeper pathos, subtler wit and more variety in metre and rhythm.

Two tragedians lived also during this period. M. Pacuvius was sister's son of Ennius, and borrowed most of the subjects of his tragedy from the Greek. One, however, *Paullus*, was a Roman subject, and had for its hero L. Aemilius Paullus, the hero of Macedon. L. Accius, or Attius, began his career on the death of Pacuvius. Besides his Greek translations, he produced two Roman plays, *Brutus* and *Decius*. The subject of the one was the exile of the Tarquins, and of the other the self-sacrifice of Decius at the battle of Sentinum.

It will thus be seen that most of the Roman dramas were of exotic growth. There was still one kind of drama native to the soil. The *Atellanae Fabulae* took their name from Atella, a small town of Campania, were written in the Oscan dialect and at first were rude extemporaneous farces, but afterwards developed into regular plays. Another species of play were the *mimes*, a purely Roman species of literature, though the name is derived from the Greek. They were distinguished rather for their lewdness and boisterous mirth and gestures, than for the refinement of their dialogue.

The only species of poetry, however, worth mentioning in which the Romans were original was *Satire*. This sprung out of the Fescennine Songs, rude dialogues in which the rural population at the various festivals attacked each other in rude repartee or jests. From this rude element satire was developed by L. Lucilius, a Roman knight of Suessa Arunca. His style

Lucilius,
148-103 B.C. was marked by vigour of thought, and Horace, while censuring his harsh versification and slovenly haste, pays a tribute to the vigorous style with which he assails prevailing vices.

While poetry was being cultivated, prose was not altogether neglected. The earliest of the chroniclers were Fabius Pictor and Cincius Alimentus, who lived at the beginning of the Second Punic War. Both wrote in Greek. After these we find a number of chroniclers, till we come to the period of the regular historians.

T. Lucretius Carus, 95-51 B.C. The two poets that close the first period of Roman literature are in many respects the greatest of all the Roman poets. T. Lucretius Carus was a Roman of good descent. We know little about his private life, except that he was driven mad by a love potion and died by his own hand. But while little is known of his life, his great work *De Rerum Natura* is known to all. In this poem he explains the leading features of the Epicurean philosophy in a style so attractive that his poem has been regarded the greatest of all didactic poems of any age.

Valerius Catullus, 87-47 B.C. Valerius Catullus was born at Verona. His father, a personal friend of Julius Caesar, squandered his wealth in the metropolis. To better his fortune, Catullus went to Bithynia, but lost his brother in the Troad. On his return to Rome he lived at Rome or at his country seat on the shore of lake Benacus. His poems, composed on a variety of themes, and in a variety of styles and metres, are all marked by originality of thought and felicity of expression, and in some respects he is the superior of even Horace in lyrical composition.

Second period. The second or Augustan period of Roman literature begins with the poet Vergil. P. Vergilius Maro was born at Andes in Cisalpine Gaul. His father left him a small farm, on which the poet lived for the first thirty years of his life. When the lands in Cisalpine Gaul were taken away from the sympathizers of the republican cause, the poet was among the first to lose his farm. He, however, afterwards received it back by the aid of Asinius Pollio, and afterwards lived on intimate terms with the circle around the court of Augustus. He died at Brundisium on his return from Greece, where he had been in search of health.

P. Vergilius Maro, 70-19 B.C.

His works are *Pastoral* poems, ten in number; the *Georgics*, a poem on agricultural subjects; and the great Epic, the *Aeneid*, in twelve books. Vergil is with the majority of readers the prince of Latin poets. His *Aeneid* ranks among the few great epic poems of the world, along with *Paradise Lost*, the *Iliad*, *Odyssey*, and the *Inferno*. The charm of Vergil lies in his exquisite taste, his studied diction, his matchless rhythm, and his skilful narration.

Q. Horatius Flaccus, the prince of Latin lyrical poets, Q. Horatius Flaccus, 65-8 B.C. was born at Venusia. His father was a freedman who followed the profession of *scriba* or notary, or collector of taxes. At the age of twelve he went to Rome, where he attended the school of Orbilius, who was noted for his flogging propensities. After mastering the best of Greek and Roman literature he went to Athens, then the great university of the ancient world. When the war broke out between the republican party and Antony, Horace at once took sides with the republicans and fought at Philippi. Losing his all by the war, his only hope was in literature. Meantime his poems had attracted the notice of Varius and Vergil, who introduced him to Maecenas, the prime minister of Augustus. From that time until his death he lived an uneventful, literary life in the congenial society of the court of Augustus. His chief works are his Odes, Satires and Epistles. Horace was undoubtedly the most popular of all the Latin lyrical poets, and this popularity arises from his skilful felicity of expression, graceful verse, and above all from his deep knowledge of human nature.

Albius Tibullus was of an equestrian family. He had an estate between Tibur and Praeneste. Like Vergil and Horace, Albius Tibullus, 59-18 B.C. he suffered by the confiscation of the Civil War, but like them had a patron—M. Valerius Messala. He accompanied his patron to Aquitania and to the East. He died soon after Vergil. He may be said to be the poet of a quiet life, who had little interest in martial glory. His elegies celebrate the cruelty or beauty of his mistresses.

Sextus Aurelius Propertius was a native of Umbria. We have Sextus Aurelius Propertius flourished 25 B.C. little but fragmentary information about his life. He belonged

to the literary circle of Horace. The poems of Propertius are uninteresting to a modern reader, chiefly from their obscurity, an unnatural fondness for Greek expression, and the references to obscure Greek myths.

P. Ovidius Naso, 43 B.C.-18 A.D.

P. Ovidius Naso was born at Sulmo in the country of the Peligni. His father, who belonged to the equestrian order, determined at first to give his son a legal training, but the poetical disposition of Ovid was an insuperable barrier to his success as a lawyer. He was soon recognized as a poet and lived for many years on intimate terms with the literary men of the Capital as well as with the emperor himself. For some reason or other he was banished to Tomi on the Euxine (*Black*) sea, and died there. His works are numerous. He wrote the *Metamorphoses* in fifteen books; *Fasti* in twelve books, of which six only are extant; elegies and amatory poems. Ovid possessed in a remarkable degree vigorous fancy and warm imagination, but also a fatal facility of expression which he took little heed to restrain.

Prose writers.

M. Porcius Cato, 238-149 B.C.

M. Porcius Cato is the first prose writer of the Latin language of whom we have any considerable fragment. His chief works were the *Origines*, a work containing a history of the Roman kings, and *De Re Rustica*, a book 'on farming.'

M. Tullius Cicero, 106-43 B.C.

M. Tullius Cicero wrote besides his orations many works on *Rhetoric*, of which the best is a systematic treatise on the art of oratory (*De Oratore*). His works on philosophy is an attempt to present to the Roman people a popular treatise of the views of the various schools without expounding any new principles. Perhaps the most valuable of all his works are his numerous epistles to Atticus and to other numerous correspondents, which give a clear insight into the history of the period. Cicero is noted for the versatility of his talents, since he was the chief of Roman orators and also of Roman philosophers. His style is noted for its grace and delicacy, though often marred by diffuseness. It was chiefly as an orator that he was noted among his contemporaries.

M. Terentius Varro, 126-28 B.C.

M. Terentius Varro, 'the most learned of the Romans,' was a friend and intimate of Cicero. He was a Pompeian, but after Pharsalia was pardoned by Caesar, who employed him in

promoting the plan of establishing a public library at Rome. After the death of Caesar he retired to the country, but his name was put on the proscription list. Still he endeavoured to escape, and devoted his remaining life to literature. Of the very numerous books written by him, the best known are *De Re Rustica*, in three books, 'on agriculture,' and *De Lingua Latina*, a treatise 'on Latin grammar.'


C. Julius Caesar was not only a great warrior but a great writer. His Commentaries are the only works of his that have come down to us. These contain seven books of the Gallic wars in seven books, and three books of the Civil wars in three books. Neither work completes the history of the Gallic or Civil wars. The eighth book of the Gallic war is supposed to have been added by Hirtius, and the history of the campaigns in Alexandria, Spain and Africa is also ascribed to the same author. The style of Caesar is the perfection of strength, since in it brevity and clearness are combined.

C. Sallustius Crispus was born at Amiternum. After the African war Caesar left him governor of Numidia, where he acquired great wealth by his oppressive exactions. He wrote two books which have been preserved to us, the '*Conspiracy of Catiline*' and the '*Jugurthine War*'.

Cornelius Nepos was a contemporary and friend of Cicero, Catullus and Atticus, perhaps born at Verona, and died in the reign of Augustus. We know scarcely any more about his history. He wrote a work, 'The Lives of Distinguished Commanders,' but with the exception of the life of Atticus the rest are taken from the abridged edition of the original work.

Titus Livius was the most distinguished of the historians of the Augustan age. He was a native of Patavium (*Padua*), but spent the most part of his life at the Capital, where he obtained the patronage and friendship of the court. His history of Rome originally comprised one hundred and forty-two books, and extended from the foundation of the city to the death of Drusus B.C. 9. Of these thirty-five have been preserved to us; the whole of the first decade is entire (Books I-X). This covers the period from the beginning of the regal period to the subju-

gation of the Samnites (294 B.C.). The second decade is lost, which would have covered from 294 B.C. to 219 B.C., or the period dealing with the invasion of Pyrrhus and the whole of the First Punic War. The third, fourth, and half of the fifth decades are entire (Books XXI–XLV), or the period from the siege of Saguntum 219–169 B.C. The history of Livy is not a critical history of Rome. His object was to give a pleasing narrative to his countrymen and to gratify their vanity. In his work the great fault is that he gives relief to his imagination and regards rather the attractiveness than the truth of the narrative, for he takes little pains to investigate the authenticity of the sources on which he founds his statements.



ITALIA, SICILIA. SARDINIA & CORSICA.







Ethel Cole

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